Juan Manuel Pérez Salamero González, Marta Regúlez-Castillo, Carlos Vidal-Meliá
El objetivo de este trabajo es contribuir a aumentar el conocimiento de la Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL) en cuanto a la informacion sobre prestaciones y advertir de posibles errores que se podrian cometer a la hora de realizar cierto tipo de estudios sobre el sistema publico de pensiones. Se analiza el conjunto de datos de prestaciones de la MCVL de 2010 teniendo en cuenta los datos agrupados por tipo de pension, grupos de edad y genero, asi como por cuantia. Despues de realizar las pruebas estadisticas apropiadas sobre el ajuste de la muestra a la poblacion basada en los datos del Informe Estadistico anual del INSS del mismo ano, se concluye que los datos extraidos de la MCVL pueden no ser una fiel replica de la poblacion objeto de estudio, para cierto tipo de investigaciones, debido a su concepcion inicial (Muestra Aleatoria Simple), algunos errores originados en las fuentes administrativas y problemas de reclasificacion. Este resultado advierte de las implicaciones que pudiera tener en aquellos estudios que seleccionaran una submuestra de los datos de la MCVL sobre determinado tipo de prestaciones.
{"title":"Análisis de la representatividad de la MCVL: el caso de las prestaciones del sistema público de pensiones","authors":"Juan Manuel Pérez Salamero González, Marta Regúlez-Castillo, Carlos Vidal-Meliá","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2548631","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2548631","url":null,"abstract":"El objetivo de este trabajo es contribuir a aumentar el conocimiento de la Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL) en cuanto a la informacion sobre prestaciones y advertir de posibles errores que se podrian cometer a la hora de realizar cierto tipo de estudios sobre el sistema publico de pensiones. Se analiza el conjunto de datos de prestaciones de la MCVL de 2010 teniendo en cuenta los datos agrupados por tipo de pension, grupos de edad y genero, asi como por cuantia. Despues de realizar las pruebas estadisticas apropiadas sobre el ajuste de la muestra a la poblacion basada en los datos del Informe Estadistico anual del INSS del mismo ano, se concluye que los datos extraidos de la MCVL pueden no ser una fiel replica de la poblacion objeto de estudio, para cierto tipo de investigaciones, debido a su concepcion inicial (Muestra Aleatoria Simple), algunos errores originados en las fuentes administrativas y problemas de reclasificacion. Este resultado advierte de las implicaciones que pudiera tener en aquellos estudios que seleccionaran una submuestra de los datos de la MCVL sobre determinado tipo de prestaciones.","PeriodicalId":39542,"journal":{"name":"Social Security Bulletin","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76598735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
“Soft paternalism” is in vogue among academics and lawmakers, but too much is being asked of it. This Article studies soft paternalist techniques — including nudging and disclosure — that have been used in the employer-sponsored retirement system. Defined-contribution retirement plans represent an ideal test case for libertarian paternalism: there has been extensive experimentation, and it has often been held up as a success by nudge advocates. In particular, this Article focuses on investment allocation decisions in retirement portfolios, and suggests we should be skeptical of the ability of soft paternalism to improve those decisions. When a domain is rife with conflicts of interest — as in the allocation context — soft-touch strategies fare poorly. Since our tax-incentivized retirement system has paternalistic roots, we should more readily consider direct regulation of investment options available to retirement accounts. The migration of American retirement savings from centralized, risk-pooling structures (Social Security and pensions) towards individual retirement plans (401(k) plans and other tax-favored, individually managed accounts) had collateral consequences. In particular, the responsibility for making complicated financial choices was redistributed to the individual saver — who typically lacks the knowledge and sophistication to make such choices. The result has been that many savers make costly mistakes in investing their portfolios. In response, academics and policymakers, most formally through the Pension Protection Act of 2006, have turned to a variety of typical “soft” remedies, including nudges designed to improve investment decisions by allowing employers to automatically direct employee savings into certain default mutual funds.This Article argues that nudges have failed and will continue to fail in improving the allocation of retirement portfolios, because of problems that are common in many nudge programs. First, nudges rarely consider the ability of third parties to counter-nudge or to weaken nudge outcomes. Conflicts of interest are pervasive in the mutual fund and retirement industry, and those who accept the nudges are being pushed into a category of funds of dubious merit, and which appear to be worsening as institutions seek to exploit the default. Second, nudges are often loosely connected, or not connected at all, to the cognitive problems they seek to remedy. In the retirement allocation context, the nudge acts as a weak mandate for a substantive preference, rather than as a corrective for investors’ cognitive biases. Finally, nudging often asserts autonomy — taking an agent’s preferences seriously — as its central goal. But the claim that the retirement allocation nudges respect savers’ preferences is problematic as a descriptive matter, and illogical as a normative matter in a domain that is already a government-sponsored, tax-advantaged, paternalistic means to encourage retirement savings.
“软家长制”在学者和立法者中很流行，但人们对它的要求太多了。这篇文章研究了软家长式的技巧——包括轻推和披露——已经在雇主赞助的退休制度中使用。固定缴款退休计划代表了自由意志主义家长式作风的理想测试案例:已经进行了广泛的实验，并且经常被推动倡导者视为成功。本文特别关注退休投资组合中的投资分配决策，并建议我们应该对软家长制改善这些决策的能力持怀疑态度。当一个领域充斥着利益冲突时——就像在分配环境中一样——软性策略表现不佳。由于我们的税收激励退休制度有着家长式的根源，我们应该更容易地考虑对退休账户的投资选择进行直接监管。美国退休储蓄从集中的风险分担结构(社会保障和养老金)向个人退休计划(401(k)计划和其他税收优惠的个人管理账户)的转移产生了附带后果。特别是，做出复杂金融选择的责任被重新分配给了个人储蓄者——他们通常缺乏做出此类选择的知识和经验。其结果是，许多储户在投资他们的投资组合时犯下了代价高昂的错误。作为回应，学者和政策制定者(多数是通过2006年《养老金保护法案》(Pension Protection Act of 2006)正式出台)转向了各种典型的“软”补救措施，包括通过允许雇主自动将员工储蓄转入某些默认共同基金，来改善投资决策。本文认为，由于许多推动计划中常见的问题，推动在改善退休投资组合配置方面已经失败，并将继续失败。首先，推动者很少考虑第三方对抗推动或削弱推动结果的能力。在共同基金和退休基金行业，利益冲突无处不在，那些接受这种推动的基金正被推入一个价值可疑的基金类别，随着机构寻求利用违约，这种情况似乎正在恶化。其次，轻推通常与他们寻求补救的认知问题联系不紧密，或者根本没有联系。在退休分配的背景下，推动作用是对实质性偏好的弱授权，而不是对投资者认知偏差的纠正。最后，轻推通常主张自主——认真对待一个主体的偏好——作为其核心目标。但是，退休分配鼓励尊重储户偏好的说法，作为一个描述性问题是有问题的，作为一个规范性问题也是不合逻辑的，因为这个领域已经是一个政府支持的、税收优惠的、家长式的方式来鼓励退休储蓄。
{"title":"The Separation of Intelligence and Control: Retirement Savings and the Limits of Soft Paternalism","authors":"J. Russell","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2404183","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2404183","url":null,"abstract":"“Soft paternalism” is in vogue among academics and lawmakers, but too much is being asked of it. This Article studies soft paternalist techniques — including nudging and disclosure — that have been used in the employer-sponsored retirement system. Defined-contribution retirement plans represent an ideal test case for libertarian paternalism: there has been extensive experimentation, and it has often been held up as a success by nudge advocates. In particular, this Article focuses on investment allocation decisions in retirement portfolios, and suggests we should be skeptical of the ability of soft paternalism to improve those decisions. When a domain is rife with conflicts of interest — as in the allocation context — soft-touch strategies fare poorly. Since our tax-incentivized retirement system has paternalistic roots, we should more readily consider direct regulation of investment options available to retirement accounts. The migration of American retirement savings from centralized, risk-pooling structures (Social Security and pensions) towards individual retirement plans (401(k) plans and other tax-favored, individually managed accounts) had collateral consequences. In particular, the responsibility for making complicated financial choices was redistributed to the individual saver — who typically lacks the knowledge and sophistication to make such choices. The result has been that many savers make costly mistakes in investing their portfolios. In response, academics and policymakers, most formally through the Pension Protection Act of 2006, have turned to a variety of typical “soft” remedies, including nudges designed to improve investment decisions by allowing employers to automatically direct employee savings into certain default mutual funds.This Article argues that nudges have failed and will continue to fail in improving the allocation of retirement portfolios, because of problems that are common in many nudge programs. First, nudges rarely consider the ability of third parties to counter-nudge or to weaken nudge outcomes. Conflicts of interest are pervasive in the mutual fund and retirement industry, and those who accept the nudges are being pushed into a category of funds of dubious merit, and which appear to be worsening as institutions seek to exploit the default. Second, nudges are often loosely connected, or not connected at all, to the cognitive problems they seek to remedy. In the retirement allocation context, the nudge acts as a weak mandate for a substantive preference, rather than as a corrective for investors’ cognitive biases. Finally, nudging often asserts autonomy — taking an agent’s preferences seriously — as its central goal. But the claim that the retirement allocation nudges respect savers’ preferences is problematic as a descriptive matter, and illogical as a normative matter in a domain that is already a government-sponsored, tax-advantaged, paternalistic means to encourage retirement savings.","PeriodicalId":39542,"journal":{"name":"Social Security Bulletin","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87881331","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Personal individual capitalization systems have experienced significant growth in recent decades, following the trend of aging populations and defined benefit pension crisis. This article investigates whether the implementation of funded pension schemes globally has prompted the development of domestic capital markets worldwide, considering 31 pension funds over the period of 1990-2011. The methodological strategy relies upon panel data regressions applied to depth and liquidity indicators of stock and bond markets. The analysis has revealed that individual capitalization pension funds have meant a stimulus to stock market depth. A negative causality with stock market liquidity is also evidenced, which is linked to the long-term profile of pension portfolio management, which privileges funding strategies on trading strategies. Given the structural diversity of pension systems studied, the article uses clustering classification tools for segmenting the population according to the importance of pension funds in the economy. This analysis shows that there are homogeneous groups whose members have similar age of the systems, but not a geographical proximity or type of system structure. It is found that the attribute of belonging to a cluster determines significant impacts of pension systems in relation to indicators of capital market development. Stock markets depth and liquidity indicators receive the positive impacts of greater magnitude from the systems included in the advanced maturation cluster. Pension funds belonging to the low gradual and incipient maturation cluster exert significant impacts on public bond markets depth. These findings are consistent with existing literature and with the investment portfolio, that usually characterizes pension funds in their earlier stages of life.
{"title":"Pension Reforms and Incentives to Domestic Capital Markets: A Global Study","authors":"M. Seijas, J. Brida","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2556835","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2556835","url":null,"abstract":"Personal individual capitalization systems have experienced significant growth in recent decades, following the trend of aging populations and defined benefit pension crisis. This article investigates whether the implementation of funded pension schemes globally has prompted the development of domestic capital markets worldwide, considering 31 pension funds over the period of 1990-2011. The methodological strategy relies upon panel data regressions applied to depth and liquidity indicators of stock and bond markets. The analysis has revealed that individual capitalization pension funds have meant a stimulus to stock market depth. A negative causality with stock market liquidity is also evidenced, which is linked to the long-term profile of pension portfolio management, which privileges funding strategies on trading strategies. Given the structural diversity of pension systems studied, the article uses clustering classification tools for segmenting the population according to the importance of pension funds in the economy. This analysis shows that there are homogeneous groups whose members have similar age of the systems, but not a geographical proximity or type of system structure. It is found that the attribute of belonging to a cluster determines significant impacts of pension systems in relation to indicators of capital market development. Stock markets depth and liquidity indicators receive the positive impacts of greater magnitude from the systems included in the advanced maturation cluster. Pension funds belonging to the low gradual and incipient maturation cluster exert significant impacts on public bond markets depth. These findings are consistent with existing literature and with the investment portfolio, that usually characterizes pension funds in their earlier stages of life.","PeriodicalId":39542,"journal":{"name":"Social Security Bulletin","volume":"44 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75223491","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many state and local governments have responded to challenges facing their pension plans by cutting benefits. Will these cuts make it harder for state and local governments to recruit and retain high-quality workers? To date, the answer has been difficult to obtain; most micro-level datasets contain information on the existence of pensions but not on pension generosity. To get around this constraint, this study uses a unique source, the Public Plans Database, to obtain data on the pension generosity of state and local workers’ pensions. These data are merged with the Current Population Survey to investigate how pension generosity affects the gap between the private sector wage of workers that states and localities recruit from the private sector relative to the workers that they lose to it. The findings suggest relatively generous pensions help reduce this “quality gap,” making it easier for state and local employers to recruit high-earning workers from the private sector and retain those workers. The effect is similar regardless of whether employer or employee contributions finance the benefits. The study suggests states should be cautious as they cut their pension benefits and that a strategy to maintain benefits by shifting some costs onto employees may help maintain states’ ability to recruit and retain high-quality workers.
许多州和地方政府通过削减福利来应对养老金计划面临的挑战。这些削减会使州和地方政府更难招募和留住高素质的工人吗?迄今为止，很难得到答案;大多数微观层面的数据集包含养老金存在的信息，但不包含养老金慷慨程度的信息。为了绕过这一限制，本研究使用了一个独特的来源，即公共计划数据库，来获取有关州和地方工人养老金慷慨程度的数据。这些数据与当前人口调查(Current Population Survey)合并，以调查养老金慷慨程度如何影响各州和地方政府从私营部门招聘的工人的工资与从私营部门流失的工人之间的差距。研究结果表明，相对慷慨的养老金有助于缩小这种“质量差距”，使州和地方雇主更容易从私营部门招聘高收入工人并留住这些工人。无论雇主或雇员是否为福利提供资金，其效果都是相似的。该研究建议，各州在削减养老金福利时应谨慎，通过将部分成本转嫁给雇员来维持福利的策略，可能有助于维持各州招聘和留住高素质工人的能力。
{"title":"Recruiting and Retaining High-Quality State and Local Workers: Do Pensions Matter?","authors":"A. Munnell, J. Aubry, Geoffrey T. Sanzenbacher","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2546047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2546047","url":null,"abstract":"Many state and local governments have responded to challenges facing their pension plans by cutting benefits. Will these cuts make it harder for state and local governments to recruit and retain high-quality workers? To date, the answer has been difficult to obtain; most micro-level datasets contain information on the existence of pensions but not on pension generosity. To get around this constraint, this study uses a unique source, the Public Plans Database, to obtain data on the pension generosity of state and local workers’ pensions. These data are merged with the Current Population Survey to investigate how pension generosity affects the gap between the private sector wage of workers that states and localities recruit from the private sector relative to the workers that they lose to it. The findings suggest relatively generous pensions help reduce this “quality gap,” making it easier for state and local employers to recruit high-earning workers from the private sector and retain those workers. The effect is similar regardless of whether employer or employee contributions finance the benefits. The study suggests states should be cautious as they cut their pension benefits and that a strategy to maintain benefits by shifting some costs onto employees may help maintain states’ ability to recruit and retain high-quality workers.","PeriodicalId":39542,"journal":{"name":"Social Security Bulletin","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82465522","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many job-losers suffer large and persistent losses in earnings capacity. For displaced workers who are age-eligible, one reaction to these losses is to begin claiming Social Security retirement benefits. We use administrative earnings records from the Social Security Administration’s Continuous Work History Sample to study the impacts of labor market shocks among workers in their late 50’s and early 60’s on Social Security retirement benefit claiming rates. We find that labor market shocks lead to current and future increases in the fraction of insured workers who initiate Social Security benefits at the earliest possible claiming age. Moreover, once they initiate benefits, early claimants continue to have low levels of earnings in all subsequent years.
{"title":"Labor Market Shocks and Early Social Security Benefit Claiming","authors":"David Card, Nicole Maestas, P. Purcell","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2609044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2609044","url":null,"abstract":"Many job-losers suffer large and persistent losses in earnings capacity. For displaced workers who are age-eligible, one reaction to these losses is to begin claiming Social Security retirement benefits. We use administrative earnings records from the Social Security Administration’s Continuous Work History Sample to study the impacts of labor market shocks among workers in their late 50’s and early 60’s on Social Security retirement benefit claiming rates. We find that labor market shocks lead to current and future increases in the fraction of insured workers who initiate Social Security benefits at the earliest possible claiming age. Moreover, once they initiate benefits, early claimants continue to have low levels of earnings in all subsequent years.","PeriodicalId":39542,"journal":{"name":"Social Security Bulletin","volume":"70 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81287910","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study the retention effects of the Australian military’s decision to remove a 20-year cliff-vesting requirement from their retirement system in 1991. We follow to the present individuals who self-selected into and out of the 20-year cliff-vesting plan, as well as those who were forced out of the plan. Eliminating the high years of service cliff-vesting provision leads to consistently higher attrition over time.
{"title":"The Retention Effects of High Years of Service Cliff-Vesting Pension Plans","authors":"J. Cunha, A. Menichini, A. Crockett","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2502074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2502074","url":null,"abstract":"We study the retention effects of the Australian military’s decision to remove a 20-year cliff-vesting requirement from their retirement system in 1991. We follow to the present individuals who self-selected into and out of the 20-year cliff-vesting plan, as well as those who were forced out of the plan. Eliminating the high years of service cliff-vesting provision leads to consistently higher attrition over time.","PeriodicalId":39542,"journal":{"name":"Social Security Bulletin","volume":"120 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77967312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we apply the life-cycle framework to study saving accumulation and de-cumulation among ethnic minorities in the UK. Our findings reflect large variations between ethnic groups in terms of socio-economic characteristics and saving accumulation during the working life as well as in retirement, with gender, income and education as the most important factors in determining saving behaviours. The Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups in particular, show greater disadvantage in the workplace, which reflects negatively on their labour income and saving patterns. Although many ethnic minority groups show positive savings at the start of their working lives, the disadvantage experienced in employment has a profound effect on their ability to save for the long-term.
{"title":"Ethnic Minorities Saving in the UK: A Life-Cycle Analysis","authors":"R. Adami, A. Carosi, O. Gough, Anita Sharma","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2637884","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2637884","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we apply the life-cycle framework to study saving accumulation and de-cumulation among ethnic minorities in the UK. Our findings reflect large variations between ethnic groups in terms of socio-economic characteristics and saving accumulation during the working life as well as in retirement, with gender, income and education as the most important factors in determining saving behaviours. The Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups in particular, show greater disadvantage in the workplace, which reflects negatively on their labour income and saving patterns. Although many ethnic minority groups show positive savings at the start of their working lives, the disadvantage experienced in employment has a profound effect on their ability to save for the long-term.","PeriodicalId":39542,"journal":{"name":"Social Security Bulletin","volume":"71 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86414971","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When setting public policies on retirement incomes, governments should focus on objectives they have a unique capacity to influence. Only governments can reliably eliminate poverty in old age, level the tax and regulatory playing fields for financial service providers/savers and gather impeccable, deep data. They can also help citizens to understand the things that really matter to individual saving decisions. Governments should avoid trying to influence or direct private provision for retirement by tax breaks or compulsion (‘hard’ or ‘soft’). That those common interventions seem not to work is only one of their many shortcomings. Then, citizens and employers should make their own decisions about financial provision for retirement.
{"title":"Ageing Populations, Retirement Incomes and Public Policy: What Really Matters","authors":"M. Littlewood","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2452247","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2452247","url":null,"abstract":"When setting public policies on retirement incomes, governments should focus on objectives they have a unique capacity to influence. Only governments can reliably eliminate poverty in old age, level the tax and regulatory playing fields for financial service providers/savers and gather impeccable, deep data. They can also help citizens to understand the things that really matter to individual saving decisions. Governments should avoid trying to influence or direct private provision for retirement by tax breaks or compulsion (‘hard’ or ‘soft’). That those common interventions seem not to work is only one of their many shortcomings. Then, citizens and employers should make their own decisions about financial provision for retirement.","PeriodicalId":39542,"journal":{"name":"Social Security Bulletin","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74226915","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Americans are rapidly losing their pensions — replaced by savings plans disguised as retirement plans. Many sponsors view defined contribution (DC) plans as the best option for retaining some of the features of a pension plan without bearing all of the costs and risks of DB. This paper explores how hybrid plans offer a more flexible approach to retirement plans by bringing together the best features of both DB and DC. This paper explores how: • Hybrid plans offer a flexible third option — taking advantage of the best features of DB and DC plans, including: • A shared-risk approach • Stable cost • Guaranteed lifetime benefits • Professional management • Hybrid plans — and how they balance sponsor and beneficiary responsibilities — differ materially and hence provide flexibility. • A hybrid plan can limit participant biases and may help increase contributions and reduce investment risk. • Hybrid plans use professional management that can look beyond short-term volatility to focus on maximizing return potential (e.g., greater exposure to equities and higher yielding bonds). • Hybrids pool individual participants’ assets, helping counter longevity risk.
{"title":"Hybrid Retirement Plans: Acceptable Compromises and Long-Term Solutions","authors":"Brandes Institute","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2659329","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2659329","url":null,"abstract":"Americans are rapidly losing their pensions — replaced by savings plans disguised as retirement plans. Many sponsors view defined contribution (DC) plans as the best option for retaining some of the features of a pension plan without bearing all of the costs and risks of DB. This paper explores how hybrid plans offer a more flexible approach to retirement plans by bringing together the best features of both DB and DC. This paper explores how: • Hybrid plans offer a flexible third option — taking advantage of the best features of DB and DC plans, including: • A shared-risk approach • Stable cost • Guaranteed lifetime benefits • Professional management • Hybrid plans — and how they balance sponsor and beneficiary responsibilities — differ materially and hence provide flexibility. • A hybrid plan can limit participant biases and may help increase contributions and reduce investment risk. • Hybrid plans use professional management that can look beyond short-term volatility to focus on maximizing return potential (e.g., greater exposure to equities and higher yielding bonds). • Hybrids pool individual participants’ assets, helping counter longevity risk.","PeriodicalId":39542,"journal":{"name":"Social Security Bulletin","volume":"177 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79941683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The policy option of extending mandatory Social Security coverage to newly hired uncovered state and local workers is often included in packages to eliminate the program’s financing shortfall. The arguments for mandatory coverage go beyond financial considerations, though, as extending coverage would bring benefit protections that state and local workers currently lack and would improve equity by more broadly sharing the burden of Social Security’s legacy costs. The main argument against mandatory coverage is that it would raise costs to public employers and workers. The actual cost increase depends on the extent to which employers reduce their existing pensions when adopting Social Security. This paper estimates the costs under four different integration strategies: 1) no adjustment to existing pensions; 2) match the level of the first-year benefit; 3) match the lifetime benefit; and 4) match the benefit to levels in neighboring states with Social Security coverage. This analysis is conducted for 22 state-administered plans in 13 states that were identified as lacking coverage. The results show that the cost of adding Social Security varies significantly, with the smallest increase for the “match lifetime benefit” option and the largest increase for the “no adjustment” option. Presenting the additional costs as a percent of payroll may exaggerate their burden on the employer as the increases will likely be split between employer and employee. Perhaps a better way to gauge the size of the cost increase is as a share of a state’s budget; this measure shows only a very modest impact.
{"title":"The Impact of Mandatory Coverage on State and Local Budgets","authors":"A. Munnell, J. Aubry, Anek Belbase","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2443857","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2443857","url":null,"abstract":"The policy option of extending mandatory Social Security coverage to newly hired uncovered state and local workers is often included in packages to eliminate the program’s financing shortfall. The arguments for mandatory coverage go beyond financial considerations, though, as extending coverage would bring benefit protections that state and local workers currently lack and would improve equity by more broadly sharing the burden of Social Security’s legacy costs. The main argument against mandatory coverage is that it would raise costs to public employers and workers. The actual cost increase depends on the extent to which employers reduce their existing pensions when adopting Social Security. This paper estimates the costs under four different integration strategies: 1) no adjustment to existing pensions; 2) match the level of the first-year benefit; 3) match the lifetime benefit; and 4) match the benefit to levels in neighboring states with Social Security coverage. This analysis is conducted for 22 state-administered plans in 13 states that were identified as lacking coverage. The results show that the cost of adding Social Security varies significantly, with the smallest increase for the “match lifetime benefit” option and the largest increase for the “no adjustment” option. Presenting the additional costs as a percent of payroll may exaggerate their burden on the employer as the increases will likely be split between employer and employee. Perhaps a better way to gauge the size of the cost increase is as a share of a state’s budget; this measure shows only a very modest impact.","PeriodicalId":39542,"journal":{"name":"Social Security Bulletin","volume":"96 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86077273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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