Serbian Abstract: Аутори у раду говоре о систему здравственог, пензионог и социјалног осигурања. Ова три подсистема социјалног осигурања посматрају се кроз важећи законски оквир која чине три закона: закон о здравственом осигурању, закон о доприносима за обавезно социјално осигурање и закон о запошљавању и осигурању за случај незапослености. Ови закони се посматрају са аспекта правила која су тренутно актуелна. Поменути приступ изучавања ових закона се ослања на чињеницу да ови закони представљају важећу регулативу у овој области. Законска регулатива која је на снази у Србији према нашем мишљењу треба да буде подложна променама и усклађивању са важећом законском регулативом која је на снази у земљама ЕУ. Односно треба је мењати и усавршавати. English Abstract: The authors talk about the health, pension and social security. These three sub-systems of social security are seen through the current legal framework, which consists of three laws: the Law on Health Insurance, the Law on Compulsory Social Insurance and the Law on Employment and Unemployment Insurance. These laws are observed in terms of the rules that are currently open. This approach is the study of these laws relies on the fact that these laws are applicable regulations in this area. The legislation in force in Serbia, in our opinion, should be subject to change and adjustment with the current legislation in force in the EU. Or should it be changed and improved.
{"title":"Си�?тем Здрав�?твеног, Пензионог и Инвалид�?ког О�?игурања Пољопривредника У Србији (The Health, Pension and Disability Insurance Farmers in Serbia)","authors":"Zoran Simonović, Janko Todorov","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2435519","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2435519","url":null,"abstract":"Serbian Abstract: Аутори у раду говоре о систему здравственог, пензионог и социјалног осигурања. Ова три подсистема социјалног осигурања посматрају се кроз важећи законски оквир која чине три закона: закон о здравственом осигурању, закон о доприносима за обавезно социјално осигурање и закон о запошљавању и осигурању за случај незапослености. Ови закони се посматрају са аспекта правила која су тренутно актуелна. Поменути приступ изучавања ових закона се ослања на чињеницу да ови закони представљају важећу регулативу у овој области. Законска регулатива која је на снази у Србији према нашем мишљењу треба да буде подложна променама и усклађивању са важећом законском регулативом која је на снази у земљама ЕУ. Односно треба је мењати и усавршавати. English Abstract: The authors talk about the health, pension and social security. These three sub-systems of social security are seen through the current legal framework, which consists of three laws: the Law on Health Insurance, the Law on Compulsory Social Insurance and the Law on Employment and Unemployment Insurance. These laws are observed in terms of the rules that are currently open. This approach is the study of these laws relies on the fact that these laws are applicable regulations in this area. The legislation in force in Serbia, in our opinion, should be subject to change and adjustment with the current legislation in force in the EU. Or should it be changed and improved.","PeriodicalId":39542,"journal":{"name":"Social Security Bulletin","volume":"48 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78169626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper explores the financial sustainability of a typical U.S. state defined-benefit pension fund under the continuation of current policies and under alternative policies, such as alternative contribution, indexation and investment allocation policies. We explore the "classic" asset-liability management (ALM) results, which indicate that a policy of conditional indexation may substantially improve the financial position of the fund. We also investigate the value-based ALM results, which provide a market-based evaluation of the net benefits of the contract to the various stakeholders. All participant cohorts under our simulation horizon derive a substantial net benefit from the pension contract, implying that tax payers make substantial contributions to this pension arrangement. The aforementioned measures can be instrumental in alleviating the burden on the tax payer, though this will happen at the cost of a reduction in the value of the contract to the participants.
{"title":"A Value-Based Approach to Pension Redesign in the US State Plans","authors":"Z. Lekniute, R. Beetsma, Eduard H. M. Ponds","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2574286","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2574286","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the financial sustainability of a typical U.S. state defined-benefit pension fund under the continuation of current policies and under alternative policies, such as alternative contribution, indexation and investment allocation policies. We explore the \"classic\" asset-liability management (ALM) results, which indicate that a policy of conditional indexation may substantially improve the financial position of the fund. We also investigate the value-based ALM results, which provide a market-based evaluation of the net benefits of the contract to the various stakeholders. All participant cohorts under our simulation horizon derive a substantial net benefit from the pension contract, implying that tax payers make substantial contributions to this pension arrangement. The aforementioned measures can be instrumental in alleviating the burden on the tax payer, though this will happen at the cost of a reduction in the value of the contract to the participants.","PeriodicalId":39542,"journal":{"name":"Social Security Bulletin","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78255621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper provides an empirical analysis of what determines access to occupational pensions as perceived by workers. We investigate this issue in Germany, where workers have the legal right to an occupational pension since 2001, but many might lack the incentive or the ability to gather and process the relevant information to make use of their right. In particular, if workers rely exclusively on the information available at their firm, employers will continue to regulate access despite workers’ rights. Our findings suggest that the current regulation in Germany has not resolved the problem of workers’ ignorance of their access to occupational pensions. Only about half the workers are aware of having access to an occupational pension. We find that there is important heterogeneity in workers’ perceptions, and that this heterogeneity is directly related to worker and firm-side factors as well as outcomes of the employer-employee match. Distorted perceptions have important consequences for workers, policy makers and firms. Workers can only make optimal savings decisions if they are aware of their savings possibilities. Policy makers could help by making information material about occupational pensions mandatory and/or by defining standardised information. A low level of knowledge of employees might also be frustrating for employers, as this would suggest that workers do not appreciate their occupational pension, limiting the power of occupational pension as a Human Resources tool.
{"title":"Is it All About Access? Perceived Access to Occupational Pensions in Germany","authors":"Bettina Lamla, M. Coppola","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2366733","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2366733","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides an empirical analysis of what determines access to occupational pensions as perceived by workers. We investigate this issue in Germany, where workers have the legal right to an occupational pension since 2001, but many might lack the incentive or the ability to gather and process the relevant information to make use of their right. In particular, if workers rely exclusively on the information available at their firm, employers will continue to regulate access despite workers’ rights. Our findings suggest that the current regulation in Germany has not resolved the problem of workers’ ignorance of their access to occupational pensions. Only about half the workers are aware of having access to an occupational pension. We find that there is important heterogeneity in workers’ perceptions, and that this heterogeneity is directly related to worker and firm-side factors as well as outcomes of the employer-employee match. Distorted perceptions have important consequences for workers, policy makers and firms. Workers can only make optimal savings decisions if they are aware of their savings possibilities. Policy makers could help by making information material about occupational pensions mandatory and/or by defining standardised information. A low level of knowledge of employees might also be frustrating for employers, as this would suggest that workers do not appreciate their occupational pension, limiting the power of occupational pension as a Human Resources tool.","PeriodicalId":39542,"journal":{"name":"Social Security Bulletin","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89137459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Previous EBRI research reported on a comparative analysis of future benefits from private-sector, voluntary enrollment (VE) 401(k) plans and stylized, final-average-pay defined benefit (DB) plans. This paper expands upon work previously published by computing for a number of simulated employee contingencies (such as job turnover) what level of final-average DB accrual would provide an equal amount of retirement income at age 65 as would be produced if the projected sum of voluntary enrollment 401(k) and IRA rollover balances were annuitized. In so doing, it provides a comparison in median outcomes for a variety of assumptions, both market returns and annuity purchase prices, and should provide a much-needed reference point for policy makers in evaluating these plan designs in view of both current and future workforce trends. Rather than trying to reflect the real-world variation in DB accruals, the baseline analysis used the median accrual rate in the sample (1.5 percent of final compensation per year of participation) as the stylized value for the baseline counterfactual simulations. EBRI’s modeling finds that the median accrual rates (mid-point, half above and half below) that final average DB pensions would need in order to provide retirement income equal to voluntary enrollment 401(k) plans would range from just under 1 percent to 3 percent of final compensation per year of participation, using baseline assumptions. These rates would go down if investment returns fall and annuity prices go up, to between 0.6-1.6 percent per year. The PDF for the above title, published in the December 2013 issue of EBRI Notes, also contains the fulltext of another December 2013 EBRI Notes article abstracted on SSRN: “Views on Employment-Based Health Benefits: Findings from the 2013 Health and Voluntary Workplace Benefits Survey.”
{"title":"How Much Would It Take? Achieving Retirement Income Equivalency Between Final-Average-Pay Defined Benefit Plan Accruals and Automatic Enrollment 401(k) Plans in the Private Sector","authors":"Jack L. VanDerhei","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3342397","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3342397","url":null,"abstract":"Previous EBRI research reported on a comparative analysis of future benefits from private-sector, voluntary enrollment (VE) 401(k) plans and stylized, final-average-pay defined benefit (DB) plans. This paper expands upon work previously published by computing for a number of simulated employee contingencies (such as job turnover) what level of final-average DB accrual would provide an equal amount of retirement income at age 65 as would be produced if the projected sum of voluntary enrollment 401(k) and IRA rollover balances were annuitized. In so doing, it provides a comparison in median outcomes for a variety of assumptions, both market returns and annuity purchase prices, and should provide a much-needed reference point for policy makers in evaluating these plan designs in view of both current and future workforce trends. Rather than trying to reflect the real-world variation in DB accruals, the baseline analysis used the median accrual rate in the sample (1.5 percent of final compensation per year of participation) as the stylized value for the baseline counterfactual simulations. EBRI’s modeling finds that the median accrual rates (mid-point, half above and half below) that final average DB pensions would need in order to provide retirement income equal to voluntary enrollment 401(k) plans would range from just under 1 percent to 3 percent of final compensation per year of participation, using baseline assumptions. These rates would go down if investment returns fall and annuity prices go up, to between 0.6-1.6 percent per year. The PDF for the above title, published in the December 2013 issue of EBRI Notes, also contains the fulltext of another December 2013 EBRI Notes article abstracted on SSRN: “Views on Employment-Based Health Benefits: Findings from the 2013 Health and Voluntary Workplace Benefits Survey.”","PeriodicalId":39542,"journal":{"name":"Social Security Bulletin","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79394812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Purpose - – The purpose of this paper is to present novel empirical findings regarding the shareholder-management agency problem. Design/methodology/approach - – The paper presents new evidence regarding the shareholder-management agency problem. It expands the set of factors that may cause agency problems to include both dollar value of management holdings and its fractional holdings. Findings - – First, the paper finds that this problem is better explained when management fractional holdings and management absolute equity wealth are considered simultaneously than separately. Second, it provides evidence that separation of control and ownership leads management to drive profits artificially upwards by overstating the anticipated long-term rate of return on pension plans (LTROR). The paper's findings point to the LTROR as a promising novel indicator for shareholder-management agency problem. Research limitations/implications - – Samples of 628 US firms during the period 1996-2005. Only 238 firms for pension plans as many firms do not have an internal pension fund. Practical implications - – The paper suggests practical ways to alleviate agency problems. Social implications - – The paper shows the strategic use of a change in the anticipated LTROR on pension plan assets that stems from an agency problem and affects the firm's reported net profits. The paper observes the strategic determination of LTROR in firms in which the pension funds are controlled by management. A possible social implication can be a risk for employees in firms in which the pension funds are controlled by management. Originality/value - – The paper aims to enrich the current literature using a novel indicator of the agency problem: the long-term change in the anticipated LTROR on pension plan assets.
{"title":"Equity Agency Costs in Payouts, Pension Plan Manipulation and Firm Performance","authors":"Rony Moshe Halman","doi":"10.1108/MF-09-2011-0218","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/MF-09-2011-0218","url":null,"abstract":"Purpose - – The purpose of this paper is to present novel empirical findings regarding the shareholder-management agency problem. Design/methodology/approach - – The paper presents new evidence regarding the shareholder-management agency problem. It expands the set of factors that may cause agency problems to include both dollar value of management holdings and its fractional holdings. Findings - – First, the paper finds that this problem is better explained when management fractional holdings and management absolute equity wealth are considered simultaneously than separately. Second, it provides evidence that separation of control and ownership leads management to drive profits artificially upwards by overstating the anticipated long-term rate of return on pension plans (LTROR). The paper's findings point to the LTROR as a promising novel indicator for shareholder-management agency problem. Research limitations/implications - – Samples of 628 US firms during the period 1996-2005. Only 238 firms for pension plans as many firms do not have an internal pension fund. Practical implications - – The paper suggests practical ways to alleviate agency problems. Social implications - – The paper shows the strategic use of a change in the anticipated LTROR on pension plan assets that stems from an agency problem and affects the firm's reported net profits. The paper observes the strategic determination of LTROR in firms in which the pension funds are controlled by management. A possible social implication can be a risk for employees in firms in which the pension funds are controlled by management. Originality/value - – The paper aims to enrich the current literature using a novel indicator of the agency problem: the long-term change in the anticipated LTROR on pension plan assets.","PeriodicalId":39542,"journal":{"name":"Social Security Bulletin","volume":"61 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84564220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Effective from 2014, new pension scheme will be introduced in Armenia which will affect those under age of 40. The new scheme assumes that each individual will contribute some amount from his/her salary which will be invested and distributed back after retirement. The paper analyses the impact of the new scheme in two directions. First, it tries to uncover the pass-through of the scheme’s impact on macroeconomic variables and particularly on market interest rates. Using vector error correction models (VEC) and informed decision making, we have found that it has downward impact on interest rates of local deposits and treasuries. Using the forecast path of interest rates and portfolio composition, Monte Carlo simulation technique has enabled us to obtain the possible paths of pension wealth portfolio of the average wage individual who will retire on 2038 (first retirees under the system). The pension portfolio value as of December 2037 was used to calculate the annuity payment amount for the retirement period.
{"title":"Mandatory Pension Scheme in Armenia: Impact Assessment","authors":"Arsen S. Grigoryan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2481921","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2481921","url":null,"abstract":"Effective from 2014, new pension scheme will be introduced in Armenia which will affect those under age of 40. The new scheme assumes that each individual will contribute some amount from his/her salary which will be invested and distributed back after retirement. The paper analyses the impact of the new scheme in two directions. First, it tries to uncover the pass-through of the scheme’s impact on macroeconomic variables and particularly on market interest rates. Using vector error correction models (VEC) and informed decision making, we have found that it has downward impact on interest rates of local deposits and treasuries. Using the forecast path of interest rates and portfolio composition, Monte Carlo simulation technique has enabled us to obtain the possible paths of pension wealth portfolio of the average wage individual who will retire on 2038 (first retirees under the system). The pension portfolio value as of December 2037 was used to calculate the annuity payment amount for the retirement period.","PeriodicalId":39542,"journal":{"name":"Social Security Bulletin","volume":"58 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90985831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The sustainable development of any modern society in many respects depends on conditions such as economic opportunities and welfare system. Lower expected economic growth, coupled with large public spending and obligations are bringing significant challenges for emerging and developed countries to manage their public finances, with latter stuck in the uncertain austerity trap. Commodity and export depended nature of the national account balances in developing countries, makes managing public finances even more difficult, as the demand for those mainly comes from developed countries, which are now facing anemic growth levels. Pension reforms and economic growth issues have inverse relationship and at the same time interdependent. When economic growth is sustainable and predictable, pension reforms do not pose immediate concern. But low prospects of economic growth increase the burden on business and state to look for the coffers to fill the contribution gap. Although many countries claim their pension systems to be fair and efficient it really takes several decades to see it. This paper which was based on the research sheds some light to the process, issues and the complexity of pension reform in the relatively young and upcoming emerging economy as Kazakhstan, and could be a good case for other countries to learn and make proper conclusions.
{"title":"On the Issues of Reforming Pension System in Emerging Economies: Case on the Republic of Kazakhstan","authors":"Golib Kholjigitov, Aigerim Umbetbayeva","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2307927","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2307927","url":null,"abstract":"The sustainable development of any modern society in many respects depends on conditions such as economic opportunities and welfare system. Lower expected economic growth, coupled with large public spending and obligations are bringing significant challenges for emerging and developed countries to manage their public finances, with latter stuck in the uncertain austerity trap. Commodity and export depended nature of the national account balances in developing countries, makes managing public finances even more difficult, as the demand for those mainly comes from developed countries, which are now facing anemic growth levels. Pension reforms and economic growth issues have inverse relationship and at the same time interdependent. When economic growth is sustainable and predictable, pension reforms do not pose immediate concern. But low prospects of economic growth increase the burden on business and state to look for the coffers to fill the contribution gap. Although many countries claim their pension systems to be fair and efficient it really takes several decades to see it. This paper which was based on the research sheds some light to the process, issues and the complexity of pension reform in the relatively young and upcoming emerging economy as Kazakhstan, and could be a good case for other countries to learn and make proper conclusions.","PeriodicalId":39542,"journal":{"name":"Social Security Bulletin","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74226436","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The effect of accepting more immigrants on welfare in the presence of a pay-as-you-go social security system is analyzed qualitatively and quantitatively. First, it is shown that if initially there exist intergenerational government transfers from the young to the old, the government can lead an economy to the (modified) golden rule level within a finite time in a Pareto-improving way by increasing the percentage of immigrants to natives (PITN). Second, using the computational overlapping generation model, the welfare gain is calculated of increasing the PITN from 15.5 percent to 25.5 percent and years needed to reach the (modified) golden rule level in a Pareto-improving way in a model economy. The simulation shows that the present value of the welfare gain of increasing the PITN comprises 23 percent of the initial GDP. It takes 112 years for the model economy to reach the golden rule level in a Pareto-improving way.
{"title":"Pareto-Improving Immigration and Its Effect on Capital Accumulation in the Presence of Social Security","authors":"Hisahiro Naito","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2332605","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2332605","url":null,"abstract":"The effect of accepting more immigrants on welfare in the presence of a pay-as-you-go social security system is analyzed qualitatively and quantitatively. First, it is shown that if initially there exist intergenerational government transfers from the young to the old, the government can lead an economy to the (modified) golden rule level within a finite time in a Pareto-improving way by increasing the percentage of immigrants to natives (PITN). Second, using the computational overlapping generation model, the welfare gain is calculated of increasing the PITN from 15.5 percent to 25.5 percent and years needed to reach the (modified) golden rule level in a Pareto-improving way in a model economy. The simulation shows that the present value of the welfare gain of increasing the PITN comprises 23 percent of the initial GDP. It takes 112 years for the model economy to reach the golden rule level in a Pareto-improving way.","PeriodicalId":39542,"journal":{"name":"Social Security Bulletin","volume":"101 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79336498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How can public pension systems be reformed to ensure fiscal stability in the face of increasing life expectancy? To address this question, we use micro data to estimate a structural life-cycle model of individuals’ employment, retirement and consumption decisions. We calculate that, in the case of Germany, an increase of 3.76 years in the pension age thresholds or a cut of 26.8% in the per-year value of public pension benefits would offset the fiscal consequences of the increase in life expectancy anticipated to occur over the next 40 years. On average, individuals value the increase in the pension age thresholds at 3.44% of baseline consumption, and are willing to forgo 8.51% of baseline consumption to avoid the cut in per-year pension value. The increase in the pension age thresholds makes 87.7% of individuals better-off, and generates large responses in labor supply and retirement behavior. However, the favorable effects of this reform depend on the availability of jobs for older individuals.
{"title":"Longevity, Life-Cycle Behavior and Pension Reform","authors":"P. Haan, Victoria Prowse","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1916585","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1916585","url":null,"abstract":"How can public pension systems be reformed to ensure fiscal stability in the face of increasing life expectancy? To address this question, we use micro data to estimate a structural life-cycle model of individuals’ employment, retirement and consumption decisions. We calculate that, in the case of Germany, an increase of 3.76 years in the pension age thresholds or a cut of 26.8% in the per-year value of public pension benefits would offset the fiscal consequences of the increase in life expectancy anticipated to occur over the next 40 years. On average, individuals value the increase in the pension age thresholds at 3.44% of baseline consumption, and are willing to forgo 8.51% of baseline consumption to avoid the cut in per-year pension value. The increase in the pension age thresholds makes 87.7% of individuals better-off, and generates large responses in labor supply and retirement behavior. However, the favorable effects of this reform depend on the availability of jobs for older individuals.","PeriodicalId":39542,"journal":{"name":"Social Security Bulletin","volume":"235 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89036184","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In June 2011 the International Labour Conference (ILC) adopted a Resolution and Conclusions setting out the Organization's new social security strategy, which aims at supporting Members in building and maintaining comprehensive social security systems on the basis of a two-dimensional approach: (1) (“horizontal” dimension) establishing – as a priority – nationally-defined sets of basic social security guarantees to provide a floor of protection to all in need as soon as possible; (2) (“vertical” dimension) extending the scope and levels of social security coverage as guided by Convention No. 102 (1952) and other existing social security standards to as many people as possible and as soon as possible. In June 2012, the ILC completed this strategy with a new international labour standard: Recommendation concerning national floors of social protection, 2012 (No. 202). The Recommendation is deemed a breakthrough in global social policy, whereby the establishing of national social protection floors may close prevailing gaps in social security coverage and help countries to effectively address poverty and vulnerability. This special double issue offers analysis of the process that culminated in the Recommendation's adoption and addresses practical fiscal, legal, political and institutional challenges that must be addressed if the Recommendation's goals are to be successfully implemented.
{"title":"The Role of National Social Protection Floors in Extending Social Security to All","authors":"Krzysztof Hagemejer, Roddy Mckinnon","doi":"10.1111/issr.12016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/issr.12016","url":null,"abstract":"In June 2011 the International Labour Conference (ILC) adopted a Resolution and Conclusions setting out the Organization's new social security strategy, which aims at supporting Members in building and maintaining comprehensive social security systems on the basis of a two-dimensional approach: (1) (“horizontal” dimension) establishing – as a priority – nationally-defined sets of basic social security guarantees to provide a floor of protection to all in need as soon as possible; (2) (“vertical” dimension) extending the scope and levels of social security coverage as guided by Convention No. 102 (1952) and other existing social security standards to as many people as possible and as soon as possible. In June 2012, the ILC completed this strategy with a new international labour standard: Recommendation concerning national floors of social protection, 2012 (No. 202). The Recommendation is deemed a breakthrough in global social policy, whereby the establishing of national social protection floors may close prevailing gaps in social security coverage and help countries to effectively address poverty and vulnerability. This special double issue offers analysis of the process that culminated in the Recommendation's adoption and addresses practical fiscal, legal, political and institutional challenges that must be addressed if the Recommendation's goals are to be successfully implemented.","PeriodicalId":39542,"journal":{"name":"Social Security Bulletin","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78936460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}