Abstract Law and economics scholarship suggests that, in appropriate cases, the law can improve people’s behavior by changing their preferences. For example, the law can curb discriminatory hiring practices by providing employers with information that might change their discriminatory preference. Supposedly, if employers no longer prefer one class of employees to another, they will simply stop discriminating, with no need for further legal intervention. The current Article aims to add some depth to this familiar analysis by introducing the insights of behavioral ethics into the law and economics literature on preference change. Behavioral ethics research shows that wrongdoing often originates from semi-deliberative or non-deliberative cognitive processes. These findings suggest that the process of preference change through the use of the law is markedly more complicated and nuanced than previously appreciated. For instance, even if an employer’s explicit discriminatory stance is changed, and the employer no longer consciously prefers one class of employees over another, discriminatory behavior might persist if it originates from semi-conscious, habitual, or non-deliberative decision-making mechanisms. Therefore, actual change in behavior might necessitate a close engagement with people’s level of moral awareness. We discuss the institutional and normative implications of these insights and evaluate their significance for the attempt to improve preferences through the different functions of the legal system.
{"title":"Preference Change and Behavioral Ethics: Can States Create Ethical People?","authors":"Y. Feldman, Yotam Kaplan","doi":"10.1515/til-2021-0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/til-2021-0018","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Law and economics scholarship suggests that, in appropriate cases, the law can improve people’s behavior by changing their preferences. For example, the law can curb discriminatory hiring practices by providing employers with information that might change their discriminatory preference. Supposedly, if employers no longer prefer one class of employees to another, they will simply stop discriminating, with no need for further legal intervention. The current Article aims to add some depth to this familiar analysis by introducing the insights of behavioral ethics into the law and economics literature on preference change. Behavioral ethics research shows that wrongdoing often originates from semi-deliberative or non-deliberative cognitive processes. These findings suggest that the process of preference change through the use of the law is markedly more complicated and nuanced than previously appreciated. For instance, even if an employer’s explicit discriminatory stance is changed, and the employer no longer consciously prefers one class of employees over another, discriminatory behavior might persist if it originates from semi-conscious, habitual, or non-deliberative decision-making mechanisms. Therefore, actual change in behavior might necessitate a close engagement with people’s level of moral awareness. We discuss the institutional and normative implications of these insights and evaluate their significance for the attempt to improve preferences through the different functions of the legal system.","PeriodicalId":39577,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Inquiries in Law","volume":"3 1","pages":"85 - 110"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88295718","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract “I would prefer not” HERMAN MELVILLE, BARTLEBY THE SCRIVENER: A STORY OF WALL STREET (1853), reprinted in THE PIAZZA TALES 32, 48 (London, Sampson Low, Son & Co. 1856). Scholars have recently challenged the claim in classical deterrence theory that law influences behavior only through the expected sanction imposed. Some go further and argue that law may also “shape preferences,” changing people’s wants and values. In this Article, we analyze existing claims that criminal and civil law alter preferences and conclude that none suggest that the law shapes preferences. We first clarify this preference-shaping claim by elaborating the structure of rational choice theory generally and “preference” in particular. We then investigate three mechanisms of legal influence suggested by the preference-shaping literature: (1) the “serious harm” mechanism; (2) the “social norm” mechanism; and (3) the “self-improvement” mechanism. We then show that each of these mechanisms operates by changing the agent’s beliefs about the attributes or consequences of her choice options rather than by changing her preferences.
{"title":"Does the Law Change Preferences?","authors":"Jennifer H. Arlen, L. Kornhauser","doi":"10.1515/til-2021-0021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/til-2021-0021","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract “I would prefer not” HERMAN MELVILLE, BARTLEBY THE SCRIVENER: A STORY OF WALL STREET (1853), reprinted in THE PIAZZA TALES 32, 48 (London, Sampson Low, Son & Co. 1856). Scholars have recently challenged the claim in classical deterrence theory that law influences behavior only through the expected sanction imposed. Some go further and argue that law may also “shape preferences,” changing people’s wants and values. In this Article, we analyze existing claims that criminal and civil law alter preferences and conclude that none suggest that the law shapes preferences. We first clarify this preference-shaping claim by elaborating the structure of rational choice theory generally and “preference” in particular. We then investigate three mechanisms of legal influence suggested by the preference-shaping literature: (1) the “serious harm” mechanism; (2) the “social norm” mechanism; and (3) the “self-improvement” mechanism. We then show that each of these mechanisms operates by changing the agent’s beliefs about the attributes or consequences of her choice options rather than by changing her preferences.","PeriodicalId":39577,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Inquiries in Law","volume":"101 1","pages":"175 - 213"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72908174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Upon Brexit, the United Kingdom chose to follow the path of EU data protection and remain tied to the requirements of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). It even enacted the GDPR into its domestic law. This Article evaluates five models relating to preference change, demonstrating how they identify different dimensions of Brexit while providing a rich explanation of why a legal system may or may not reject an established transnational legal order. While market forces and a “Brussels Effect” played the most significant role in the decision of the UK government to accept the GDPR, important nonmarket factors were also present in this choice. This Article’s models of preference change are also useful in thinking about the likely extent of the UK’s future divergence from EU data protection.
{"title":"The Data Privacy Law of Brexit: Theories of Preference Change","authors":"P. Schwartz","doi":"10.1515/til-2021-0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/til-2021-0019","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Upon Brexit, the United Kingdom chose to follow the path of EU data protection and remain tied to the requirements of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). It even enacted the GDPR into its domestic law. This Article evaluates five models relating to preference change, demonstrating how they identify different dimensions of Brexit while providing a rich explanation of why a legal system may or may not reject an established transnational legal order. While market forces and a “Brussels Effect” played the most significant role in the decision of the UK government to accept the GDPR, important nonmarket factors were also present in this choice. This Article’s models of preference change are also useful in thinking about the likely extent of the UK’s future divergence from EU data protection.","PeriodicalId":39577,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Inquiries in Law","volume":"8 1","pages":"111 - 152"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74470120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Elite U.S.-based global law firms (“Biglaw” firms) concentrate in the costliest districts of superstar cities, especially two neighborhoods in Manhattan. This pattern has persisted despite both the dispersal of Biglaw clients across less-dense, lower-cost U.S. geographies and the development of telework capacity. It suggests a puzzle: law is among the occupations most conducive to remote work, yet Biglaw prior to the coronavirus pandemic required in-person work in the priciest places—meaning it paid (and continues to pay) a premium on both of its biggest expenses, wages and real estate. How might this equilibrium be explained, and what might lead it to change? This Article contends that Biglaw clustering reflects a management preference for the exploitation of proven strategies over the exploration of novel and uncertain ones—but that the pandemic telework experience is eroding this dichotomy. This analysis has direct implications for private international law (“PIL”) practice, where large-scale transactions and disputes are handled by Biglaw firms and involve significant international travel. This Article contributes to a growing literature on telework’s impacts on cities, labor markets, and industries, and is the first to extend that focus to Biglaw and PIL. A post-pandemic Biglaw embrace of dispersal via telework would destabilize standard accounts of collaboration in agglomeration economies. While the Article expresses skepticism about that outcome, it identifies a mechanism by which it might plausibly come about. Crucially, this mechanism—the replacement of an exploit vs. explore choice with two different exploit options—posits as the key driver not technology but management learning and innovation that quickened during the pandemic.
{"title":"The puzzle and persistence of biglaw clustering","authors":"Gregory H. Shill","doi":"10.1515/til-2022-0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/til-2022-0008","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Elite U.S.-based global law firms (“Biglaw” firms) concentrate in the costliest districts of superstar cities, especially two neighborhoods in Manhattan. This pattern has persisted despite both the dispersal of Biglaw clients across less-dense, lower-cost U.S. geographies and the development of telework capacity. It suggests a puzzle: law is among the occupations most conducive to remote work, yet Biglaw prior to the coronavirus pandemic required in-person work in the priciest places—meaning it paid (and continues to pay) a premium on both of its biggest expenses, wages and real estate. How might this equilibrium be explained, and what might lead it to change? This Article contends that Biglaw clustering reflects a management preference for the exploitation of proven strategies over the exploration of novel and uncertain ones—but that the pandemic telework experience is eroding this dichotomy. This analysis has direct implications for private international law (“PIL”) practice, where large-scale transactions and disputes are handled by Biglaw firms and involve significant international travel. This Article contributes to a growing literature on telework’s impacts on cities, labor markets, and industries, and is the first to extend that focus to Biglaw and PIL. A post-pandemic Biglaw embrace of dispersal via telework would destabilize standard accounts of collaboration in agglomeration economies. While the Article expresses skepticism about that outcome, it identifies a mechanism by which it might plausibly come about. Crucially, this mechanism—the replacement of an exploit vs. explore choice with two different exploit options—posits as the key driver not technology but management learning and innovation that quickened during the pandemic.","PeriodicalId":39577,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Inquiries in Law","volume":"6 1","pages":"191 - 218"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87209867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Criminal law conceptualizes guilt and the finding of guilt as purely categorical phenomena. At the end of trial, the defendant is pronounced either “guilty” or “not guilty” of the charges made against her, excluding the possibility of judgment of degree. Judges or juries cannot calibrate findings of guilt to various degrees of epistemic certainty by pronouncing the defendant “probably guilty,” “most certainly guilty,” or “guilty by preponderance of the evidence.” Nor can decision makers qualify the verdict to reflect normative or legal ambiguities. Findings of guilt are construed as asserting factual and legal truths. The penal results of conviction assume similar “all or nothing” properties: punishment can be calibrated, but not with the established probability of guilt. The prevailing decision-making model, with its ‘on-off’ formulation of guilt, is so broadly established that it is considered an axiom— but there is nothing natural or pre-political about it, nor about the derivative distribution of punishment. This Article attempts to expose the hidden potential rooted in the construal of criminal verdicts as judgments of degree, by drawing three hypothetical manifestations of a linear conceptualization of conviction and punishment in the criminal trial and plea-bargaining arena. It also offers a normative assessment of converting criminal verdicts from categorical decisions to continuities.
{"title":"Half the Guilt","authors":"Talia Fisher","doi":"10.1515/til-2021-0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/til-2021-0005","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Criminal law conceptualizes guilt and the finding of guilt as purely categorical phenomena. At the end of trial, the defendant is pronounced either “guilty” or “not guilty” of the charges made against her, excluding the possibility of judgment of degree. Judges or juries cannot calibrate findings of guilt to various degrees of epistemic certainty by pronouncing the defendant “probably guilty,” “most certainly guilty,” or “guilty by preponderance of the evidence.” Nor can decision makers qualify the verdict to reflect normative or legal ambiguities. Findings of guilt are construed as asserting factual and legal truths. The penal results of conviction assume similar “all or nothing” properties: punishment can be calibrated, but not with the established probability of guilt. The prevailing decision-making model, with its ‘on-off’ formulation of guilt, is so broadly established that it is considered an axiom— but there is nothing natural or pre-political about it, nor about the derivative distribution of punishment. This Article attempts to expose the hidden potential rooted in the construal of criminal verdicts as judgments of degree, by drawing three hypothetical manifestations of a linear conceptualization of conviction and punishment in the criminal trial and plea-bargaining arena. It also offers a normative assessment of converting criminal verdicts from categorical decisions to continuities.","PeriodicalId":39577,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Inquiries in Law","volume":"13 1","pages":"87 - 109"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87511008","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Judges and juries often make factual decisions even if the facts are disputed and there is no clear-cut evidence available. Despite this common state of uncertainty, verdicts are thought of as having clear winners and losers––either the plaintiff wins and receives a full remedy, or the defendant wins and the plaintiff gets nothing. In private disputes, factfinders base their binary factual determinations on the preponderance of the evidence. There are, however, several doctrines that allow for partial remedy, discounted by the probability that the facts support the plaintiff’s case, given the available evidence (proportional liability). This Article offers a general theory for proportional liability in private law. It identifies three types of factual uncertainty—mutual uncertainty, unilateral uncertainty, and institutional uncertainty—and shows that legal economists should support proportional liability when the state of uncertainty is shared by the parties and the court (mutual uncertainty), and they should adopt an all-or-nothing rule whenever the information is observable but unverifiable (institutional uncertainty). In cases where one party holds private information (unilateral uncertainty), proportional liability is sometimes, but not always, superior to an all-or-nothing rule.
{"title":"All-or-Nothing, or Something – Proportional Liability in Private Law","authors":"Omer Pelled","doi":"10.1515/til-2021-0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/til-2021-0008","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Judges and juries often make factual decisions even if the facts are disputed and there is no clear-cut evidence available. Despite this common state of uncertainty, verdicts are thought of as having clear winners and losers––either the plaintiff wins and receives a full remedy, or the defendant wins and the plaintiff gets nothing. In private disputes, factfinders base their binary factual determinations on the preponderance of the evidence. There are, however, several doctrines that allow for partial remedy, discounted by the probability that the facts support the plaintiff’s case, given the available evidence (proportional liability). This Article offers a general theory for proportional liability in private law. It identifies three types of factual uncertainty—mutual uncertainty, unilateral uncertainty, and institutional uncertainty—and shows that legal economists should support proportional liability when the state of uncertainty is shared by the parties and the court (mutual uncertainty), and they should adopt an all-or-nothing rule whenever the information is observable but unverifiable (institutional uncertainty). In cases where one party holds private information (unilateral uncertainty), proportional liability is sometimes, but not always, superior to an all-or-nothing rule.","PeriodicalId":39577,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Inquiries in Law","volume":"20 1","pages":"159 - 199"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79300776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The law values fairness, proportionality, and predictability. Accordingly, in the context of criminal law, punishments should be carefully calibrated to reflect the harm caused by an offense and the culpability of the offender. Yet, while this would suggest the dominance of “smooth” input/output relationships—for example, such that a minuscule increase in culpability would result in a correspondingly small increase in punishment—in fact, the law is laden with “bumpy” input/output relationships. Indeed, a minuscule change in input (be it of harm, culpability, or any number of other measures) may result in a drastic change in output, creating significant discontinuities. Leading scholars have argued that smooth input/output relationships, which feature careful gradation and calibration, better accord with dominant theories of punishment than do bumpy relationships, which lack fine-tuning. Accepting as a starting premise that smooth input/ output relationships are to be preferred in the criminal law, this Article focuses on the significant doctrinal and practical impediments to smoothing out these relationships. This analysis reveals challenges to smoothing out relationships between inputs and outputs, as well as the difficulties associated with addressing discontinuous relationships among inputs and outputs. Specifically, it exposes the law’s classification of inputs and outputs itself as contestable and responsible for a range of hard-to-resolve discontinuities. In doing so, this Article begins the task of laying the groundwork for further analysis and possible reforms.
{"title":"Discontinuities in Criminal Law","authors":"Avlana K. Eisenberg","doi":"10.1515/til-2021-0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/til-2021-0007","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The law values fairness, proportionality, and predictability. Accordingly, in the context of criminal law, punishments should be carefully calibrated to reflect the harm caused by an offense and the culpability of the offender. Yet, while this would suggest the dominance of “smooth” input/output relationships—for example, such that a minuscule increase in culpability would result in a correspondingly small increase in punishment—in fact, the law is laden with “bumpy” input/output relationships. Indeed, a minuscule change in input (be it of harm, culpability, or any number of other measures) may result in a drastic change in output, creating significant discontinuities. Leading scholars have argued that smooth input/output relationships, which feature careful gradation and calibration, better accord with dominant theories of punishment than do bumpy relationships, which lack fine-tuning. Accepting as a starting premise that smooth input/ output relationships are to be preferred in the criminal law, this Article focuses on the significant doctrinal and practical impediments to smoothing out these relationships. This analysis reveals challenges to smoothing out relationships between inputs and outputs, as well as the difficulties associated with addressing discontinuous relationships among inputs and outputs. Specifically, it exposes the law’s classification of inputs and outputs itself as contestable and responsible for a range of hard-to-resolve discontinuities. In doing so, this Article begins the task of laying the groundwork for further analysis and possible reforms.","PeriodicalId":39577,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Inquiries in Law","volume":"45 1","pages":"137 - 157"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75725521","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This Article explores the costs and benefits of one subset of continuous and discontinuous rules. These expressions are shown to be distinct from the familiar dichotomy expressed as standards versus rules, but they share the difficulty of dividing the world of law in two. Still, regulatory approaches that focus on discontinuities can often be made more continuous, and vice versa. A speed limit is discontinuous in the sense that one drives above or below (or within) the announced limit. But it is often made more continuous—even with more discontinuities— as when the stated limit is different for various kinds of vehicles. This Article works around these definitional problems to show that law often discourages useful disclosures by encouraging parties with information to offer continuous information in order to avoid after-the-fact lawsuits when specific disclosures prove to have inaccuracies. For example, it is common to hear or be warned that a medical procedure poses the risk of death, when a better-informed doctor or hospital could have given the precise percentages attached to various outcomes. Similarly, a corporation is on safe ground when it follows “generally accepted accounting principles,” when investors would have learned more from information about good and bad outcomes put in probabilistic terms. The Article works toward the suggestion that law might create a safe harbor in which probabilistic disclosures are protected when they are, or are certified to be, more useful than the ready alternative of fairly general disclosures.
{"title":"Probabilistic Disclosures for Corporate and other Law","authors":"Saul Levmore","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3442607","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3442607","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This Article explores the costs and benefits of one subset of continuous and discontinuous rules. These expressions are shown to be distinct from the familiar dichotomy expressed as standards versus rules, but they share the difficulty of dividing the world of law in two. Still, regulatory approaches that focus on discontinuities can often be made more continuous, and vice versa. A speed limit is discontinuous in the sense that one drives above or below (or within) the announced limit. But it is often made more continuous—even with more discontinuities— as when the stated limit is different for various kinds of vehicles. This Article works around these definitional problems to show that law often discourages useful disclosures by encouraging parties with information to offer continuous information in order to avoid after-the-fact lawsuits when specific disclosures prove to have inaccuracies. For example, it is common to hear or be warned that a medical procedure poses the risk of death, when a better-informed doctor or hospital could have given the precise percentages attached to various outcomes. Similarly, a corporation is on safe ground when it follows “generally accepted accounting principles,” when investors would have learned more from information about good and bad outcomes put in probabilistic terms. The Article works toward the suggestion that law might create a safe harbor in which probabilistic disclosures are protected when they are, or are certified to be, more useful than the ready alternative of fairly general disclosures.","PeriodicalId":39577,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Inquiries in Law","volume":"18 1","pages":"263 - 284"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75794819","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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