{"title":"Security Law and Policy","authors":"C. Taylor","doi":"10.4324/9781351243094-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351243094-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39833,"journal":{"name":"Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78139673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, Vol. 27, No. 3, p. 797, 2018In recent years, there has been no shortage of scandals involving fraudulent, predatory, and otherwise ethically unacceptable behavior on the part of large U.S. and non-U.S. financial institutions. Reverse redlining and targeting of racial minorities and other vulnerable segments of the population for subprime mortgages, collusive price-fixing in the world’s most important interbank lending and trading markets, and fraudulent creation of client accounts by bank employees pressured to generate fees for the bank are only some of the recent examples of such blatantly unethical behavior. Much of this behavior was also directly implicated in the generation of unsustainable levels of risk in the financial system, which led to the global financial crisis of 2008-2009.Not surprisingly, industry regulators and scholars of financial markets have been increasingly vocal in their criticisms of the financial industry’s systematic failure to maintain high ethical standards of business conduct. Much of the regulators’ and academics’ attention in this area is focused on individual financial institutions’ apparent inability to foster a strong internal culture of pursuing market objectives through ethical and socially responsible means. Accordingly, the potential remedy for this problem is often seen as a matter of improving the firms’ culture of risk-taking, so that they develop a genuine commitment to seek private gains without creating systemically destabilizing risks or otherwise endangering the well-being of their clients, creditors, and the rest of the society. In effect, this recent “ethics turn” in financial regulation recasts firms’ “risk culture” as a crucial determinant of success, or failure, of the post-crisis search for systemic financial stability.This Article analyzes the principal themes in the newly reinvigorated public debate on the role of ethical norms and cultural factors in financial markets and identifies its key conceptual and normative limitations. It argues that the principal flaw in that debate is that it tends to ignore the critical role of systemic, structural factors in shaping individual firms’ internal cultural norms and attitudes toward legitimate business conduct. Reversing the causality assumption underlying the current academic and policy discourse on institutional culture, the Article discusses how broader reform measures seeking to alter the fundamental structure and dynamics of the financial market--on a macro- rather than micro-level--would profoundly, and far more effectively, alter individuals’ and firms’ normative choices and attitudes. The key to making finance ethically sound, therefore, is to make it structurally sound – and to do so on a systemic level.
{"title":"ETHICAL FINANCE AS A SYSTEMIC CHALLENGE: RISK, CULTURE, AND STRUCTURE","authors":"S. Omarova","doi":"10.31228/osf.io/h6tx7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31228/osf.io/h6tx7","url":null,"abstract":"Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, Vol. 27, No. 3, p. 797, 2018In recent years, there has been no shortage of scandals involving fraudulent, predatory, and otherwise ethically unacceptable behavior on the part of large U.S. and non-U.S. financial institutions. Reverse redlining and targeting of racial minorities and other vulnerable segments of the population for subprime mortgages, collusive price-fixing in the world’s most important interbank lending and trading markets, and fraudulent creation of client accounts by bank employees pressured to generate fees for the bank are only some of the recent examples of such blatantly unethical behavior. Much of this behavior was also directly implicated in the generation of unsustainable levels of risk in the financial system, which led to the global financial crisis of 2008-2009.Not surprisingly, industry regulators and scholars of financial markets have been increasingly vocal in their criticisms of the financial industry’s systematic failure to maintain high ethical standards of business conduct. Much of the regulators’ and academics’ attention in this area is focused on individual financial institutions’ apparent inability to foster a strong internal culture of pursuing market objectives through ethical and socially responsible means. Accordingly, the potential remedy for this problem is often seen as a matter of improving the firms’ culture of risk-taking, so that they develop a genuine commitment to seek private gains without creating systemically destabilizing risks or otherwise endangering the well-being of their clients, creditors, and the rest of the society. In effect, this recent “ethics turn” in financial regulation recasts firms’ “risk culture” as a crucial determinant of success, or failure, of the post-crisis search for systemic financial stability.This Article analyzes the principal themes in the newly reinvigorated public debate on the role of ethical norms and cultural factors in financial markets and identifies its key conceptual and normative limitations. It argues that the principal flaw in that debate is that it tends to ignore the critical role of systemic, structural factors in shaping individual firms’ internal cultural norms and attitudes toward legitimate business conduct. Reversing the causality assumption underlying the current academic and policy discourse on institutional culture, the Article discusses how broader reform measures seeking to alter the fundamental structure and dynamics of the financial market--on a macro- rather than micro-level--would profoundly, and far more effectively, alter individuals’ and firms’ normative choices and attitudes. The key to making finance ethically sound, therefore, is to make it structurally sound – and to do so on a systemic level.","PeriodicalId":39833,"journal":{"name":"Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy","volume":"27 1","pages":"797-839"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42677121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This essay first examines various conceptions of promissory obligation, which suggest a range of possible benefits associated with promising. Theories of temporally extended practical rationality suggest that to obtain benefits of this kind, it may be rational for a promisor to treat his or her promise as binding. The difficulty is that, whatever practical and normative benefits binding promises may have, it will not always be epistemically rational for the promisor to perform. Thus, to the extent that markets rely on binding promises, they rely on an element of irrationality in human decision-making.
{"title":"The Rationality of Promising","authors":"Emily L. Sherwin","doi":"10.31228/osf.io/a37vp","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31228/osf.io/a37vp","url":null,"abstract":"This essay first examines various conceptions of promissory obligation, which suggest a range of possible benefits associated with promising. Theories of temporally extended practical rationality suggest that to obtain benefits of this kind, it may be rational for a promisor to treat his or her promise as binding. The difficulty is that, whatever practical and normative benefits binding promises may have, it will not always be epistemically rational for the promisor to perform. Thus, to the extent that markets rely on binding promises, they rely on an element of irrationality in human decision-making.","PeriodicalId":39833,"journal":{"name":"Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy","volume":"27 1","pages":"533-551"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42919112","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Trans-cending the Medicalization of Gender: Improving Legal Protections for People Who are Transgender and Incarcerated.","authors":"Lindsey Ruff","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39833,"journal":{"name":"Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy","volume":"28 1","pages":"127-58"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"37029408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Regulating Markets for Gestational Care: Comparative Perspectives on Surrogacy in the United States and India.","authors":"Sital Kalantry","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39833,"journal":{"name":"Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy","volume":"27 3","pages":"685-715"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"36637114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Direct-to-consumer genetic testing (DTC-GT) companies have proliferated in the past several years. Based on an analysis of genetic material submitted by consumers, these companies offer a wide array of services, ranging from providing information about health and ancestry to identification of surreptitiously-gathered biological material sent in by suspicious spouses. Federal and state laws are ambiguous about the types of disclosures these companies must make about how the genetic information they obtain is collected, used, and shared. In an effort to assist in developing such laws, this Article reports a survey of the privacy policies these companies purport to follow. It canvasses ninety DTC-GT companies operating in the United States and provides a detailed analysis of whether and to what extent those policies inform consumers about how their genetic information will be used and secured, with whom it will be shared, and a host of other issues. Using the Federal Trade Commission’s articulation of the Fair Information Practice Principles and the agency’s proposed Privacy Framework as the baseline, we conclude that most policies fall well short of the ideal.
{"title":"Who Knows What, and When?: A Survey of the Privacy Policies Proffered by U.S. Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Companies.","authors":"James W Hazel, Christopher Slobogin","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Direct-to-consumer genetic testing (DTC-GT) companies have proliferated in the past several years. Based on an analysis of genetic material submitted by consumers, these companies offer a wide array of services, ranging from providing information about health and ancestry to identification of surreptitiously-gathered biological material sent in by suspicious spouses. Federal and state laws are ambiguous about the types of disclosures these companies must make about how the genetic information they obtain is collected, used, and shared. In an effort to assist in developing such laws, this Article reports a survey of the privacy policies these companies purport to follow. It canvasses ninety DTC-GT companies operating in the United States and provides a detailed analysis of whether and to what extent those policies inform consumers about how their genetic information will be used and secured, with whom it will be shared, and a host of other issues. Using the Federal Trade Commission’s articulation of the Fair Information Practice Principles and the agency’s proposed Privacy Framework as the baseline, we conclude that most policies fall well short of the ideal.</p>","PeriodicalId":39833,"journal":{"name":"Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy","volume":"28 1","pages":"35-66"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"37029410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Eighteen U.S. states and India, as well as at least forty other countries, have no legislation or case law that permits, prohibits, or regulates surrogacy.1 This regulatory lacuna typically exists because of a failure to reach a consensus on legislation or sheer neglect of the issue. In jurisdictions where there is no regulation, a free market model prevails. Intended parents and surrogates negotiate contract terms based on their relative bargaining power and there are no statutes or common law that specifically address surrogacy in those jurisdictions. In those eighteen U.S. states where state legislatures have not mandated certain protections for surrogates, the surrogacy industry has developed strong baseline protections for women who sell gestational care on its own accord. For example, industry norms require that intended par-
{"title":"Regulating Markets for Gestational Care: Comparative Perspectives on Surrogacy in the United States and India.","authors":"Sital Kalantry","doi":"10.31228/osf.io/7txky","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31228/osf.io/7txky","url":null,"abstract":"Eighteen U.S. states and India, as well as at least forty other countries, have no legislation or case law that permits, prohibits, or regulates surrogacy.1 This regulatory lacuna typically exists because of a failure to reach a consensus on legislation or sheer neglect of the issue. In jurisdictions where there is no regulation, a free market model prevails. Intended parents and surrogates negotiate contract terms based on their relative bargaining power and there are no statutes or common law that specifically address surrogacy in those jurisdictions. In those eighteen U.S. states where state legislatures have not mandated certain protections for surrogates, the surrogacy industry has developed strong baseline protections for women who sell gestational care on its own accord. For example, industry norms require that intended par-","PeriodicalId":39833,"journal":{"name":"Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy","volume":"27 3 1","pages":"685-715"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69639812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Seemingly worlds apart, art and the law of property in fact share much in common. Some of this shared space is obvious, the result of their intersection through property law's protection and regulation of art. But another aspect of their commonality is considerably less obvious. Both rely, implicitly and in ways not always acknowledged, on assumptions about objects in the world-thing-ness. That is, both have relied, or traditionally have done so, on certain assumptions about the nature of objects-the objects of art and the objects of property-and the upshot of those assumptions is that those objects are characterized by thing-ness, i.e., physicality, tangibility, stability, durability. Further, these assumptions are not only parallel to each realm but intersect with each other in functional ways. Notably, property law's interaction with art depends upon art's assumption of its own thing-ness, for property law itself traditionally has depended upon certain assumptions regarding the nature of property-what can be property. It has assumed that art is a tangible, stable, and durable object.
{"title":"Objects of Art; Objects of Property","authors":"G. Alexander","doi":"10.31228/osf.io/au7xb","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31228/osf.io/au7xb","url":null,"abstract":"Seemingly worlds apart, art and the law of property in fact share much in common. Some of this shared space is obvious, the result of their intersection through property law's protection and regulation of art. But another aspect of their commonality is considerably less obvious. Both rely, implicitly and in ways not always acknowledged, on assumptions about objects in the world-thing-ness. That is, both have relied, or traditionally have done so, on certain assumptions about the nature of objects-the objects of art and the objects of property-and the upshot of those assumptions is that those objects are characterized by thing-ness, i.e., physicality, tangibility, stability, durability. Further, these assumptions are not only parallel to each realm but intersect with each other in functional ways. Notably, property law's interaction with art depends upon art's assumption of its own thing-ness, for property law itself traditionally has depended upon certain assumptions regarding the nature of property-what can be property. It has assumed that art is a tangible, stable, and durable object.","PeriodicalId":39833,"journal":{"name":"Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy","volume":"26 1","pages":"461"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42933263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Felix Gonzales-Torres on Contracts","authors":"Joan Kee","doi":"10.31228/osf.io/ktxdz","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31228/osf.io/ktxdz","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39833,"journal":{"name":"Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy","volume":"26 1","pages":"517-531"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41546591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article, for a symposium on the intersection of art and law, I explore the artist Felix Gonzalez Torres’ work in relation to a concept that we often focus on in property law, the idea of a “public good,” and how it can relate to the powerful conceptual work that his artistic legacy offers us. Here, I suggest using the concept of a public good as a metaphor for thinking about Felix Gonzalez Torres’ work in three potential ways. First, I use the economic framework of a public good to demonstrate the ways in which his work underscored and also challenged the notion of a singular intellectual property. Second, as I argue in Part II, using a non-market framework, his work also illuminates the concept of a public good in a philosophical sense because his work illuminates the kind of ideal, utopian terrain that law often strives to achieve. Third, I highlight Gonzalez Torres’ work, not in terms of how his work represents a public good, but rather how a decentralized notion of a public good, in both moral and market terms, personifies the legacy of the artist himself. Much of his work reworked the notion of advertising and consumption to use the concept of originality to focus on the way that identities circulated in modern contemporary culture. By reworking classic imagery, Gonzalez Torres also, ironically, forcibly reclaimed the perspectives of those who are often missing from mainstream representations. His work, in many ways, illustrates why it is so important to study the relationships between art and property, between audience and artist, between the visual image and narrative form, between the space between reality and the ideal. His work directs us to study the text or the picture that is created and the meaning that it is supposed to produce—and the space between how that meaning is communicated, and how that meaning is received by the audience. In this article, it is that space—the space between the artist’s intent and the audience’s interpretation—that I want to focus on here, because I believe that the work of Felix Gonzalez Torres carries important lessons for those of us who care, not just about social justice and conceptual art, but who also care about creating a world that enables a multiplicity of interpretations, particularly in the age of new media.
{"title":"The Public Good in Poetic Justice","authors":"S. K. Katyal","doi":"10.31228/osf.io/er9s5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31228/osf.io/er9s5","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, for a symposium on the intersection of art and law, I explore the artist Felix Gonzalez Torres’ work in relation to a concept that we often focus on in property law, the idea of a “public good,” and how it can relate to the powerful conceptual work that his artistic legacy offers us. Here, I suggest using the concept of a public good as a metaphor for thinking about Felix Gonzalez Torres’ work in three potential ways. First, I use the economic framework of a public good to demonstrate the ways in which his work underscored and also challenged the notion of a singular intellectual property. Second, as I argue in Part II, using a non-market framework, his work also illuminates the concept of a public good in a philosophical sense because his work illuminates the kind of ideal, utopian terrain that law often strives to achieve. Third, I highlight Gonzalez Torres’ work, not in terms of how his work represents a public good, but rather how a decentralized notion of a public good, in both moral and market terms, personifies the legacy of the artist himself. Much of his work reworked the notion of advertising and consumption to use the concept of originality to focus on the way that identities circulated in modern contemporary culture. By reworking classic imagery, Gonzalez Torres also, ironically, forcibly reclaimed the perspectives of those who are often missing from mainstream representations. \u0000His work, in many ways, illustrates why it is so important to study the relationships between art and property, between audience and artist, between the visual image and narrative form, between the space between reality and the ideal. His work directs us to study the text or the picture that is created and the meaning that it is supposed to produce—and the space between how that meaning is communicated, and how that meaning is received by the audience. In this article, it is that space—the space between the artist’s intent and the audience’s interpretation—that I want to focus on here, because I believe that the work of Felix Gonzalez Torres carries important lessons for those of us who care, not just about social justice and conceptual art, but who also care about creating a world that enables a multiplicity of interpretations, particularly in the age of new media.","PeriodicalId":39833,"journal":{"name":"Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy","volume":"26 1","pages":"497-516"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46315433","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：