Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy最新文献

Each year, thousands of pregnant women learn of fetal abnormalities through prenatal genetic analysis. This discovery--made after a woman has initially declined to exercise her right to abort an unwanted pregnancy—raises the difficult and heart-wrenching question of whether to terminate on genetic grounds. Women considering a genetic abortion rely on information and support from health care providers to assist them in making their choice. Though intended to be objective and nondirective, the support women receive frequently provides them within complete and incomprehensible information having the effect of encouraging them to abort genetically anomalous fetuses. As a result, genetic terminations--which cause severe and long-standing psychological impacts such as pathological grief, depression and post-traumatic stress—are often the result of something other than a fully informed choice.Congress and eleven states have recognized the importance of better informing choice by passing legislation aimed at providing clearer and more balanced information to expectant mothers learning of fetal genetic abnormalities. But existing legislative remedies do not adequately address this problem, and this inadequacy will become more pronounced in future years as increases in access to prenatal genetic analysis further stretch the capabilities of the available support services.This Article describes the unique characteristics of terminations for a fetal abnormality, their troubling and persistent psychological impacts,and the reasons why they will become more common in future years. It then offers proposals for how to reconfigure the prenatal genetic counseling landscape in order to reduce the incidence of genetic terminations based on incomplete or misleading information, thereby alleviating their distinct psychological costs. Its overall objective is to ensure that women learning of prenatal genetic abnormalities have access to complete and comprehensible information prior to making their decision and adequate support whether or not they choose to terminate.

This Article asks whether parents who choose not to vaccinate their child should be liable if that child, at higher risk of infectious disease than vaccinated children, transmits a vaccine-preventable disease to another. The Article argues that a tort remedy in this situation is both desirable and appropriate. It is desirable to assure compensation to the injured child and the family, who should not have to face the insult of financial ruin on top of the injury from the disease. It is appropriate to require that a family that chooses not to vaccinate a child fully internalizes the costs of that decision, and does not pass it on to others. This Article argues there should be a duty to act in the aforementioned situation, since the non-vaccinating parents create a risk. Even if not vaccinating is seen as nonfeasance, there are policy reasons to create an exception to the default rule that there is no duty to act. As an alternative, the Article suggests creating a statutory duty to act. This Article suggests that legal exemptions from school immunization requirements are not a barrier to liability, since the considerations behind those exemptions are separate from tort liability. It addresses the problem of demonstrating causation, and suggests in which types of cases showing causation would be possible, and when proximate cause is capable of extending from an index case to subsequent cases. The Article concludes by addressing potential counter arguments.