Psychoanalytic Review最新文献

In this paper, the author attempts to arrive at a comprehensive outline of Winnicott's developmental theory. This theory encompasses the infant's emergence from total dependence and subject/object merging to what the author refers to as relative independence and relative subject/object separation (in Winnicott's words, "separation that is a not a separation but a form of union" [1971a, p. 98]). This conceptualization is based mainly on an amalgam of Winnicott's two well-known papers, on transitional objects and phenomena (1953) and on the use of an object (1969). The author also refers to André Green's notions of the importance of the negative and of the "dead mother" in reference to Winnicott's work. To demonstrate the clinical implications of the paper, the author discusses in detail the case of Rosemary Dinnage, as described by both Winnicott and Green and as reported directly by herself.

On Tuesday, April 24, 1900, three days after Passover, Freud gave a talk at his B'nai B'rith lodge on Emile Zola's utopian novel penned in self-exile in London, Fécondité (1899). The next day Freud wrote Wilhelm Fliess that the night before the talk he had a dream in which "[t]he brethren … were unkind and scornful of me." In the dream his brethren's contempt signifies that Freud is making his impious move to destroy their Tree of Life: no Law, no Judaism, no Christianity, no miserable anti-Semitism. In Freud's utopia, an enlightened socially just world grounded in reason, which mirrors the brotherly atheistic utopia envisioned in Fécondité, the seed of Abraham at long last can move across frontiers freely, develop their talents, and satisfy their needs.

The author argues against neuropsychoanalysis by focusing on the metaphysical issues. Neuropsychoanalysts argue that the philosophical theories of dual aspect monism (DAM) and anomalous monism support their position. The author contends that not only do DAM and anomalous monism not offer support for neuropsychoanalysis; they are also inconsistent with its claims. The conceptual distinction between the mental and the physical - the so-called "epistemological dualism" cited by neuropsychoanalysis-stands as an insurmountable barrier to the project of neuropsychoanalysis. By way of example, the author offers an analogy with artworks. The author concludes the paper by arguing that neuropsychoanalysis deflects from the real project of psychoanalysis, which is the study of persons, not so-called "mindbrains."

The unique conditions and characteristics of listening in psychoanalysis are introduced in relation to an effort to define how psychoanalysis proceeds "beyond psychotherapy." Using an example from Freud's self-analysis, the author explores the tenet that every psychoanalytic session is to be treated like a dream. Freud's prescriptions for the method of listening psychoanalytically are critically discussed and the idea of "listening-to-listen" is introduced, as contrasted with listening in order to hear, listening-to-understand or in order to interpret. It is argued that free-associative listening is distinctive as a processive momentum that deconstructively interrogates the practitioner's own mechanisms of suppression and repression. This process fosters an awareness of that which is otherwise than representation, that which cannot be captured within the purview of reflective consciousness. In this sense, healing is not only transformative, but also transmutative, and the psychoanalyst is one for whom nothing is alien and everything is strange.

The author discusses Winnicott's theory (1949/1975) of the psyche-soma and Fairbairn's (1944) theory of internal object relations, bringing them together to enrich our perspective of one's somatization. By focusing on how the patient takes care, attends, experiences, and feels toward the symptom, the analyst can better understand the patient's early object-relations. This allows analyst and patient to rethink the symptom in terms of the patient's early traumas and one's capacity to mourn the loss of the love-object. Fairbairn's conceptualizations of the "rejecting," "alluring," and "addictive" object-relations are combined with Winnicott's understanding of the split between psyche and soma, following the ill-adaptation of the mother to the baby's earliest emotional needs.

Ferenczi's Clinical Diary reveals an exceptional analyst who honestly and bravely documented radical clinical experiences and theoretical insights about the tragic impacts of trauma. The author follows Ferenczi's thinking from his falling out with Freud and his view of the classical psychoanalyst's objectivity and emotional detachment as triggers of the original trauma, through the use of the countertransference to lay bare trauma, eventually issuing in his radical experiment in mutual analysis. The Diary's fate in the history of psychoanalysis reflects that of its thinking on trauma: Beginning with Ferenczi's decades-long silencing and exclusion from the main psychoanalytic community, together with the silencing of actual trauma, this history evolved into the revival and dissemination of Ferenczi's thinking and the reappraisal of the role of actual trauma.

The authors explore Heinz Kohut's ideas of self, including its nuclear and virtual forms, in the critical period from the late 1960s to about 1975. Kohut's creative process, it is argued, has not been fully appreciated. The authors establish the baseline of Kohut's ideas about the self in his first book, The Analysis of the Self in 1971. His ideas then evolved significantly in the next few years, as he came to define the self as the center of psychological experience and then to consider what he came to call the nuclear self and the virtual self as extensions of his core ideas about the self-selfobject system. The authors trace the specific sequence of conceptual steps that Kohut took in his reexamination of what he meant by self. Kohut's thinking in this area proceeded unevenly and not always chronologically. His pathbreaking work in the early 1970s on fragmentation, on the cohesion and continuity of the self, and on the mutable nature of the nuclear self and the virtual self represents a seminal development in the understanding of these psychoanalytic concepts.

This article traces the evolution of the concept of the leading edge in Kohut's work. The leading edge is defined as the growth-promoting dimension of the transference. The authors argue that although Kohut did not ever use the term explicitly in his writings-Marian Tolpin (2002), one of Kohut's gifted pupils, introduced the concept into the psychoanalytic literature in the form of the forward edge-the idea of the leading edge was already present in nascent form in Kohut's earliest papers and became ever more central as his psychology of the self evolved and the concept of the selfobject transference took center stage. Kohut, it is argued, could not fully develop the idea of working with the leading edge for fear of being accused of advocating for a corrective emotional experience in psychoanalytic treatment. However, in his posthumous empathy paper (1982) Kohut came as close as he could to endorsing the leading edge as pivotal in all psychoanalytic work.

This paper elaborates on the implications of Heinz Kohut's radical revision of the concepts of introspection and empathy for psychoanalytic practice and therapeutics. I focus on three of Kohut's papers: "Introspection, Empathy, and Psychoanalysis," published in 1959, and its follow-up, "On Empathy", and "Introspection, Empathy, and the Semi-Circle of Mental Health," both published in 1981. Specifically, I address the importance of the analysand's introspective capacity as an active element in the therapeutic process augmented by the empathy of the analyst in the form of understanding and interpretation. Analysands enter psychoanalysis because they are aware that they cannot solve the problems with which they suffer or access the selfobject milieu that would help them. Through analysis patients' capacity for introspection and action is broadened and deepened, allowing them to understand and deal creatively with their problems, particularly their inability to fulfill the potential of their self.