In the abstract, the limits on a lawyer’s loyalty obligations could take several forms. For example, constraints on a fiduciary’s loyalty obligations may be derived from a correct understanding of that fiduciary’s loyalty itself. Indeed, violations might count as a form of disloyalty to the client. Alternatively, such constraints could stem from obligations owed to parties other than a lawyer’s client, or even something more abstract like the rule of law. Notably, such constraints could be derived from legal principles that have nothing to do with fiduciary law. Each of these options is a conceptual possibility, contingent on the choices made by a given legal system. Constraints on a loyalty obligation that are implications of that loyalty obligation itself are defined here as internal. Constraints imposed from outside a given fiduciary loyalty obligation are defined as external. This paper seeks to deepen our understanding of a particular type of fiduciary loyalty (the loyalty owed by lawyers) by focusing on the role of such internal constraints, and in the process to elaborate on the scope of loyalty obligations more generally. This paper will also indicate why we should care about the internal/external distinction. Among other things, this distinction helps determine whether lawyers are better seen as private or public fiduciaries, and in practice it may bear on both judicial reasoning and legal compliance.
{"title":"The Internal Limits on Fiduciary Loyalty","authors":"Andrew S. Gold","doi":"10.1093/ajj/auaa003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ajj/auaa003","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In the abstract, the limits on a lawyer’s loyalty obligations could take several forms. For example, constraints on a fiduciary’s loyalty obligations may be derived from a correct understanding of that fiduciary’s loyalty itself. Indeed, violations might count as a form of disloyalty to the client. Alternatively, such constraints could stem from obligations owed to parties other than a lawyer’s client, or even something more abstract like the rule of law. Notably, such constraints could be derived from legal principles that have nothing to do with fiduciary law. Each of these options is a conceptual possibility, contingent on the choices made by a given legal system. Constraints on a loyalty obligation that are implications of that loyalty obligation itself are defined here as internal. Constraints imposed from outside a given fiduciary loyalty obligation are defined as external. This paper seeks to deepen our understanding of a particular type of fiduciary loyalty (the loyalty owed by lawyers) by focusing on the role of such internal constraints, and in the process to elaborate on the scope of loyalty obligations more generally. This paper will also indicate why we should care about the internal/external distinction. Among other things, this distinction helps determine whether lawyers are better seen as private or public fiduciaries, and in practice it may bear on both judicial reasoning and legal compliance.","PeriodicalId":39920,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Jurisprudence","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/ajj/auaa003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48818681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article explores an axiomatic approach to distinguishing different usages of correlativity and investigates Hurd and Moore’s disagreement with Hohfeldian correlativity, in terms of a choice of axioms. Detailed critical consideration is provided of three negative steps, ascribing theoretical positions to Hohfeld that Hurd and Moore wish to amend or depart from; and three positive steps taken towards vindicating their stated objectives of avoiding moral combat and providing recognition to active rights. The conclusion is reached that the actual state of any normative system, moral or legal, can best be captured by the finer-grained analysis of correlativity found within Hohfeld’s scheme of analysis. Supplementary discussion is provided on the role of Hurd’s “Correspondence Thesis” within a correlativity axiom for permission (liberty/privilege); the relationship between the correspondence thesis and a set of compossible rights; the compatibility between a logic of correlativity and deontic logic; and, the relationship between moral and legal normative systems, or, our perceptions of them.
{"title":"Choosing Axioms of Correlativity","authors":"A. Halpin","doi":"10.1093/ajj/auz010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ajj/auz010","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article explores an axiomatic approach to distinguishing different usages of correlativity and investigates Hurd and Moore’s disagreement with Hohfeldian correlativity, in terms of a choice of axioms. Detailed critical consideration is provided of three negative steps, ascribing theoretical positions to Hohfeld that Hurd and Moore wish to amend or depart from; and three positive steps taken towards vindicating their stated objectives of avoiding moral combat and providing recognition to active rights. The conclusion is reached that the actual state of any normative system, moral or legal, can best be captured by the finer-grained analysis of correlativity found within Hohfeld’s scheme of analysis. Supplementary discussion is provided on the role of Hurd’s “Correspondence Thesis” within a correlativity axiom for permission (liberty/privilege); the relationship between the correspondence thesis and a set of compossible rights; the compatibility between a logic of correlativity and deontic logic; and, the relationship between moral and legal normative systems, or, our perceptions of them.","PeriodicalId":39920,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Jurisprudence","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/ajj/auz010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47044792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article considers in detail one criticism of an earlier paper of ours advanced by both Matthew Kramer and Andrew Halpin. This is the criticism that the content of deontic statuses (such as rights and duties) does not shift but is identical in truly correlatively-related deontic statuses. We argue that the content does shift in both our scheme and in Hohfeld's scheme for the logic of rights, and that such shifts are both good things and consistent with correlativity, properly understood. Miscellaneous other criticisms are also discussed, albeit more briefly.
{"title":"Replying to Halpin and Kramer: Agreements, Disagreements and No-Agreements","authors":"Heidi M. Hurd, M. Moore","doi":"10.1093/ajj/auz012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ajj/auz012","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The article considers in detail one criticism of an earlier paper of ours advanced by both Matthew Kramer and Andrew Halpin. This is the criticism that the content of deontic statuses (such as rights and duties) does not shift but is identical in truly correlatively-related deontic statuses. We argue that the content does shift in both our scheme and in Hohfeld's scheme for the logic of rights, and that such shifts are both good things and consistent with correlativity, properly understood. Miscellaneous other criticisms are also discussed, albeit more briefly.","PeriodicalId":39920,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Jurisprudence","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/ajj/auz012","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42268466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Legal Validity: The Fabric of Justice Maris Köpcke Hart Publishing, 2019 Reviewed by Christoph Kletzer","authors":"C. Kletzer","doi":"10.1093/ajj/auz013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ajj/auz013","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39920,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Jurisprudence","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/ajj/auz013","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44988701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mark Greenberg has attempted to refute what he regards as a popular metaphysical thesis about how law is constituted. He calls it the “Standard Picture,” and it includes a “Communication Theory.” His own “Moral Impact Theory” of law is built partly on that attempted refutation. I defend positions that are very close to the Standard Picture and Communication Theory, albeit different in important respects. In particular, they are not primarily metaphysical theses, although they have metaphysical implications. They are actual fundamental doctrines of constitutional law in Anglo-American legal systems, which I call Legislative Supremacy and Legislative Intention. I argue that: (a) these doctrines, and their metaphysical implications, vindicate much of the Standard Picture, and explain why so many theorists have been attracted to it; (b) the doctrines are inconsistent with Greenberg’s Moral Impact Theory; and (c) the best theory of what makes them part of the law is legal positivism: in other words, facts about legal practices make them law. In arguing for (a) and (b), I examine in detail and respond to Greenberg’s account of the legal principles and practice of statutory interpretation. I distinguish between three kinds of interpretation: clarifying, supplementing and rectifying. In arguing for (c), I contend that legal positivism satisfies Greenberg’s (questionable) insistence that any metaphysical account of what constitutes law must satisfy a “rationality requirement.”
{"title":"The Real Standard Picture, and How Facts Make It Law: a Response to Mark Greenberg","authors":"J. Goldsworthy","doi":"10.1093/AJJ/AUZ011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AJJ/AUZ011","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Mark Greenberg has attempted to refute what he regards as a popular metaphysical thesis about how law is constituted. He calls it the “Standard Picture,” and it includes a “Communication Theory.” His own “Moral Impact Theory” of law is built partly on that attempted refutation. I defend positions that are very close to the Standard Picture and Communication Theory, albeit different in important respects. In particular, they are not primarily metaphysical theses, although they have metaphysical implications. They are actual fundamental doctrines of constitutional law in Anglo-American legal systems, which I call Legislative Supremacy and Legislative Intention. I argue that: (a) these doctrines, and their metaphysical implications, vindicate much of the Standard Picture, and explain why so many theorists have been attracted to it; (b) the doctrines are inconsistent with Greenberg’s Moral Impact Theory; and (c) the best theory of what makes them part of the law is legal positivism: in other words, facts about legal practices make them law. In arguing for (a) and (b), I examine in detail and respond to Greenberg’s account of the legal principles and practice of statutory interpretation. I distinguish between three kinds of interpretation: clarifying, supplementing and rectifying. In arguing for (c), I contend that legal positivism satisfies Greenberg’s (questionable) insistence that any metaphysical account of what constitutes law must satisfy a “rationality requirement.”","PeriodicalId":39920,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Jurisprudence","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/AJJ/AUZ011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48319674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As is well known to everyone familiar with the analytical table of legal relationships propounded by the American jurist Wesley Hohfeld, one of the eight positions in the table is that of the no-right. In most discussions of Hohfeld’s overall framework, no-rights have received rather little attention. Doubtless, one reason for the relative dearth of scrutiny is that Hohfeld devised a hyphenated neologism to designate no-rights. Each of the other positions in the Hohfeldian table is designated by a term with a solid grounding in everyday discourse and juristic discourse, whereas the hyphenated term “no-right”—in contrast with the unhyphenated phrase “no right”—does not have any comparable grounding either in ordinary discourse or in juristic discourse. That neologism is almost never employed by anyone outside the confines of discussions of Hohfeld’s categories, and it is often not employed even within those confines. Notwithstanding the enormous amount of philosophical and juristic attention bestowed on Hohfeld’s analytical framework since its elaboration in the second decade of the twentieth century, the term “no-right” has found little favor in philosophical or juristic circles. Moreover, on the rather rare occasions when the term is used rather than merely mentioned, it is almost always misused. The exploration of the correct use of that term in the first half of this paper may seem rather fussy, but the importance of that exploration for a satisfactory understanding of legal and moral relationships will become apparent in the second half of the paper. While endeavoring to vindicate the term “no-right” as a fully apposite element in the vocabulary of legal philosophy, this paper will also be replying to a recent article by Heidi Hurd and Michael Moore in this journal.
{"title":"On No-Rights and No Rights","authors":"Matthew H Kramer","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3373807","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3373807","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 As is well known to everyone familiar with the analytical table of legal relationships propounded by the American jurist Wesley Hohfeld, one of the eight positions in the table is that of the no-right. In most discussions of Hohfeld’s overall framework, no-rights have received rather little attention. Doubtless, one reason for the relative dearth of scrutiny is that Hohfeld devised a hyphenated neologism to designate no-rights. Each of the other positions in the Hohfeldian table is designated by a term with a solid grounding in everyday discourse and juristic discourse, whereas the hyphenated term “no-right”—in contrast with the unhyphenated phrase “no right”—does not have any comparable grounding either in ordinary discourse or in juristic discourse. That neologism is almost never employed by anyone outside the confines of discussions of Hohfeld’s categories, and it is often not employed even within those confines. Notwithstanding the enormous amount of philosophical and juristic attention bestowed on Hohfeld’s analytical framework since its elaboration in the second decade of the twentieth century, the term “no-right” has found little favor in philosophical or juristic circles. Moreover, on the rather rare occasions when the term is used rather than merely mentioned, it is almost always misused. The exploration of the correct use of that term in the first half of this paper may seem rather fussy, but the importance of that exploration for a satisfactory understanding of legal and moral relationships will become apparent in the second half of the paper. While endeavoring to vindicate the term “no-right” as a fully apposite element in the vocabulary of legal philosophy, this paper will also be replying to a recent article by Heidi Hurd and Michael Moore in this journal.","PeriodicalId":39920,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Jurisprudence","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/SSRN.3373807","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46648322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ekins’s Moral Assumptions and Their Impact on the Analysis of Legislation","authors":"F. Ferraro, A. Zambon","doi":"10.1093/AJJ/AUZ006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AJJ/AUZ006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39920,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Jurisprudence","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/AJJ/AUZ006","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45411470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ekins on Groups and Procedures","authors":"C. Roversi, Alessio Sardo","doi":"10.1093/AJJ/AUZ002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AJJ/AUZ002","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39920,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Jurisprudence","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/AJJ/AUZ002","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45041708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Pragmatic Aspects of Legislative Intent","authors":"D. Canale, F. Poggi","doi":"10.1093/AJJ/AUZ003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AJJ/AUZ003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39920,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Jurisprudence","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/AJJ/AUZ003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49603290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：