Philosophy CompassVolume 18, Issue 10 e12944 TEACHING AND LEARNING GUIDE Teaching & Learning Guide for: Taking stock of regularity theories of causation Marc Johansen, Corresponding Author Marc Johansen [email protected] orcid.org/0000-0001-7417-3279 Department of Philosophy, Creighton University, Omaha, Nebraska, USA Correspondence Marc Johansen, Department of Philosophy, Creighton University, 2500 California Plaza, Omaha, NE 68178, USA. Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author Marc Johansen, Corresponding Author Marc Johansen [email protected] orcid.org/0000-0001-7417-3279 Department of Philosophy, Creighton University, Omaha, Nebraska, USA Correspondence Marc Johansen, Department of Philosophy, Creighton University, 2500 California Plaza, Omaha, NE 68178, USA. Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author First published: 18 August 2023 https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12944 This guide accompanies the following article: Johansen, M. (2021), Taking stock of regularity theories of causation. Philosophy Compass, 16: e12735. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12735. Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume18, Issue10October 2023e12944 RelatedInformation
哲学罗盘第18卷，第10期e12944教学和学习指南教学和学习指南:评估因果关系的规律性理论马克约翰森，通讯作者马克约翰森[email protected] orcid.org/0000-0001-7417-3279哲学系，克雷顿大学，奥马哈，内布拉斯加州，美国通信马克约翰森，哲学系，克雷顿大学，2500加州广场，奥马哈，ne68178，美国。Email: [Email protected]搜索本文作者Marc Johansen的更多论文，通讯作者Marc Johansen [Email protected] orcid.org/0000-0001-7417-3279美国内布拉斯加州奥马哈市克雷顿大学哲学系通讯Marc Johansen，克雷顿大学哲学系，2500 California Plaza, Omaha, NE 68178, USA。电子邮件:[Email protected]搜索该作者的更多论文首次发表:2023年8月18日https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12944本指南附有以下文章:约翰森，M.(2021)，因果关系的规律性理论的评估。哲学罗盘，16:12735。https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12735。阅读全文taboutpdf ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare给accessShare全文accessShare全文accessShare请查看我们的使用条款和条件，并勾选下面的框来分享文章的全文版本。我已经阅读并接受了Wiley在线图书馆使用共享链接的条款和条件，请使用下面的链接与您的朋友和同事分享本文的全文版本。学习更多的知识。复制URL共享链接共享一个emailfacebooktwitterlinkedinreddit微信本文无摘要vol . 18, Issue10October 2023e12944相关信息
{"title":"Teaching & Learning Guide for: Taking stock of regularity theories of causation","authors":"Marc Johansen","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12944","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12944","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophy CompassVolume 18, Issue 10 e12944 TEACHING AND LEARNING GUIDE Teaching & Learning Guide for: Taking stock of regularity theories of causation Marc Johansen, Corresponding Author Marc Johansen [email protected] orcid.org/0000-0001-7417-3279 Department of Philosophy, Creighton University, Omaha, Nebraska, USA Correspondence Marc Johansen, Department of Philosophy, Creighton University, 2500 California Plaza, Omaha, NE 68178, USA. Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author Marc Johansen, Corresponding Author Marc Johansen [email protected] orcid.org/0000-0001-7417-3279 Department of Philosophy, Creighton University, Omaha, Nebraska, USA Correspondence Marc Johansen, Department of Philosophy, Creighton University, 2500 California Plaza, Omaha, NE 68178, USA. Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author First published: 18 August 2023 https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12944 This guide accompanies the following article: Johansen, M. (2021), Taking stock of regularity theories of causation. Philosophy Compass, 16: e12735. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12735. Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume18, Issue10October 2023e12944 RelatedInformation","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136063119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many political philosophers have held that democracy has epistemic benefits. Most commonly, this case is made by arguing that democracies are better able to track the truth than other political arrangements. Truth, however, is not the only epistemic good that is politically valuable. A number of other epistemic goods – goods including evidence, intellectual virtue, epistemic justice, and empathetic understanding – can also have political value, and in ways that go beyond the value of truth. In this paper, I will survey those who have argued that democracy can be valuable because of these other epistemic benefits, considering (1) the ways in which these epistemic goods can be of political value and (2) the challenges that democracies face in producing them.
{"title":"The Epistemic Aims of Democracy","authors":"Robert Weston Siscoe","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12941","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12941","url":null,"abstract":"Many political philosophers have held that democracy has epistemic benefits. Most commonly, this case is made by arguing that democracies are better able to track the truth than other political arrangements. Truth, however, is not the only epistemic good that is politically valuable. A number of other epistemic goods – goods including evidence, intellectual virtue, epistemic justice, and empathetic understanding – can also have political value, and in ways that go beyond the value of truth. In this paper, I will survey those who have argued that democracy can be valuable because of these other epistemic benefits, considering (1) the ways in which these epistemic goods can be of political value and (2) the challenges that democracies face in producing them.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41988597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Skeptical theism, broadly construed, is an attempt to leverage our limited cognitive powers, in some specified sense, against “evidential” and “explanatory” arguments from evil. Since there are different versions of these kinds of arguments, there are correspondingly different versions of skeptical theism. In this paper, I consider four challenges to three central versions of skeptical theism: (a) the problem of generalized skepticism, (b) the problem of moral skepticism, (c) the problem of unqualified modal skepticism, and (d) the challenge from Bayesian epistemology.
{"title":"Skeptical Theism: A Panoramic Overview (Part II)","authors":"Luis R. G. Oliveira","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12946","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12946","url":null,"abstract":"Skeptical theism, broadly construed, is an attempt to leverage our limited cognitive powers, in some specified sense, against “evidential” and “explanatory” arguments from evil. Since there are different versions of these kinds of arguments, there are correspondingly different versions of skeptical theism. In this paper, I consider four challenges to three central versions of skeptical theism: (a) the problem of generalized skepticism, (b) the problem of moral skepticism, (c) the problem of unqualified modal skepticism, and (d) the challenge from Bayesian epistemology.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48258972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Skeptical theism, broadly construed, is an attempt to leverage our limited cognitive powers, in some specified sense, against “evidential” and “explanatory” arguments from evil. Since there are different versions of these kinds of arguments, there are correspondingly different versions of skeptical theism. In this paper, I briefly explain three versions of these arguments from evil (two from William Rowe and one from Paul Draper) and the three versions of skeptical theism tailor‐made to block them (from Stephen Wykstra, Michael Bergmann, and Peter van Inwagen).
{"title":"Skeptical Theism: A Panoramic Overview (Part I)","authors":"Luis R. G. Oliveira","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12947","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12947","url":null,"abstract":"Skeptical theism, broadly construed, is an attempt to leverage our limited cognitive powers, in some specified sense, against “evidential” and “explanatory” arguments from evil. Since there are different versions of these kinds of arguments, there are correspondingly different versions of skeptical theism. In this paper, I briefly explain three versions of these arguments from evil (two from William Rowe and one from Paul Draper) and the three versions of skeptical theism tailor‐made to block them (from Stephen Wykstra, Michael Bergmann, and Peter van Inwagen).","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41586492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The concept of personal autonomy in contemporary moral and political philosophy is broadly associated with an agent's self-determining or self-governing capacities. However, scholars have long criticized the tendency in philosophy to idealize autonomy in an overtly atomistic and asocial manner, for example by assuming that autonomous individuals are totally independent decision-makers unaffected by interpersonal ties. Feminist philosophers especially have developed ‘relational’ approaches to autonomy in attempt to reconfigure this individualistic tradition in ways that are amenable to social considerations. Relational autonomy accounts are now known for espousing a more socially informed version of human agency. Such frameworks recognize that the very making of the autonomous self must involve some degree of socialization, for instance, or that certain subordinating social phenomena like oppression might problematically influence one's otherwise autonomous beliefs, preferences, and so forth. There remains much theoretical variation, however, in the range of relational accounts which have thus far been proposed. My Philosophy Compass article endeavours to highlight and organize some of the major points of disagreement between relational theories, covering distinctions commonly invoked in the debate. Despite the heterogeneity of relational autonomy theories, I also emphasize the ways that relational autonomy-theorizing makes for a challenging but valuable contribution to philosophy. Frankfurt, Harry. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.” The Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): 5–20. A paper that offers a theorization on the structure of the human will, which catalysed and invigorated many of the debates about the nature of personal autonomy ongoing today. Khader, Serene J. Adaptive Preference and Women's Empowerment. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. A book which offers in-depth analysis of adaptive preferences in relation to various themes in feminist debates, such as internalized oppression and multiculturalism. Mackenzie, Catriona and Stoljar, Natalie. (eds.) Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. This is the first anthology which collates articles around the subject of ‘relational autonomy’ as understood within contemporary feminist philosophy. It contains a comprehensive introduction to the topic, and many of the texts that have defined feminist debates on autonomy. Oshana, Marina A.L. (ed.) Personal Autonomy and Social Oppression. New York: Routledge, 2014. This edited volume focuses on the problem of oppression for autonomy. Taylor, James Stacey. (ed.) Personal Autonomy New Essays on Personal Autonomy and its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. A definitive anthology which captures the major contemporary developments on the nature, value, and applications of personal autonomy within moral philo
{"title":"Teaching & Learning Guide for: Relational Approaches to Personal Autonomy","authors":"J. Y. Lee","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12943","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12943","url":null,"abstract":"The concept of personal autonomy in contemporary moral and political philosophy is broadly associated with an agent's self-determining or self-governing capacities. However, scholars have long criticized the tendency in philosophy to idealize autonomy in an overtly atomistic and asocial manner, for example by assuming that autonomous individuals are totally independent decision-makers unaffected by interpersonal ties. Feminist philosophers especially have developed ‘relational’ approaches to autonomy in attempt to reconfigure this individualistic tradition in ways that are amenable to social considerations. Relational autonomy accounts are now known for espousing a more socially informed version of human agency. Such frameworks recognize that the very making of the autonomous self must involve some degree of socialization, for instance, or that certain subordinating social phenomena like oppression might problematically influence one's otherwise autonomous beliefs, preferences, and so forth. There remains much theoretical variation, however, in the range of relational accounts which have thus far been proposed. My Philosophy Compass article endeavours to highlight and organize some of the major points of disagreement between relational theories, covering distinctions commonly invoked in the debate. Despite the heterogeneity of relational autonomy theories, I also emphasize the ways that relational autonomy-theorizing makes for a challenging but valuable contribution to philosophy. Frankfurt, Harry. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.” The Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): 5–20. A paper that offers a theorization on the structure of the human will, which catalysed and invigorated many of the debates about the nature of personal autonomy ongoing today. Khader, Serene J. Adaptive Preference and Women's Empowerment. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. A book which offers in-depth analysis of adaptive preferences in relation to various themes in feminist debates, such as internalized oppression and multiculturalism. Mackenzie, Catriona and Stoljar, Natalie. (eds.) Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. This is the first anthology which collates articles around the subject of ‘relational autonomy’ as understood within contemporary feminist philosophy. It contains a comprehensive introduction to the topic, and many of the texts that have defined feminist debates on autonomy. Oshana, Marina A.L. (ed.) Personal Autonomy and Social Oppression. New York: Routledge, 2014. This edited volume focuses on the problem of oppression for autonomy. Taylor, James Stacey. (ed.) Personal Autonomy New Essays on Personal Autonomy and its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. A definitive anthology which captures the major contemporary developments on the nature, value, and applications of personal autonomy within moral philo","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"108 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135443462","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Modal Ontological Arguments","authors":"Gregory R. P. Stacey","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12938","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12938","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44048506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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