Abstract:The lack of what may be termed "metaphysical authority" in [e.g., liberation theology, narrative theology, and hermeneutical theology] makes them ill equipped to render the theological totality of Catholic Christianity, which needs to speak about being as well as meaning and about eternity as well as time. . . . They must find ways of making space for other kinds of theological discourse, and above all, for those which, in their cherishing of ontology, enable the expression of Catholic doctrine as a description of reality—in its two poles, finite and infinite, and the relation between them. At the same time, such other kinds of theology, of which Thomism may stand as the paradigm by presenting human intelligence as above all the capacity for intake of the real, highlight in an irreplaceable fashion the Church's fundamental intuition about truth: namely, that it is not first and foremost an action to be done (cf. liberation theology) or a story to be told (cf. narrative theology) or a text to be interpreted (cf. hermeneutical theology), though it may indeed also be all of these. Primordially, truth is an encounter with what is not humanity's work: the deed of God in creation and salvation.
{"title":"The Splendor of Truth in Fides et Ratio","authors":"E. Echeverria","doi":"10.5840/QD20189115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/QD20189115","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:The lack of what may be termed \"metaphysical authority\" in [e.g., liberation theology, narrative theology, and hermeneutical theology] makes them ill equipped to render the theological totality of Catholic Christianity, which needs to speak about being as well as meaning and about eternity as well as time. . . . They must find ways of making space for other kinds of theological discourse, and above all, for those which, in their cherishing of ontology, enable the expression of Catholic doctrine as a description of reality—in its two poles, finite and infinite, and the relation between them. At the same time, such other kinds of theology, of which Thomism may stand as the paradigm by presenting human intelligence as above all the capacity for intake of the real, highlight in an irreplaceable fashion the Church's fundamental intuition about truth: namely, that it is not first and foremost an action to be done (cf. liberation theology) or a story to be told (cf. narrative theology) or a text to be interpreted (cf. hermeneutical theology), though it may indeed also be all of these. Primordially, truth is an encounter with what is not humanity's work: the deed of God in creation and salvation.","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79064536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
G. E. M. Anscombe’s trenchant critique of consequentialist and deontological moral theories helped bring virtues back into moral philosophy.1 Ethicists committed to consequentialist or deontological frameworks gave virtues renewed attention by developing theories of moral virtue that assimilated virtue into their prior and more fundamental moral commitments.2 Others, rather than assimilating moral virtue, developed a pure virtue ethic that gives virtue and related aretaic notions of excellence and admirability a fundamental role in one’s moral framework. Some pure virtue ethicists address the traditional problems and questions (e.g., giving an account of right action) asked by consequentialists and deontologists, some argue that there is something flawed or importantly deficient with these traditional projects and questions addressed by the other moral frameworks. Virtue epistemology has experienced similar developments since Ernest Sosa’s “The Raft and the Pyramid.”3 Some virtue epistemologists offer theories of intellectual virtue that assimilate virtue into some more fundamental epistemic framework (e.g., reliabilism or evidentialism). Some, however, argue for a pure virtue epistemology that takes intellectual virtues as personally excellent or admirable intellectual character traits analogous to Aristotelian moral virtues, which purportedly play a fundamental role in one’s epistemic framework. As in the moral realm, some pure virtueepistemic
{"title":"The Myth of a Pure Virtue Epistemology","authors":"Joshue Orozco","doi":"10.5840/QD20188211","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/QD20188211","url":null,"abstract":"G. E. M. Anscombe’s trenchant critique of consequentialist and deontological moral theories helped bring virtues back into moral philosophy.1 Ethicists committed to consequentialist or deontological frameworks gave virtues renewed attention by developing theories of moral virtue that assimilated virtue into their prior and more fundamental moral commitments.2 Others, rather than assimilating moral virtue, developed a pure virtue ethic that gives virtue and related aretaic notions of excellence and admirability a fundamental role in one’s moral framework. Some pure virtue ethicists address the traditional problems and questions (e.g., giving an account of right action) asked by consequentialists and deontologists, some argue that there is something flawed or importantly deficient with these traditional projects and questions addressed by the other moral frameworks. Virtue epistemology has experienced similar developments since Ernest Sosa’s “The Raft and the Pyramid.”3 Some virtue epistemologists offer theories of intellectual virtue that assimilate virtue into some more fundamental epistemic framework (e.g., reliabilism or evidentialism). Some, however, argue for a pure virtue epistemology that takes intellectual virtues as personally excellent or admirable intellectual character traits analogous to Aristotelian moral virtues, which purportedly play a fundamental role in one’s epistemic framework. As in the moral realm, some pure virtueepistemic","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79230635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In an appendix to The Foundations of Knowledge, Timothy McGrew provides the outline of a solution to the problem of the external world.1 McGrew argues that the probability of the existence of a deceiver who makes it appear that we live in a real external world must be lower than the probability of a real external world itself because the ontological commitments of the latter hypothesis will always necessarily be greater than those of the former. In the latter hypothesis, we posit a mental state of the deceiver as a cause of each of the apparently real things that seem to exist in the external world, but the deceiver himself also exists as an entity who is not merely the sum of all of these mental states. McGrew argues, further, that any time we conditionalize on some particular mental state of our own that we normally take to be caused by real objects in the external world, the gap in probability between realism and the deceiver hypothesis grows larger. He bases this argument on the probabilistic fact that if one theory is strictly simpler than some other theory, the confirmation a given piece of evidence affords to the simpler theory is always greater than the confirmation it affords to the more complex theory— the difference between the old probability of the simpler theory and its new probability is always greater than the comparable difference between the old and new probabilities of the more complex theory.2 McGrew’s argument thus shows, if we take it to be successful, that the prior probability of a deceiver scenario is lower than the prior probability of realism and also that, as we gradually conditionalize on more and more everyday evidence, the gap in probability between the two will continue to grow. This set of conclusions would seem to mean (since we have a great deal of sensory evidence that we normally
{"title":"The World, the Deceiver, and The Face in the Frost","authors":"L. McGrew","doi":"10.5840/QD2018827","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/QD2018827","url":null,"abstract":"In an appendix to The Foundations of Knowledge, Timothy McGrew provides the outline of a solution to the problem of the external world.1 McGrew argues that the probability of the existence of a deceiver who makes it appear that we live in a real external world must be lower than the probability of a real external world itself because the ontological commitments of the latter hypothesis will always necessarily be greater than those of the former. In the latter hypothesis, we posit a mental state of the deceiver as a cause of each of the apparently real things that seem to exist in the external world, but the deceiver himself also exists as an entity who is not merely the sum of all of these mental states. McGrew argues, further, that any time we conditionalize on some particular mental state of our own that we normally take to be caused by real objects in the external world, the gap in probability between realism and the deceiver hypothesis grows larger. He bases this argument on the probabilistic fact that if one theory is strictly simpler than some other theory, the confirmation a given piece of evidence affords to the simpler theory is always greater than the confirmation it affords to the more complex theory— the difference between the old probability of the simpler theory and its new probability is always greater than the comparable difference between the old and new probabilities of the more complex theory.2 McGrew’s argument thus shows, if we take it to be successful, that the prior probability of a deceiver scenario is lower than the prior probability of realism and also that, as we gradually conditionalize on more and more everyday evidence, the gap in probability between the two will continue to grow. This set of conclusions would seem to mean (since we have a great deal of sensory evidence that we normally","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85286853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Over the years, Alvin Plantinga has developed an epistemological system that allows beliefs to be warranted1 without requiring the subject to have internal access to those properties conferring warrant. Plantinga’s epistemology, known as proper functionalism, allows a subject’s belief to be warranted, insofar as the right conditions relating to cognitive proper function are in place.2 Plantinga’s theory of warrant can be summarized as follows:
{"title":"Proper Functionalism and the Metalevel: A Friendly Reply to Timothy and Lydia McGrew","authors":"T. McNabb","doi":"10.5840/QD2018829","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/QD2018829","url":null,"abstract":"Over the years, Alvin Plantinga has developed an epistemological system that allows beliefs to be warranted1 without requiring the subject to have internal access to those properties conferring warrant. Plantinga’s epistemology, known as proper functionalism, allows a subject’s belief to be warranted, insofar as the right conditions relating to cognitive proper function are in place.2 Plantinga’s theory of warrant can be summarized as follows:","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80511710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Preemptionism and Epistemic Authority","authors":"Donald J. Bungum","doi":"10.5840/QD2018824","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/QD2018824","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79102892","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Unassertability of Contextualism","authors":"M. Blaauw, J. Ridder","doi":"10.5840/QD2018825","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/QD2018825","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73729133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fine-Tuning and the Search for an Archimedean Point","authors":"T. McGrew","doi":"10.5840/QD2018828","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/QD2018828","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74630588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is still a live question in epistemology and philosophy of science as to what exactly evidence is. In my view, evidence consists in experiences called “seemings.” This view is a version of the phenomenal conception of evidence, the position that evidence consists in nonfactive mental states with propositional content.1 This conception is opposed by sensedata theorists, disjunctivists, and those who think evidence consists in physical objects or publicly observable states of affairs (what I call the courtroom conception of evidence). Thomas Kelly has recently argued that the phenomenal conception cannot play all the roles evidence plays and is thus inadequate.2 Having first explained the nature of seemings, in this essay I utilize Kelly’s own understanding of the four major roles of evidence and argue that the phenomenal conception can play each one. Experience is a good candidate for evidence.
{"title":"Can Experience Fulfill the Many Roles of Evidence?","authors":"L. Gage","doi":"10.5840/QD2018826","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/QD2018826","url":null,"abstract":"It is still a live question in epistemology and philosophy of science as to what exactly evidence is. In my view, evidence consists in experiences called “seemings.” This view is a version of the phenomenal conception of evidence, the position that evidence consists in nonfactive mental states with propositional content.1 This conception is opposed by sensedata theorists, disjunctivists, and those who think evidence consists in physical objects or publicly observable states of affairs (what I call the courtroom conception of evidence). Thomas Kelly has recently argued that the phenomenal conception cannot play all the roles evidence plays and is thus inadequate.2 Having first explained the nature of seemings, in this essay I utilize Kelly’s own understanding of the four major roles of evidence and argue that the phenomenal conception can play each one. Experience is a good candidate for evidence.","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74170922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This essay argues that certain cases involving what I shall term complexly based belief, where a belief is formed via complex inference to the best explanation, pose a serious difficulty for reliabilist theories of epistemic justification or warrant. Many of our most important beliefs appear to be of this character. The problem, in short, is that in such cases we cannot identify any beliefforming process type that is such as to yield an intuitively correct verdict on the epistemic status of the agent’s belief. If this is correct, then no proposed solution to the generality problem can succeed.
{"title":"Complexly Based Beliefs and the Generality Problem for Reliabilism","authors":"Max Baker-Hytch","doi":"10.5840/QD2018823","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/QD2018823","url":null,"abstract":"This essay argues that certain cases involving what I shall term complexly based belief, where a belief is formed via complex inference to the best explanation, pose a serious difficulty for reliabilist theories of epistemic justification or warrant. Many of our most important beliefs appear to be of this character. The problem, in short, is that in such cases we cannot identify any beliefforming process type that is such as to yield an intuitively correct verdict on the epistemic status of the agent’s belief. If this is correct, then no proposed solution to the generality problem can succeed.","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81077371","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
An epistemological issue that preoccupied John Henry Newman was the conditions under which Christian belief can be considered rational. As he sought to offer a broader and more refined account of faith and reason, he focused, for example, on the informal nature of reasoning and on the role of personal judgment in assessing evidence. In particular, his approach homed in on how the mind actually works and the conditions under which people reason within various contexts and fields of knowledge. Along these lines, an important, though complex, issue involves clarifying Newman’s position on the grounds of faith. In this respect, Anthony Kenny says the University Sermons contain some of Newman’s “very best work on the nature and justification of faith.”1 However, Newman’s position on the grounds of faith in some of the University Sermons is difficult to capture and, perhaps, prone to misunderstanding (e.g., serm. 10). As I hope to show, Newman provides greater clarification of his own position on the grounds of faith in sermon 13 (see also serm. 14). Accordingly, I will structure this essay in the following way. First, I will identify some potential misunderstandings in the University Sermons concerning Newman’s position on the grounds of faith. Second, I will show how the distinction between implicit and explicit reason in sermon 13 shapes both his rejection of a particular kind of hard rationalism (a religious belief is rational if and only if it can be articulated or demonstrated formally) and his alternative understanding of the grounds of faith. Implicit reason, for Newman, is a spontaneous, unconscious, or unargumentative process of reasoning by which people form beliefs without appealing to explicitly stated grounds; explicit reason is a secondorder activity that works out whether beliefs are true rather than false; the former is unreflective, while the latter has a reflective component.2 Third, I will argue constructively that Newman
{"title":"Newman on the Grounds of Faith","authors":"F. Aquino","doi":"10.5840/QD2018822","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/QD2018822","url":null,"abstract":"An epistemological issue that preoccupied John Henry Newman was the conditions under which Christian belief can be considered rational. As he sought to offer a broader and more refined account of faith and reason, he focused, for example, on the informal nature of reasoning and on the role of personal judgment in assessing evidence. In particular, his approach homed in on how the mind actually works and the conditions under which people reason within various contexts and fields of knowledge. Along these lines, an important, though complex, issue involves clarifying Newman’s position on the grounds of faith. In this respect, Anthony Kenny says the University Sermons contain some of Newman’s “very best work on the nature and justification of faith.”1 However, Newman’s position on the grounds of faith in some of the University Sermons is difficult to capture and, perhaps, prone to misunderstanding (e.g., serm. 10). As I hope to show, Newman provides greater clarification of his own position on the grounds of faith in sermon 13 (see also serm. 14). Accordingly, I will structure this essay in the following way. First, I will identify some potential misunderstandings in the University Sermons concerning Newman’s position on the grounds of faith. Second, I will show how the distinction between implicit and explicit reason in sermon 13 shapes both his rejection of a particular kind of hard rationalism (a religious belief is rational if and only if it can be articulated or demonstrated formally) and his alternative understanding of the grounds of faith. Implicit reason, for Newman, is a spontaneous, unconscious, or unargumentative process of reasoning by which people form beliefs without appealing to explicitly stated grounds; explicit reason is a secondorder activity that works out whether beliefs are true rather than false; the former is unreflective, while the latter has a reflective component.2 Third, I will argue constructively that Newman","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79180013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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