This paper explores the relationship between Augustine’s and Husserl’s conceptions of time, consciousness, and memory. Although Husserl claims to provide a phenomenological understanding of the paradox of time so famously formulated by Augustine in his Confessions, this paper explores the apparent similarities between Augustine’s concept of distentio animi and the Husserlian concept of inner time-consciousness against their more profound differences. At stake in this confrontation between Augustine and Husserl is a fundamental divergence in the sense of time as the movement of transcendence in immanence. Within this discussion, the contrast between speaking time (rhetoric) and seeing time (perception), time and eternity, and contrasting notions of the past and future are explored.
{"title":"Augustine and Husserl on Time and Memory","authors":"N. Warren","doi":"10.5840/QD20167113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/QD20167113","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the relationship between Augustine’s and Husserl’s conceptions of time, consciousness, and memory. Although Husserl claims to provide a phenomenological understanding of the paradox of time so famously formulated by Augustine in his Confessions, this paper explores the apparent similarities between Augustine’s concept of distentio animi and the Husserlian concept of inner time-consciousness against their more profound differences. At stake in this confrontation between Augustine and Husserl is a fundamental divergence in the sense of time as the movement of transcendence in immanence. Within this discussion, the contrast between speaking time (rhetoric) and seeing time (perception), time and eternity, and contrasting notions of the past and future are explored.","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2017-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82524379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Plotinus the Neoplatonist speaks of the “grace that shimmers on the surface of beauty”1 love. By a natural movement, the soul ascends, thanks to the wings given to it by the giver of this gracious love. Along the way of ascent, the impetus to contemplate the giver directly is gradually bestowed. The vision of spiritual beauty in the audible and visible is indeed a premonition of what lies behind the world of Forms; but “form is only the trace of that which has no form,” says Plotinus.2 The experience of the grace immanent in beauty is thus precisely what directs us to that transcendent source that both engenders form and also bestows the grace shimmering upon its beautiful surface.
{"title":"“Grace That Shimmers on the Surface of Beauty”: Beyond Platonic-Aristotelian Form, a Stoic Vision of Primary Causality","authors":"Christopher S. Morrissey","doi":"10.1353/QUD.2016.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/QUD.2016.0001","url":null,"abstract":"Plotinus the Neoplatonist speaks of the “grace that shimmers on the surface of beauty”1 love. By a natural movement, the soul ascends, thanks to the wings given to it by the giver of this gracious love. Along the way of ascent, the impetus to contemplate the giver directly is gradually bestowed. The vision of spiritual beauty in the audible and visible is indeed a premonition of what lies behind the world of Forms; but “form is only the trace of that which has no form,” says Plotinus.2 The experience of the grace immanent in beauty is thus precisely what directs us to that transcendent source that both engenders form and also bestows the grace shimmering upon its beautiful surface.","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2016-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78467182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The famous quote by Dostoyevsky, “Beauty will save the world,”1 encapsulates the theme of the current volume, The Power of Beauty. For many of us in the West, these words inspire hope in the renewing power of beauty. The statement’s meaning, however, is opaque. Either aesthetic beauty elevates human desires, or metaphysical beauty inspires mimicry. That is to say, either an aesthetically pleasing creation ennobles those who behold it, or the beauty of moral conduct incites imitation in those who behold it. Roman Catholic intellectuals often use this phrase to promote their theology in the context of modernity.2 This phenomenon occurs despite the fact that Dostoyevsky, in the same work, The Idiot, gives his protagonist Prince Myshkin the following lines: “Roman Catholicism is, in my opinion, worse than Atheism itself.”3 Dostoyevsky himself did hold such stark views of the Roman Catholic Church. Writing for The Tablet in 1947, Christopher Hollis recognized this:
{"title":"Dietrich von Hildebrand as Ambassador to the East: A Philokalic Reading of His Writings on Beauty","authors":"Daniel VanderKolk","doi":"10.1353/QUD.2016.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/QUD.2016.0007","url":null,"abstract":"The famous quote by Dostoyevsky, “Beauty will save the world,”1 encapsulates the theme of the current volume, The Power of Beauty. For many of us in the West, these words inspire hope in the renewing power of beauty. The statement’s meaning, however, is opaque. Either aesthetic beauty elevates human desires, or metaphysical beauty inspires mimicry. That is to say, either an aesthetically pleasing creation ennobles those who behold it, or the beauty of moral conduct incites imitation in those who behold it. Roman Catholic intellectuals often use this phrase to promote their theology in the context of modernity.2 This phenomenon occurs despite the fact that Dostoyevsky, in the same work, The Idiot, gives his protagonist Prince Myshkin the following lines: “Roman Catholicism is, in my opinion, worse than Atheism itself.”3 Dostoyevsky himself did hold such stark views of the Roman Catholic Church. Writing for The Tablet in 1947, Christopher Hollis recognized this:","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2016-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77788519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
“Thank you, Sister, for wearing your habit!” “Mom, a blue fairy!” “Sister, would you and your sisters pray for my special request?” Comments that spring spontaneously from the lips of persons who encounter religious demonstrate that those in consecrated life keep up a consistent dialogue with those who observe them, oftentimes without words. Consecrated life serves as a sign to those who live it, and for those who view it from without. The variety of reactions and responses to the sight of a religious sister, brother,
{"title":"Beauty and Hermeneutic Identity in Consecrated Life: Gadamer and the “Icon of the Transfigured Christ”","authors":"S. Eucharista","doi":"10.1353/QUD.2016.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/QUD.2016.0006","url":null,"abstract":"“Thank you, Sister, for wearing your habit!” “Mom, a blue fairy!” “Sister, would you and your sisters pray for my special request?” Comments that spring spontaneously from the lips of persons who encounter religious demonstrate that those in consecrated life keep up a consistent dialogue with those who observe them, oftentimes without words. Consecrated life serves as a sign to those who live it, and for those who view it from without. The variety of reactions and responses to the sight of a religious sister, brother,","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2016-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78670462","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Beauty as Anomaly: Why Does the Bush Not Burn Up?","authors":"Linus Meldrum","doi":"10.1353/QUD.2016.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/QUD.2016.0004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2016-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84899257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
to make little sense. Von Hildebrandian values contrast in fundamental ways with Scholastic theories of the good and beautiful. For von Hildebrand, beauty and good are not transcendentals that are coextensive with being. Rather, being is rendered beautiful or good by values: properties that remain distinct from “neutral” being as such.1 Nevertheless, there is ground for substantial movement towards synthesizing these traditions. Von Hildebrand’s description of values bears strong resemblance with a centerpiece of Scholastic phi-
{"title":"The Metaphysics of Moral Values and Moral Beauty","authors":"M. Otte","doi":"10.1353/QUD.2016.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/QUD.2016.0003","url":null,"abstract":"to make little sense. Von Hildebrandian values contrast in fundamental ways with Scholastic theories of the good and beautiful. For von Hildebrand, beauty and good are not transcendentals that are coextensive with being. Rather, being is rendered beautiful or good by values: properties that remain distinct from “neutral” being as such.1 Nevertheless, there is ground for substantial movement towards synthesizing these traditions. Von Hildebrand’s description of values bears strong resemblance with a centerpiece of Scholastic phi-","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2016-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79959923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
On December 10, 1974, Nobel laureate Alexandr Solzhenitsyn delivered an address on the power of beauty and the arts to change the world. Taking as his point of departure Dostoyevsky’s insight that beauty will save the world, and shaped by his own experience of the power of literature to unmask totalitarianism, Solzhenitsyn spoke on the relationship of beauty, truth, and goodness, and the distinctive nature of the power of beauty.
{"title":"Introduction to The Power of Beauty","authors":"Theresa Farnan","doi":"10.1353/QUD.2016.0000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/QUD.2016.0000","url":null,"abstract":"On December 10, 1974, Nobel laureate Alexandr Solzhenitsyn delivered an address on the power of beauty and the arts to change the world. Taking as his point of departure Dostoyevsky’s insight that beauty will save the world, and shaped by his own experience of the power of literature to unmask totalitarianism, Solzhenitsyn spoke on the relationship of beauty, truth, and goodness, and the distinctive nature of the power of beauty.","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2016-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76648327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Saint John Paul II is one of the two greatest Catholic realist phenomenologists of the twentieth century. While we rightly revere his papacy and its magisterial works (e.g., Fides et Ratio, Veritatis Splendor, Theology of the Body and above all the new Catechism), we should remember that his pre-papal years were spent as a professor of philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin. His important works of this period—Love and Responsibility,1 The Acting Person,2 and many powerful essays—are realist phenomenology at its best. One of his most important contributions is his rich understanding of marital love. Like Dietrich von Hildebrand, the other phenomenological thinker of his stature, Saint John Paul II employs the tools of a realist and personalist phenomenology of the marital embrace to reach the traditional moral conclusions—for instance, about the nature of the human person, the problem of contraception, and the meaning of marriage—in a more attractive and powerful manner than the sometimes sterile manuals of the past. In what follows I shall use sections of Theology of the Body3 as well as his pre-papal work since these sections contain philosophy as such, rather than theology, and can therefore stand on their own. In this paper, I present Saint John Paul II’s understanding of the beauty of marital love and suggest some fruitful avenues for further research.
{"title":"The Beauty of Marital Love in the Thought of Saint John Paul II","authors":"R. Sherlock","doi":"10.1353/QUD.2016.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/QUD.2016.0008","url":null,"abstract":"Saint John Paul II is one of the two greatest Catholic realist phenomenologists of the twentieth century. While we rightly revere his papacy and its magisterial works (e.g., Fides et Ratio, Veritatis Splendor, Theology of the Body and above all the new Catechism), we should remember that his pre-papal years were spent as a professor of philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin. His important works of this period—Love and Responsibility,1 The Acting Person,2 and many powerful essays—are realist phenomenology at its best. One of his most important contributions is his rich understanding of marital love. Like Dietrich von Hildebrand, the other phenomenological thinker of his stature, Saint John Paul II employs the tools of a realist and personalist phenomenology of the marital embrace to reach the traditional moral conclusions—for instance, about the nature of the human person, the problem of contraception, and the meaning of marriage—in a more attractive and powerful manner than the sometimes sterile manuals of the past. In what follows I shall use sections of Theology of the Body3 as well as his pre-papal work since these sections contain philosophy as such, rather than theology, and can therefore stand on their own. In this paper, I present Saint John Paul II’s understanding of the beauty of marital love and suggest some fruitful avenues for further research.","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2016-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84578170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In February 2012, the British Journal of Medical Ethics published a paper that garnered notoriety for its central premise. In “After birth abortion: why should the baby live?” authors Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva argue that infanticide as well as abortion should be legal in cases of babies born with disabilities.1 They focus on two disabilities—Treacher Collins syndrome and Down syndrome—as instances where infanticide should be permitted. Let me state at the outset that I absolutely reject their claim that unborn and newborn human beings lack the moral status of personhood, as well as their abhorrent conclusion that it is acceptable to kill them.2 In this paper, however, I would like to focus on a more subtle aspect of their
2012年2月，《英国医学伦理学杂志》(British Journal of Medical Ethics)发表了一篇论文，因其中心前提而声名狼藉。在《产后流产:为什么婴儿应该活下去?》作者Alberto Giubilini和Francesca Minerva认为，对于出生时就有残疾的婴儿，杀婴和堕胎都应该是合法的他们把重点放在了两种残疾——特里切尔·柯林斯综合症和唐氏综合症——作为杀婴行为应该被允许的例子。请允许我首先声明，我绝对反对他们关于未出生和新生的人类缺乏人格的道德地位的说法，以及他们关于可以接受杀死他们的令人憎恶的结论然而，在本文中，我想把重点放在他们的一个更微妙的方面
{"title":"Beauty, the Person, and Disability: Understanding (and Defending) the Intrinsic Beauty and Value of the Person with Disabilities","authors":"Theresa Farnan","doi":"10.1353/QUD.2016.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/QUD.2016.0009","url":null,"abstract":"In February 2012, the British Journal of Medical Ethics published a paper that garnered notoriety for its central premise. In “After birth abortion: why should the baby live?” authors Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva argue that infanticide as well as abortion should be legal in cases of babies born with disabilities.1 They focus on two disabilities—Treacher Collins syndrome and Down syndrome—as instances where infanticide should be permitted. Let me state at the outset that I absolutely reject their claim that unborn and newborn human beings lack the moral status of personhood, as well as their abhorrent conclusion that it is acceptable to kill them.2 In this paper, however, I would like to focus on a more subtle aspect of their","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2016-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84347923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The concept of kalon appears at important places in Aristotle’s Ethics.1 For instance, Aristotle claims that the virtuous agent acts for the sake of what is kalon; in his account of individual virtues of character, he describes many of them explicitly as dispositions oriented toward what is kalon; he also describes many of the virtues themselves as kalon, and suggests that this has something to do with the value and importance of the virtues. The Greek word kalon has been rendered variously in English as ent translations have arisen not only among translators and commentators, but also within single translations of the Ethics. This fact draws our attention to two problems facing an investigation of the concept of kalon in Aristotle’s ethics. First, it suggests that we have no English word that corresponds isomorphically with the term kalon. As English-readers of Aristotle, we need, instead, an arsenal of terms to capture the nuanced features of its evidently complex Greek connotation. Of course, this is a common problem facing translators; isomorphic translations are perhaps more the exception than the norm. However, a peculiar problem arises in this case because the concept it is supposed to express is patently central to Aristotle’s Ethics, and yet we lack not only a single word in English that corresponds to the Greek term, but it might also very well be a native concept of the attribute kalon itself. From a cursory survey of the above list of candidate translations, it isn’t at all clear why the meanings associated with this list of English words should hang together as expressing a single attribute familiar to English language users. The second problem facing translators is the diversity of contexts in which Aristotle employs the term kalon. As it turns out, one reason for
{"title":"Beauty and Motivation in Aristotle","authors":"Brian Donohue","doi":"10.1353/QUD.2016.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/QUD.2016.0002","url":null,"abstract":"The concept of kalon appears at important places in Aristotle’s Ethics.1 For instance, Aristotle claims that the virtuous agent acts for the sake of what is kalon; in his account of individual virtues of character, he describes many of them explicitly as dispositions oriented toward what is kalon; he also describes many of the virtues themselves as kalon, and suggests that this has something to do with the value and importance of the virtues. The Greek word kalon has been rendered variously in English as ent translations have arisen not only among translators and commentators, but also within single translations of the Ethics. This fact draws our attention to two problems facing an investigation of the concept of kalon in Aristotle’s ethics. First, it suggests that we have no English word that corresponds isomorphically with the term kalon. As English-readers of Aristotle, we need, instead, an arsenal of terms to capture the nuanced features of its evidently complex Greek connotation. Of course, this is a common problem facing translators; isomorphic translations are perhaps more the exception than the norm. However, a peculiar problem arises in this case because the concept it is supposed to express is patently central to Aristotle’s Ethics, and yet we lack not only a single word in English that corresponds to the Greek term, but it might also very well be a native concept of the attribute kalon itself. From a cursory survey of the above list of candidate translations, it isn’t at all clear why the meanings associated with this list of English words should hang together as expressing a single attribute familiar to English language users. The second problem facing translators is the diversity of contexts in which Aristotle employs the term kalon. As it turns out, one reason for","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2016-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89540054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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