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The cost of proportional representations in electoral system design 选举制度设计中比例代表制的代价
IF 0.3 Q4 ECONOMICS
Economic Theory Bulletin
Pub Date : 2024-03-07 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-024-00261-1
Byeong-hyeon Jeong

We present an impossibility result concerning the design of dual vote electoral systems that meet three key conditions: proportional party representation, proportional local representation, and local accountability. By identifying the necessary number of compensatory seats to meet these three conditions in dual vote systems, we show that the number is not bounded in general; thus, it can be very costly to achieve the three conditions. When a cap is applied to the total seats, combined with a district-decentralization, semi-compensatory dual vote systems that distribute the limited compensatory seats to enhance proportionality become vulnerable to strategic manipulations. Specifically, when political parties seek to maximize their legislative representation, they might employ the strategy of creating ‘decoy’ party lists.

我们提出了一个不可能的结果，涉及如何设计满足三个关键条件的双票选举制：政党代表比例、地方代表比例和地方问责制。通过确定在双票制中满足这三个条件所需的补偿席位数量，我们证明了这一数量在一般情况下是没有界限的；因此，要实现这三个条件的代价可能会非常高昂。如果对总席位数设置上限，再加上地区分权，半补偿双票制在分配有限的补偿席位以提高比例性时，就容易受到策略操纵的影响。具体来说，当政党寻求最大化其立法代表权时，他们可能会采用创建 "诱饵 "政党名单的策略。
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引用次数: 0
Welfare reducing licensing by an outside innovator 由外部创新者颁发减少福利的许可证
IF 0.3 Q4 ECONOMICS
Economic Theory Bulletin
Pub Date : 2024-01-06 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00259-1
Arijit Mukherjee, Uday Bhanu Sinha

It is commonly believed that licensing of cost reducing technology increases welfare. We show that technology licensing by an outside innovator may reduce welfare when the technology is not useful for all final goods producers. Technology licensing reduces welfare if cost reduction by the licensed technology is small and the initial cost difference of the final goods producers is large. A higher intensity of competition, either due to lower product differentiation or due to Bertrand competition instead of Cournot competition, increases the possibility of welfare reducing licensing.

人们普遍认为，发放降低成本的技术许可会增加福利。我们的研究表明，当技术并非对所有最终产品生产者都有用时，外部创新者的技术许可可能会降低福利。如果被许可技术降低的成本很小，而最终产品生产者的初始成本差异很大，那么技术许可就会降低福利。由于产品差异较小或由于伯特兰竞争而不是库诺竞争，竞争强度越大，发放技术许可降低福利的可能性就越大。
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引用次数: 0
Valuation asymmetry in the dynamic private provision of public goods 动态私人提供公共产品中的估值不对称问题
IF 0.3 Q4 ECONOMICS
Economic Theory Bulletin
Pub Date : 2023-12-27 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00260-8
Subhra K. Bhattacharya

I consider a dynamic game of private provision of a discrete public good by individuals who derive asymmetric flow benefits every period upon project completion. The individuals are otherwise homogeneous. I show that an asymmetric Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) exists, which is either a completion equilibrium (where the good is provided) or a no-contribution equilibrium depending on the benefits asymmetry. A completion equilibrium does not require all the agents to contribute at every period. Along an MPE, an individual contributes from the beginning ((t=0)), irrespective of others’ contributions, if her flow benefit exceeds a contribution threshold. Individual contributions are strategic complements across time; however, the coefficient of strategic complementarity is independent of valuation asymmetry. A higher valuation individual makes a larger absolute contribution every period. I show that all the socially beneficial projects get completed in an asymmetric MPE when the higher valuation individual’s flow benefit exceeds that contribution threshold and that an asymmetric completion MPE is efficiency improving compared to its symmetric counterpart.

我考虑的是一个由个人私人提供离散公共物品的动态博弈，这些个人在项目完成后每期都会获得不对称的流动收益。这些个体在其他方面是同质的。我的研究表明，非对称马尔可夫完全均衡（MPE）是存在的，它要么是完工均衡（提供物品），要么是无贡献均衡，这取决于收益的非对称性。完成均衡并不要求所有代理人在每个时期都做出贡献。在 MPE 中，如果一个人的流量收益超过了贡献阈值，那么无论其他人的贡献如何，他都会从一开始就贡献（（t=0））。个人贡献是跨时间的战略互补；然而，战略互补系数与估值不对称无关。估值越高的人每期的绝对贡献越大。我的研究表明，在非对称 MPE 中，当估值较高的个人的流量收益超过该贡献阈值时，所有对社会有益的项目都会完成，而且非对称完成 MPE 与对称完成 MPE 相比会提高效率。
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引用次数: 0
On the shape of Pareto sets in Edgeworth box economies 论埃奇沃斯盒子经济中帕累托集合的形状
Q4 ECONOMICS
Economic Theory Bulletin
Pub Date : 2023-09-12 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00258-2
William Thomson
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引用次数: 0
Spying and imperfect commitment in first-price auctions: a case of tacit collusion 首价拍卖中的间谍行为和不完全承诺:一个默契勾结的案例
IF 0.3 Q4 ECONOMICS
Economic Theory Bulletin
Pub Date : 2023-08-28 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00257-3
Cuihong Fan, B. Jun, Elmar G. Wolfstetter
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引用次数: 0
Relative performance evaluation in organizations with information networks 信息网络组织的相对绩效评估
IF 0.3 Q4 ECONOMICS
Economic Theory Bulletin
Pub Date : 2023-08-28 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00256-4
Xiangyu Shi
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引用次数: 0
Obstacles to redistribution through markets and one solution 通过市场进行再分配的障碍和一个解决方案
IF 0.3 Q4 ECONOMICS
Economic Theory Bulletin
Pub Date : 2023-08-24 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00255-5
R. Allen, John Rehbeck
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引用次数: 1
Correction: The precedence function: a numerical evaluation method for multicriteria ranking problems 更正:优先函数:多准则排序问题的数值评价方法
Q4 ECONOMICS
Economic Theory Bulletin
Pub Date : 2023-08-12 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00254-6
Antonio Villar
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引用次数: 0
The enemy of my enemy is my friend: new conditions for network games 敌人的敌人就是朋友:网络游戏的新形势
IF 0.3 Q4 ECONOMICS
Economic Theory Bulletin
Pub Date : 2023-07-28 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00253-7
Hideto Koizumi
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引用次数: 1
The precedence function: a numerical evaluation method for multicriteria ranking problems 优先级函数：多准则排序问题的一种数值评价方法
IF 0.3 Q4 ECONOMICS
Economic Theory Bulletin
Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00249-3
Antonio Villar
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引用次数: 0
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