In this paper, I present two presumed alternative definitions of metavalidity for metainferences: Local and Global. I defend the latter, first, by arguing that it is not too weak with respect to metainference-cases, and that local metavalidity is in fact too strong with respect to types. Second, I show that although regarding metainference-schemas Local metavalidity is always stable, Global metavalidity is also stable when the language satisfies reasonable expressibility criteria (and that in fact, both concepts collapse in those cases).
{"title":"Strength and Stability","authors":"Paula Teijeiro","doi":"10.36446/af.2021.459","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2021.459","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I present two presumed alternative definitions of metavalidity for metainferences: Local and Global. I defend the latter, first, by arguing that it is not too weak with respect to metainference-cases, and that local metavalidity is in fact too strong with respect to types. Second, I show that although regarding metainference-schemas Local metavalidity is always stable, Global metavalidity is also stable when the language satisfies reasonable expressibility criteria (and that in fact, both concepts collapse in those cases).","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42369702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper provides an inferentialist motivation for a logic belonging in the connexive family, by borrowing elements from the bilateralist interpretation for Classical Logic without the Cut rule, proposed by David Ripley. The paper focuses on the relation between inferentialism and relevance, through the exploration of what we call relevant assertion and denial, showing that a connexive system emerges as a symptom of this interesting link. With the present attempt we hope to broaden the available interpretations for connexive logics, showing they can be rightfully motivated in terms of certain relevantist constraints imposed on assertion and denial.
{"title":"Inferentialism and Relevance","authors":"D. Szmuc","doi":"10.36446/af.2021.458","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2021.458","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides an inferentialist motivation for a logic belonging in the connexive family, by borrowing elements from the bilateralist interpretation for Classical Logic without the Cut rule, proposed by David Ripley. The paper focuses on the relation between inferentialism and relevance, through the exploration of what we call relevant assertion and denial, showing that a connexive system emerges as a symptom of this interesting link. With the present attempt we hope to broaden the available interpretations for connexive logics, showing they can be rightfully motivated in terms of certain relevantist constraints imposed on assertion and denial.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48808334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
En este artículo analizamos la crítica que Richard Rorty hace de la apelación al “método experimental” por parte de John Dewey. Defendemos que la categórica desestimación que Rorty presenta del vínculo entre el pragmatismo de Dewey y su concepción de método hubiera sido o bien matizada, o bien radicalmente diferente, de haber considerado seriamente la importancia que la reflexión sobre la educación tenía para el filósofo de Vermont. Nuestra estrategia interpretativa se apoya en la recuperación que Henry Cowles hace recientemente de la apelación al método experimental que Dewey lleva a cabo en How We Think (1910 primera edición, 1933 segunda edición) —uno de sus textos educativos más importantes—, en donde se muestra las vinculaciones relevantes entre pragmatismo, evolucionismo y método. Este marco histórico-conceptual nos permitirá cuestionar la reconstrucción de Rorty en torno de este aspecto de la filosofía deweyana tomando en cuenta, fundamentalmente, sus propias reflexiones sobre educación.
{"title":"Pragmatismo, método y educación","authors":"J. Saharrea, C. Viale","doi":"10.36446/af.2021.435","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2021.435","url":null,"abstract":"En este artículo analizamos la crítica que Richard Rorty hace de la apelación al “método experimental” por parte de John Dewey. Defendemos que la categórica desestimación que Rorty presenta del vínculo entre el pragmatismo de Dewey y su concepción de método hubiera sido o bien matizada, o bien radicalmente diferente, de haber considerado seriamente la importancia que la reflexión sobre la educación tenía para el filósofo de Vermont. Nuestra estrategia interpretativa se apoya en la recuperación que Henry Cowles hace recientemente de la apelación al método experimental que Dewey lleva a cabo en How We Think (1910 primera edición, 1933 segunda edición) —uno de sus textos educativos más importantes—, en donde se muestra las vinculaciones relevantes entre pragmatismo, evolucionismo y método. Este marco histórico-conceptual nos permitirá cuestionar la reconstrucción de Rorty en torno de este aspecto de la filosofía deweyana tomando en cuenta, fundamentalmente, sus propias reflexiones sobre educación.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43855742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Uncut is a book about two kinds of paradoxes: paradoxes involving truth and its relatives, like the liar paradox, and paradoxes involving vagueness. There are lots of ways to look at these paradoxes, and lots of puzzles generated by them, and Uncut ignores most of this variety to focus on a single issue. That issue: do our words mean what they seem to mean, and if so, how can this be? I claim that our words do mean what they seem to, and yet our language is not undermined by paradox. By developing a distinctive theory of meaning, I show how this can be.
{"title":"Précis of Uncut","authors":"David Ripley","doi":"10.36446/af.2021.462","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2021.462","url":null,"abstract":"Uncut is a book about two kinds of paradoxes: paradoxes involving truth and its relatives, like the liar paradox, and paradoxes involving vagueness. There are lots of ways to look at these paradoxes, and lots of puzzles generated by them, and Uncut ignores most of this variety to focus on a single issue. That issue: do our words mean what they seem to mean, and if so, how can this be? I claim that our words do mean what they seem to, and yet our language is not undermined by paradox. By developing a distinctive theory of meaning, I show how this can be.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45645271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The main idea that we want to defend in this paper is that the question of what a logic is should be addressed differently when structural properties enter the game. In particular, we want to support the idea according to which it is not enough to identify the set of valid inferences to characterize a logic. In other words, we will argue that two logical theories could identify the same set of validities (e.g. its logical truths and valid inferences), but not be the same logic.
{"title":"Why a Logic is not only its Set of Valid Inferences","authors":"E. Barrio, F. Pailos","doi":"10.36446/af.2021.461","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2021.461","url":null,"abstract":"The main idea that we want to defend in this paper is that the question of what a logic is should be addressed differently when structural properties enter the game. In particular, we want to support the idea according to which it is not enough to identify the set of valid inferences to characterize a logic. In other words, we will argue that two logical theories could identify the same set of validities (e.g. its logical truths and valid inferences), but not be the same logic.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42837917","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While participating in a symposium on Dave Ripley’s forthcoming book Uncut, I had proposed that employing a strict-tolerant interpretation of the weak Kleene matrices provided a content-theoretical conception of the bounds of conversational norms that enjoyed advantages over Ripley’s use of the strong Kleene matrices. During discussion, I used the case of sentences that are taken to be out-of-bounds for being secrets as an example of a case in which the setting of conversational bounds in practice diverged from the account championed by Ripley. In this paper, I consider an objection that my treatment of quantifiers was mistaken insofar as the confidentiality of a sentence ϕ(t) may not lift to the sentence ∃xϕ(x) and draw from this objection that neither the strong nor the weak Kleene interpretation of quantifiers suffices, but that a novel interpretation may do so.
{"title":"Secrecy, Content, and Quantification","authors":"T. M. Ferguson","doi":"10.36446/af.2021.457","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2021.457","url":null,"abstract":"While participating in a symposium on Dave Ripley’s forthcoming book Uncut, I had proposed that employing a strict-tolerant interpretation of the weak Kleene matrices provided a content-theoretical conception of the bounds of conversational norms that enjoyed advantages over Ripley’s use of the strong Kleene matrices. During discussion, I used the case of sentences that are taken to be out-of-bounds for being secrets as an example of a case in which the setting of conversational bounds in practice diverged from the account championed by Ripley. In this paper, I consider an objection that my treatment of quantifiers was mistaken insofar as the confidentiality of a sentence ϕ(t) may not lift to the sentence ∃xϕ(x) and draw from this objection that neither the strong nor the weak Kleene interpretation of quantifiers suffices, but that a novel interpretation may do so.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44643058","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Some authors have recently argued in favor of anti-exceptionalism about logic. The general idea is that logic is not different from the other sciences, and its principles are as revisable as scientific principles. This paper has three sections. In section 1, I discuss the meaning of anti-exceptionalism and its place in contemporary logic. In section 2, I analyze some recent developments on this topic by Williamson (2017) and Hjortland (2017), which will motivate my view. In section 3, I propose a puzzle-solving perspective on logical practice. According to my view, there is a common methodology, in which scientists may use non-classical in order to solve some specific puzzles, but classical logic stays in a privileged position, as a common language and as a general theory of reasoning. This role cannot be fulfilled by other logics, and therefore the comparison between classical and non-classical logic is not like a regular comparison between competing hypotheses in science. The methodology of logical practice is therefore not abductive, at least in many important cases. Classical logic is not the “best available theory”, but the fundamental piece of our scientific methodology. My position is still anti-exceptionalist: logic is like any other science, or at least like any other science which can be characterized by a puzzle-solving methodology.
{"title":"Logic as a Puzzle-Solving Activity","authors":"Diego Tajer","doi":"10.36446/AF.2021.361","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/AF.2021.361","url":null,"abstract":"Some authors have recently argued in favor of anti-exceptionalism about logic. The general idea is that logic is not different from the other sciences, and its principles are as revisable as scientific principles. This paper has three sections. In section 1, I discuss the meaning of anti-exceptionalism and its place in contemporary logic. In section 2, I analyze some recent developments on this topic by Williamson (2017) and Hjortland (2017), which will motivate my view. In section 3, I propose a puzzle-solving perspective on logical practice. According to my view, there is a common methodology, in which scientists may use non-classical in order to solve some specific puzzles, but classical logic stays in a privileged position, as a common language and as a general theory of reasoning. This role cannot be fulfilled by other logics, and therefore the comparison between classical and non-classical logic is not like a regular comparison between competing hypotheses in science. The methodology of logical practice is therefore not abductive, at least in many important cases. Classical logic is not the “best available theory”, but the fundamental piece of our scientific methodology. My position is still anti-exceptionalist: logic is like any other science, or at least like any other science which can be characterized by a puzzle-solving methodology.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":"41 1","pages":"119-140"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42441405","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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