This article discusses the notion of rationality and agency in Fernando Broncano’s Racionalidad, Accion y Opacidad (2017). In this book, contradicting the apriorist normative theses or simple naturalistic descriptivism, Broncano argues that rationality is something that is directly associated with our ordinary practices of evaluating the judgments, actions and decisions of others. “Rationality” should be considered as a term we use as an intellectual qualifier or as a virtue we bestow on people who can make theoretical and practical decisions autonomously. Thus, rationality would not be an a priori condition for someone to become a person or a capacity to eliminate the turbulence of human cognitive and moral precariousness, but a form of involvement in the world that positively qualifies the organism that relates thought and action, judgment and choice in the search for lucidity in an uncertain world. With this, rationality and agency would be products of the social interdependence that one has in relation to the other, since we learn it and teach it in the context of natural life. This article is organized in three sections: in the first section I make a very brief presentation of one of the aspects of the problem that has motivated the philosophical discussion on rationality and agency; in the second section, I present my understanding of the themes developed in Racionalidad, Accion y Opacidad, their internal structure and, of course, their central thesis; in the third section, I specifically discuss the theme that the normativity of rationality arises from our dialectical encounter with other people and make personal considerations on the value and scope of the arguments constructed in this book.
{"title":"Racionalidad para los humanos","authors":"Waldomiro J. Silva Filho","doi":"10.36446/AF.2021.345","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/AF.2021.345","url":null,"abstract":"This article discusses the notion of rationality and agency in Fernando Broncano’s Racionalidad, Accion y Opacidad (2017). In this book, contradicting the apriorist normative theses or simple naturalistic descriptivism, Broncano argues that rationality is something that is directly associated with our ordinary practices of evaluating the judgments, actions and decisions of others. “Rationality” should be considered as a term we use as an intellectual qualifier or as a virtue we bestow on people who can make theoretical and practical decisions autonomously. Thus, rationality would not be an a priori condition for someone to become a person or a capacity to eliminate the turbulence of human cognitive and moral precariousness, but a form of involvement in the world that positively qualifies the organism that relates thought and action, judgment and choice in the search for lucidity in an uncertain world. With this, rationality and agency would be products of the social interdependence that one has in relation to the other, since we learn it and teach it in the context of natural life. This article is organized in three sections: in the first section I make a very brief presentation of one of the aspects of the problem that has motivated the philosophical discussion on rationality and agency; in the second section, I present my understanding of the themes developed in Racionalidad, Accion y Opacidad, their internal structure and, of course, their central thesis; in the third section, I specifically discuss the theme that the normativity of rationality arises from our dialectical encounter with other people and make personal considerations on the value and scope of the arguments constructed in this book.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":"41 1","pages":"67-89"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47285524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cecilia Hidalgo, Innovación y creatividad científica: La reconfiguración del pensamiento antropológico en la obra de Clifford Geertz, Buenos Aires, Eudeba, colección Primer círculo, 2019, 264 pp.","authors":"M. Martini","doi":"10.36446/AF.2021.391","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/AF.2021.391","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":"41 1","pages":"187-190"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45714082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Luego de la Conquista del Desierto, el Estado argentino impuso su ordenamiento institucional a los miembros sobrevivientes de varias comunidades indigenas. De este modo, sus instituciones fueron desplazadas. Esta es una injusticia historica cuya reparacion, en aquel tiempo, requeria la restauracion de la vigencia de las instituciones indigenas. Sin embargo, no estamos mas en 1885 y muchas circunstancias han cambiado. Muchas personas indigenas y no indigenas viven en las mismas ciudades, tienen intereses en las mismas porciones de tierra, e interactuan entre ellos en innumerables formas. Por lo tanto, debe analizarse si, bajo estas condiciones, los reclamos indigenas por recuperar su soberania siguen siendo validos. En este trabajo argumentare que, debido a cambios en las circunstancias, estos reclamos tienen menos fuerza que en el pasado. Por lo tanto, la injusticia historica no puede ser reparada del mismo modo que en 1885. No obstante, dada la historia de opresion a la que los indigenas han sido sometidos, el sistema institucional de Argentina tiene que ser reformado de manera tal que su aplicacion sobre ellos sea legitima. Propongo tres medidas que contribuyen a conseguir dicho objetivo, a saber, el autogobierno para asuntos internos, la representacion en el Senado y el cambio institucional por mayoria simple.
{"title":"La Conquista del Desierto, Confianza y el Principio de Proximidad","authors":"Santiago Truccone-Borgogno","doi":"10.36446/AF.2021.378","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/AF.2021.378","url":null,"abstract":"Luego de la Conquista del Desierto, el Estado argentino impuso su ordenamiento institucional a los miembros sobrevivientes de varias comunidades indigenas. De este modo, sus instituciones fueron desplazadas. Esta es una injusticia historica cuya reparacion, en aquel tiempo, requeria la restauracion de la vigencia de las instituciones indigenas. Sin embargo, no estamos mas en 1885 y muchas circunstancias han cambiado. Muchas personas indigenas y no indigenas viven en las mismas ciudades, tienen intereses en las mismas porciones de tierra, e interactuan entre ellos en innumerables formas. Por lo tanto, debe analizarse si, bajo estas condiciones, los reclamos indigenas por recuperar su soberania siguen siendo validos. En este trabajo argumentare que, debido a cambios en las circunstancias, estos reclamos tienen menos fuerza que en el pasado. Por lo tanto, la injusticia historica no puede ser reparada del mismo modo que en 1885. No obstante, dada la historia de opresion a la que los indigenas han sido sometidos, el sistema institucional de Argentina tiene que ser reformado de manera tal que su aplicacion sobre ellos sea legitima. Propongo tres medidas que contribuyen a conseguir dicho objetivo, a saber, el autogobierno para asuntos internos, la representacion en el Senado y el cambio institucional por mayoria simple.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":"41 1","pages":"7-36"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44409372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In “The Nature of Judgment” (1899), G. E. Moore defends the strange thesis according to which “[i]t seems necessary… to regard the world as formed of concepts”. Philosophers have offered distinct understandings of this proposal, in particular of what Moorean concepts really are. In this article I discuss and reject three of them: one, according to which Moorean concepts are universals within the framework of a bundle theory of concrete particulars (Nelson, 1962; Baldwin, 1990); a second one, according to which Moorean concepts are particulars within a mereological framework of analysis (Bell, 1999); and a third one, according to which Moorean concepts are a sui generis category, resulting from his alleged rejection of the substance (particular)/attribute (universal) distinction (MacBride, 2018). I end by defending my own understanding, which highlights the openly Platonic stance of the young G. E. Moore.
{"title":"G. E. Moore on Concepts and Judgment","authors":"José Sebastián Briceño Domínguez","doi":"10.36446/AF.2021.357","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/AF.2021.357","url":null,"abstract":"In “The Nature of Judgment” (1899), G. E. Moore defends the strange thesis according to which “[i]t seems necessary… to regard the world as formed of concepts”. Philosophers have offered distinct understandings of this proposal, in particular of what Moorean concepts really are. In this article I discuss and reject three of them: one, according to which Moorean concepts are universals within the framework of a bundle theory of concrete particulars (Nelson, 1962; Baldwin, 1990); a second one, according to which Moorean concepts are particulars within a mereological framework of analysis (Bell, 1999); and a third one, according to which Moorean concepts are a sui generis category, resulting from his alleged rejection of the substance (particular)/attribute (universal) distinction (MacBride, 2018). I end by defending my own understanding, which highlights the openly Platonic stance of the young G. E. Moore.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":"41 1","pages":"91-117"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44442048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rapid advancements in human neuroscience and neurotechnology open unprecedented possibilities for accessing, collecting, sharing and manipulating information from the human brain. Such applications raise important challenges to human rights principles that need to be addressed to prevent unintended consequences. This paper assesses the implications of emerging neurotechnology applications in the context of the human rights framework and suggests that existing human rights may not be sufficient to respond to these emerging issues. After analysing the relationship between neuroscience and human rights, we identify four new rights that may become of great relevance in the coming decades: the right to cognitive liberty, the right to mental privacy, the right to mental integrity, and the right to psychological continuity.
{"title":"Hacia nuevos derechos humanos en la era de la neurociencia y la neurotecnología","authors":"Marcello Ienca, Roberto Andorno","doi":"10.36446/AF.2021.386","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/AF.2021.386","url":null,"abstract":"Rapid advancements in human neuroscience and neurotechnology open unprecedented possibilities for accessing, collecting, sharing and manipulating information from the human brain. Such applications raise important challenges to human rights principles that need to be addressed to prevent unintended consequences. This paper assesses the implications of emerging neurotechnology applications in the context of the human rights framework and suggests that existing human rights may not be sufficient to respond to these emerging issues. After analysing the relationship between neuroscience and human rights, we identify four new rights that may become of great relevance in the coming decades: the right to cognitive liberty, the right to mental privacy, the right to mental integrity, and the right to psychological continuity.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":"41 1","pages":"141-185"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44112551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Alberto Moretti “La logica y la trama de las cosas” presents and defends a conception of logic according to which there are logical principles that structure language and, consequently, the world. This way of understanding logic offers an answer to the problem of its normativity, at the same time that it dissolves the problem of its justification. In this work, I critically analyze this view of logic and propose an alternative conception that vindicates the legitimacy of both problems and gives them a satisfactory solution.
阿尔贝托·莫雷蒂的《La logica y La trama de las cosas》提出并捍卫了一种逻辑概念，根据这种逻辑概念，有逻辑原则来构建语言，从而构建世界。这种理解逻辑的方式为逻辑的规范性问题提供了答案，同时也解决了逻辑的正当性问题。在这项工作中，我批判性地分析了这种逻辑观点，并提出了另一种概念，证明了这两个问题的合法性，并给出了令人满意的解决方案。
{"title":"Lógica, justificación y normatividad","authors":"Natalia Buacar","doi":"10.36446/AF.2020.431","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/AF.2020.431","url":null,"abstract":"Alberto Moretti “La logica y la trama de las cosas” presents and defends a conception of logic according to which there are logical principles that structure language and, consequently, the world. This way of understanding logic offers an answer to the problem of its normativity, at the same time that it dissolves the problem of its justification. In this work, I critically analyze this view of logic and propose an alternative conception that vindicates the legitimacy of both problems and gives them a satisfactory solution.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":"40 1","pages":"159-182"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43563462","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Some of Alberto Moretti’s thoughts about the trascendental nature of logic are presented, with special emphasis in the evolution of his ideas about this subject between the publication in 2006 of “Logica y semantica” and “La logica y la trama de las cosas” from 2016. The most general traits of a version of logical naturalism that might survive Moretti’s transcendentalist objections is presented.
{"title":"Lógica trascendental y lógica naturalista","authors":"Javier Castro Albano","doi":"10.36446/AF.2020.432","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/AF.2020.432","url":null,"abstract":"Some of Alberto Moretti’s thoughts about the trascendental nature of logic are presented, with special emphasis in the evolution of his ideas about this subject between the publication in 2006 of “Logica y semantica” and “La logica y la trama de las cosas” from 2016. The most general traits of a version of logical naturalism that might survive Moretti’s transcendentalist objections is presented.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":"40 1","pages":"183-196"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49363387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper I review various conceptions of logic. I study the scope and the limitations of the dominant conception in at least the first half of the XXth. century. I try to show the limitations of the notion associated with the concept of consequence captured by classical logical formalism, which is related to the program of the foundation of mathematics. Those limitations are pointed out not only with respect to the intuitive notions of logic but also with respect to the different associated disciplines (in particular computer sciences, psychology, cognitive sciences and the theory of argumentation). I argue that the characterization of logic offered by A. Moretti offers a broader and overcoming view of logic.
{"title":"Las lógicas y los lógicos: Concepciones de la lógica","authors":"Diego Letzen","doi":"10.36446/AF.2020.430","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/AF.2020.430","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I review various conceptions of logic. I study the scope and the limitations of the dominant conception in at least the first half of the XXth. century. I try to show the limitations of the notion associated with the concept of consequence captured by classical logical formalism, which is related to the program of the foundation of mathematics. Those limitations are pointed out not only with respect to the intuitive notions of logic but also with respect to the different associated disciplines (in particular computer sciences, psychology, cognitive sciences and the theory of argumentation). I argue that the characterization of logic offered by A. Moretti offers a broader and overcoming view of logic.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":"40 1","pages":"133-157"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42086969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the conference “Las logicas y las cosas “ (2014), Alberto Moretti argues that approaches that focus on the phenomenon of interpretation to account for the problem of meaning have a problem, namely, they do not support the transcendental conditions that make significance possible. Thus, in the context of interpretation, distinguishing others as speakers involves the possibility of distinguishing others as related objects in the (non-linguistic) world. Not only is this distinction possible because specific logical principles expose the basic structure for discourse and thought but they also expose the elementary structure of the world or reality (Moretti, 2016, p.1). In other words, the logical forms or the logical principles that structure our language are also principles of things (cf. Moretti: 1:23:14). This argument can be considered a transcendental argument as it establishes, through pointing out certain necessary conditions, the intimate world-language connection that accounts for significance, and as it insinuates itself as a response to the problem of the external world (cf. Moretti, 2014: 1:39:13).I propose discussing the scope of this argument from the idea of language autonomy that Wittgenstein develops in On Certainty, which entails an alternative dissolutional strategy against the skeptical challenge. To account for this strategy, I will focus on the distinction between logical and empirical propositions. I will also analyze the distinction show-say that, in its relation with the notion of “forms of life”, allows for illuminating aspects of its praxiological focus on language. Thus, I will defend an approach that does not omit but rejects the possibility of an external (transcendental) point of view both to account for language and to respond to the skeptic.
在会议“Las logicas y Las cosas”（2014），Alberto Moretti认为，专注于解释现象来解释意义问题的方法有一个问题，即它们不支持使意义成为可能的先验条件。因此，在解释的背景下，将他人区分为说话者涉及到将他人在（非语言）世界中区分为相关对象的可能性。这种区别不仅是可能的，因为特定的逻辑原则揭示了话语和思想的基本结构，而且也揭示了世界或现实的基本结构（Moretti，2016，p.1）。换句话说，构成我们语言的逻辑形式或逻辑原则也是事物的原则（参见Moretti:1:23:14）。这一论点可以被视为一种先验论点，因为它通过指出某些必要条件，建立了解释意义的亲密世界语言联系，以及它暗示自己是对外部世界问题的回应（参见Moretti，2014:1:39:13）。为了解释这种策略，我将重点讨论逻辑命题和经验命题之间的区别。我还将分析这种区别，比如说，在它与“生命形式”概念的关系中，它可以阐明其对语言的实践学关注。因此，我将捍卫一种方法，这种方法不会省略但拒绝外部（先验）观点的可能性，既可以解释语言，也可以回应怀疑论者。
{"title":"Formas lógicas y formas de vida: La distinción entre proposiciones lógicas y empíricas y la distinción mostrar-decir en Sobre la Certeza","authors":"G. Reinoso","doi":"10.36446/AF.2020.428","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/AF.2020.428","url":null,"abstract":"In the conference “Las logicas y las cosas “ (2014), Alberto Moretti argues that approaches that focus on the phenomenon of interpretation to account for the problem of meaning have a problem, namely, they do not support the transcendental conditions that make significance possible. Thus, in the context of interpretation, distinguishing others as speakers involves the possibility of distinguishing others as related objects in the (non-linguistic) world. Not only is this distinction possible because specific logical principles expose the basic structure for discourse and thought but they also expose the elementary structure of the world or reality (Moretti, 2016, p.1). In other words, the logical forms or the logical principles that structure our language are also principles of things (cf. Moretti: 1:23:14). This argument can be considered a transcendental argument as it establishes, through pointing out certain necessary conditions, the intimate world-language connection that accounts for significance, and as it insinuates itself as a response to the problem of the external world (cf. Moretti, 2014: 1:39:13).I propose discussing the scope of this argument from the idea of language autonomy that Wittgenstein develops in On Certainty, which entails an alternative dissolutional strategy against the skeptical challenge. To account for this strategy, I will focus on the distinction between logical and empirical propositions. I will also analyze the distinction show-say that, in its relation with the notion of “forms of life”, allows for illuminating aspects of its praxiological focus on language. Thus, I will defend an approach that does not omit but rejects the possibility of an external (transcendental) point of view both to account for language and to respond to the skeptic.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":"40 1","pages":"89-108"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48786153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Lista de obras publicadas e inéditas de Alberto Moretti","authors":"Alberto Moretti","doi":"10.36446/AF.2020.423","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/AF.2020.423","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":"40 1","pages":"13-19"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46326752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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