After an exposition of the importance of the concept of diachronic identity and a short sketch of the bewildering confusion concerning the meaning of the terms intimately connected to it, an outline of the basic features of Whitehead’s process approach is presented in as far as it is relevant for the topic of the human person and identity. In a further step, Whitehead’s concept of ‘person’ as nested in this approach will be discussed and the dilemma between securing human identity on the one side and accounting at the same time for its flexible adaptivity to the environment on the other, will be elaborated. Then the concepts of strict and partial identity (in the sense of equivalence) and the problem of the fragility of human identity, and even its possible loss, and how identity can be secured within this processorganismic conception of ‘person’ will be dealt with. Finally, the sources of partial diachronic identity within the framework of process philosophy will be discussed.
{"title":"Hobos – on the Fragility of Human Diachronic Identity in Whitehead’s Process Philosophy","authors":"F. Riffert","doi":"10.5840/bjp202214212","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/bjp202214212","url":null,"abstract":"After an exposition of the importance of the concept of diachronic identity and a short sketch of the bewildering confusion concerning the meaning of the terms intimately connected to it, an outline of the basic features of Whitehead’s process approach is presented in as far as it is relevant for the topic of the human person and identity. In a further step, Whitehead’s concept of ‘person’ as nested in this approach will be discussed and the dilemma between securing human identity on the one side and accounting at the same time for its flexible adaptivity to the environment on the other, will be elaborated. Then the concepts of strict and partial identity (in the sense of equivalence) and the problem of the fragility of human identity, and even its possible loss, and how identity can be secured within this processorganismic conception of ‘person’ will be dealt with. Finally, the sources of partial diachronic identity within the framework of process philosophy will be discussed.","PeriodicalId":41126,"journal":{"name":"Balkan Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71226365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article examines the epistemological views of key quantum physicists of the Copenhagen circle (Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg and Léon Rosenfeld). The discussion begins with a presentation of their conception of measurement, indeterminacy and complementarity, and goes on to focus on their views regarding the nature of being and knowledge. The author identifies the basic areas of consensus in the Copenhagen circle as well as the disagreements and disputes that arose between its members. Three main points are argued: (1) The fundamental epistemological consensus in the group was that subject and object are inseparable; that the subject participates in the formation of images of reality, which are multiple and depend on how the subject is concretely constituted historically; the disagreements within the group did not arise with logical inevitability from the principles of quantum mechanics but largely stemmed from ideological clash in the Cold War context. (2) Being linked to specific configurations of the subjects, knowledge is always relative; but it does not follow that knowledge is illusory or inadequate; on the contrary, it is the pretension of attaining the ultimate nature of things “in themselves” that leads to devaluation of any concrete knowledge. (3) The world is something external, generally independent of our desires and will, but at the same time is constructed as concrete objects through the specific configuration of each concrete subject.
本文考察了哥本哈根圈的关键量子物理学家(Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg和lsamonrosenfeld)的认识论观点。讨论从他们对测量、不确定性和互补性的概念的介绍开始，并继续关注他们关于存在和知识的本质的观点。作者指出了哥本哈根圈达成共识的基本领域，以及成员之间产生的分歧和争端。主要论述了三点:(1)该学派在认识论上的基本共识是主体与客体是不可分割的;主体参与了现实形象的形成，这些形象是多重的，取决于主体是如何在历史上具体构成的;小组内部的分歧并非出于量子力学原理的逻辑必然性，而是主要源于冷战背景下的意识形态冲突。(2)知识与主体的具体形态相联系，总是相对的;但这并不意味着知识是虚幻的或不充分的;相反，它是获得事物“在其自身”的最终本质的自命不凡，导致任何具体知识的贬值。(3)世界是一种外在的东西，一般不依赖于我们的欲望和意志，但同时又通过每个具体主体的特殊形态被建构为具体的客体。
{"title":"Quantum Mechanics, Being and Cognition","authors":"Ivan Katzarski","doi":"10.5840/bjp202214220","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/bjp202214220","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the epistemological views of key quantum physicists of the Copenhagen circle (Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg and Léon Rosenfeld). The discussion begins with a presentation of their conception of measurement, indeterminacy and complementarity, and goes on to focus on their views regarding the nature of being and knowledge. The author identifies the basic areas of consensus in the Copenhagen circle as well as the disagreements and disputes that arose between its members. Three main points are argued: (1) The fundamental epistemological consensus in the group was that subject and object are inseparable; that the subject participates in the formation of images of reality, which are multiple and depend on how the subject is concretely constituted historically; the disagreements within the group did not arise with logical inevitability from the principles of quantum mechanics but largely stemmed from ideological clash in the Cold War context. (2) Being linked to specific configurations of the subjects, knowledge is always relative; but it does not follow that knowledge is illusory or inadequate; on the contrary, it is the pretension of attaining the ultimate nature of things “in themselves” that leads to devaluation of any concrete knowledge. (3) The world is something external, generally independent of our desires and will, but at the same time is constructed as concrete objects through the specific configuration of each concrete subject.","PeriodicalId":41126,"journal":{"name":"Balkan Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71227259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Organic Marxism, a new development in the history of Marxism, has elicited scrutiny in China. Beyond merely being considered absurd, it has been accused of curbing China’s development on the pretext of ecological motivations,weakeningChina’s dominant ideology by introducing ideological competition, and enabling religious infiltration by promoting Alfred North Whitehead’s process philosophy and constructive postmodern philosophy, which are of a religious nature. Fortunately, organic Marxism has survived despite fierce attacks from fundamentalist Marxists. This paper intends to answer three questions related to this topic: How can organic Marxism survive in China? What is it about organic Marxism that attracts the Chinese most? What lessons can be learned from the fundamentalist Marxists’ attacks?
{"title":"Organic Marxism in China","authors":"Zhihe Wang, Zanmei Cui, Wenxian Zhang, Qing Tang","doi":"10.5840/bjp20221414","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/bjp20221414","url":null,"abstract":"Organic Marxism, a new development in the history of Marxism, has elicited scrutiny in China. Beyond merely being considered absurd, it has been accused of curbing China’s development on the pretext of ecological motivations,weakeningChina’s dominant ideology by introducing ideological competition, and enabling religious infiltration by promoting Alfred North Whitehead’s process philosophy and constructive postmodern philosophy, which are of a religious nature. Fortunately, organic Marxism has survived despite fierce attacks from fundamentalist Marxists. This paper intends to answer three questions related to this topic: How can organic Marxism survive in China? What is it about organic Marxism that attracts the Chinese most? What lessons can be learned from the fundamentalist Marxists’ attacks?","PeriodicalId":41126,"journal":{"name":"Balkan Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71226221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article addresses the two sides of the work of Nicholas Maxwell – his criticism of science and his call to bring about a revolution in academia encouraging it to become much more effective in tackling the real problems humanity is facing. I would use: It focuses on the connection of these two aspects of Maxwell’s work and provides a critical analysis of Maxwell’s conceptual framework. It is argued here that the two sides of Maxwell’s whole conception are not necessarily connected, and do not have to be. Academia can be more effectively organized even without a change in our understanding of science. Maxwell has argued that academia has to aim at making wisdom rather than knowledge its goal. The knowledge-inquiry framework that currently prevails should be exchanged for wisdom-inquiry. Maxwell has explained his understanding of wisdom in several publications, while not being fully consistent in his explanations of what wisdom-inquiry has to embrace. In addition, Maxwell’s original approach to rationality goes against traditional attitudes. Maxwell is definitely critical of the Enlightenment but his attitude to Romanticism remains unclear. Related to these, the article addresses the future tasks of universities.
{"title":"Rationality of Wisdom-Inquiry and Redefining the Tasks of Universities","authors":"P. Müürsepp, M. Jakubik","doi":"10.5840/bjp20221416","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/bjp20221416","url":null,"abstract":"The article addresses the two sides of the work of Nicholas Maxwell – his criticism of science and his call to bring about a revolution in academia encouraging it to become much more effective in tackling the real problems humanity is facing. I would use: It focuses on the connection of these two aspects of Maxwell’s work and provides a critical analysis of Maxwell’s conceptual framework. It is argued here that the two sides of Maxwell’s whole conception are not necessarily connected, and do not have to be. Academia can be more effectively organized even without a change in our understanding of science. Maxwell has argued that academia has to aim at making wisdom rather than knowledge its goal. The knowledge-inquiry framework that currently prevails should be exchanged for wisdom-inquiry. Maxwell has explained his understanding of wisdom in several publications, while not being fully consistent in his explanations of what wisdom-inquiry has to embrace. In addition, Maxwell’s original approach to rationality goes against traditional attitudes. Maxwell is definitely critical of the Enlightenment but his attitude to Romanticism remains unclear. Related to these, the article addresses the future tasks of universities.","PeriodicalId":41126,"journal":{"name":"Balkan Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71226285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article reviews cases of unsuccessful implicatures and possible reasons for misunderstanding the speaker’s meaning. The focus is on explaining misunderstanding with the graded salience hypothesis. Under review are examples of cases where the conventional meaning and intended meaning differ thus resulting in a misunderstanding. The graded salience hypothesis offers an explanation of how we understand expressions based on personal preference priority, so the main argument made is that in cases of misunderstanding the speaker and the listener prioritize different meanings attributed to the same expression due to differences in knowledge, personal background, familiarity with the expression in particular usage, etc. There are also cases of scalar implicatures where the inference meaning is not always the same. In such cases, the speaker’s meaning could be misunderstood if the listener considers a different meaning of the scalar expression as more salient than the one the speaker wishes to convey.
{"title":"Cases of Misunderstanding","authors":"Elena Teofilova Tsvetkova","doi":"10.5840/bjp202214110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/bjp202214110","url":null,"abstract":"The article reviews cases of unsuccessful implicatures and possible reasons for misunderstanding the speaker’s meaning. The focus is on explaining misunderstanding with the graded salience hypothesis. Under review are examples of cases where the conventional meaning and intended meaning differ thus resulting in a misunderstanding. The graded salience hypothesis offers an explanation of how we understand expressions based on personal preference priority, so the main argument made is that in cases of misunderstanding the speaker and the listener prioritize different meanings attributed to the same expression due to differences in knowledge, personal background, familiarity with the expression in particular usage, etc. There are also cases of scalar implicatures where the inference meaning is not always the same. In such cases, the speaker’s meaning could be misunderstood if the listener considers a different meaning of the scalar expression as more salient than the one the speaker wishes to convey.","PeriodicalId":41126,"journal":{"name":"Balkan Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71225984","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper examines the meaning of a Hegelian expression: “the ascension of the human spirit to God”, which was formulated in the philosopher’s 1829 summer course dedicated to the proofs of God’s existence. We argue that the Hegelian formula describes a double movement: the first one refers to the departure of thinking from the Phenomenon and its arrival to the Ideal, and the second one describes the opposite movement, in which thinking crosses the barrier between the Ideal and the Phenomenon.
{"title":"“Die Erhebung des Menschengeistes zu Gott”. Evidence and Proof of God’s Existence, According to Hegel","authors":"D. Popescu","doi":"10.5840/bjp202214218","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/bjp202214218","url":null,"abstract":"The paper examines the meaning of a Hegelian expression: “the ascension of the human spirit to God”, which was formulated in the philosopher’s 1829 summer course dedicated to the proofs of God’s existence. We argue that the Hegelian formula describes a double movement: the first one refers to the departure of thinking from the Phenomenon and its arrival to the Ideal, and the second one describes the opposite movement, in which thinking crosses the barrier between the Ideal and the Phenomenon.","PeriodicalId":41126,"journal":{"name":"Balkan Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71226753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Röck, Tina (2022) Dynamic Realism Uncovering the Reality of Becoming through Phenomenology and Process Philosophy","authors":"Marina Bakalova","doi":"10.5840/bjp202214223","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/bjp202214223","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":41126,"journal":{"name":"Balkan Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71226910","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper defends the view that narratives that bring understanding of the past need not be exhaustively analyzable as explanatory inferences, nor as causal narratives. Instead of treating historical narrative as explanations, I argue that understanding of history can be analyzed by the general epistemic criteria of understanding. I explore one such criterion, which is of chief importance for good historical narratives: potential inferential power. As a corollary, I dispute one of the distinctive features of narratives described by some philosophers: the non-aggregativity of narrative histories. Instead, I propose that historical narratives modestly aggregate and this aggregation depends on the success of the colligatory concepts they offer.
{"title":"Historical Narratives and Understanding","authors":"S. Petkov","doi":"10.5840/BJP20211315","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/BJP20211315","url":null,"abstract":"This paper defends the view that narratives that bring understanding of the past need not be exhaustively analyzable as explanatory inferences, nor as causal narratives. Instead of treating historical narrative as explanations, I argue that understanding of history can be analyzed by the general epistemic criteria of understanding. I explore one such criterion, which is of chief importance for good historical narratives: potential inferential power. As a corollary, I dispute one of the distinctive features of narratives described by some philosophers: the non-aggregativity of narrative histories. Instead, I propose that historical narratives modestly aggregate and this aggregation depends on the success of the colligatory concepts they offer.","PeriodicalId":41126,"journal":{"name":"Balkan Journal of Philosophy","volume":"13 1","pages":"33-44"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71225541","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Special issue devoted to the topic of “The Uses of Narratives: From Practice to Epistemology and Back”","authors":"","doi":"10.5840/bjp20211311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/bjp20211311","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":41126,"journal":{"name":"Balkan Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71225725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
More than a simple command of a sovereign, law is a form of moral communication, something that helps constitute the way we conceive of ourselves, our community, and our culture. In this essay, I argue that law is a form of “world projection,” a way for human communities to use law as an aesthetic way to understand themselves. Within this legal world are narratives that present an idealized reflection of our world. Law has two functions, a reflective function, in which it mirrors the actual world and a reflexive function, in which it corrects undesirable aspects of the actual world. It is through these functions that law describes the narratives within legal relationships in order to say something real and important about those corresponding relationships in the actual world.
{"title":"Legal Worlds and Legal Narratives","authors":"Aaron J. Walayat","doi":"10.5840/BJP20211316","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/BJP20211316","url":null,"abstract":"More than a simple command of a sovereign, law is a form of moral communication, something that helps constitute the way we conceive of ourselves, our community, and our culture. In this essay, I argue that law is a form of “world projection,” a way for human communities to use law as an aesthetic way to understand themselves. Within this legal world are narratives that present an idealized reflection of our world. Law has two functions, a reflective function, in which it mirrors the actual world and a reflexive function, in which it corrects undesirable aspects of the actual world. It is through these functions that law describes the narratives within legal relationships in order to say something real and important about those corresponding relationships in the actual world.","PeriodicalId":41126,"journal":{"name":"Balkan Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71225573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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