Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research最新文献

The relation between food and morality is not a novel concern in Philosophy. There have been discussions about the same in traditions as early as the Vedic and Buddhist traditions in Indian philosophy. While food has always been a significant topic of discussion in ethics, there has been the upcoming of a new understanding of the relation between food and morality in the twenty-first century, namely—food ethics.

The Trika school, which is popularly known as Pratyabhijñā-darśana or Kashmir Śaivism is an absolutist and theistic school of Śaivism in the 9th Century. For the Trika school, the self is synonymous with pure consciousness, equated with Śiva. The path elaborated by the school is from self-ignorance to the realisation of pure consciousness. The Trika philosophy strives to answer two fundamental and interrelated questions. Firstly, understanding oneself as a reduced form of Śiva? Secondly, how does an individual attain “Śivatva”? In this study, we explicate answers to these queries by resorting to the metaphysics of the Trika school along with interpretative textual analysis and present a model proposed by Bhoja Raja based on the three guṇas. This model attributed to Sāṅkhya philosophy and puruṣārtha could help to place the metaphysics of upāya in Trika philosophy in the context of the question of attaining “Śivatva”.

The proposed study endeavors to delve into the philosophical concepts of self and identity as elucidated by the eminent Indian philosopher Rāmānujachārya. This critical examination aims to underscore Rāmānuja’s perspective on the self, surpassing the limitations inherent in both physical and mentalist accounts of human existence. The study specifically directs attention to queries surrounding self-ownership, the constancy of identity amidst change, consciousness, and its interconnection with the self. Unlike explanations that reduce the notion of self to either the body or the mind, this study seeks to explicate Rāmānuja's accounts of self and identity by recognizing that merely equating the self with the body or mind fails to address the profound sense of ownership or possession we experience. In the vast landscape of Indian philosophical thought, the self is traditionally viewed as inherently eternal, temporarily associated with the body for the purpose of navigating accumulated karma across multiple lifetimes. However, this study diverges from moralistic and eschatological discussions, concentrating instead on the metaphysical aspects articulated by Rāmānuja. Central to Rāmānuja's philosophy is the juxtaposition of Brahman, the ultimate reality, with ātman, the individual self present in all living beings. Distinctions among beings are attributed to the nature of the bodies they inhabit. The crux of the matter lies in understanding the relationship between the individual self and Brahman, conceptualized as a part–whole relationship. Consequently, the inquiry emerges: How does the part relate to the whole? What is the nature of the self in the context of Brahman? This paper undertakes a dual-level philosophical analysis of the notion self. It explores the metaphysical level, seeking to comprehend the general meaning and significance of the self. Simultaneously, it delves into the contextual and particular dimensions, unraveling the specific conceptualizations that the individual self undergoes contingent upon its situations. Further questions pertaining to self and identity come to the forefront. How does the self relate to its identity—is it pre-given or constructed? Is there an intrinsic essence to the identity of the self? Addressing these questions inevitably draws attention to the intertwined issues of caste and gender within this philosophical discourse.

John. R. Searle’s account of perception is often called the intentionality theory of perception (ITP). ITP maintains direct realism. According to direct realism, physical objects are directly perceived. Searle denies Locke's representational theory of perception since the latter is an antithesis of direct realism. Searle's contention is that, first, according to the representational theory of perception, subjective ideas (mind-dependent entities) are the only object of perception, we do not perceive physical objects at all. Second, Searle says that on the face of the resemblance thesis, the representational theory of perception is not secured because the former is insufficient to explain the latter. This paper is an attempt to reflect on these two charges raised by Searle. First, I will try to show how we can conceive physical objects are objects (indirect) of perception within Locke’s representational theory of perception. Then, it will be argued that Locke’s representationalist theory of perception can be upheld without the support of the resemblance thesis.

The date of Ādi Śaṅkarācārya has been one of the unsolved problems of Indian Philosophy. He is generally accepted to have lived from 788 to 820 CE and is thus assigned from the end of the eighth century to the beginning of the ninth century. So far scholars who have worked on this problem have consulted his hagiographies and his works to determine his date. However, they have not studied the date of Ādi Śaṅkarācārya by placing him in the context of the development of religion in South India. Nor have they consulted South Indian sources, especially Tamiḻ texts, to see if there are any references to his philosophy. In this paper, I study the problem of the date of Ādi Śaṅkarācārya by consulting Tamiḻ sources and the hitherto less consulted epic Śivarahasya. I also connect his date with the emergence of Śaivism as a popular religion in South India. Based on my study, I place Ādi Śaṅkarācārya in the fifth century BCE and as a result, I emphasize the importance of redating Hindu scriptures, especially the Vedas, as Ādi Śaṅkarācārya is the earliest commentator.

In Seeing Things as They Are (Searle 2015), Searle developed a direct realist’s theory of perception. According to direct realism, physical objects are directly and immediately perceived. Searle claims that Berkeley’s theory of perception goes against direct realism. For Searle, Berkeley’s theory suggests that only subjective experiences (ideas) are directly and immediately perceived, not physical objects. Contrary to Searle, G. S. Pappas claims that Berkeley’s theory of perception is consistent with the view that physical objects are immediately perceivable (Pappas 1982; Pappas 1987). Given the conflicting interpretations of Berkeley’s theory of perception, this paper attempts to defend Searle’s position on Berkeley’s theory of perception. It refutes Pappas’ interpretation by arguing that he is inconsistent with Berkeley’s theses of ontological phenomenalism and heterogeneity thesis.

Proponents of Veritism believe that truth is the sole non-instrumental epistemic good. This view is often taken to entail that all truths should be of equal epistemic value. Hence, it is put under stress by the presence of trivial truths: truths to which we attach relatively little or no epistemic value. Pritchard, in the defense of Veritism, has tried to argue that the best way to understand the implications of Veritism is to think in terms of how an intellectually virtuous inquirer would pursue truth. Furthermore, he thinks that such an inquirer would prefer weighty truths and set aside trivial ones. As such, he thinks that our epistemic disregard for trivial truths is just to be expected given Veritism. We argue that Pritchard’s defense of Veritism fails, and the problem of trivial truths remains a significant challenge for Veritism.

In this paper, I offer a close comparative reading of a creation myth from chapter 1 of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad, which opens with the startling statement “ātmaivedam agra āsīt”, “in the beginning there was the self (ātman)”. I read this classical text with Śaṅkara, its foremost commentator, in dialogue with an ensemble of Indologists (Wilhelm Halbfass, Greg Bailey and Frederick Smith) and theorists (Walter Benjamin, Ramchandra Gandhi and Hélène Cixous), and vis-à-vis, the creation myth narrated in chapter 1 of the Book of Genesis. My aim is to decipher the intrinsic relation between identity, difference and diversity underlying the Upaniṣadic myth, and the ambivalent relationship (fear and desire) between self and other depicted here. The Upaniṣad presents a narrative of “the self first”, and implied is the aspiration to retrieve and rediscover this first self, the ātman, which precedes and encompasses everything else. I challenge this narrative drawing on Mukund Lath’s paper (J World Philos 4:6–23, 2003/2018). According to Lath, being is becoming, and change is a precondition of identity-formation. Identity, he argues, does not only accommodate but also invites change and plurality. Identity for Lath is a matter of creation, not restoration. It is pregnant with the future, not obsessed with premordiality. Lath’s unique case study for his counter-Upaniṣadic discussion of identity and self is classical Indian music, rāga music.

What we understand by nationalism is the idea of supporting one’s country, people, culture and sovereignty of the nation. It believes in self-rule, with an objective to maintain the national unity and solidarity. It also encourages pride in national achievements and is closely linked with patriotism. One who dedicates his life to promoting the above objectives for the glory of his nation is considered as a nationalist. Swami Vivekananda who has dedicated his short, but meaningful life for the upliftment of his fellow country-men and worked hard for the freedom of his motherland from political, religious, economic and cultural bondage, for which he can rightly be called an epitome of nationalism or a true nationalist. In this article, I shall focus on his dedications and contributions for his nation and human race at large and justify him to be called a true nationalist.