German Abstract: Deutsche Zusammenfassung: Die CSR-Richtlinie der EU erhöht die Transparenz der sozialen und ökologischen Auswirkungen unternehmerischer Tätigkeit. Die Verhandlungen über diesen Gesetzentwurf waren jedoch hoch umstritten. Dieser Aufsatz beschäftigt sich mit dem Entstehungsprozess und den politischen Auseinandersetzungen, die mit dieser Richtlinie verbunden waren. Während Frankreich, Dänemark, Holland und Belgien dieses Vorhaben unterstützten, versuchte die Bundesregierung, sie ganz zu verhindern. Dies gelang nicht, abgeschwächt wurde die Richtlinie jedoch schon. Wie lassen sich die unterschiedlichen Positionen der Länder in den Verhandlungen (von Unterstützung bis Ablehnung), sowie die langjährige deutsche Ablehnung der Europäischen Gesetzgebung in dieser Hinsicht und eine eher zögerliche Umsetzung dieser Richtlinie in das deutsche Recht erklären? Ich argumentiere, dass Anpassungskosten, die Politik der Parteien und der deutsche Mittelstand wesentliche Einflussfaktoren sind. English Abstract: The EU’s Non-Financial Disclosure Directive 2014/95/EU increases the transparency of companies’ social and environmental impacts, but the negotiations over this Directive were very contentious. This paper (in German) deals with the origins and the political conflicts that were associated with this Directive. While France, Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium supported the Directive, the German government opposed it tooth-and-nail. Although it could not be stopped, the text of the Directive was weakened in a number of respects. How can the positions of different countries in the negotiations (from strong support to strong opposition), as well as the longstanding German opposition to legislation in this area and the unambitious transposition of this Directive into German law be explained? I argue that adjustment costs, political ideology, and partisan politics as well as the German Mittelstand (or SME sector) are important.
{"title":"Die Politischen Auseinandersetzungen Um Die CSR-Richtlinie Der EU: Unterstützer, Gegner Und Die Ursachen Des Deutschen Widerstandes (The Political Conflicts over the CSR Directive of the EU: Supporters, Opponents, and the Reasons for German Resistance)","authors":"Daniel P. Kinderman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3241959","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3241959","url":null,"abstract":"<b>German Abstract:</b> Deutsche Zusammenfassung: Die CSR-Richtlinie der EU erhöht die Transparenz der sozialen und ökologischen Auswirkungen unternehmerischer Tätigkeit. Die Verhandlungen über diesen Gesetzentwurf waren jedoch hoch umstritten. Dieser Aufsatz beschäftigt sich mit dem Entstehungsprozess und den politischen Auseinandersetzungen, die mit dieser Richtlinie verbunden waren. Während Frankreich, Dänemark, Holland und Belgien dieses Vorhaben unterstützten, versuchte die Bundesregierung, sie ganz zu verhindern. Dies gelang nicht, abgeschwächt wurde die Richtlinie jedoch schon. Wie lassen sich die unterschiedlichen Positionen der Länder in den Verhandlungen (von Unterstützung bis Ablehnung), sowie die langjährige deutsche Ablehnung der Europäischen Gesetzgebung in dieser Hinsicht und eine eher zögerliche Umsetzung dieser Richtlinie in das deutsche Recht erklären? Ich argumentiere, dass Anpassungskosten, die Politik der Parteien und der deutsche Mittelstand wesentliche Einflussfaktoren sind. <b>English Abstract:</b> The EU’s Non-Financial Disclosure Directive 2014/95/EU increases the transparency of companies’ social and environmental impacts, but the negotiations over this Directive were very contentious. This paper (in German) deals with the origins and the political conflicts that were associated with this Directive. While France, Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium supported the Directive, the German government opposed it tooth-and-nail. Although it could not be stopped, the text of the Directive was weakened in a number of respects. How can the positions of different countries in the negotiations (from strong support to strong opposition), as well as the longstanding German opposition to legislation in this area and the unambitious transposition of this Directive into German law be explained? I argue that adjustment costs, political ideology, and partisan politics as well as the German Mittelstand (or SME sector) are important.","PeriodicalId":412394,"journal":{"name":"AARN: Economic Law (Topic)","volume":"88 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122945796","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-05-30DOI: 10.17573/CEPAR.V16I1.356
Lucija Cerar Godec, Jože Benčina
Due to the financial crisis and the increase in the unemployment rate, active labour market policy (ALMP) inevitably returned to the forefront with its “activation strategy”. The research challenge of the article is analysing the effectiveness of ALMP in the period 2007-2013. The methodology of the work is panel regression with fixed effects estimation. The model estimates the effect of the two largest programs of the ALMP, Training and Employment Incentives, on Employment Rate, considering six additional control variables with potential effect on the labour market. The results demonstrate a positive impact of the Training program on the Employment Rate even in the time of crisis. In contrast, the Employment Incentives program had, along with Passive Labour Market Policy (PLMP), a somewhat negative impact on Employment Rate. The findings provide an insight into the nature of ALMP's implementation during the financial crisis. While the training programs keep their active nature, the employment incentives become reactive and to a certain degree act as a measure of PLMP.
{"title":"Impact of Active Labour Market Policy Programs on Employment in the EU During the Crisis","authors":"Lucija Cerar Godec, Jože Benčina","doi":"10.17573/CEPAR.V16I1.356","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17573/CEPAR.V16I1.356","url":null,"abstract":"Due to the financial crisis and the increase in the unemployment rate, active labour market policy (ALMP) inevitably returned to the forefront with its “activation strategy”. The research challenge of the article is analysing the effectiveness of ALMP in the period 2007-2013. The methodology of the work is panel regression with fixed effects estimation. The model estimates the effect of the two largest programs of the ALMP, Training and Employment Incentives, on Employment Rate, considering six additional control variables with potential effect on the labour market. The results demonstrate a positive impact of the Training program on the Employment Rate even in the time of crisis. In contrast, the Employment Incentives program had, along with Passive Labour Market Policy (PLMP), a somewhat negative impact on Employment Rate. The findings provide an insight into the nature of ALMP's implementation during the financial crisis. While the training programs keep their active nature, the employment incentives become reactive and to a certain degree act as a measure of PLMP. ","PeriodicalId":412394,"journal":{"name":"AARN: Economic Law (Topic)","volume":"101 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123217956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-07-25DOI: 10.5102/rdi/bjil.v14i2.4720
Jose Gustavo Prieto Muñoz
On 16 May 2017, Ecuador terminated all the 16 Ecuadorian Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) still remaining in force. This decision was the end of a longer process that aimed to disengage the South American state from the international investment regime, a process begun nearly a decade earlier, with the drafting of a new constitution in 2008, one that contained an article prohibiting the state from giving consent to investment arbitration. The article argues that it was not the 2017 decision itself, but the different erratic legal steps that led to Ecuador’s poor performance in terms of FDI policy. These steps included the initial and unfortunate draft of a constitutional provision, the timing involved in re-evaluating this constitutional decision so many years later, and in general the lack of any pre-established course for action during this process. In this light, the article further claims that an analysis of the Ecuadorian experience can contribute to a better understanding of how the constitutional sphere can best interact with international investment law, potentially by applying specific principles of investment rather than prohibitions on constitutional texts.
{"title":"Ecuador's 2017 Termination of Treaties: How Not to Exit the International Investment Regime","authors":"Jose Gustavo Prieto Muñoz","doi":"10.5102/rdi/bjil.v14i2.4720","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5102/rdi/bjil.v14i2.4720","url":null,"abstract":"On 16 May 2017, Ecuador terminated all the 16 Ecuadorian Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) still remaining in force. This decision was the end of a longer process that aimed to disengage the South American state from the international investment regime, a process begun nearly a decade earlier, with the drafting of a new constitution in 2008, one that contained an article prohibiting the state from giving consent to investment arbitration. The article argues that it was not the 2017 decision itself, but the different erratic legal steps that led to Ecuador’s poor performance in terms of FDI policy. These steps included the initial and unfortunate draft of a constitutional provision, the timing involved in re-evaluating this constitutional decision so many years later, and in general the lack of any pre-established course for action during this process. In this light, the article further claims that an analysis of the Ecuadorian experience can contribute to a better understanding of how the constitutional sphere can best interact with international investment law, potentially by applying specific principles of investment rather than prohibitions on constitutional texts.","PeriodicalId":412394,"journal":{"name":"AARN: Economic Law (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123501996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Will investor-to-state arbitration be the dispute settlement mechanism of choice for investment disputes under the EU-EAC EPA? This study argues that despite the criticism, ISDS shall be included under the investment chapter in the EU-EAC EPA. This argument is based on three reasons for this;1) The coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty which now gives the EU exclusive competence on Foreign Direct Investment, 2) The existing of numerous BITs between the EU Member States, and the EAC Partner States which stipulate ISDS as the dispute settlement mechanism, 3) both blocs advocate for ISDS in their laws and investment policies. The inclusion of ISDS is likely to shrink the policy space of the EAC Partner States if it is adopted under the existing framework. Therefore, to avoid the situation that has made ISDS unpopular both under the BITs and the NAFTA, it is recommended that the EU and EAC partner ensure a balance between investor rights and the developmental goals of host states. This has been achieved in some of the emerging new generation investment agreements such as the COMESA Common Investment Agreement which is proffered here as a model that can adopted to ameliorate the problems of ISDS as it currently exists in international law.
{"title":"Investor-State Arbitration in the Context of EU-EAC EPA","authors":"Khaseke Makadia Georgiadis","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2257150","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2257150","url":null,"abstract":"Will investor-to-state arbitration be the dispute settlement mechanism of choice for investment disputes under the EU-EAC EPA? This study argues that despite the criticism, ISDS shall be included under the investment chapter in the EU-EAC EPA. This argument is based on three reasons for this;1) The coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty which now gives the EU exclusive competence on Foreign Direct Investment, 2) The existing of numerous BITs between the EU Member States, and the EAC Partner States which stipulate ISDS as the dispute settlement mechanism, 3) both blocs advocate for ISDS in their laws and investment policies. The inclusion of ISDS is likely to shrink the policy space of the EAC Partner States if it is adopted under the existing framework. Therefore, to avoid the situation that has made ISDS unpopular both under the BITs and the NAFTA, it is recommended that the EU and EAC partner ensure a balance between investor rights and the developmental goals of host states. This has been achieved in some of the emerging new generation investment agreements such as the COMESA Common Investment Agreement which is proffered here as a model that can adopted to ameliorate the problems of ISDS as it currently exists in international law.","PeriodicalId":412394,"journal":{"name":"AARN: Economic Law (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129355990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2017.10.16.4
Katarzyna Sadrak
English Abstract: On May 21st 2015, the Court of Justice of the European Union in CDC Hydrogen Peroxide decided whether the application of jurisdiction clauses in actions for damages impedes the effective enforcement of EU competition law. The CJ stayed silent, however, on how to treat arbitration clauses, which similarly to jurisdiction clauses, exclude a default court jurisdiction. The question of how to interpret arbitration agreements in the event of an antitrust violation and subsequent actions for damages remains thus unanswered. In light of the foreseen increase in private enforcement of EU competition law, this problem gains significance. This is because arbitration agreements may be frequently used to govern commercial relationships between antitrust infringers and their injured direct contractors. Against this background, the paper aims to analyse the consequences brought about by the existence of arbitration clauses in the event of actions for antitrust damages. It seeks to answer two questions: whether the claims for antitrust damages can be per se arbitrated, and whether the general arbitration clauses used by the parties to regulate their commercial relations cover the actions for antitrust damages. In order to address these problems, the papers draws attention to the CJ’s interpretation of jurisdiction clauses and the Polish experience of interpreting the scope of arbitration agreements in the field of unfair competition law. The paper reaches the conclusion that neither the arbitration nor EU law prevent arbitrating actions for antitrust damages. Whether a specific arbitration agreement covers actions for antitrust damages or not can be analyzed only with reference to the will of the parties interpreted under applicable national law. It is believed, however, that there are many reasons to adopt an arbitration-friendly interpretation of vague arbitration agreements. French Abstract: Le 21 mai 2015, la Cour de justice de l'Union europeenne dans l'arret CDC Hydrogen Peroxide a statue sur la question de savoir si l'application d'une clause de juridiction lors d'action en dommages et interets empechait une application effective du droit europeen de la concurrence. Neanmoins, la Cour de justice est restee muette sur le sort des clauses d'arbitrage qui, a l'instar des clauses de juridiction, excluent la designation d'une juridiction par defaut. La Cour n'a donc pas tranche sur la maniere d'interpreter les accords d'arbitrage dans le cas d'une violation du droit de la concurrence et d'actions en dommages interets en decoulant. Dans l'optique d'une augmentation a prevoir du contentieux du private enforcement, cette question gagne en importance du fait de l'utilisation recurrente des accords d'arbitrage pour regir les relations entre les contrevenants au droit de la concurrence et les parties contractantes lesees. Dans un tel contexte, cette contribution cherche a analyser les consequences decoulant de l'existence d'une clause d'arbitrag
{"title":"Arbitration Agreements and Actions for Antitrust Damages after the CDC Hydrogen Peroxide Judgment","authors":"Katarzyna Sadrak","doi":"10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2017.10.16.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2017.10.16.4","url":null,"abstract":"English Abstract: On May 21st 2015, the Court of Justice of the European Union in CDC Hydrogen Peroxide decided whether the application of jurisdiction clauses in actions for damages impedes the effective enforcement of EU competition law. The CJ stayed silent, however, on how to treat arbitration clauses, which similarly to jurisdiction clauses, exclude a default court jurisdiction. The question of how to interpret arbitration agreements in the event of an antitrust violation and subsequent actions for damages remains thus unanswered. In light of the foreseen increase in private enforcement of EU competition law, this problem gains significance. This is because arbitration agreements may be frequently used to govern commercial relationships between antitrust infringers and their injured direct contractors. \u0000Against this background, the paper aims to analyse the consequences brought about by the existence of arbitration clauses in the event of actions for antitrust damages. It seeks to answer two questions: whether the claims for antitrust damages can be per se arbitrated, and whether the general arbitration clauses used by the parties to regulate their commercial relations cover the actions for antitrust damages. In order to address these problems, the papers draws attention to the CJ’s interpretation of jurisdiction clauses and the Polish experience of interpreting the scope of arbitration agreements in the field of unfair competition law. The paper reaches the conclusion that neither the arbitration nor EU law prevent arbitrating actions for antitrust damages. Whether a specific arbitration agreement covers actions for antitrust damages or not can be analyzed only with reference to the will of the parties interpreted under applicable national law. It is believed, however, that there are many reasons to adopt an arbitration-friendly interpretation of vague arbitration agreements. \u0000French Abstract: Le 21 mai 2015, la Cour de justice de l'Union europeenne dans l'arret CDC Hydrogen Peroxide a statue sur la question de savoir si l'application d'une clause de juridiction lors d'action en dommages et interets empechait une application effective du droit europeen de la concurrence. Neanmoins, la Cour de justice est restee muette sur le sort des clauses d'arbitrage qui, a l'instar des clauses de juridiction, excluent la designation d'une juridiction par defaut. La Cour n'a donc pas tranche sur la maniere d'interpreter les accords d'arbitrage dans le cas d'une violation du droit de la concurrence et d'actions en dommages interets en decoulant. Dans l'optique d'une augmentation a prevoir du contentieux du private enforcement, cette question gagne en importance du fait de l'utilisation recurrente des accords d'arbitrage pour regir les relations entre les contrevenants au droit de la concurrence et les parties contractantes lesees. \u0000Dans un tel contexte, cette contribution cherche a analyser les consequences decoulant de l'existence d'une clause d'arbitrag","PeriodicalId":412394,"journal":{"name":"AARN: Economic Law (Topic)","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133034231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：