Pub Date : 2020-06-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0014
M. Mooijman, P. Meindl, J. Graham
In this chapter, the authors synthesize current research and thinking on the topic of self-control moralization. They focus on three parts: (1) similarities and differences between morality and self-control, (2) the process of moralizing self-control, and (3) the consequences of moralizing self-control. They use a moral pluralistic perspective—the idea that there are multiple, sometimes conflicting, moral concerns within and between cultures and individuals—to argue that research on self-control moralization could benefit greatly from exploring the roles of different types of moral concerns, emotions, and social contexts. The chapter discusses when self-control and morality overlap and when they don’t, what this means for moralizing self-control, and how one might be able to leverage moral concerns to achieve greater self-control success and prevent self-control failure.
{"title":"Moralizing Self-Control","authors":"M. Mooijman, P. Meindl, J. Graham","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0014","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter, the authors synthesize current research and thinking on the topic of self-control moralization. They focus on three parts: (1) similarities and differences between morality and self-control, (2) the process of moralizing self-control, and (3) the consequences of moralizing self-control. They use a moral pluralistic perspective—the idea that there are multiple, sometimes conflicting, moral concerns within and between cultures and individuals—to argue that research on self-control moralization could benefit greatly from exploring the roles of different types of moral concerns, emotions, and social contexts. The chapter discusses when self-control and morality overlap and when they don’t, what this means for moralizing self-control, and how one might be able to leverage moral concerns to achieve greater self-control success and prevent self-control failure.","PeriodicalId":413819,"journal":{"name":"Surrounding Self-Control","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121820332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0017
L. O’Brien
In this chapter the author defends a novel view of the relationships among intention for the future, self-control, and cooperation. The author argues that when an agent forms an intention for the future she comes to regard herself as criticizable if she does not act in accordance with her intention. In contexts where the agent has inclinations that run contrary to her unrescinded intention, her disposition for reflexive criticism helps her to resist these inclinations. Such intentions have, the author argues, a built-in mechanism for exercising self-control. The author goes on to argue that this mechanism can also function as a mechanism for cooperative behavior. Agents are not just equipped to abide by plans for the future, they are also thereby equipped for exercising self-control and for cooperating.
{"title":"Self-Control, Cooperation, and Intention’s Authority","authors":"L. O’Brien","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0017","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter the author defends a novel view of the relationships among intention for the future, self-control, and cooperation. The author argues that when an agent forms an intention for the future she comes to regard herself as criticizable if she does not act in accordance with her intention. In contexts where the agent has inclinations that run contrary to her unrescinded intention, her disposition for reflexive criticism helps her to resist these inclinations. Such intentions have, the author argues, a built-in mechanism for exercising self-control. The author goes on to argue that this mechanism can also function as a mechanism for cooperative behavior. Agents are not just equipped to abide by plans for the future, they are also thereby equipped for exercising self-control and for cooperating.","PeriodicalId":413819,"journal":{"name":"Surrounding Self-Control","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132732093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0004
Asael Y. Sklar, K. Fujita
This chapter presents an analysis of self-control from a motivational perspective, modeling it as the resolution of a conflict between proximal and distal concerns. It briefly reviews “divided-mind” models that suggest that self-control entails competition between opposing elements of the mind, and discusses some of the empirical and conceptual challenges to these conceptual frameworks. The authors then propose an alternative account that addresses these challenges, suggesting that coordination of (rather than competition between) elements of the mind is key to self-control. They review empirical evidence for the new model, and then conclude by outlining some of its implications for future research and theory.
{"title":"Self-Control as a Coordination Problem","authors":"Asael Y. Sklar, K. Fujita","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter presents an analysis of self-control from a motivational perspective, modeling it as the resolution of a conflict between proximal and distal concerns. It briefly reviews “divided-mind” models that suggest that self-control entails competition between opposing elements of the mind, and discusses some of the empirical and conceptual challenges to these conceptual frameworks. The authors then propose an alternative account that addresses these challenges, suggesting that coordination of (rather than competition between) elements of the mind is key to self-control. They review empirical evidence for the new model, and then conclude by outlining some of its implications for future research and theory.","PeriodicalId":413819,"journal":{"name":"Surrounding Self-Control","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131660260","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0005
M. Mylopoulos, E. Pacherie
A main obstacle to the successful pursuit of long-term goals is a lack of self-control. But what is the capacity for self-control? The aim of this chapter is to contribute to an overarching theory of self-control by exploring the proposal that it is best understood as a form of hybrid skill. The authors draw on recent work on skill in the domain of motor control to highlight important ways in which experts differ from novices in the capacities they deploy. They then consider how the resulting framework can be applied to the domain of self-control. The chapter ends by examining how this approach can help reconcile a motivational construal of self-control, according to which it involves resisting competing temptations in order to do what one deems best, and an executive construal, in which the emphasis is on overriding “cold” habits that are at odds with what one intends to do.
{"title":"Self-Control as Hybrid Skill","authors":"M. Mylopoulos, E. Pacherie","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"A main obstacle to the successful pursuit of long-term goals is a lack of self-control. But what is the capacity for self-control? The aim of this chapter is to contribute to an overarching theory of self-control by exploring the proposal that it is best understood as a form of hybrid skill. The authors draw on recent work on skill in the domain of motor control to highlight important ways in which experts differ from novices in the capacities they deploy. They then consider how the resulting framework can be applied to the domain of self-control. The chapter ends by examining how this approach can help reconcile a motivational construal of self-control, according to which it involves resisting competing temptations in order to do what one deems best, and an executive construal, in which the emphasis is on overriding “cold” habits that are at odds with what one intends to do.","PeriodicalId":413819,"journal":{"name":"Surrounding Self-Control","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113949964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0011
Eric Funkhouser, J. Veilleux
Self-control concerns the successful management of the conflicting desires or emotions toward which the self is in some sense invested. The prospects for self-control are affected by how these desires and emotions are represented, and this chapter argues for giving special attention to how people frame temptations with respect to their sense of self. Drawing on philosopher Harry Frankfurt’s concept of identification, which is supposed to establish the boundaries for what is internal and external to the self, the authors distinguish two attitudes that a person can take toward her temptations: acceptance and alienation. They describe their descriptive and laboratory studies testing, among other things, whether those who accept their temptations as part of the self fare better at self-control than do those who alienate their temptations as external to the self. The results show significant differences, but they do not paint a simple picture of the relationship.
{"title":"Framing Temptations in Relation to the Self","authors":"Eric Funkhouser, J. Veilleux","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"Self-control concerns the successful management of the conflicting desires or emotions toward which the self is in some sense invested. The prospects for self-control are affected by how these desires and emotions are represented, and this chapter argues for giving special attention to how people frame temptations with respect to their sense of self. Drawing on philosopher Harry Frankfurt’s concept of identification, which is supposed to establish the boundaries for what is internal and external to the self, the authors distinguish two attitudes that a person can take toward her temptations: acceptance and alienation. They describe their descriptive and laboratory studies testing, among other things, whether those who accept their temptations as part of the self fare better at self-control than do those who alienate their temptations as external to the self. The results show significant differences, but they do not paint a simple picture of the relationship.","PeriodicalId":413819,"journal":{"name":"Surrounding Self-Control","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115743884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0018
Tyler K. Fagan, K. Sifferd, W. Hirstein
US criminal courts have recently moved toward seeing juveniles as inherently less culpable than their adult counterparts, influenced by a growing mass of neuroscientific and psychological evidence. In support of this trend, this chapter argues that the criminal law’s notion of responsible agency requires both the cognitive capacity to understand one’s actions and the volitional control to conform one’s actions to legal standards. These capacities require, among other things, a minimal working set of executive functions—a suite of mental processes, mainly realized in the prefrontal cortex, such as planning and inhibition—which remain in significant states of immaturity through late adolescence, and in some cases beyond. Drawing on scientific evidence of how these cognitive and volitional capacities develop in the maturing brain, the authors sketch a scalar structure of juvenile responsibility, and suggest some possible directions for reforming the juvenile justice system to reflect this scalar structure.
{"title":"Juvenile Self-Control and Legal Responsibility","authors":"Tyler K. Fagan, K. Sifferd, W. Hirstein","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0018","url":null,"abstract":"US criminal courts have recently moved toward seeing juveniles as inherently less culpable than their adult counterparts, influenced by a growing mass of neuroscientific and psychological evidence. In support of this trend, this chapter argues that the criminal law’s notion of responsible agency requires both the cognitive capacity to understand one’s actions and the volitional control to conform one’s actions to legal standards. These capacities require, among other things, a minimal working set of executive functions—a suite of mental processes, mainly realized in the prefrontal cortex, such as planning and inhibition—which remain in significant states of immaturity through late adolescence, and in some cases beyond. Drawing on scientific evidence of how these cognitive and volitional capacities develop in the maturing brain, the authors sketch a scalar structure of juvenile responsibility, and suggest some possible directions for reforming the juvenile justice system to reflect this scalar structure.","PeriodicalId":413819,"journal":{"name":"Surrounding Self-Control","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129545011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0009
Marcela Herdova, Stephen Kearns
This chapter explores the relationship between self-control and decision-making. In particular, it examines various problems with the idea that agents can (and do) exercise self-control over their decisions. Two facts about decisions give rise to these problems. First, decisions do not result from intentions to make those very decisions. Second, decisions are often made when agents are uncertain what to do, and thus when agents lack best judgments. On the common understanding of self-control as an ability to act in line with an intention or best judgment (in the face of counter-motivation), decisions are not, and perhaps cannot, be the subject of self-control. In light of this, the authors propose that this common conception of self-control needs revision. As well as commitment-based self-control, they argue that there is also non-commitment-based self-control—the type of self-control over an action that need not involve any prior evaluative or executive commitment.
{"title":"Mind Control","authors":"Marcela Herdova, Stephen Kearns","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter explores the relationship between self-control and decision-making. In particular, it examines various problems with the idea that agents can (and do) exercise self-control over their decisions. Two facts about decisions give rise to these problems. First, decisions do not result from intentions to make those very decisions. Second, decisions are often made when agents are uncertain what to do, and thus when agents lack best judgments. On the common understanding of self-control as an ability to act in line with an intention or best judgment (in the face of counter-motivation), decisions are not, and perhaps cannot, be the subject of self-control. In light of this, the authors propose that this common conception of self-control needs revision. As well as commitment-based self-control, they argue that there is also non-commitment-based self-control—the type of self-control over an action that need not involve any prior evaluative or executive commitment.","PeriodicalId":413819,"journal":{"name":"Surrounding Self-Control","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117045252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0019
J. Bermúdez
This chapter approaches self-control via a problem arising in decision theoretic discussions of sequential choice within a broadly Humean conception of action and motivation. How can agents stick to their plans and honor their commitments in the face of temptation, if at the moment of choice the short-term temptation motivationally outweighs the long-term goal? After introducing the sequential choice puzzle in section 19.1, section 19.2 surveys suggestive psychological work on the mechanisms of self-control, pointing to the importance of how outcomes are framed. Section 19.3 offers a solution to the sequential choice problem in terms of frame-sensitive reasoning—i.e. reasoning that allows outcomes to be valued differently depending on how they are framed, even when the agent knows that she is dealing with two (or more) different ways of framing the same outcome. Section 19.4 argues that this type of quasi-cyclical, frame-sensitive reasoning can indeed be rational.
{"title":"Framing as a Mechanism for Self-Control","authors":"J. Bermúdez","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0019","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter approaches self-control via a problem arising in decision theoretic discussions of sequential choice within a broadly Humean conception of action and motivation. How can agents stick to their plans and honor their commitments in the face of temptation, if at the moment of choice the short-term temptation motivationally outweighs the long-term goal? After introducing the sequential choice puzzle in section 19.1, section 19.2 surveys suggestive psychological work on the mechanisms of self-control, pointing to the importance of how outcomes are framed. Section 19.3 offers a solution to the sequential choice problem in terms of frame-sensitive reasoning—i.e. reasoning that allows outcomes to be valued differently depending on how they are framed, even when the agent knows that she is dealing with two (or more) different ways of framing the same outcome. Section 19.4 argues that this type of quasi-cyclical, frame-sensitive reasoning can indeed be rational.","PeriodicalId":413819,"journal":{"name":"Surrounding Self-Control","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131866809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0016
Sammy Basu, James Friedrich
This chapter considers the relationship of individual “self-control” to epistemic behavior and ethical responsibility. The authors distinguish deliberate ignorance into two forms: partiality-preserving and impartiality-enhancing, associating the former with “epistemic diligence/negligence” and the latter with “epistemic restraint/recklessness.” As such, they argue that ethical responsibility entails three prescriptive orders of self-control. First, in the moment, the individual should reactively self-control epistemic relevance. However, research on cognitive irregularities such as the introspection illusion highlights difficulties in doing so. Second, the individual should proactively regulate information available to self and others. Here, the authors’ own studies test whether individuals will consistently guard against information contamination. They find that a personal “bias blind-spot” compromises such epistemic discretion. Given epistemic responsibility but unreliable introspection, then, the individual needs a third order of self-control. That is, in certain decision-making situations the individual is obliged to utilize institutions of epistemic justice that mandate to decision-makers information availability/restraint.
{"title":"Self-Control and Deliberate Ignorance","authors":"Sammy Basu, James Friedrich","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0016","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter considers the relationship of individual “self-control” to epistemic behavior and ethical responsibility. The authors distinguish deliberate ignorance into two forms: partiality-preserving and impartiality-enhancing, associating the former with “epistemic diligence/negligence” and the latter with “epistemic restraint/recklessness.” As such, they argue that ethical responsibility entails three prescriptive orders of self-control. First, in the moment, the individual should reactively self-control epistemic relevance. However, research on cognitive irregularities such as the introspection illusion highlights difficulties in doing so. Second, the individual should proactively regulate information available to self and others. Here, the authors’ own studies test whether individuals will consistently guard against information contamination. They find that a personal “bias blind-spot” compromises such epistemic discretion. Given epistemic responsibility but unreliable introspection, then, the individual needs a third order of self-control. That is, in certain decision-making situations the individual is obliged to utilize institutions of epistemic justice that mandate to decision-makers information availability/restraint.","PeriodicalId":413819,"journal":{"name":"Surrounding Self-Control","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122551012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0008
M. Griffith
Children are often regarded as less morally blameworthy when they fail to control their behavior. If one regards failures of self-control as failures to do what one knows or judges to be best, then one must ask whether children are less blameworthy even when they “know better.” The author argues that children are less blameworthy for these failures because it is harder for them to exercise self-control. She argues that one important reason that it is harder for children to control themselves is that children are still in the process of developing what she calls “narrative capacity.” Her account of this capacity is informed by both psychological and philosophical accounts. The chapter spells out the characteristic features of narrative capacity and illustrates how these are required for self-control.
{"title":"Children, Responsibility for Self-Control Failures, and Narrative Capacity","authors":"M. Griffith","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"Children are often regarded as less morally blameworthy when they fail to control their behavior. If one regards failures of self-control as failures to do what one knows or judges to be best, then one must ask whether children are less blameworthy even when they “know better.” The author argues that children are less blameworthy for these failures because it is harder for them to exercise self-control. She argues that one important reason that it is harder for children to control themselves is that children are still in the process of developing what she calls “narrative capacity.” Her account of this capacity is informed by both psychological and philosophical accounts. The chapter spells out the characteristic features of narrative capacity and illustrates how these are required for self-control.","PeriodicalId":413819,"journal":{"name":"Surrounding Self-Control","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124206681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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