Pub Date : 2022-04-11DOI: 10.1080/07343469.2021.1964640
Jordan T. Cash
Abstract The vice presidency is often viewed as constitutionally devoid of any importance or power. Most research on the vice presidency argues that it is only as the vice presidency moved into the executive branch and became more tied to the president that the office gained significance. Yet this significance has come at the cost of the vice presidency’s agency. Vice presidents are more powerful now, but also more subordinate to the president. By drawing out the theory underlying the structure, duties, and powers of the vice presidency, I demonstrate that the Constitution positions the vice president to be an independent institutional actor with the capacity for autonomous action apart from the president and Congress. Furthermore, the vice president’s potential for acting with agency remains salient despite subsequent constitutional amendments and changes in political practices. Indeed, I argue that the development of the modern vice presidency has created tensions at odds with the office’s underlying constitutional structure and authority. Supplemental data for this article is available online at https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2021.1964640 .
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Pub Date : 2022-03-23DOI: 10.1080/07343469.2021.2009056
Evan T. Haglund
Abstract With each presidential transition and subsequent rush of presidential appointments, the long-running debate about presidential preferences and senatorial advice and consent becomes front-page news. The political science literature has long examined the nomination and confirmation process, especially for cabinet and judicial appointments, and a growing quantitative literature evaluates political and personal factors shaping that process. Yet we lack a systematic understanding of how ex ante statutory requirements, in addition to the ex post confirmation process, affect presidential choices and how senators might seek to enforce compliance with those requirements. Using a new dataset that combines ambassadorial nominee qualifications provided by the State Department to the Senate with nomination and confirmation data, this article provides an initial glimpse of the competing perspectives of presidents and senators on the bounds Congress can set for ambassadorial appointees’ characteristics. The evidence suggests that, instead of the interbranch competition set up by Article II’s checks on presidential appointments, collusion to maintain the status quo on ambassadorial appointments is less costly and more beneficial for both presidents and senators.
{"title":"Competition or Collusion? How Presidents and the Senate Evade or Enforce Statutory Requirements for Ambassadorial Nominees","authors":"Evan T. Haglund","doi":"10.1080/07343469.2021.2009056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2021.2009056","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract With each presidential transition and subsequent rush of presidential appointments, the long-running debate about presidential preferences and senatorial advice and consent becomes front-page news. The political science literature has long examined the nomination and confirmation process, especially for cabinet and judicial appointments, and a growing quantitative literature evaluates political and personal factors shaping that process. Yet we lack a systematic understanding of how ex ante statutory requirements, in addition to the ex post confirmation process, affect presidential choices and how senators might seek to enforce compliance with those requirements. Using a new dataset that combines ambassadorial nominee qualifications provided by the State Department to the Senate with nomination and confirmation data, this article provides an initial glimpse of the competing perspectives of presidents and senators on the bounds Congress can set for ambassadorial appointees’ characteristics. The evidence suggests that, instead of the interbranch competition set up by Article II’s checks on presidential appointments, collusion to maintain the status quo on ambassadorial appointments is less costly and more beneficial for both presidents and senators.","PeriodicalId":41473,"journal":{"name":"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49387995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/07343469.2021.2016122
A. Prasch
{"title":"Lyndon Johnson, Vietnam, and the Presidency: The Speech of March 31, 1968.","authors":"A. Prasch","doi":"10.1080/07343469.2021.2016122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2021.2016122","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41473,"journal":{"name":"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41582135","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/07343469.2021.2016111
Reed L. Welch
{"title":"Informing a Nation: The Newspaper Presidency of Thomas Jefferson","authors":"Reed L. Welch","doi":"10.1080/07343469.2021.2016111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2021.2016111","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41473,"journal":{"name":"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43425258","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/07343469.2021.2016120
Christopher Kelley
{"title":"Phantoms of a Beleaguered Republic: The Deep State and the Unitary Executive","authors":"Christopher Kelley","doi":"10.1080/07343469.2021.2016120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2021.2016120","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41473,"journal":{"name":"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47180163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/07343469.2021.2016109
Michael E. Thunberg
{"title":"Presidents, Populism, and the Crisis of Democracy","authors":"Michael E. Thunberg","doi":"10.1080/07343469.2021.2016109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2021.2016109","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41473,"journal":{"name":"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48757949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/07343469.2021.2016112
J. Peck
{"title":"The President Who Would Not Be King: Executive Power Under the Constitution.","authors":"J. Peck","doi":"10.1080/07343469.2021.2016112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2021.2016112","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41473,"journal":{"name":"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49644743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/07343469.2021.2016110
Kevin J. Burns
{"title":"Presidential Leadership at the Crossroads: William Howard Taft and the Modern Presidency","authors":"Kevin J. Burns","doi":"10.1080/07343469.2021.2016110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2021.2016110","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41473,"journal":{"name":"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43663337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/07343469.2021.2016113
Matthew R. Miles
{"title":"The Presidency: Facing Constitutional Crossroads","authors":"Matthew R. Miles","doi":"10.1080/07343469.2021.2016113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2021.2016113","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41473,"journal":{"name":"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42270958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/07343469.2021.2016114
Joshua B. Kennedy
{"title":"By Executive Order: Bureaucratic Management and the Limits of Presidential Power","authors":"Joshua B. Kennedy","doi":"10.1080/07343469.2021.2016114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2021.2016114","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41473,"journal":{"name":"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41441106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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