Pub Date : 2021-04-23DOI: 10.1080/07343469.2020.1813842
Scott R. Meinke
Abstract Through most of the modern partisan era, the House Rules Committee adhered to a norm of One Measure, One Rule. Starting in the 1990s, majorities violated this norm on rare occasions, but after 2010, multiple-measures rules became commonplace. This paper argues that multiple, sometimes competing objectives—majority messaging, member position-taking opportunities, and managing limited floor time—motivate the majority’s use of this creative rule. Bills in multiple-measures rules since 2010 have been more majority-unifying and divisive between the parties, and bills appear more in these rules as some time constraints increase. Bills sponsored by rank-and-file members, as compared to committee chairs, are also more likely to be included in multiple-measures packages. A special case of the multiple-measures rule, the bifurcated rule, also governs measures with heightened partisan conflict, and it allows the majority to navigate coalition problems creatively under certain conditions. The multiple-measures trend highlights how the majority continues to evolve special rules to pursue multiple goals under constraints, and it raises important questions about the way these tactics limit floor consideration of procedure.
{"title":"The Rise of Multiple-Measures Rules in the House of Representatives","authors":"Scott R. Meinke","doi":"10.1080/07343469.2020.1813842","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2020.1813842","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Through most of the modern partisan era, the House Rules Committee adhered to a norm of One Measure, One Rule. Starting in the 1990s, majorities violated this norm on rare occasions, but after 2010, multiple-measures rules became commonplace. This paper argues that multiple, sometimes competing objectives—majority messaging, member position-taking opportunities, and managing limited floor time—motivate the majority’s use of this creative rule. Bills in multiple-measures rules since 2010 have been more majority-unifying and divisive between the parties, and bills appear more in these rules as some time constraints increase. Bills sponsored by rank-and-file members, as compared to committee chairs, are also more likely to be included in multiple-measures packages. A special case of the multiple-measures rule, the bifurcated rule, also governs measures with heightened partisan conflict, and it allows the majority to navigate coalition problems creatively under certain conditions. The multiple-measures trend highlights how the majority continues to evolve special rules to pursue multiple goals under constraints, and it raises important questions about the way these tactics limit floor consideration of procedure.","PeriodicalId":41473,"journal":{"name":"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies","volume":"49 1","pages":"31 - 59"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/07343469.2020.1813842","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43543713","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-13DOI: 10.1080/07343469.2021.1905106
Michael Nelson
Abstract Presidential crises come in multiple forms. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington DC exemplify a type of crisis marked by a combination of four qualities: (1) a sudden event that is (2) unanticipated and (3) requires (4) an urgent response by the president. This article offers an account of the day's unfolding events as White House and other officials experienced them. It does so in the words of participants, most of them drawn from lengthy and recently-released interviews conducted by the University of Virginia's Miller Center as part of its George W. Bush Oral History. Like all historical methods, oral history is imperfect. Among its advantages, however, is that it supplements documentary White House records that have become steadily less revealing. The article concludes with a brief discussion of certain post-9/11 measures designed to enhance security, some of which have been effective but none of which forestalled the January 6, 2021 assault on the Capitol.
总统危机有多种形式。2001年9月11日发生在纽约和华盛顿特区的恐怖袭击是一种危机的典型，它具有以下四个特征:(1)突发事件(2)始料未及(3)需要(4)总统作出紧急反应。本文根据白宫和其他官员的经历，对当天发生的事件进行了描述。它是用参与者的话来表达的，他们中的大多数人都来自弗吉尼亚大学米勒中心(University of Virginia’s Miller Center)最近发布的长篇采访，这是乔治·w·布什口述历史的一部分。像所有的历史方法一样，口述历史是不完美的。然而，它的优点之一是，它补充了白宫的书面记录，这些记录的披露程度正在逐渐下降。文章最后简要讨论了911事件后旨在加强安全的一些措施，其中一些措施是有效的，但没有一个能阻止2021年1月6日对国会大厦的袭击。
{"title":"Day of Fire: An Oral History Perspective on the Bush White House on 9/11","authors":"Michael Nelson","doi":"10.1080/07343469.2021.1905106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2021.1905106","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Presidential crises come in multiple forms. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington DC exemplify a type of crisis marked by a combination of four qualities: (1) a sudden event that is (2) unanticipated and (3) requires (4) an urgent response by the president. This article offers an account of the day's unfolding events as White House and other officials experienced them. It does so in the words of participants, most of them drawn from lengthy and recently-released interviews conducted by the University of Virginia's Miller Center as part of its George W. Bush Oral History. Like all historical methods, oral history is imperfect. Among its advantages, however, is that it supplements documentary White House records that have become steadily less revealing. The article concludes with a brief discussion of certain post-9/11 measures designed to enhance security, some of which have been effective but none of which forestalled the January 6, 2021 assault on the Capitol.","PeriodicalId":41473,"journal":{"name":"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies","volume":"48 1","pages":"373 - 389"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/07343469.2021.1905106","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41885590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-13DOI: 10.1080/07343469.2020.1814903
Carlos Algara
Abstract The traditional view among scholars is that voters do not weigh job performance in their congressional voting decisions. Recent work challenges this notion and provides evidence that congressional job approval matters at the ballot box. However, scholars are divided as to which party benefits from positive job approval ratings. Moreover, the literature is unclear regarding the conditions under which voters hold individual candidates accountable for the collective performance of Congress. Analyzing individual and aggregate-level data, this study produces several key findings: (1) assessments of congressional job performance are directly tied to the electoral standing of the majority party; (2) positive approval ratings raise the level of support for majority party candidates among minority partisans and those closest to the minority in ideological proximity; and (3) majority party incumbents gain more from congressional approval than nonincumbents and suffer less of a loss from congressional disapproval. These findings provide a clearer narrative of how collective accountability works in congressional elections and the incentives for majority and minority party behavior in the contemporary Congress.
{"title":"The Collective “Congress” on the Ballot? A Voter and Aggregate-Level Analysis of Collective Responsibility in Congressional Elections","authors":"Carlos Algara","doi":"10.1080/07343469.2020.1814903","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2020.1814903","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The traditional view among scholars is that voters do not weigh job performance in their congressional voting decisions. Recent work challenges this notion and provides evidence that congressional job approval matters at the ballot box. However, scholars are divided as to which party benefits from positive job approval ratings. Moreover, the literature is unclear regarding the conditions under which voters hold individual candidates accountable for the collective performance of Congress. Analyzing individual and aggregate-level data, this study produces several key findings: (1) assessments of congressional job performance are directly tied to the electoral standing of the majority party; (2) positive approval ratings raise the level of support for majority party candidates among minority partisans and those closest to the minority in ideological proximity; and (3) majority party incumbents gain more from congressional approval than nonincumbents and suffer less of a loss from congressional disapproval. These findings provide a clearer narrative of how collective accountability works in congressional elections and the incentives for majority and minority party behavior in the contemporary Congress.","PeriodicalId":41473,"journal":{"name":"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies","volume":"48 1","pages":"219 - 264"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/07343469.2020.1814903","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59919030","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-10DOI: 10.1080/07343469.2020.1817175
Nicholas O. Howard, Mark Owens
Abstract Funding for legislative staff represents a valuable commodity to legislators. However it is a resource distributed to separate internal organizations. Previous studies show strong correlations between a legislator’s available institutional power and the benefits of having access to more staffing resources. Therefore, all individual legislators, committee chairs, and party leaders face incentives to direct a larger share of the Senate’s budget. However, we argue the Senate approaches staff allocations for each organization by giving attention to the previous workload of the chamber and resources allocated to other offices in the same bill. Using newly collected data on staff resource allocations between 1885 and 2018, we observe that the Senate’s internal organizations do not undermine each other, and that allocation decisions benefit each area separately. Results of a time series model show that increasing allocations for a staff area actually promotes greater allocations for other areas rather than undermining them, and that changes in membership and eras shape how senators collectively choose to allocate staff resources.
{"title":"Organizing Staff in the U.S. Senate: The Priority of Individualism in Resource Allocation","authors":"Nicholas O. Howard, Mark Owens","doi":"10.1080/07343469.2020.1817175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2020.1817175","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Funding for legislative staff represents a valuable commodity to legislators. However it is a resource distributed to separate internal organizations. Previous studies show strong correlations between a legislator’s available institutional power and the benefits of having access to more staffing resources. Therefore, all individual legislators, committee chairs, and party leaders face incentives to direct a larger share of the Senate’s budget. However, we argue the Senate approaches staff allocations for each organization by giving attention to the previous workload of the chamber and resources allocated to other offices in the same bill. Using newly collected data on staff resource allocations between 1885 and 2018, we observe that the Senate’s internal organizations do not undermine each other, and that allocation decisions benefit each area separately. Results of a time series model show that increasing allocations for a staff area actually promotes greater allocations for other areas rather than undermining them, and that changes in membership and eras shape how senators collectively choose to allocate staff resources.","PeriodicalId":41473,"journal":{"name":"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies","volume":"49 1","pages":"60 - 83"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/07343469.2020.1817175","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45393242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-10DOI: 10.1080/07343469.2020.1863519
Ruth Bloch Rubin
Abstract In recent years, the most bruising intraparty battles have pitted House leaders against their respective parties’ ideological extremes. While we know much about the resources and procedural powers leaders draw on in these confrontations, we know considerably less about the tactics of their hardline foes. What bargaining strategies do hardline members typically employ when negotiating with party leaders? Why do hardline groups favor some institutional arrangements over others? This paper argues that hardliners’ bargaining strategies and organizational choices are tightly linked and often path dependent. Members first choose how to generate leverage, sometimes resorting to collective defection, but more typically attempting to wrangle a party majority. This choice then dictates the organizational practices that structure their collaboration. But those organizational practices are often sticky, making it difficult for legislators to pivot from one strategy to another.
{"title":"Organizing at the Extreme: Hardline Strategy and Institutional Design","authors":"Ruth Bloch Rubin","doi":"10.1080/07343469.2020.1863519","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2020.1863519","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In recent years, the most bruising intraparty battles have pitted House leaders against their respective parties’ ideological extremes. While we know much about the resources and procedural powers leaders draw on in these confrontations, we know considerably less about the tactics of their hardline foes. What bargaining strategies do hardline members typically employ when negotiating with party leaders? Why do hardline groups favor some institutional arrangements over others? This paper argues that hardliners’ bargaining strategies and organizational choices are tightly linked and often path dependent. Members first choose how to generate leverage, sometimes resorting to collective defection, but more typically attempting to wrangle a party majority. This choice then dictates the organizational practices that structure their collaboration. But those organizational practices are often sticky, making it difficult for legislators to pivot from one strategy to another.","PeriodicalId":41473,"journal":{"name":"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies","volume":"49 1","pages":"1 - 30"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/07343469.2020.1863519","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45681921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-10DOI: 10.1080/07343469.2020.1841336
A. Russell
Abstract Women running for Congress make different choices than men about how to connect with constituents on social media, but few studies investigate how these variable strategies shape in-office messaging, particularly those of U.S. senators. This article extends research on gendered congressional communication by looking at how women in the Senate build reputations on Twitter, specifically assessing whether they set themselves apart with the policy agendas they promote online. Senators take advantage of Twitter’s low-cost and user-driven messaging to cultivate a reputation with their legislative expertise, and this research shows that women are curating a more comprehensive and broad agenda than gender stereotypes would otherwise suggest. Senators’ legislative communication on Twitter shows that women on both sides of the aisle are expanding their policy agenda to reach beyond “female issues.” Women are often stereotyped as less policy-oriented and only capable in gender-specific policy areas, but women in the Senate are actively communicating about contested policy issues and articulating diverse agendas. By adopting a comprehensive policy agenda for their public image, women in the Senate are both meeting and defying expectations about the policy topics they are willing and ready to act on.
{"title":"Gendered Priorities? Policy Communication in the U.S. Senate","authors":"A. Russell","doi":"10.1080/07343469.2020.1841336","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2020.1841336","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Women running for Congress make different choices than men about how to connect with constituents on social media, but few studies investigate how these variable strategies shape in-office messaging, particularly those of U.S. senators. This article extends research on gendered congressional communication by looking at how women in the Senate build reputations on Twitter, specifically assessing whether they set themselves apart with the policy agendas they promote online. Senators take advantage of Twitter’s low-cost and user-driven messaging to cultivate a reputation with their legislative expertise, and this research shows that women are curating a more comprehensive and broad agenda than gender stereotypes would otherwise suggest. Senators’ legislative communication on Twitter shows that women on both sides of the aisle are expanding their policy agenda to reach beyond “female issues.” Women are often stereotyped as less policy-oriented and only capable in gender-specific policy areas, but women in the Senate are actively communicating about contested policy issues and articulating diverse agendas. By adopting a comprehensive policy agenda for their public image, women in the Senate are both meeting and defying expectations about the policy topics they are willing and ready to act on.","PeriodicalId":41473,"journal":{"name":"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies","volume":"48 1","pages":"319 - 342"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/07343469.2020.1841336","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47361880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-08DOI: 10.1080/07343469.2020.1811424
Hanna K. Brant, L. Overby
Abstract Although we prefer to think of congressional turnover as being electorally driven and based on the choices of voters, in recent decades retirements/resignations have been a larger contributor to change in the composition of both chambers of Congress than have electoral defeats of incumbents. In this article, we consider the impact of retirements (and other forms of non-electoral exits) on the 2018 congressional midterms, focusing primarily on the House of Representatives. After reviewing the relevant (and limited) literature, we provide a descriptive overview of congressional retirements (including the unusual retirement of a comparatively young speaker of the House and almost two dozen GOP committee and subcommittee chairs) then examine the extent of voluntary retirements in this electoral cycle against historical patterns, and explore the effects of different retirements (i.e., progressive ambition versus retirement from public life). Using multivariate models, we examine which factors correlate significantly with retirement decisions, test for a partisan differential in retirement rates, and compare the rates at which the parties are capable of replacing retirees with co-partisans. Our analysis allows us to consider the ongoing importance of members’ career decisions for the composition of and the partisan balance of power in the U. S. Congress. Within the context of 2018 specifically, these career decisions had substantial implications for partisan control of the House, experience and leadership within the House Republican conference, and entrance of female members into Congress and toward higher office.
{"title":"Congressional Career Decisions in the 2018 Congressional Midterm Elections","authors":"Hanna K. Brant, L. Overby","doi":"10.1080/07343469.2020.1811424","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2020.1811424","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Although we prefer to think of congressional turnover as being electorally driven and based on the choices of voters, in recent decades retirements/resignations have been a larger contributor to change in the composition of both chambers of Congress than have electoral defeats of incumbents. In this article, we consider the impact of retirements (and other forms of non-electoral exits) on the 2018 congressional midterms, focusing primarily on the House of Representatives. After reviewing the relevant (and limited) literature, we provide a descriptive overview of congressional retirements (including the unusual retirement of a comparatively young speaker of the House and almost two dozen GOP committee and subcommittee chairs) then examine the extent of voluntary retirements in this electoral cycle against historical patterns, and explore the effects of different retirements (i.e., progressive ambition versus retirement from public life). Using multivariate models, we examine which factors correlate significantly with retirement decisions, test for a partisan differential in retirement rates, and compare the rates at which the parties are capable of replacing retirees with co-partisans. Our analysis allows us to consider the ongoing importance of members’ career decisions for the composition of and the partisan balance of power in the U. S. Congress. Within the context of 2018 specifically, these career decisions had substantial implications for partisan control of the House, experience and leadership within the House Republican conference, and entrance of female members into Congress and toward higher office.","PeriodicalId":41473,"journal":{"name":"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies","volume":"48 1","pages":"8 - 24"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/07343469.2020.1811424","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41880690","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/07343469.2020.1865079
J. P. Burke
{"title":"Han, Lori Cox. Advising Nixon: The White House Memos of Patrick J. Buchanan. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2019. 368 Pages. $39.95 (Hardcover)","authors":"J. P. Burke","doi":"10.1080/07343469.2020.1865079","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2020.1865079","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41473,"journal":{"name":"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies","volume":"48 1","pages":"114 - 115"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/07343469.2020.1865079","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43656579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/07343469.2020.1865075
Shirley Anne Warshaw
{"title":"Chervinsky, Lindsay M. The Cabinet: George Washington and the Creation of an American Institution","authors":"Shirley Anne Warshaw","doi":"10.1080/07343469.2020.1865075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2020.1865075","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41473,"journal":{"name":"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies","volume":"48 1","pages":"105 - 106"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/07343469.2020.1865075","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44888625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/07343469.2020.1865081
Jack D. Collens
{"title":"Sides, John, Michael Tesler, and Lynn Vavreck. Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America","authors":"Jack D. Collens","doi":"10.1080/07343469.2020.1865081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2020.1865081","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41473,"journal":{"name":"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies","volume":"48 1","pages":"118 - 119"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/07343469.2020.1865081","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45994948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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