In this article, earlier versions of which were presented at the IVR World Congress in 2019 and in graduate student workshops at the University of Pennsylvania, the author offers a critical look at the existing definition of a refugee in international law, in particular, in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. The Convention recognizes a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion as a condition for a person to be granted refugee status. However, this leaves significant gaps in the protection of persons fleeing indiscriminate or generalized violence or harm, although such people today constitute a significant proportion of those forced to move from their country of nationality. The author emphasizes that within some regions and countries there are legal instruments capable of bridging these gaps (the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention on the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, as well as temporary protection in the EU and the US), but the UN Convention continues to be deficient in this regard. The author proposes to correct these shortcomings by applying the “needs-first” approach, which understands refugees as all displaced persons fleeing sufficiently serious threats. The author presents her own definition of a refugee as “any person with a well-founded fear that their fundamental human rights are urgently threatened; who would have no recourse to their home government, even if appropriate international assistance were available; and whose interests can only or best satisfied by means of refugee – that is, by means of protection from a political authority that is not their own, usually in the form of asylum within the territory of that country.” The author acknowledges that her proposed “needs-first” approach is not without its drawbacks, and the main challenge in its implementation is to avoid becoming a purely humanitarian measure and to preserve the political identity of the individuals who are fleeing the threat to countries not of their nationality.
{"title":"Replacing the Persecution Condition for Refugeehood","authors":"E. Beaton","doi":"10.25162/arsp-2020-0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25162/arsp-2020-0001","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, earlier versions of which were presented at the IVR World Congress in 2019 and in graduate student workshops at the University of Pennsylvania, the author offers a critical look at the existing definition of a refugee in international law, in particular, in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. The Convention recognizes a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion as a condition for a person to be granted refugee status. However, this leaves significant gaps in the protection of persons fleeing indiscriminate or generalized violence or harm, although such people today constitute a significant proportion of those forced to move from their country of nationality. The author emphasizes that within some regions and countries there are legal instruments capable of bridging these gaps (the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention on the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, as well as temporary protection in the EU and the US), but the UN Convention continues to be deficient in this regard. \u0000The author proposes to correct these shortcomings by applying the “needs-first” approach, which understands refugees as all displaced persons fleeing sufficiently serious threats. The author presents her own definition of a refugee as “any person with a well-founded fear that their fundamental human rights are urgently threatened; who would have no recourse to their home government, even if appropriate international assistance were available; and whose interests can only or best satisfied by means of refugee – that is, by means of protection from a political authority that is not their own, usually in the form of asylum within the territory of that country.” \u0000The author acknowledges that her proposed “needs-first” approach is not without its drawbacks, and the main challenge in its implementation is to avoid becoming a purely humanitarian measure and to preserve the political identity of the individuals who are fleeing the threat to countries not of their nationality.","PeriodicalId":41477,"journal":{"name":"Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88876393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper explores the theoretical basis of the third party’s duty of justice as to grave human rights violations, presenting role obligations as the best complement to the literature. It begins with discussions on agents of justice in duty-based theories, notably O’Neill’s account on global justice, and rights-based theories, which are both included in the institution-centred perspective. I claim that these studies have failed to consider an individual duty bearer’s motive, autonomous reasoning and integrity in relation to justice, all of which constitute serious lacunae for the effective accomplishment of responsibility. To supplement, I introduce the distinction between responsibility and commitment, and acknowledge that combining the two is the desirable condition for recognising the duty of justice. Finally, I argue that the role obligations undertaken through personal acceptance of an institution-based role or a commitment-based role related to human rights norms adequately explain third parties’ duty to protect others from serious harm.
{"title":"Third Party Duty of Justice","authors":"Kumie Hattori","doi":"10.25162/arsp-2023-0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25162/arsp-2023-0019","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the theoretical basis of the third party’s duty of justice as to grave human rights violations, presenting role obligations as the best complement to the literature. It begins with discussions on agents of justice in duty-based theories, notably O’Neill’s account on global justice, and rights-based theories, which are both included in the institution-centred perspective. I claim that these studies have failed to consider an individual duty bearer’s motive, autonomous reasoning and integrity in relation to justice, all of which constitute serious lacunae for the effective accomplishment of responsibility. To supplement, I introduce the distinction between responsibility and commitment, and acknowledge that combining the two is the desirable condition for recognising the duty of justice. Finally, I argue that the role obligations undertaken through personal acceptance of an institution-based role or a commitment-based role related to human rights norms adequately explain third parties’ duty to protect others from serious harm.","PeriodicalId":41477,"journal":{"name":"Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135799155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Die Revolution im Urteilen in Christoph Menkes Rechtskritik","authors":"Simon Kneip","doi":"10.25162/arsp-2023-0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25162/arsp-2023-0016","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41477,"journal":{"name":"Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90137825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Family in the History of Philosophy","authors":"Vittorio Hösle","doi":"10.25162/arsp-2023-0023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25162/arsp-2023-0023","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41477,"journal":{"name":"Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135262733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Right of Nonlaw","authors":"Christoph Menke","doi":"10.25162/arsp-2023-0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25162/arsp-2023-0017","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41477,"journal":{"name":"Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie","volume":"41 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80771232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mit den Augen eines befangenen Chronisten","authors":"W. Hellmich","doi":"10.25162/arsp-2023-0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25162/arsp-2023-0010","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41477,"journal":{"name":"Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie","volume":"60 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75170547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hume und der Liberalismus","authors":"S. Bender","doi":"10.25162/arsp-2023-0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25162/arsp-2023-0006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41477,"journal":{"name":"Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie","volume":"116 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78161659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"No Pure Theory of Law without Free Will","authors":"Joachim Renzikowski","doi":"10.25162/arsp-2023-0022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25162/arsp-2023-0022","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41477,"journal":{"name":"Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie","volume":"121 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135263702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Impermissible Targeting of Human Shields","authors":"Beba Cibralic","doi":"10.25162/arsp-2023-0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25162/arsp-2023-0005","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41477,"journal":{"name":"Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88626442","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rule-Creating Activity of EVE Online Players","authors":"Radosław Pałosz","doi":"10.25162/arsp-2023-0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25162/arsp-2023-0004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41477,"journal":{"name":"Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84946482","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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