{"title":"The Decline in Reciprocity in Ethiopia","authors":"Robert L. Gallagher","doi":"10.25162/arsp-2022-0028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25162/arsp-2022-0028","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41477,"journal":{"name":"Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90955963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dialektik der Aufklärung?","authors":"Martin Welsch","doi":"10.25162/arsp-2022-0021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25162/arsp-2022-0021","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41477,"journal":{"name":"Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90441530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Futurities of Law","authors":"Malte-C. Gruber","doi":"10.25162/arsp-2021-0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25162/arsp-2021-0019","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41477,"journal":{"name":"Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75537681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
To be born means to be entrusted to others. On this basis, trust is first and foremost a mode of living with others (even anonymous others) which takes definite shape only when it appears to be weakened, doubtful, or even destroyed. In this case, mistrust raises the question how trust can get restored in order to stabilize social and political relations on which the state rests. In historical perspective, however, we are confronted with a radical desillusionment of trust that raises the question how the state can deserve our trust and how we are to avoid that mistrust reigns. The following considerations seek to make junctions plausible between the ontogenetic basis of trust on the one hand and the political precariousness of trust on the other hand.
{"title":"Desillusioniertes Vertrauen – in ontogenetischer und geschichtlicher Perspektive","authors":"B. Liebsch","doi":"10.25162/ARSP-2021-0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25162/ARSP-2021-0006","url":null,"abstract":"To be born means to be entrusted to others. On this basis, trust is first and foremost a mode of living with others (even anonymous others) which takes definite shape only when it appears to be weakened, doubtful, or even destroyed. In this case, mistrust raises the question how trust can get restored in order to stabilize social and political relations on which the state rests. In historical perspective, however, we are confronted with a radical desillusionment of trust that raises the question how the state can deserve our trust and how we are to avoid that mistrust reigns. The following considerations seek to make junctions plausible between the ontogenetic basis of trust on the one hand and the political precariousness of trust on the other hand.","PeriodicalId":41477,"journal":{"name":"Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77907321","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The essay explores the world of Jurisprudential Legal ethics, which ever closer claims the status of jurisprudential issue deeply woven into the contemporary debate about the concept and the nature of law. The paper briefly explores the leading jurisprudential theories about the lawyer’s role, in attempt to outline that the conceptualization of the lawyers’ role and the nature of their professional commitments are both a function of the concept of law we adopt, mainly focusing on the “positivist turn” in legal ethics. In the conclusive section the paper I address the abuse-of-law filtes thesis of lawyering. Such reading moves from the idea that legal rules do not provide about their own application, thus there is room for a general practical discourse that regards the scope of advocacy and provides a proper role for legal ethics that would be independent from the bare respect of the settled law.
{"title":"Abuse of Law and Advocacy","authors":"Andrea Romeo","doi":"10.25162/arsp-2021-0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25162/arsp-2021-0015","url":null,"abstract":"The essay explores the world of Jurisprudential Legal ethics, which ever closer claims the status of jurisprudential issue deeply woven into the contemporary debate about the concept and the nature of law. The paper briefly explores the leading jurisprudential theories about the lawyer’s role, in attempt to outline that the conceptualization of the lawyers’ role and the nature of their professional commitments are both a function of the concept of law we adopt, mainly focusing on the “positivist turn” in legal ethics. In the conclusive section the paper I address the abuse-of-law filtes thesis of lawyering. Such reading moves from the idea that legal rules do not provide about their own application, thus there is room for a general practical discourse that regards the scope of advocacy and provides a proper role for legal ethics that would be independent from the bare respect of the settled law.","PeriodicalId":41477,"journal":{"name":"Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78109880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Individual questions of the institutional reforms of the representative-democratic parliamentary system, such as issues of electoral law, party law, and parliamentary law, are frequently discussed. But all these reflections - and this is the principal thesis of this article - must eventually remain without success, if they do not address the preceding basic problem concerning the democratically indispensable conditions of the mental constitution of the active citizen, the „civis“. There, a key role, consciously experienced like a paradox, falls upon the renunciation of the claim to absolute truth of one’s own political convictions with regard to equally „relative-absolute“ claims for validity of others. On this base the psychological presuppositions of a modern pluralistic democracy are discussed, which thereupon are to be institutionalized: e. g. the capacity to compromise, the obligation of state neutrality in religious matters, the renunciation of hate speech, the rejection of „denial of reality“, and of allegedly „finalizing“ ideologies of history.
{"title":"Demokratische „Bürgertugend“ und die Krise des Parlamentarismus","authors":"E. Denninger","doi":"10.25162/ARSP-2021-0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25162/ARSP-2021-0007","url":null,"abstract":"Individual questions of the institutional reforms of the representative-democratic parliamentary system, such as issues of electoral law, party law, and parliamentary law, are frequently discussed. But all these reflections - and this is the principal thesis of this article - must eventually remain without success, if they do not address the preceding basic problem concerning the democratically indispensable conditions of the mental constitution of the active citizen, the „civis“. There, a key role, consciously experienced like a paradox, falls upon the renunciation of the claim to absolute truth of one’s own political convictions with regard to equally „relative-absolute“ claims for validity of others. On this base the psychological presuppositions of a modern pluralistic democracy are discussed, which thereupon are to be institutionalized: e. g. the capacity to compromise, the obligation of state neutrality in religious matters, the renunciation of hate speech, the rejection of „denial of reality“, and of allegedly „finalizing“ ideologies of history.","PeriodicalId":41477,"journal":{"name":"Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86075068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Hungarian legal scholarship is dominated by a formal, “technical” conception of the rule of law and this is even truer in the jurisprudence of criminal law. This fact can be demonstrated by analysing the case-law of the Hungarian Constitutional Court with regard to the constitutional review of judicial decisions and criminal statutes. In constitutional complaint proceedings the Constitutional Court has ruled out legal certainty issues from the review of legal norms and judicial decisions by stating that legal certainty is not a value of constitutional importance and does not raise human rights issues. In this paper the author argues for the claim that conceiving the principle of the rule of law and legal certainty as a formal and technical value which is isolated from the principles of political morality, can lead to a narrow and weak protection of human rights. If the rule of law and legal certainty issues are regarded as amoral values, (criminal) norms can become servants of political interests where highly unjust laws can be held to be constitutional.
{"title":"The Uncertain Concept of Legal Certainty","authors":"Krisztina Ficsor","doi":"10.25162/arsp-2021-0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25162/arsp-2021-0014","url":null,"abstract":"Hungarian legal scholarship is dominated by a formal, “technical” conception of the rule of law and this is even truer in the jurisprudence of criminal law. This fact can be demonstrated by analysing the case-law of the Hungarian Constitutional Court with regard to the constitutional review of judicial decisions and criminal statutes. In constitutional complaint proceedings the Constitutional Court has ruled out legal certainty issues from the review of legal norms and judicial decisions by stating that legal certainty is not a value of constitutional importance and does not raise human rights issues. In this paper the author argues for the claim that conceiving the principle of the rule of law and legal certainty as a formal and technical value which is isolated from the principles of political morality, can lead to a narrow and weak protection of human rights. If the rule of law and legal certainty issues are regarded as amoral values, (criminal) norms can become servants of political interests where highly unjust laws can be held to be constitutional.","PeriodicalId":41477,"journal":{"name":"Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74734955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Über Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494), das Chamäleon und die Würde des Menschen","authors":"Bernd Kannowski","doi":"10.25162/arsp-2021-0021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25162/arsp-2021-0021","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41477,"journal":{"name":"Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85410743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Teleological Interpretation in European Legal Tradition","authors":"M. L. A. Dmitrievich Strunskiy","doi":"10.25162/arsp-2021-0024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25162/arsp-2021-0024","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41477,"journal":{"name":"Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78864207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Michael Levin challenges the methodological soundness of Robert Nozick’s argument for the minimal state, but supports his final result: The exclusive aims of the state must be the “protection against force, theft, fraud, [and the] enforcement of contracts”. To replace Nozick’s, Levin builds a Hobbesian defense of the minimal state. He claims that the hypothetical rational choice of the less extensive bargain by the individuals in the state of nature morally justifies a minimal, but no other state. I analyze and seek to improve upon this Hobbesian defense of the minimal state. While Levin’s arguments can support the claim that any justified state has to be at least as extensive as the ultraminimal state, they also provide ground, contrary to his intention, upon which to build more extensive states.
{"title":"On a Hobbesian Defense of the Minimal State","authors":"Joachim Wündisch","doi":"10.25162/ARSP-2021-0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25162/ARSP-2021-0008","url":null,"abstract":"Michael Levin challenges the methodological soundness of Robert Nozick’s argument for the minimal state, but supports his final result: The exclusive aims of the state must be the “protection against force, theft, fraud, [and the] enforcement of contracts”. To replace Nozick’s, Levin builds a Hobbesian defense of the minimal state. He claims that the hypothetical rational choice of the less extensive bargain by the individuals in the state of nature morally justifies a minimal, but no other state. I analyze and seek to improve upon this Hobbesian defense of the minimal state. While Levin’s arguments can support the claim that any justified state has to be at least as extensive as the ultraminimal state, they also provide ground, contrary to his intention, upon which to build more extensive states.","PeriodicalId":41477,"journal":{"name":"Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82157854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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