The world has not always been there. At least not in philosophy. This two-part article examines the complex interplay of concepts among which the idea of the world appeared, and analyses the characteristics that allow it to play a central role in the space of philosophy. These are found to be fundamentally two. First, its capacity to identify with the idea of a closed, ordered totality (the classic idea of the cosmos), at the same time as it erodes the consistency of the latter and opens the philosophical space onto a positive use of the idea of indetermination. And second, the way in which it operates inside several well-ordered philosophical systems as a point of confusion: as a blurred point that lacks the type of clarity and distinction normally required of philosophical concepts, and that nonetheless appears to be important enough not to be expelled from philosophy. The first part of the article, published in this issue, reconstructs some of the coordinates within which the problematic notion of the world comes to appear. The planned second part will investigate how the idea of the world comes to play a central role within contemporary philosophy by allowing for a new articulation between the idea of the universal and the idea of totality – which produces a cascade of effects, the most notable of which are a new articulation of the idea of subject, and of the relation between philosophy and praxis.
{"title":"The World: The Tormented History of an Inescapable Para-Concept","authors":"B. Besana","doi":"10.3986/fv.42.2.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3986/fv.42.2.02","url":null,"abstract":"The world has not always been there. At least not in philosophy. This two-part article examines the complex interplay of concepts among which the idea of the world appeared, and analyses the characteristics that allow it to play a central role in the space of philosophy. These are found to be fundamentally two. First, its capacity to identify with the idea of a closed, ordered totality (the classic idea of the cosmos), at the same time as it erodes the consistency of the latter and opens the philosophical space onto a positive use of the idea of indetermination. And second, the way in which it operates inside several well-ordered philosophical systems as a point of confusion: as a blurred point that lacks the type of clarity and distinction normally required of philosophical concepts, and that nonetheless appears to be important enough not to be expelled from philosophy. The first part of the article, published in this issue, reconstructs some of the coordinates within which the problematic notion of the world comes to appear. The planned second part will investigate how the idea of the world comes to play a central role within contemporary philosophy by allowing for a new articulation between the idea of the universal and the idea of totality – which produces a cascade of effects, the most notable of which are a new articulation of the idea of subject, and of the relation between philosophy and praxis.","PeriodicalId":41584,"journal":{"name":"FILOZOFSKI VESTNIK","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47481424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Prispevek se nameni raziskati stik med literarno imaginacijo konca sveta, kot je ta upodobljen v H.G. Wellsovem znanstveno-fantastičnem romanu Časovni stroj in konceptom izumrtja, idejo francoskega naturalista Georgesa Cuvierja, ki na prelomu 19. stoletja oblikuje tezo o strukturi sveta, ki ima vase vgrajen konec kot elementaren gradnik svojega naravnega ustroja. Časovnega potnika v Wellsovem romanu v daljno prihodnost žene obsesivna želja po uzrtju usode sveta. Sreča jo na obali že mrtvega morja, kjer ga pričaka podoba umirajočega sveta, tihega in odetega v rdečo luč trajnega sončnega zahoda. Cuvier se po drugi strani s koncem sveta sreča kot bralec sledi tiste zgodovine, kot jo pripoveduje naravni svet skozi svoje plastenje in nalaganje. Znotraj teh plasti Cuvier prepozna momente repetitivnih prekinitev, ki so v veliki naravni zgodovini pustili za seboj ne samo cele vrste in rodove, temveč vključno z njimi tudi cele svetove. Ključno vprašanje je tako status konca, ki ga bomo obravnavali znotraj mehanizma vrnitve in ponovitve.
{"title":"Izumrtje in ponovljivost konca: Wells, Cuvier, Nietzsche","authors":"Marisa Žele","doi":"10.3986/fv.42.3.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3986/fv.42.3.04","url":null,"abstract":"Prispevek se nameni raziskati stik med literarno imaginacijo konca sveta, kot je ta upodobljen v H.G. Wellsovem znanstveno-fantastičnem romanu Časovni stroj in konceptom izumrtja, idejo francoskega naturalista Georgesa Cuvierja, ki na prelomu 19. stoletja oblikuje tezo o strukturi sveta, ki ima vase vgrajen konec kot elementaren gradnik svojega naravnega ustroja. Časovnega potnika v Wellsovem romanu v daljno prihodnost žene obsesivna želja po uzrtju usode sveta. Sreča jo na obali že mrtvega morja, kjer ga pričaka podoba umirajočega sveta, tihega in odetega v rdečo luč trajnega sončnega zahoda. Cuvier se po drugi strani s koncem sveta sreča kot bralec sledi tiste zgodovine, kot jo pripoveduje naravni svet skozi svoje plastenje in nalaganje. Znotraj teh plasti Cuvier prepozna momente repetitivnih prekinitev, ki so v veliki naravni zgodovini pustili za seboj ne samo cele vrste in rodove, temveč vključno z njimi tudi cele svetove. Ključno vprašanje je tako status konca, ki ga bomo obravnavali znotraj mehanizma vrnitve in ponovitve.","PeriodicalId":41584,"journal":{"name":"FILOZOFSKI VESTNIK","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43684422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rousseau in Nietzsche sta filozofa, med katerima le stežka vzpostavimo dialog, ki bi izhajal neposredno iz njunih del in vendar se med njunima filozofijama spletajo povezave ali, rečeno z Nietzschejem, perspektive, ki odpirajo skupno vprašanje: vprašanje vrednotenja. A na kaj se nanaša vrednotenje, na katero vrednost oziroma na vrednost česa se nanaša? Pokazati želimo, da gre za vrednotenje sedanjika v katerem se izvaja mišljenje, ki se vrača kot spomin tako kontinuitete sledi, kot njenih prekinitev. Vendar spomin se vrača bodisi kot resentiment in volja po maščevanju, torej samonegacija spomina, ki nikdar ni adekvaten, bodisi kot afirmacija tega, ki se spominja in tega, kar se v spominu vrača, vključno z diskontinuitetami. Kot odgovor na ta problem Rousseau iznajde proto-pojem srca, ki se v bolj ali manj pojmovni obliki pojavlja tako v njegovih avtobiografskih kot politično teoretskih delih, ne da bi mu Rousseau kdaj deklariral mesto v svoji filozofiji. Trdimo, da srce pridobi svojo pojmovnost šele ko ga prepoznamo kot centralni in plastični princip njegove misli, ki strukturno ustreza Nietzschejevi volji do moči. Slednjo Deleuze označi za plastični princip Nietzschejeve filozofije, kot princip vrednotenja in prevrednotenja vrednot in kot princip vrednotenja tega, kar se more in mora vračati v mišljenju.
{"title":"Rousseau, Nietzsche in vprašanje srca","authors":"Voranc Kumar","doi":"10.3986/fv.42.3.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3986/fv.42.3.03","url":null,"abstract":"Rousseau in Nietzsche sta filozofa, med katerima le stežka vzpostavimo dialog, ki bi izhajal neposredno iz njunih del in vendar se med njunima filozofijama spletajo povezave ali, rečeno z Nietzschejem, perspektive, ki odpirajo skupno vprašanje: vprašanje vrednotenja. A na kaj se nanaša vrednotenje, na katero vrednost oziroma na vrednost česa se nanaša? Pokazati želimo, da gre za vrednotenje sedanjika v katerem se izvaja mišljenje, ki se vrača kot spomin tako kontinuitete sledi, kot njenih prekinitev. Vendar spomin se vrača bodisi kot resentiment in volja po maščevanju, torej samonegacija spomina, ki nikdar ni adekvaten, bodisi kot afirmacija tega, ki se spominja in tega, kar se v spominu vrača, vključno z diskontinuitetami. Kot odgovor na ta problem Rousseau iznajde proto-pojem srca, ki se v bolj ali manj pojmovni obliki pojavlja tako v njegovih avtobiografskih kot politično teoretskih delih, ne da bi mu Rousseau kdaj deklariral mesto v svoji filozofiji. Trdimo, da srce pridobi svojo pojmovnost šele ko ga prepoznamo kot centralni in plastični princip njegove misli, ki strukturno ustreza Nietzschejevi volji do moči. Slednjo Deleuze označi za plastični princip Nietzschejeve filozofije, kot princip vrednotenja in prevrednotenja vrednot in kot princip vrednotenja tega, kar se more in mora vračati v mišljenju.","PeriodicalId":41584,"journal":{"name":"FILOZOFSKI VESTNIK","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45488845","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nove oblikoslovne rešitve (ali manko le-teh), ki jih je prinesla reforma opere v glasbeno dramo, burijo duhove že od samega nastanka zrelih Wagnerjevih del (Nibelungov prstan, Tristan in Izolda, Mojstri pevci nürnberški, Parsifal). Najbolj slavno formulacijo očitka dozdevne skladateljeve pomanjkljive veščine obvladovanja velikih form je artikuliral Friedrich Nietzsche, ki v Primeru Wagner poda diagnozo miniaturizma kot glavne kompozicijske značilnosti ali pa kar splošnega simptoma Wagnerjevega dekadentnega sloga. V prispevku se bomo s pomočjo analiz, ki jih najdemo v zajetni študiji muzikologa Karola Bergerja, ozrli na zgodovinski kontekst te pripombe, pretehtali njeno splošno ustreznost ter nazadnje osvetlili pot in zagate umetnika in filozofa, ki v drugi polovici 19. stoletja vsak na svoj način iščeta nova bežišča po zatonu razsvetljenske vere v moč razuma.
{"title":"Nietzsche, Wagner, kompozicijski miniaturizem","authors":"Lovrenc Rogelj","doi":"10.3986/fv.42.3.05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3986/fv.42.3.05","url":null,"abstract":"Nove oblikoslovne rešitve (ali manko le-teh), ki jih je prinesla reforma opere v glasbeno dramo, burijo duhove že od samega nastanka zrelih Wagnerjevih del (Nibelungov prstan, Tristan in Izolda, Mojstri pevci nürnberški, Parsifal). Najbolj slavno formulacijo očitka dozdevne skladateljeve pomanjkljive veščine obvladovanja velikih form je artikuliral Friedrich Nietzsche, ki v Primeru Wagner poda diagnozo miniaturizma kot glavne kompozicijske značilnosti ali pa kar splošnega simptoma Wagnerjevega dekadentnega sloga. V prispevku se bomo s pomočjo analiz, ki jih najdemo v zajetni študiji muzikologa Karola Bergerja, ozrli na zgodovinski kontekst te pripombe, pretehtali njeno splošno ustreznost ter nazadnje osvetlili pot in zagate umetnika in filozofa, ki v drugi polovici 19. stoletja vsak na svoj način iščeta nova bežišča po zatonu razsvetljenske vere v moč razuma.","PeriodicalId":41584,"journal":{"name":"FILOZOFSKI VESTNIK","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49327893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Fragmenti iz zapuščine: pomlad – jesen 1881 [odlomki]
遗产碎片:1881年春季至秋季[摘录]
{"title":"Fragmenti iz zapuščine: pomlad – jesen 1881 [odlomki]","authors":"Friedrich Nietzsche","doi":"10.3986/fv.42.3.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3986/fv.42.3.01","url":null,"abstract":"Fragmenti iz zapuščine: pomlad – jesen 1881 [odlomki]","PeriodicalId":41584,"journal":{"name":"FILOZOFSKI VESTNIK","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46106195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article, I focus on Alain Badiou’s idiosyncratic interpretation of Jacques Lacan and highlight his conceptual points of divergence with the psychoanalyst. I elaborate on Badiou’s distinction between philosophy, antiphilosophy, and sophistry as well as the notions of sense, ab-sense, and non-sense that he proposed in the book There’s No Such Thing as a Sexual Relationship: Two Lessons on Lacan as well as in his seminar on Lacan. Unlike Lacan, who affirmed that philosophy is subject to the fantasy of the One, Badiou claimed that the One exists merely as a result of an operation of counting. In this manner, he contested Lacan’s conviction that philosophy forecloses the real. I argue that Badiou’s main point of divergence with Lacan is centred on the notion of the subject and on the localization of the void in relation to the subject. I also touch upon philosophy’s relation to the symbolic, namely its ability to raise powerlessness to logical impossibility.
{"title":"Breaking the Mirror: Alain Badiou’s Reading of Jacques Lacan","authors":"Jana Ndiaye Berankova","doi":"10.3986/fv.42.1.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3986/fv.42.1.03","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I focus on Alain Badiou’s idiosyncratic interpretation of Jacques Lacan and highlight his conceptual points of divergence with the psychoanalyst. I elaborate on Badiou’s distinction between philosophy, antiphilosophy, and sophistry as well as the notions of sense, ab-sense, and non-sense that he proposed in the book There’s No Such Thing as a Sexual Relationship: Two Lessons on Lacan as well as in his seminar on Lacan. Unlike Lacan, who affirmed that philosophy is subject to the fantasy of the One, Badiou claimed that the One exists merely as a result of an operation of counting. In this manner, he contested Lacan’s conviction that philosophy forecloses the real. I argue that Badiou’s main point of divergence with Lacan is centred on the notion of the subject and on the localization of the void in relation to the subject. I also touch upon philosophy’s relation to the symbolic, namely its ability to raise powerlessness to logical impossibility.","PeriodicalId":41584,"journal":{"name":"FILOZOFSKI VESTNIK","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46793052","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Avtor zagovarja tezo, da je Newtonova vzpostavitev razlikovanja med absolutnim in relativnim gibanjem, tj. zavrnitev opredelitve gibanja v razmerju do zaznavnih stvari, v »Sholiji o času, prostoru, mestu in gibanju« iz Matematičnih principov filozofije narave v veliki meri rezultat njegovega kritičnega obračuna z Descartesovo filozofijo narave. To je razvidno iz primerjave »Sholije«, v kateri Descartes sicer ni omenjen, z Newtonovo izrecno kritiko Descartesa v rokopisu De gravitatione. Pozitivni rezultati Newtonovega kritičnega soočenja z Descartesovim pojmovanjem gibanja so namreč skoraj v celoti identični njegovi teoriji gibanja iz »Sholije«: definicija gibanja mora zadevati celotno telo in ne samo njegove površine; vanjo je treba namesto »vzajemnega prenosa« vključiti silo, ki je vzrok fizičnega gibanja; gibanje teles je enakomerno hitro in premo, kar pa je mogoče doseči samo znotraj okvira absolutnega prostora oz. razsežnosti. Kar zadeva teorijo gibanja, je bil Newtonov filozofski izziv torej vseskozi Descartes.
{"title":"Newtonova kritika Descartesovega pojmovanja gibanja","authors":"Matjaž Vesel","doi":"10.3986/fv.42.3.07","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3986/fv.42.3.07","url":null,"abstract":"Avtor zagovarja tezo, da je Newtonova vzpostavitev razlikovanja med absolutnim in relativnim gibanjem, tj. zavrnitev opredelitve gibanja v razmerju do zaznavnih stvari, v »Sholiji o času, prostoru, mestu in gibanju« iz Matematičnih principov filozofije narave v veliki meri rezultat njegovega kritičnega obračuna z Descartesovo filozofijo narave. To je razvidno iz primerjave »Sholije«, v kateri Descartes sicer ni omenjen, z Newtonovo izrecno kritiko Descartesa v rokopisu De gravitatione. Pozitivni rezultati Newtonovega kritičnega soočenja z Descartesovim pojmovanjem gibanja so namreč skoraj v celoti identični njegovi teoriji gibanja iz »Sholije«: definicija gibanja mora zadevati celotno telo in ne samo njegove površine; vanjo je treba namesto »vzajemnega prenosa« vključiti silo, ki je vzrok fizičnega gibanja; gibanje teles je enakomerno hitro in premo, kar pa je mogoče doseči samo znotraj okvira absolutnega prostora oz. razsežnosti. Kar zadeva teorijo gibanja, je bil Newtonov filozofski izziv torej vseskozi Descartes.","PeriodicalId":41584,"journal":{"name":"FILOZOFSKI VESTNIK","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43335469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Following Theodor W. Adorno’s reading of architecture as a purposeful art, the article explores how the social dimension is inscribed into the purposes ascribed to architecture by establishing a relation between what Adorno calls a sense of architectural space and the distribution of the sensible as defined by Jacques Rancière. Considering Rancière’s understanding of the political dimension of different “regimes of art”, the article attempts to show how similar observations can be made regarding architecture. What implications do these regimes of architecture have for the constitution of a common world, given architecture’s vast spatio-temporal presence?
根据Theodor W. Adorno将建筑视为一种有目的的艺术,本文通过建立Adorno所谓的建筑空间感和Jacques ranci定义的感性分布之间的关系,探讨了社会维度如何被嵌入到建筑的目的中。考虑到ranci对不同“艺术制度”的政治维度的理解,本文试图展示如何对建筑进行类似的观察。考虑到建筑的巨大时空存在,这些建筑制度对共同世界的构成有什么影响?
{"title":"Architecture and the Distribution of the Sensible","authors":"Nika Grabar","doi":"10.3986/fv.42.2.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3986/fv.42.2.12","url":null,"abstract":"Following Theodor W. Adorno’s reading of architecture as a purposeful art, the article explores how the social dimension is inscribed into the purposes ascribed to architecture by establishing a relation between what Adorno calls a sense of architectural space and the distribution of the sensible as defined by Jacques Rancière. Considering Rancière’s understanding of the political dimension of different “regimes of art”, the article attempts to show how similar observations can be made regarding architecture. What implications do these regimes of architecture have for the constitution of a common world, given architecture’s vast spatio-temporal presence?","PeriodicalId":41584,"journal":{"name":"FILOZOFSKI VESTNIK","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42855125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As David J. Chalmers claims, “virtual reality is a sort of genuine reality, virtual objects are real objects, and what goes on in virtual reality is truly real.” In this paper, I will suggest that the philosophical hypothesis that we might live in a simulation can be considered to be the last and most nihilistic episode in the series of narrations about the true and apparent worlds that Nietzsche sketched in The Twilight of the Idols. I will argue that Nietzsche’s prediction about the obliteration of the apparent world has actually been fulfilled by Chalmers, and I will show why his theory must be considered one of the many fables that humans have been producing in order to organise the world according to their own ends.
{"title":"How the True World Finally Became Virtual Reality","authors":"Anna Longo","doi":"10.3986/fv.42.2.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3986/fv.42.2.13","url":null,"abstract":"As David J. Chalmers claims, “virtual reality is a sort of genuine reality, virtual objects are real objects, and what goes on in virtual reality is truly real.” In this paper, I will suggest that the philosophical hypothesis that we might live in a simulation can be considered to be the last and most nihilistic episode in the series of narrations about the true and apparent worlds that Nietzsche sketched in The Twilight of the Idols. I will argue that Nietzsche’s prediction about the obliteration of the apparent world has actually been fulfilled by Chalmers, and I will show why his theory must be considered one of the many fables that humans have been producing in order to organise the world according to their own ends.","PeriodicalId":41584,"journal":{"name":"FILOZOFSKI VESTNIK","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42697884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Prispevek izhaja iz vprašanja, od kod izhajajo teze o tem, da nam danes vladajo sadisti, na katere naletimo tako v teorijah zarote kakor tudi v razlagah prevlade nasilja in krutosti v sodobni družbi. Prispevek najprej izpostavi nekatere pomembne spremembe, ki so nedavno nastale na področju politike, ekonomije in družbe (padec berlinskega zidu; viktimizacijo; krizo politike in vzpon neoliberalizma; spremenjeno dinamiko kapitalizma, ki ugrabi in valorizira afekt ter favorizira bizarno; tehnološke spremembe, ki omogočijo nastop novih družbenih medijev; premik obscenosti iz roba v središče; paradokse »konca zgodovine« in zgodovinskega zastoja; pandemijo; sprememba vsesplošnega razpoloženja iz tesnobe v štimungo nočne more, pri kateri je ključen problem užitek Drugega). Nato se loti zgodovinskih premen »sadizma«, ki so skozi 19. in 20. stoletje Sada reducirale na klinično kategorijo, določile pomen »sadizma« kot uživanja v trpinčenju drugih, pri Freudu, freudovcih in Frankfurtski šoli pa skonstruirale termin »sadomazohizem«, ki je bil uporabljen za analizo nacizma in ki ga je kasneje kot skrpucalo, ki s Sadom in Masochom nima nobene zveze, upravičeno kritiziral Deleuze. Posebno vlogo pri tem procesu splošne predstave o sadizmu imajo vojne propagande, klišeji in drugi procesi, ki so zaslužni za to, da je »sadomazohizem« kot spolna praksa in kot moda nedavno postal hkrati nekaj družbeno sprejemljivega, čeprav ima po drugi strani svojo vlogo ne le pri pornifikaciji družbe, temveč tudi pri uveljavitvi skrajno nasilnih oblik pornografije. Ne glede na vse te potvorbe »sadizma« in ne glede na neuporabnost »sadomazohizma« za konkretno analizo delovanja sodobne družbene vezi, pa nek sadizem v splošnem smislu, zlasti glede na vse poprej omenjene družbene in politične spremembe (trole, hejterje), ohranja svojo moč nad družbo. Za podrobnejšo analizo tega je treba vključiti vseprisotna, a malo analizirana fenomena Schadenfreude, zlasti na strani publike, in krutosti kot fenomena, do katerega je družba hkrati distancirana in z njim fascinirana. V tretjem koraku prispevek podrobneje razdela kaj Schadenfreude in krutost sploh sta, ter ju na koncu naveže na Lacanovo pojmovanje objet petit a.
{"title":"Sadizem, Schadenfreude in krutost","authors":"Peter Klepec","doi":"10.3986/fv.42.3.08","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3986/fv.42.3.08","url":null,"abstract":"Prispevek izhaja iz vprašanja, od kod izhajajo teze o tem, da nam danes vladajo sadisti, na katere naletimo tako v teorijah zarote kakor tudi v razlagah prevlade nasilja in krutosti v sodobni družbi. Prispevek najprej izpostavi nekatere pomembne spremembe, ki so nedavno nastale na področju politike, ekonomije in družbe (padec berlinskega zidu; viktimizacijo; krizo politike in vzpon neoliberalizma; spremenjeno dinamiko kapitalizma, ki ugrabi in valorizira afekt ter favorizira bizarno; tehnološke spremembe, ki omogočijo nastop novih družbenih medijev; premik obscenosti iz roba v središče; paradokse »konca zgodovine« in zgodovinskega zastoja; pandemijo; sprememba vsesplošnega razpoloženja iz tesnobe v štimungo nočne more, pri kateri je ključen problem užitek Drugega). Nato se loti zgodovinskih premen »sadizma«, ki so skozi 19. in 20. stoletje Sada reducirale na klinično kategorijo, določile pomen »sadizma« kot uživanja v trpinčenju drugih, pri Freudu, freudovcih in Frankfurtski šoli pa skonstruirale termin »sadomazohizem«, ki je bil uporabljen za analizo nacizma in ki ga je kasneje kot skrpucalo, ki s Sadom in Masochom nima nobene zveze, upravičeno kritiziral Deleuze. Posebno vlogo pri tem procesu splošne predstave o sadizmu imajo vojne propagande, klišeji in drugi procesi, ki so zaslužni za to, da je »sadomazohizem« kot spolna praksa in kot moda nedavno postal hkrati nekaj družbeno sprejemljivega, čeprav ima po drugi strani svojo vlogo ne le pri pornifikaciji družbe, temveč tudi pri uveljavitvi skrajno nasilnih oblik pornografije. Ne glede na vse te potvorbe »sadizma« in ne glede na neuporabnost »sadomazohizma« za konkretno analizo delovanja sodobne družbene vezi, pa nek sadizem v splošnem smislu, zlasti glede na vse poprej omenjene družbene in politične spremembe (trole, hejterje), ohranja svojo moč nad družbo. Za podrobnejšo analizo tega je treba vključiti vseprisotna, a malo analizirana fenomena Schadenfreude, zlasti na strani publike, in krutosti kot fenomena, do katerega je družba hkrati distancirana in z njim fascinirana. V tretjem koraku prispevek podrobneje razdela kaj Schadenfreude in krutost sploh sta, ter ju na koncu naveže na Lacanovo pojmovanje objet petit a.","PeriodicalId":41584,"journal":{"name":"FILOZOFSKI VESTNIK","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48608803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}