Prispevek obravnava strukturno dinamiko pandemije covid-19 in jo opredeli kot bistveno končno krizo. Ta definicija pa ne implicira abstraktne nujnosti, da se pandemija v nekem trenutku konča, temveč prej dejstvo, da je ideja konca določila celoten potek pandemije. Od samega začetka je ta ideja nastopila v dveh nasprotujočih si oblikah: v prvi perspektivi je pandemijo končati le z eliminacijo vira vdora; v drugi perspektivi konec pandemije označuje trenutek, ko družba najde način, da se na ta vdor prilagodi. Poleg analize »objektivne« evolucije pandemije v njenih različnih fazah članek prikaže inherentno sadistično strukturo prevladujočega družbenega odziva. Prav ker je ta odziv meril na dosego nemogoče totalne normalizacije, je pripravil teren, kjer pandemije potencialno mutira v pristno krizo antropocena, endemijo pandemije.
{"title":"Konec pandemije in sadizem normalizacije","authors":"Tadej Troha","doi":"10.3986/fv.42.3.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3986/fv.42.3.11","url":null,"abstract":"Prispevek obravnava strukturno dinamiko pandemije covid-19 in jo opredeli kot bistveno končno krizo. Ta definicija pa ne implicira abstraktne nujnosti, da se pandemija v nekem trenutku konča, temveč prej dejstvo, da je ideja konca določila celoten potek pandemije. Od samega začetka je ta ideja nastopila v dveh nasprotujočih si oblikah: v prvi perspektivi je pandemijo končati le z eliminacijo vira vdora; v drugi perspektivi konec pandemije označuje trenutek, ko družba najde način, da se na ta vdor prilagodi. Poleg analize »objektivne« evolucije pandemije v njenih različnih fazah članek prikaže inherentno sadistično strukturo prevladujočega družbenega odziva. Prav ker je ta odziv meril na dosego nemogoče totalne normalizacije, je pripravil teren, kjer pandemije potencialno mutira v pristno krizo antropocena, endemijo pandemije.","PeriodicalId":41584,"journal":{"name":"FILOZOFSKI VESTNIK","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44262844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In his ontology, Badiou operates with historical situations that are identified as situations whose representation regime is prone to change. Similarly, his Greater Logic operates with changes and modifications of the transcendental related to a change in a particular world determined by its transcendental. In both ontology and logic, Badiou often loosely relates the occurrence of change to temporality, but the operative concept of temporality remains unclear. The paper aims to provide a concept of temporality, borrowed from physics, and which seems consistent with Badiou’s system of thought and helps in comprehending it. We use this concept of time, which explicitly links disorder and temporality (or lack of temporality) in an attempt to elucidate certain parts of Badiou’s ontology and logic.
{"title":"Temporality in Badiou’s Ontology and Greater Logic","authors":"M. Ličer","doi":"10.3986/fv.42.1.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3986/fv.42.1.01","url":null,"abstract":"In his ontology, Badiou operates with historical situations that are identified as situations whose representation regime is prone to change. Similarly, his Greater Logic operates with changes and modifications of the transcendental related to a change in a particular world determined by its transcendental. In both ontology and logic, Badiou often loosely relates the occurrence of change to temporality, but the operative concept of temporality remains unclear. The paper aims to provide a concept of temporality, borrowed from physics, and which seems consistent with Badiou’s system of thought and helps in comprehending it. We use this concept of time, which explicitly links disorder and temporality (or lack of temporality) in an attempt to elucidate certain parts of Badiou’s ontology and logic.","PeriodicalId":41584,"journal":{"name":"FILOZOFSKI VESTNIK","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70403592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Despite his longstanding silence regarding Marx’s Capital, I wish here to argue that Badiou has in fact, in the three volumes of Being and Event, produced the materials for a contemporary logic of the capitalist social form. He has done so, however, in the form of an arsenal of abstract concepts that have yet to be precisely measured against Marx’s critical and formal reproduction of capitalism, the systematic exposition of which consumes the three volumes of Capital. I first argue that Badiou’s general disinterest in the logic of capitalism and Marx’s Capital specifically takes on a strongly symptomatic, spectral presence in the 1994-1995 seminar Lacan: Anti-philosophy 3. Secondly, while it is true that Badiou’s Logics of Worlds never discusses the logic of appearance that governs all capitalist things (i.e. commodities), it is possible nonetheless to read Logics as an abstract translation and formalisation of Marx’s Capital. In this view, Capital should quite simply be read as a systematic demonstration of the logic of what Marx calls the capitalist social form, which is to say, in Badiou’s jargon, the logic or science of the appearance of things in the capitalist world. In a sense, then, this means nothing more, though nothing less, than subjecting the Logics of Worlds to a Marxian torsion: in order to demonstrate that which Badiou has neglected, Marx has in fact already accomplished (with his own specific formal, conceptual, and discursive means), i.e. the systematic, synthetic demonstration of the necessary forms of the appearance of commodities in the capitalist social form.
{"title":"Capital, Logic of the World","authors":"Nick Nesbitt","doi":"10.3986/fv.42.2.08","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3986/fv.42.2.08","url":null,"abstract":"Despite his longstanding silence regarding Marx’s Capital, I wish here to argue that Badiou has in fact, in the three volumes of Being and Event, produced the materials for a contemporary logic of the capitalist social form. He has done so, however, in the form of an arsenal of abstract concepts that have yet to be precisely measured against Marx’s critical and formal reproduction of capitalism, the systematic exposition of which consumes the three volumes of Capital. I first argue that Badiou’s general disinterest in the logic of capitalism and Marx’s Capital specifically takes on a strongly symptomatic, spectral presence in the 1994-1995 seminar Lacan: Anti-philosophy 3. Secondly, while it is true that Badiou’s Logics of Worlds never discusses the logic of appearance that governs all capitalist things (i.e. commodities), it is possible nonetheless to read Logics as an abstract translation and formalisation of Marx’s Capital. In this view, Capital should quite simply be read as a systematic demonstration of the logic of what Marx calls the capitalist social form, which is to say, in Badiou’s jargon, the logic or science of the appearance of things in the capitalist world. In a sense, then, this means nothing more, though nothing less, than subjecting the Logics of Worlds to a Marxian torsion: in order to demonstrate that which Badiou has neglected, Marx has in fact already accomplished (with his own specific formal, conceptual, and discursive means), i.e. the systematic, synthetic demonstration of the necessary forms of the appearance of commodities in the capitalist social form.","PeriodicalId":41584,"journal":{"name":"FILOZOFSKI VESTNIK","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48732425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article discusses the philosophy of Alain Badiou from the perspective of a formulation that we believe represents it succinctly: the dialectic of formalization. The main thesis of the article is that Badiou’s doctrine of the four truth procedures (politics, science, love, and art) can be understood as a doctrine of a dialectical realization of new and universal forms in the world. The dialectic of formalization announces a double procedure – an autonomous and creative procedure for the production of a new true form in the world and a process of the formation of continuity in discontinuity. Moreover, the dialectic of formalization represents a connection between Badiou’s mature work and his early writings from the late 1960s. Even though in the 1960s and 1970s Badiou had not yet introduced the concepts of subject and truth in the sense that he understands them today, it is possible to support the thesis that there is an indisputable connection between Badiou’s early concept of formalization and his later concept of generic truth procedure. We will try to show that the dialectic of formalization (Badiou’s own formulation) designates the continuity between Badiou’s early and mature work.
{"title":"The Dialectic of Formalization","authors":"Magdalena Germek","doi":"10.3986/fv.42.1.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3986/fv.42.1.02","url":null,"abstract":"This article discusses the philosophy of Alain Badiou from the perspective of a formulation that we believe represents it succinctly: the dialectic of formalization. The main thesis of the article is that Badiou’s doctrine of the four truth procedures (politics, science, love, and art) can be understood as a doctrine of a dialectical realization of new and universal forms in the world. The dialectic of formalization announces a double procedure – an autonomous and creative procedure for the production of a new true form in the world and a process of the formation of continuity in discontinuity. Moreover, the dialectic of formalization represents a connection between Badiou’s mature work and his early writings from the late 1960s. Even though in the 1960s and 1970s Badiou had not yet introduced the concepts of subject and truth in the sense that he understands them today, it is possible to support the thesis that there is an indisputable connection between Badiou’s early concept of formalization and his later concept of generic truth procedure. We will try to show that the dialectic of formalization (Badiou’s own formulation) designates the continuity between Badiou’s early and mature work.","PeriodicalId":41584,"journal":{"name":"FILOZOFSKI VESTNIK","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47882419","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction: The World According to Contemporary Philosophy","authors":"Rok Benčin","doi":"10.3986/fv.42.2.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3986/fv.42.2.01","url":null,"abstract":"Introduction","PeriodicalId":41584,"journal":{"name":"FILOZOFSKI VESTNIK","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47924183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
By engaging with Giorgio Agamben’s article on the Italian government’s measures during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, we argue that COVID-19 points to the limits of the classical biopolitical and thanatopolitical logics of analysis and therefore requires a new conceptual framework. The outbreak of COVID-19 is an example of zoonotic globalisation in which the human species as a biological and geological actor is merely one among many other species that influence biological and geological processes on Earth, thus challenging humanist conceptualisations of politics. Here, the human role in politics is decentralised by thinking the virus as one of the actors that exert influence on how the political sphere is governed. We argue that the virus is the epitome of the ungovernable – an entity or broadly a historical challenge that cannot be subjected to existing mode(s) of governing – due to its interstitial and borderline character, resting between the ontological roots of the dominant modes of governing bios (life) and geos (nonlife), and challenging them by merely existing. We draw upon the works of Ghassan Hage, Nils Bubandt, Elizabeth Povinelli, and Donna Haraway to interrogate the limits of biopolitics and diagnose theoretical conundrums stemming from the division of nature vs. culture and life vs. nonlife entrenched in the existing social-political paradigms. Rather than providing finite answers about the role of the virus as a non-human actor in the political sphere, we raise questions as to how and why it should matter.
{"title":"Towards Biopolitics beyond Life and Death: The Virus, Life, and Death","authors":"Toni Čerkez, Martin Gramc","doi":"10.3986/fv.42.1.09","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3986/fv.42.1.09","url":null,"abstract":"By engaging with Giorgio Agamben’s article on the Italian government’s measures during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, we argue that COVID-19 points to the limits of the classical biopolitical and thanatopolitical logics of analysis and therefore requires a new conceptual framework. The outbreak of COVID-19 is an example of zoonotic globalisation in which the human species as a biological and geological actor is merely one among many other species that influence biological and geological processes on Earth, thus challenging humanist conceptualisations of politics. Here, the human role in politics is decentralised by thinking the virus as one of the actors that exert influence on how the political sphere is governed. We argue that the virus is the epitome of the ungovernable – an entity or broadly a historical challenge that cannot be subjected to existing mode(s) of governing – due to its interstitial and borderline character, resting between the ontological roots of the dominant modes of governing bios (life) and geos (nonlife), and challenging them by merely existing. We draw upon the works of Ghassan Hage, Nils Bubandt, Elizabeth Povinelli, and Donna Haraway to interrogate the limits of biopolitics and diagnose theoretical conundrums stemming from the division of nature vs. culture and life vs. nonlife entrenched in the existing social-political paradigms. Rather than providing finite answers about the role of the virus as a non-human actor in the political sphere, we raise questions as to how and why it should matter.","PeriodicalId":41584,"journal":{"name":"FILOZOFSKI VESTNIK","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45871728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article, we discuss Badiou’s concept of the world through the somewhat unusual metaphor of “the anatomy of the world”. The anatomy of the world allows us to approach the concept of the world through the idea of its constitution, architecture, structure – its anatomy. But as we show in the first part of the text, in order to derive the anatomy of the world, we need a corpse of the world – the world must die. Following the philosophy of Alain Badiou, we demonstrate that the world in its objective existence is indifferent to the question of life and death. Whether the world lives or dies depends only on the realisation of the truth procedures in the world on the basis of which the world is subjectivised. The world suffers from mortifying impulses, as the reactive and obscure forms of subjectivity actively work against the realisation of truths in the world. Through the artistic presentations of anatomy by Rembrandt van Rijn and John Donne, we also elaborate the tense relationship between the corpse of the world (from the perspective of the scientific procedure of truth) and the life of the world (from the perspective of the artistic procedure of truth). Although art often sees science as something that kills the world, our final point is that the world can also come to life through science.
{"title":"The Anatomy of the World","authors":"Magdalena Germek","doi":"10.3986/fv.42.2.07","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3986/fv.42.2.07","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we discuss Badiou’s concept of the world through the somewhat unusual metaphor of “the anatomy of the world”. The anatomy of the world allows us to approach the concept of the world through the idea of its constitution, architecture, structure – its anatomy. But as we show in the first part of the text, in order to derive the anatomy of the world, we need a corpse of the world – the world must die. Following the philosophy of Alain Badiou, we demonstrate that the world in its objective existence is indifferent to the question of life and death. Whether the world lives or dies depends only on the realisation of the truth procedures in the world on the basis of which the world is subjectivised. The world suffers from mortifying impulses, as the reactive and obscure forms of subjectivity actively work against the realisation of truths in the world. Through the artistic presentations of anatomy by Rembrandt van Rijn and John Donne, we also elaborate the tense relationship between the corpse of the world (from the perspective of the scientific procedure of truth) and the life of the world (from the perspective of the artistic procedure of truth). Although art often sees science as something that kills the world, our final point is that the world can also come to life through science.","PeriodicalId":41584,"journal":{"name":"FILOZOFSKI VESTNIK","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45105599","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ko so v Bristolu junija 2020 protirasistični protestniki prevrnili kip Edwarda Colstona, so politične elite vzdolž celotnega političnega spektra levo-desno, kljub pripoznanju, da kip trgovca s sužnji ne sme imeti svojega mesta v sodobni politiki, pozvale k odločni uveljavitvi zakona in reda. Članek skozi primer Colstonovega kipa raziskuje, kaj nam lahko Lacanova ideja perverzije razkrije glede razmerja moči med političnimi elitami in protirasističnimi protestniki. Uvodoma razpravlja o nemožnosti etike v kontekstu političnega, nato pa se posveti vprašanju užitka in njegove vloge pri ustvarjanju rasiziranega drugega in političnih institucij (ter mitov o belski nadvladi). Če je užitek drugega tisto, kar drugega rasizira kot deviantnega, pa je užitek perverzneža razosebljen užitek, ki naj bi sledil »višjemu dobru«. Na ta način članek trdi, da perverzija razkriva logiko rasnih hierarhij, ki podpirajo in ohranjajo sodobne družbe.
{"title":"Politika perverzije: rasizirana razlika in skupno dobro","authors":"Andreja Zevnik","doi":"10.3986/fv.42.3.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3986/fv.42.3.10","url":null,"abstract":"Ko so v Bristolu junija 2020 protirasistični protestniki prevrnili kip Edwarda Colstona, so politične elite vzdolž celotnega političnega spektra levo-desno, kljub pripoznanju, da kip trgovca s sužnji ne sme imeti svojega mesta v sodobni politiki, pozvale k odločni uveljavitvi zakona in reda. Članek skozi primer Colstonovega kipa raziskuje, kaj nam lahko Lacanova ideja perverzije razkrije glede razmerja moči med političnimi elitami in protirasističnimi protestniki. Uvodoma razpravlja o nemožnosti etike v kontekstu političnega, nato pa se posveti vprašanju užitka in njegove vloge pri ustvarjanju rasiziranega drugega in političnih institucij (ter mitov o belski nadvladi). Če je užitek drugega tisto, kar drugega rasizira kot deviantnega, pa je užitek perverzneža razosebljen užitek, ki naj bi sledil »višjemu dobru«. Na ta način članek trdi, da perverzija razkriva logiko rasnih hierarhij, ki podpirajo in ohranjajo sodobne družbe.","PeriodicalId":41584,"journal":{"name":"FILOZOFSKI VESTNIK","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45458549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
“The world” as a concept necessarily involves many difficulties and contradictions. The text presents some of them in a rather circular way, underlining the fact that we are always confronted with the dilemma of what to do with the world, or rather, what, which, and whose world we are dealing with. Beginning with some arguments about the claim that “the world is (out there),” and then moving on to certain dilemmas related to some views on the two-world theory, one inevitably comes across Marx’s thesis that the ultimate goal in relation to the world should be to “change it”. The text also presents some contemporary views thereon of Badiou, Nancy, and Ruda. Taking into account all these arguments and adding insights from Freud, Husserl, Heidegger, and Adorno as to the world and one’s worldview, we can only agree with Badiou’s statement about the only true goal of philosophy: “Philosophy has no other legitimate aim except to help find the new names that will bring into existence the unknown world that is only waiting for us because we are waiting for it.”
{"title":"World? Which World? On Some Pitfalls of a Concept","authors":"Peter Klepec","doi":"10.3986/fv.42.2.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3986/fv.42.2.03","url":null,"abstract":"“The world” as a concept necessarily involves many difficulties and contradictions. The text presents some of them in a rather circular way, underlining the fact that we are always confronted with the dilemma of what to do with the world, or rather, what, which, and whose world we are dealing with. Beginning with some arguments about the claim that “the world is (out there),” and then moving on to certain dilemmas related to some views on the two-world theory, one inevitably comes across Marx’s thesis that the ultimate goal in relation to the world should be to “change it”. The text also presents some contemporary views thereon of Badiou, Nancy, and Ruda. Taking into account all these arguments and adding insights from Freud, Husserl, Heidegger, and Adorno as to the world and one’s worldview, we can only agree with Badiou’s statement about the only true goal of philosophy: “Philosophy has no other legitimate aim except to help find the new names that will bring into existence the unknown world that is only waiting for us because we are waiting for it.”","PeriodicalId":41584,"journal":{"name":"FILOZOFSKI VESTNIK","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41738365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article proposes to reconsider the late Heidegger’s examination of the concept of the world, as for Heidegger the eradication of all life on planet earth is not the most horrible thing that could happen. It is the impossibility of thinking the world that exposes us to something worse: the loss of our link with being. Following Heidegger, to think the world is not only necessary to prevent the extinction of life on earth, but, moreover, the loss of thinking the world lies at the beginning of the crisis we are living through.
{"title":"The End of Life Is Not the Worst: On Heidegger’s Notion of the World","authors":"Jan Voelker","doi":"10.3986/fv.42.2.06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3986/fv.42.2.06","url":null,"abstract":"The article proposes to reconsider the late Heidegger’s examination of the concept of the world, as for Heidegger the eradication of all life on planet earth is not the most horrible thing that could happen. It is the impossibility of thinking the world that exposes us to something worse: the loss of our link with being. Following Heidegger, to think the world is not only necessary to prevent the extinction of life on earth, but, moreover, the loss of thinking the world lies at the beginning of the crisis we are living through.","PeriodicalId":41584,"journal":{"name":"FILOZOFSKI VESTNIK","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46252860","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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