Abstract A historical assessment of the use of chemical and biological weapons, Syria’s use of chemical weapons, and the abilities and authority of the United Nations, specifically the United Nations Secretary-General’s Mechanism.
{"title":"The Mechanisms Behind the United Nations Secretary-General’s Mechanism – an Examination of the History and Application of the Fact-Finding Mechanism to the Alleged Chemical Attacks in Syria","authors":"Tyler Green","doi":"10.1515/JBBBL-2019-0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/JBBBL-2019-0009","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A historical assessment of the use of chemical and biological weapons, Syria’s use of chemical weapons, and the abilities and authority of the United Nations, specifically the United Nations Secretary-General’s Mechanism.","PeriodicalId":415930,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Biodefense Law","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131524972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract An analysis of the United States’ government ability to conduct experiments on the general public, with a Specific emphasis on the Common Rule.
摘要分析了美国政府对公众进行实验的能力,特别强调了共同规则。
{"title":"Forgiveness or Permission: How May the United States Government Conduct Experiments on the Public or in Public?","authors":"David Lafrenière","doi":"10.1515/jbbbl-2019-0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jbbbl-2019-0001","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract An analysis of the United States’ government ability to conduct experiments on the general public, with a Specific emphasis on the Common Rule.","PeriodicalId":415930,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Biodefense Law","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115746993","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction to Volume X","authors":"V. Sutton","doi":"10.1515/JBBBL-2019-0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/JBBBL-2019-0011","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":415930,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Biodefense Law","volume":"286 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132419845","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Today, arguably the most common assertion against mandatory vaccinations comes from parents using the Due Process Clause to challenge mandatory vaccinations, claiming the mandates violate their children’s substantive due process rights. Ordinarily, schools allow certain exemptions to tenderly avoid violating the children’s constitutional rights. Many children may have parents advocating for their exemption from these vaccinations, but what about those who have less sway in an argument for exemption? What is at stake for children is their admission into a specific school, and even if they are denied admittance, their parents always have the option to homeschool them if they truly feel so passionately against mandatory vaccinations. However, a healthcare worker who is seeking employment, or who is already employed, does not have as much sway or alternatives when it comes to opposing a mandatory immunization policy. Employers have begun implementing mandatory influenza immunization programs, but even the employers who grant accommodations exempting certain healthcare employees impose some form of additional infection-control practice (e.g. requiring exempt healthcare workers to wear facemasks while on duty, wear different color badges, or placing them in alternative positions during flu season). These mandatory influenza immunization programs, and the alternatives required if healthcare workers acquire exemptions, strike a critical balance between the workers’ constitutional rights and the overarching public safety issues.
{"title":"Vaccination or Termination: The Issue of Mandatory Influenza Vaccinations for Healthcare Workers","authors":"Emily DeYoung","doi":"10.1515/jbbbl-2019-0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jbbbl-2019-0005","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Today, arguably the most common assertion against mandatory vaccinations comes from parents using the Due Process Clause to challenge mandatory vaccinations, claiming the mandates violate their children’s substantive due process rights. Ordinarily, schools allow certain exemptions to tenderly avoid violating the children’s constitutional rights. Many children may have parents advocating for their exemption from these vaccinations, but what about those who have less sway in an argument for exemption? What is at stake for children is their admission into a specific school, and even if they are denied admittance, their parents always have the option to homeschool them if they truly feel so passionately against mandatory vaccinations. However, a healthcare worker who is seeking employment, or who is already employed, does not have as much sway or alternatives when it comes to opposing a mandatory immunization policy. Employers have begun implementing mandatory influenza immunization programs, but even the employers who grant accommodations exempting certain healthcare employees impose some form of additional infection-control practice (e.g. requiring exempt healthcare workers to wear facemasks while on duty, wear different color badges, or placing them in alternative positions during flu season). These mandatory influenza immunization programs, and the alternatives required if healthcare workers acquire exemptions, strike a critical balance between the workers’ constitutional rights and the overarching public safety issues.","PeriodicalId":415930,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Biodefense Law","volume":"2013 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114634992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract An attack on America’s food supply could come in many forms such as: poisoning imported food, burning crop fields, or a conventional terrorist attacks on food centers; however, one of the most frightening and potentially disastrous scenarios for an attack is a coordinated, biological agroterrorism attack released on the nation’s livestock or crops.
{"title":"Fields of Danger: The Looming Threat of Agroterrorism on the United States’ Agriculture","authors":"Marshall Haley","doi":"10.1515/jbbbl-2019-0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jbbbl-2019-0010","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract An attack on America’s food supply could come in many forms such as: poisoning imported food, burning crop fields, or a conventional terrorist attacks on food centers; however, one of the most frightening and potentially disastrous scenarios for an attack is a coordinated, biological agroterrorism attack released on the nation’s livestock or crops.","PeriodicalId":415930,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Biodefense Law","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128894649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"All Things are Bigger in Texas: Due Process Issues of Area Quarantine","authors":"Chase Price","doi":"10.1515/jbbbl-2018-0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jbbbl-2018-0004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":415930,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Biodefense Law","volume":"89 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114403814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We are pleased to publish Volume IX of the Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law. This volume continues the Journal’s tradition of shining light on emerging and important issues within the fields of biosecurity, biosafety, and biodefense law, both from a practical as well as a theoretical perspective. The lead article of Volume IX is a transcript of a presentation entitled Ethical Challenges in Biosecurity and the Lawyer’s Obligations. Dr. Sheri Dacso, Partner at Seyforth Shaw, and Cheryl Erwin, Director of Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center Medical Bioethics Program, presented on both the ethical framework of bioethics in clinics and the application of bioethics and cyber terrorism laws. The remaining articles selected for Volume IX are divided into four subject-matter areas. The first addresses biological threats and national preparedness. The second addresses Good Samaritan laws in response to biological epidemics. The third focuses on the environmental ramifications of released biological agents. Finally, the fourth addresses public health regulations. The first section provides an in depth look at the United States’ regulations and laws in place that help prevent and mitigate biological threats. Lionel “Jake” Roach addresses the compensatory laws governing medical coverage to victims of terrorism in his article The Disability Benefit Implications of an Intentional Biological Weapon Attack. In her article Regulations & Resolutions: Does the BWC Prevent Terrorists from Accessing Bioweapons?, Sarah Scrivner discusses potential terrorist possession of biological weapons and international law currently in place. Carder Brooks, in his article Classifying and Regulating Biological Agents in the United States: Problems Posed to Global Biosecurity, discusses how the classification of biological agents in the United States effects biosecurity regulations. In A Fresh Threat: Will CAS9 Lead to CRISPR Bioweapons?, Daniel Willingham touches on the manufacturing of biological agents through gene editing devises such as CRISPR, and how current regulations could address such a biological threat. The second section takes a brief look at Good Samaritan laws throughout the United States. Author Nicolas Northcut in his article Is the Good Samaritan Really Good? A Look into the Possible Harm Caused by Current Good Samaritan Laws, discusses how the lack of uniformity among the states creates ambiguity in protection, and how that might complicate and even obstruct necessary aid in the event of a bioterrorist attack. The third section discusses the environmental impacts and effects that may take place in various biological events. Uzochukwu Okonkwo, in his article Human Life and the Environment: Is There a Balance?, examines the biological alteration of mosquitos in response to Zika, and further discusses the societal and ecological side-effects this could have on ecosystems. Additionally, in the article Biological Warfare and Environmental
最后,特别感谢布里·舍温教授
{"title":"Introduction to Volume IX","authors":"V. Sutton","doi":"10.1515/jbbbl-2018-0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jbbbl-2018-0011","url":null,"abstract":"We are pleased to publish Volume IX of the Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law. This volume continues the Journal’s tradition of shining light on emerging and important issues within the fields of biosecurity, biosafety, and biodefense law, both from a practical as well as a theoretical perspective. The lead article of Volume IX is a transcript of a presentation entitled Ethical Challenges in Biosecurity and the Lawyer’s Obligations. Dr. Sheri Dacso, Partner at Seyforth Shaw, and Cheryl Erwin, Director of Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center Medical Bioethics Program, presented on both the ethical framework of bioethics in clinics and the application of bioethics and cyber terrorism laws. The remaining articles selected for Volume IX are divided into four subject-matter areas. The first addresses biological threats and national preparedness. The second addresses Good Samaritan laws in response to biological epidemics. The third focuses on the environmental ramifications of released biological agents. Finally, the fourth addresses public health regulations. The first section provides an in depth look at the United States’ regulations and laws in place that help prevent and mitigate biological threats. Lionel “Jake” Roach addresses the compensatory laws governing medical coverage to victims of terrorism in his article The Disability Benefit Implications of an Intentional Biological Weapon Attack. In her article Regulations & Resolutions: Does the BWC Prevent Terrorists from Accessing Bioweapons?, Sarah Scrivner discusses potential terrorist possession of biological weapons and international law currently in place. Carder Brooks, in his article Classifying and Regulating Biological Agents in the United States: Problems Posed to Global Biosecurity, discusses how the classification of biological agents in the United States effects biosecurity regulations. In A Fresh Threat: Will CAS9 Lead to CRISPR Bioweapons?, Daniel Willingham touches on the manufacturing of biological agents through gene editing devises such as CRISPR, and how current regulations could address such a biological threat. The second section takes a brief look at Good Samaritan laws throughout the United States. Author Nicolas Northcut in his article Is the Good Samaritan Really Good? A Look into the Possible Harm Caused by Current Good Samaritan Laws, discusses how the lack of uniformity among the states creates ambiguity in protection, and how that might complicate and even obstruct necessary aid in the event of a bioterrorist attack. The third section discusses the environmental impacts and effects that may take place in various biological events. Uzochukwu Okonkwo, in his article Human Life and the Environment: Is There a Balance?, examines the biological alteration of mosquitos in response to Zika, and further discusses the societal and ecological side-effects this could have on ecosystems. Additionally, in the article Biological Warfare and Environmental ","PeriodicalId":415930,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Biodefense Law","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116856486","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract A coordinated response to bioterrorism events requires the participation of healthcare providers, governmental agencies, ethicists, and community members. We describe some of the ethical and considerations that should go into planning for these events.
{"title":"Ethical and Legal Issues in Bioterrorism Events","authors":"Cheryl Erwin, S. Dacso","doi":"10.1515/JBBBL-2018-0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/JBBBL-2018-0013","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A coordinated response to bioterrorism events requires the participation of healthcare providers, governmental agencies, ethicists, and community members. We describe some of the ethical and considerations that should go into planning for these events.","PeriodicalId":415930,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Biodefense Law","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122575959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
With terrorist attacks becoming everyday occurrences in countries around the world, there is great concern over what types of weapons terrorist groups can access. Although biological weapons are banned under international law, there is still a risk of terrorist organizations obtaining and using them.1 As recently as 2010, The Washington Post reported on illegally manufactured beauty treatments being sold through counterfeit networks and the biosecurity risks they posed.2 Botox derived from one of the “world’s deadliest poisons” began showing up on the black market in Russia in 2006.3 The heavily regulated drug was being manufactured in illegal factories that likely numbered in the dozens, where it was then sold online for anyone to purchase.4 No identification or registration was required to purchase the drugs.5 In 2004, prior to the incidents in Russia, U.S. Justice Department officials raided a string of clinics in five states after uncovering a supply network substituting industrial-grade botulinum toxin for commercial Botox.6 The drug was intended for laboratory research, not cosmetic use, and the illegal sale paralyzed four people.7 Before the emergence of this black market, terrorist attempts at producing and using biological weapons failed due to a lack of sophisticated lab equipment.8 Now the fear is that terrorists can simply buy these biological weapons directly from illegal manufacturers.9 We have seen this done in the past, as Al Qaeda tried to obtain botulinum toxin.10 It would be easy to imagine ISIS—or other terrorist groups—may try to do the same. Terrorist attacks such as bombings can cause immediate mass devastation, but a bioweapon can increase that destruction exponentially.11 In a national security exercise conducted in 2001, the Center for Strategic and International Studiesworkedwith the JohnHopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies to create a “scenario depicting a covert smallpox attack” in the United States.12 In the scenario, the virus first appeared in Oklahoma andwithinweeks, the scenario reported asmany as amillion people in theUnited States estimated to be dead.13 Similar to these working scenarios, if the international community determines it has not taken the necessary measures to prevent a biological attack, it must take appropriate steps to remedy that finding and minimize the threat. This article will look to analyze this issue and recommend steps to make measures more effective, and is laid out as follows: Part II of this article will discuss the Biological Weapons Convention; Part III will cover the Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons; Part IV will address Resolution 1540; Part V will be an analysis of how effective the measures are; and Part VI will consist of a brief conclusion.
{"title":"Regulations & Resolutions: Does The Bwc Prevent Terrorists From Accessing Bioweapons?","authors":"Sarah Scrivner","doi":"10.1515/JBBBL-2018-0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/JBBBL-2018-0006","url":null,"abstract":"With terrorist attacks becoming everyday occurrences in countries around the world, there is great concern over what types of weapons terrorist groups can access. Although biological weapons are banned under international law, there is still a risk of terrorist organizations obtaining and using them.1 As recently as 2010, The Washington Post reported on illegally manufactured beauty treatments being sold through counterfeit networks and the biosecurity risks they posed.2 Botox derived from one of the “world’s deadliest poisons” began showing up on the black market in Russia in 2006.3 The heavily regulated drug was being manufactured in illegal factories that likely numbered in the dozens, where it was then sold online for anyone to purchase.4 No identification or registration was required to purchase the drugs.5 In 2004, prior to the incidents in Russia, U.S. Justice Department officials raided a string of clinics in five states after uncovering a supply network substituting industrial-grade botulinum toxin for commercial Botox.6 The drug was intended for laboratory research, not cosmetic use, and the illegal sale paralyzed four people.7 Before the emergence of this black market, terrorist attempts at producing and using biological weapons failed due to a lack of sophisticated lab equipment.8 Now the fear is that terrorists can simply buy these biological weapons directly from illegal manufacturers.9 We have seen this done in the past, as Al Qaeda tried to obtain botulinum toxin.10 It would be easy to imagine ISIS—or other terrorist groups—may try to do the same. Terrorist attacks such as bombings can cause immediate mass devastation, but a bioweapon can increase that destruction exponentially.11 In a national security exercise conducted in 2001, the Center for Strategic and International Studiesworkedwith the JohnHopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies to create a “scenario depicting a covert smallpox attack” in the United States.12 In the scenario, the virus first appeared in Oklahoma andwithinweeks, the scenario reported asmany as amillion people in theUnited States estimated to be dead.13 Similar to these working scenarios, if the international community determines it has not taken the necessary measures to prevent a biological attack, it must take appropriate steps to remedy that finding and minimize the threat. This article will look to analyze this issue and recommend steps to make measures more effective, and is laid out as follows: Part II of this article will discuss the Biological Weapons Convention; Part III will cover the Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons; Part IV will address Resolution 1540; Part V will be an analysis of how effective the measures are; and Part VI will consist of a brief conclusion.","PeriodicalId":415930,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Biodefense Law","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130091458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Every state in the United States of America has legislation requiring specific vaccinations for children in public and private school systems.1 Currently, eighteen states allow philosophical exemptions for those who object to vaccinations because of ”personal, moral, or other beliefs.”2 Texas is one of the eighteen states that have a vaccine exemption for reasons of conscience, which includes religious beliefs.3 The Texas Administrative Code § 97.62 states:
{"title":"God Bless Texas: Should Texas Eliminate the Vaccine Exemption for Reasons of Conscience?","authors":"Emily Thakar","doi":"10.1515/jbbbl-2018-0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jbbbl-2018-0008","url":null,"abstract":"Every state in the United States of America has legislation requiring specific vaccinations for children in public and private school systems.1 Currently, eighteen states allow philosophical exemptions for those who object to vaccinations because of ”personal, moral, or other beliefs.”2 Texas is one of the eighteen states that have a vaccine exemption for reasons of conscience, which includes religious beliefs.3 The Texas Administrative Code § 97.62 states:","PeriodicalId":415930,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Biodefense Law","volume":"116 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126310925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}