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The Mechanisms Behind the United Nations Secretary-General’s Mechanism – an Examination of the History and Application of the Fact-Finding Mechanism to the Alleged Chemical Attacks in Syria 联合国秘书长机制背后的机制——对叙利亚指称化学袭击事件实况调查机制的历史和应用的审查
Pub Date : 2019-08-27 DOI: 10.1515/JBBBL-2019-0009
Tyler Green
Abstract A historical assessment of the use of chemical and biological weapons, Syria’s use of chemical weapons, and the abilities and authority of the United Nations, specifically the United Nations Secretary-General’s Mechanism.
对化学武器和生物武器的使用,叙利亚使用化学武器,以及联合国,特别是联合国秘书长机制的能力和权威进行历史评估。
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引用次数: 0
Forgiveness or Permission: How May the United States Government Conduct Experiments on the Public or in Public? 宽恕还是许可:美国政府如何在公众面前或公共场合进行实验?
Pub Date : 2019-08-27 DOI: 10.1515/jbbbl-2019-0001
David Lafrenière
Abstract An analysis of the United States’ government ability to conduct experiments on the general public, with a Specific emphasis on the Common Rule.
摘要分析了美国政府对公众进行实验的能力,特别强调了共同规则。
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引用次数: 0
Introduction to Volume X 第十卷导言
Pub Date : 2019-08-14 DOI: 10.1515/JBBBL-2019-0011
V. Sutton
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引用次数: 0
Vaccination or Termination: The Issue of Mandatory Influenza Vaccinations for Healthcare Workers 接种或终止:卫生保健工作者强制接种流感疫苗的问题
Pub Date : 2019-08-07 DOI: 10.1515/jbbbl-2019-0005
Emily DeYoung
Abstract Today, arguably the most common assertion against mandatory vaccinations comes from parents using the Due Process Clause to challenge mandatory vaccinations, claiming the mandates violate their children’s substantive due process rights. Ordinarily, schools allow certain exemptions to tenderly avoid violating the children’s constitutional rights. Many children may have parents advocating for their exemption from these vaccinations, but what about those who have less sway in an argument for exemption? What is at stake for children is their admission into a specific school, and even if they are denied admittance, their parents always have the option to homeschool them if they truly feel so passionately against mandatory vaccinations. However, a healthcare worker who is seeking employment, or who is already employed, does not have as much sway or alternatives when it comes to opposing a mandatory immunization policy. Employers have begun implementing mandatory influenza immunization programs, but even the employers who grant accommodations exempting certain healthcare employees impose some form of additional infection-control practice (e.g. requiring exempt healthcare workers to wear facemasks while on duty, wear different color badges, or placing them in alternative positions during flu season). These mandatory influenza immunization programs, and the alternatives required if healthcare workers acquire exemptions, strike a critical balance between the workers’ constitutional rights and the overarching public safety issues.
今天,最常见的反对强制接种疫苗的主张可以说是来自父母使用正当程序条款来挑战强制接种疫苗,声称该命令侵犯了他们孩子的实质性正当程序权利。通常,学校允许某些豁免,以温和地避免侵犯儿童的宪法权利。许多孩子的父母可能会主张他们不接种这些疫苗,但那些在豁免争论中影响力较小的孩子呢?对孩子们来说,最重要的是他们能否进入一所特定的学校,即使他们被拒绝入学,如果他们真的如此强烈地反对强制接种疫苗,他们的父母也总是可以选择在家教育他们。然而,正在寻找工作或已经就业的卫生保健工作者在反对强制性免疫政策时没有那么大的影响力或选择。雇主已开始实施强制性流感免疫规划,但即使是给予豁免某些医疗保健雇员住宿的雇主,也会施加某种形式的额外感染控制措施(例如,要求豁免的医疗保健工作者在值班时佩戴口罩,佩戴不同颜色的徽章,或在流感季节将其安置在其他位置)。这些强制性流感免疫计划,以及如果医护人员获得豁免所需的替代方案,在工人的宪法权利和总体公共安全问题之间取得了关键的平衡。
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引用次数: 0
Fields of Danger: The Looming Threat of Agroterrorism on the United States’ Agriculture 危险的领域:农业恐怖主义对美国农业的潜在威胁
Pub Date : 2019-08-07 DOI: 10.1515/jbbbl-2019-0010
Marshall Haley
Abstract An attack on America’s food supply could come in many forms such as: poisoning imported food, burning crop fields, or a conventional terrorist attacks on food centers; however, one of the most frightening and potentially disastrous scenarios for an attack is a coordinated, biological agroterrorism attack released on the nation’s livestock or crops.
对美国食品供应的攻击可能有多种形式,例如:在进口食品中投毒,焚烧农田,或对食品中心进行传统的恐怖袭击;然而,最令人恐惧和潜在灾难性的袭击场景之一是对国家牲畜或农作物进行协调的生物农业恐怖袭击。
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引用次数: 0
All Things are Bigger in Texas: Due Process Issues of Area Quarantine 德克萨斯州的一切都更大:区域检疫的正当程序问题
Pub Date : 2018-06-26 DOI: 10.1515/jbbbl-2018-0004
Chase Price
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引用次数: 0
Introduction to Volume IX 第九卷导言
Pub Date : 2018-06-09 DOI: 10.1515/jbbbl-2018-0011
V. Sutton
We are pleased to publish Volume IX of the Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law. This volume continues the Journal’s tradition of shining light on emerging and important issues within the fields of biosecurity, biosafety, and biodefense law, both from a practical as well as a theoretical perspective. The lead article of Volume IX is a transcript of a presentation entitled Ethical Challenges in Biosecurity and the Lawyer’s Obligations. Dr. Sheri Dacso, Partner at Seyforth Shaw, and Cheryl Erwin, Director of Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center Medical Bioethics Program, presented on both the ethical framework of bioethics in clinics and the application of bioethics and cyber terrorism laws. The remaining articles selected for Volume IX are divided into four subject-matter areas. The first addresses biological threats and national preparedness. The second addresses Good Samaritan laws in response to biological epidemics. The third focuses on the environmental ramifications of released biological agents. Finally, the fourth addresses public health regulations. The first section provides an in depth look at the United States’ regulations and laws in place that help prevent and mitigate biological threats. Lionel “Jake” Roach addresses the compensatory laws governing medical coverage to victims of terrorism in his article The Disability Benefit Implications of an Intentional Biological Weapon Attack. In her article Regulations & Resolutions: Does the BWC Prevent Terrorists from Accessing Bioweapons?, Sarah Scrivner discusses potential terrorist possession of biological weapons and international law currently in place. Carder Brooks, in his article Classifying and Regulating Biological Agents in the United States: Problems Posed to Global Biosecurity, discusses how the classification of biological agents in the United States effects biosecurity regulations. In A Fresh Threat: Will CAS9 Lead to CRISPR Bioweapons?, Daniel Willingham touches on the manufacturing of biological agents through gene editing devises such as CRISPR, and how current regulations could address such a biological threat. The second section takes a brief look at Good Samaritan laws throughout the United States. Author Nicolas Northcut in his article Is the Good Samaritan Really Good? A Look into the Possible Harm Caused by Current Good Samaritan Laws, discusses how the lack of uniformity among the states creates ambiguity in protection, and how that might complicate and even obstruct necessary aid in the event of a bioterrorist attack. The third section discusses the environmental impacts and effects that may take place in various biological events. Uzochukwu Okonkwo, in his article Human Life and the Environment: Is There a Balance?, examines the biological alteration of mosquitos in response to Zika, and further discusses the societal and ecological side-effects this could have on ecosystems. Additionally, in the article Biological Warfare and Environmental
最后,特别感谢布里·舍温教授
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引用次数: 0
Ethical and Legal Issues in Bioterrorism Events 生物恐怖主义事件中的伦理和法律问题
Pub Date : 2018-05-16 DOI: 10.1515/JBBBL-2018-0013
Cheryl Erwin, S. Dacso
Abstract A coordinated response to bioterrorism events requires the participation of healthcare providers, governmental agencies, ethicists, and community members. We describe some of the ethical and considerations that should go into planning for these events.
对生物恐怖主义事件的协调响应需要医疗保健提供者、政府机构、伦理学家和社区成员的参与。我们描述了在计划这些活动时应该考虑的一些道德和因素。
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引用次数: 0
Regulations & Resolutions: Does The Bwc Prevent Terrorists From Accessing Bioweapons? 法规与决议:《禁止生物武器公约》能防止恐怖分子获得生物武器吗?
Pub Date : 2018-05-11 DOI: 10.1515/JBBBL-2018-0006
Sarah Scrivner
With terrorist attacks becoming everyday occurrences in countries around the world, there is great concern over what types of weapons terrorist groups can access. Although biological weapons are banned under international law, there is still a risk of terrorist organizations obtaining and using them.1 As recently as 2010, The Washington Post reported on illegally manufactured beauty treatments being sold through counterfeit networks and the biosecurity risks they posed.2 Botox derived from one of the “world’s deadliest poisons” began showing up on the black market in Russia in 2006.3 The heavily regulated drug was being manufactured in illegal factories that likely numbered in the dozens, where it was then sold online for anyone to purchase.4 No identification or registration was required to purchase the drugs.5 In 2004, prior to the incidents in Russia, U.S. Justice Department officials raided a string of clinics in five states after uncovering a supply network substituting industrial-grade botulinum toxin for commercial Botox.6 The drug was intended for laboratory research, not cosmetic use, and the illegal sale paralyzed four people.7 Before the emergence of this black market, terrorist attempts at producing and using biological weapons failed due to a lack of sophisticated lab equipment.8 Now the fear is that terrorists can simply buy these biological weapons directly from illegal manufacturers.9 We have seen this done in the past, as Al Qaeda tried to obtain botulinum toxin.10 It would be easy to imagine ISIS—or other terrorist groups—may try to do the same. Terrorist attacks such as bombings can cause immediate mass devastation, but a bioweapon can increase that destruction exponentially.11 In a national security exercise conducted in 2001, the Center for Strategic and International Studiesworkedwith the JohnHopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies to create a “scenario depicting a covert smallpox attack” in the United States.12 In the scenario, the virus first appeared in Oklahoma andwithinweeks, the scenario reported asmany as amillion people in theUnited States estimated to be dead.13 Similar to these working scenarios, if the international community determines it has not taken the necessary measures to prevent a biological attack, it must take appropriate steps to remedy that finding and minimize the threat. This article will look to analyze this issue and recommend steps to make measures more effective, and is laid out as follows: Part II of this article will discuss the Biological Weapons Convention; Part III will cover the Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons; Part IV will address Resolution 1540; Part V will be an analysis of how effective the measures are; and Part VI will consist of a brief conclusion.
随着恐怖袭击在世界各国成为家常便饭,恐怖组织能够获得何种武器备受关注。尽管国际法禁止使用生物武器,但恐怖组织获得和使用生物武器的风险仍然存在就在2010年,《华盛顿邮报》还报道了通过假冒网络销售的非法生产的美容产品,以及它们带来的生物安全风险从“世界上最致命的毒药”中提取出来的肉毒杆菌毒素于2006年开始出现在俄罗斯的黑市上。这种受到严格管制的药物是由可能有几十家的非法工厂生产的,然后在网上出售给任何人购买购买这些药品不需要身份证明或注册2004年,在俄罗斯事件发生之前,美国司法部官员在发现一个用工业级肉毒杆菌毒素代替商业肉毒杆菌毒素的供应网络后,突击搜查了五个州的一系列诊所。这种药物是用于实验室研究,而不是化妆品用途,非法销售使四人瘫痪在这个黑市出现之前,恐怖分子生产和使用生物武器的企图由于缺乏先进的实验室设备而失败现在令人担心的是恐怖分子可以直接从非法制造商那里购买这些生物武器我们在过去看到过这种做法,基地组织曾试图获得肉毒杆菌毒素不难想象,isis——或者其他恐怖组织——可能也会这么做。像爆炸这样的恐怖袭击可以立即造成大规模的破坏,但生物武器可以成倍地增加这种破坏在2001年进行的一次国家安全演习中,战略与国际研究中心与约翰霍普金斯大学民用生物防御研究中心合作,在美国创造了一个“描绘秘密天花袭击的场景”。在这个场景中,病毒首先出现在俄克拉荷马州,在几周内,该场景报告称,美国估计有多达数百万人死亡与这些工作情况类似,如果国际社会确定它没有采取必要措施防止生物攻击,它必须采取适当步骤纠正这一发现并尽量减少威胁。本文将对这一问题进行分析,并提出使各项措施更加有效的建议步骤,具体内容如下:本文第二部分将讨论《生物武器公约》;第三部分将介绍秘书长的调查指称使用化学和生物武器的机制;第四部分将讨论第1540号决议;第五部分将分析这些措施的有效性;第六部分将是一个简短的结论。
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引用次数: 0
God Bless Texas: Should Texas Eliminate the Vaccine Exemption for Reasons of Conscience? 上帝保佑德克萨斯州:德克萨斯州应该出于良心原因取消疫苗豁免吗?
Pub Date : 2018-05-11 DOI: 10.1515/jbbbl-2018-0008
Emily Thakar
Every state in the United States of America has legislation requiring specific vaccinations for children in public and private school systems.1 Currently, eighteen states allow philosophical exemptions for those who object to vaccinations because of ”personal, moral, or other beliefs.”2 Texas is one of the eighteen states that have a vaccine exemption for reasons of conscience, which includes religious beliefs.3 The Texas Administrative Code § 97.62 states:
美利坚合众国的每个州都有立法要求公立和私立学校系统的儿童接种特定的疫苗目前,有18个州允许那些因为“个人、道德或其他信仰”而反对接种疫苗的人在哲学上获得豁免。德克萨斯州是18个因良心原因(包括宗教信仰)而免除疫苗接种的州之一德克萨斯州行政法典第97.62条规定:
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引用次数: 3
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Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Biodefense Law
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