This paper investigates the value of academic independent directors (ADs) by exploring an unexpected policy shock that forces ADs to resign from Chinese listed firms. Around the announcement of the policy, stock prices of firms with ADs drop by 2.2%, which translates to a loss of 135M RMB (around $19.3M). ADs with backgrounds that are related to the firms’ primary line of business, with connections to industry associations, and who hold top positions in prestigious universities are more valuable to firms. ADs with business backgrounds are more valuable when they serve on particular board subcommittees. Moreover, ADs miss fewer board meetings. In the long run, firm fundamentals and independent directors’ monitoring and advising efficiency deteriorate significantly after ADs resign. Our paper sheds new light on the value of independent directors.
{"title":"The Value of Academic Independent Directors","authors":"Bibo Liu, X. Tian, Wei Wei, Zhen Zhou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3504140","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3504140","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the value of academic independent directors (ADs) by exploring an unexpected policy shock that forces ADs to resign from Chinese listed firms. Around the announcement of the policy, stock prices of firms with ADs drop by 2.2%, which translates to a loss of 135M RMB (around $19.3M). ADs with backgrounds that are related to the firms’ primary line of business, with connections to industry associations, and who hold top positions in prestigious universities are more valuable to firms. ADs with business backgrounds are more valuable when they serve on particular board subcommittees. Moreover, ADs miss fewer board meetings. In the long run, firm fundamentals and independent directors’ monitoring and advising efficiency deteriorate significantly after ADs resign. Our paper sheds new light on the value of independent directors.","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129736101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Purpose This study aims to investigate the impact of corporate governance (CG) mechanisms on financial risk reporting in the UK. Design/methodology/approach The study uses a panel data of 50 non-financial firms belonging to 10 industrial sectors listed on the London Stock Exchange in the period 2011-2015. Multivariate regression techniques are used to examine the relationships. Findings The findings of this study reveal that CG has a significant influence on financial risk disclosure. Specifically, it is found that block ownership and board gender diversity have a positive effect on the level of corporate financial risk disclosure (FRD). While there is no significant relationship between board size and corporate FRD. Research limitations/implications This study has significant implications for policy-makers, investors and regulators. Evidence of growing FRD implies that efforts by several stakeholders have had some positive impact on the level of FRD in the firms examined. Examples of such changes include, namely, increasing board size and gender diversity acting as effective firm level advisors and monitors of FRD. As a consequence, regulators and policymakers should continually pursue reforms to encourage firms to follow CG principles that are promoted as good practice. Originality/value This study adds to the emerging body of literature on CG–risk disclosure relationships in the UK context using content analysis. The study also highlights that gender diversity enhances FRD.
{"title":"Gender Diversity, Corporate Governance and Financial Risk Disclosure in the UK","authors":"I. Bufarwa, C. Ntim, Ahmed A. Elamer, A. Alhares","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3580213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3580213","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Purpose\u0000This study aims to investigate the impact of corporate governance (CG) mechanisms on financial risk reporting in the UK.\u0000\u0000\u0000Design/methodology/approach\u0000The study uses a panel data of 50 non-financial firms belonging to 10 industrial sectors listed on the London Stock Exchange in the period 2011-2015. Multivariate regression techniques are used to examine the relationships.\u0000\u0000\u0000Findings\u0000The findings of this study reveal that CG has a significant influence on financial risk disclosure. Specifically, it is found that block ownership and board gender diversity have a positive effect on the level of corporate financial risk disclosure (FRD). While there is no significant relationship between board size and corporate FRD.\u0000\u0000\u0000Research limitations/implications\u0000This study has significant implications for policy-makers, investors and regulators. Evidence of growing FRD implies that efforts by several stakeholders have had some positive impact on the level of FRD in the firms examined. Examples of such changes include, namely, increasing board size and gender diversity acting as effective firm level advisors and monitors of FRD. As a consequence, regulators and policymakers should continually pursue reforms to encourage firms to follow CG principles that are promoted as good practice.\u0000\u0000\u0000Originality/value\u0000This study adds to the emerging body of literature on CG–risk disclosure relationships in the UK context using content analysis. The study also highlights that gender diversity enhances FRD.\u0000","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122898863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Antti Talonen, Harri Talonen, J. Stenvall, Iiro Jussila
Its distinctive ownership base leads to a customer‐owned mutual insurer representing a mission and purpose of existence that are very different from those of an investor‐owned insurer. While the owner value of the latter can be defined in terms of return on invested capital, in mutuals, the attention is shifted toward benefits and value for customers. Despite this major difference, scholars know little about mutual insurers' value‐creating processes. To begin filling this knowledge gap, the article explores and identifies how managers of mutual insurance companies understand and communicate the economic value of ownership to their customer–owners and other stakeholders. It reports on thematic analysis of annual reports of 18 mutuals, based in seven countries (England, Finland, Ireland, The Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States), on the basis of which the authors offer a tentative framework for enhancing scholars' and practitioners' understanding of how the economic value of ownership is understood in a customer‐owned mutual insurance company.
{"title":"Communicating the Economic Value of Customer Ownership in Insurance: A Qualitative Analysis of Annual Reports","authors":"Antti Talonen, Harri Talonen, J. Stenvall, Iiro Jussila","doi":"10.1111/rmir.12157","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rmir.12157","url":null,"abstract":"Its distinctive ownership base leads to a customer‐owned mutual insurer representing a mission and purpose of existence that are very different from those of an investor‐owned insurer. While the owner value of the latter can be defined in terms of return on invested capital, in mutuals, the attention is shifted toward benefits and value for customers. Despite this major difference, scholars know little about mutual insurers' value‐creating processes. To begin filling this knowledge gap, the article explores and identifies how managers of mutual insurance companies understand and communicate the economic value of ownership to their customer–owners and other stakeholders. It reports on thematic analysis of annual reports of 18 mutuals, based in seven countries (England, Finland, Ireland, The Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States), on the basis of which the authors offer a tentative framework for enhancing scholars' and practitioners' understanding of how the economic value of ownership is understood in a customer‐owned mutual insurance company.","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"115 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114865499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines how the firm's choice of investment horizon interacts with rent-seeking by privately-informed, multi-tasking managers and the labor market. There are two main results. First, managers prefer longer-horizon projects that permit them to extract higher rents from firms, so short-termism involves lower agency costs and is value-maximizing for some firms. Second, when firms compete for managers, firms practicing short-termism attract better managerial talent when talent is unobservable, but larger firms that invest in long-horizon projects hire more talented managers when talent is revealed.
{"title":"Short-Termism, Managerial Talent, and Firm Value","authors":"Richard T. Thakor","doi":"10.1093/rcfs/cfaa017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfaa017","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines how the firm's choice of investment horizon interacts with rent-seeking by privately-informed, multi-tasking managers and the labor market. There are two main results. First, managers prefer longer-horizon projects that permit them to extract higher rents from firms, so short-termism involves lower agency costs and is value-maximizing for some firms. Second, when firms compete for managers, firms practicing short-termism attract better managerial talent when talent is unobservable, but larger firms that invest in long-horizon projects hire more talented managers when talent is revealed.","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126706937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Implementing a second-score auction requires specifying a distribution from which suppliers obtain their score draws. In practice, it is often assumed that this is the Gumbel (logit) distribution. We analyze second score models with symmetric firms to illustrate that the assumed distribution has a significant effect on the price change predicted from a merger of two firms. Therefore, sound merger analysis requires testing sensitivity to alternative distributional assumptions or a careful justification for the assumed distribution.
{"title":"The Effect of Functional Form Assumptions on Merger Price Effects in Second-Score Auction Models","authors":"M. De Stefano, Keler Marku, Yianis Sarafidis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3639703","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3639703","url":null,"abstract":"Implementing a second-score auction requires specifying a distribution from which suppliers obtain their score draws. In practice, it is often assumed that this is the Gumbel (logit) distribution. We analyze second score models with symmetric firms to illustrate that the assumed distribution has a significant effect on the price change predicted from a merger of two firms. Therefore, sound merger analysis requires testing sensitivity to alternative distributional assumptions or a careful justification for the assumed distribution.","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131257984","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we provide new evidence on the association of state ownership and tax planning and show that shareholders’ monitoring incentives affect a firm’s tax planning. Using the unique setting of the German corporate tax system, we distinguish between state owners that directly benefit from state-owned enterprises’ (SOEs’) income tax payments and those that do not. Our results indicate that the negative association between state ownership and tax planning is concentrated in SOEs where the state owner directly benefits from the tax payments. These results are robust to various specifications and suggest that shareholders’ monitoring incentives are a determinant of firms’ tax planning activities.
{"title":"Monitoring and Tax Planning – Evidence from State-Owned Enterprises","authors":"Eva Eberhartinger, David M. P. Samuel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3632938","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3632938","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we provide new evidence on the association of state ownership and tax planning and show that shareholders’ monitoring incentives affect a firm’s tax planning. Using the unique setting of the German corporate tax system, we distinguish between state owners that directly benefit from state-owned enterprises’ (SOEs’) income tax payments and those that do not. Our results indicate that the negative association between state ownership and tax planning is concentrated in SOEs where the state owner directly benefits from the tax payments. These results are robust to various specifications and suggest that shareholders’ monitoring incentives are a determinant of firms’ tax planning activities.","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115048622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We develop a tractable general equilibrium framework in which firms are large and have market power with respect to both products and labor, and in which a firm's decisions are affected by its ownership structure. We characterize the Cournot–Walras equilibrium of an economy where each firm maximizes a share‐weighted average of shareholder utilities—rendering the equilibrium independent of price normalization. In a one‐sector economy, if returns to scale are non‐increasing, then an increase in “effective” market concentration (which accounts for common ownership) leads to declines in employment, real wages, and the labor share. Yet when there are multiple sectors, due to an intersectoral pecuniary externality, an increase in common ownership could stimulate the economy when the elasticity of labor supply is high relative to the elasticity of substitution in product markets. We characterize for which ownership structures the monopolistically competitive limit or an oligopolistic one is attained as the number of sectors in the economy increases. When firms have heterogeneous constant returns to scale technologies, we find that an increase in common ownership leads to markets that are more concentrated.
{"title":"General Equilibrium Oligopoly and Ownership Structure","authors":"José Azar, X. Vives","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3501611","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3501611","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a tractable general equilibrium framework in which firms are large and have market power with respect to both products and labor, and in which a firm's decisions are affected by its ownership structure. We characterize the Cournot–Walras equilibrium of an economy where each firm maximizes a share‐weighted average of shareholder utilities—rendering the equilibrium independent of price normalization. In a one‐sector economy, if returns to scale are non‐increasing, then an increase in “effective” market concentration (which accounts for common ownership) leads to declines in employment, real wages, and the labor share. Yet when there are multiple sectors, due to an intersectoral pecuniary externality, an increase in common ownership could stimulate the economy when the elasticity of labor supply is high relative to the elasticity of substitution in product markets. We characterize for which ownership structures the monopolistically competitive limit or an oligopolistic one is attained as the number of sectors in the economy increases. When firms have heterogeneous constant returns to scale technologies, we find that an increase in common ownership leads to markets that are more concentrated.","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"31 11","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120986172","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Independent boards have been documented to have a positive effect on corporate governance, however, I show that independent boards improve shareholder value at the cost of sacrificing corporate social responsibility (CSR). Specifically, I find that stakeholders such as employees and consumers' interest have been compromised as a result of board myopia. This result is even stronger among firms in industries with intense product market competition, and among firms with more analysts followed. My result also suggests that negative corporate social behavior may not be fully priced by investors.
{"title":"The Dark side of Independent Boards, the Case of Corporate Social Responsibility","authors":"Fangzhou Lu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3586155","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3586155","url":null,"abstract":"Independent boards have been documented to have a positive effect on corporate governance, however, I show that independent boards improve shareholder value at the cost of sacrificing corporate social responsibility (CSR). Specifically, I find that stakeholders such as employees and consumers' interest have been compromised as a result of board myopia. This result is even stronger among firms in industries with intense product market competition, and among firms with more analysts followed. My result also suggests that negative corporate social behavior may not be fully priced by investors.","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"78 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123229374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines how a tournament among CEOs to progress within the CEO labor market changes their tendency toward corporate hedging policies. We exploit the textual analysis of 10-Ks to generate corporate hedging proxies. We find that the likelihood and intensity to hedge increases as the CEO labor market tournament prizes augment. We explore the mitigating impacts of corporate hedging on the adverse effects of risk-inducing ITIs on the cost of debt and stock price crash risk, which could be the possible reasons for the relation. Also, the relation between ITIs and corporate hedging is less pronounced for firms that demonstrate more financial distress and when CEOs are the founders or of retirement age. We identify a causal relation between ITIs and corporate hedging by using an instrumental variable approach and an exogenous shock sourced by the changes in the enforceability of non-competition agreements across states.
{"title":"Industry Tournament Incentives and Corporate Hedging Policies","authors":"Gunratan Lonare, A. Nart, Ahmet M. Tuncez","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3397444","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3397444","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines how a tournament among CEOs to progress within the CEO labor market changes their tendency toward corporate hedging policies. We exploit the textual analysis of 10-Ks to generate corporate hedging proxies. We find that the likelihood and intensity to hedge increases as the CEO labor market tournament prizes augment. We explore the mitigating impacts of corporate hedging on the adverse effects of risk-inducing ITIs on the cost of debt and stock price crash risk, which could be the possible reasons for the relation. Also, the relation between ITIs and corporate hedging is less pronounced for firms that demonstrate more financial distress and when CEOs are the founders or of retirement age. We identify a causal relation between ITIs and corporate hedging by using an instrumental variable approach and an exogenous shock sourced by the changes in the enforceability of non-competition agreements across states.","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124027821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Lorenzo Ductor, S. Goyal, Marco van der Leij, Gustavo Nicolas Paez
We study the evolution of the influence of journals over the period 1970-2017. In the early 1970's, a number of journals had similar influence, but by 1995, the 'Top 5' journals--QJE, AER, RES, Econometrica, and JPE--had acquired a major lead. This dominance has remained more or less unchanged since 1995. To place these developments in a broader context, we also study trends in sociology. The trends there have gone the other way--the field journals rose in influence, relative to the Top General journals. A model of journals as platforms is developed to understand these trends across time and across disciplines.
{"title":"On the Influence of Top Journals","authors":"Lorenzo Ductor, S. Goyal, Marco van der Leij, Gustavo Nicolas Paez","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3580395","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3580395","url":null,"abstract":"We study the evolution of the influence of journals over the period 1970-2017. In the early 1970's, a number of journals had similar influence, but by 1995, the 'Top 5' journals--QJE, AER, RES, Econometrica, and JPE--had acquired a major lead. This dominance has remained more or less unchanged since 1995. To place these developments in a broader context, we also study trends in sociology. The trends there have gone the other way--the field journals rose in influence, relative to the Top General journals. A model of journals as platforms is developed to understand these trends across time and across disciplines.","PeriodicalId":416291,"journal":{"name":"IO: Firm Structure","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117228423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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