Following Thomas Aquinas, Francisco de Vitoria's analysis of justice in exchanges takes place by commenting on the corresponding questions of the Summa Theologica. The identification of the just price with that of common estimation occurs under a sufficient concurrence of sellers and buyers. A high level of concurrence limits the ability to take advantage of the need on the other side of the market. This fact guaranties a full consent of the parties involved in trading. Under conditions of market power or when some authority fixes a legal price, just price should also be taken as a normative ideal.
{"title":"Justice and just price in Francisco de Vitoria's Commentary on Summa Theologica II-II q77","authors":"José Luis Cendejas Bueno","doi":"10.46298/jpe.8661","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8661","url":null,"abstract":"Following Thomas Aquinas, Francisco de Vitoria's analysis of justice in exchanges takes place by commenting on the corresponding questions of the Summa Theologica. The identification of the just price with that of common estimation occurs under a sufficient concurrence of sellers and buyers. A high level of concurrence limits the ability to take advantage of the need on the other side of the market. This fact guaranties a full consent of the parties involved in trading. Under conditions of market power or when some authority fixes a legal price, just price should also be taken as a normative ideal.","PeriodicalId":41686,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophical Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46930691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Contemporary mainstream economics cannot be seen as disconnected from philosophical concerns. On the contrary, it should be understood as a defence for a specific philosophy, namely, crude quantitative hedonism where money would measure pleasure and pain. Disguised among a great mathematical apparatus involving utility functions, supply, and demand, lies a specific hedonist philosophy that every year is lectured to thousands of economic and business students around the world. This hedonist philosophy is much less sophisticated than that in ancient hedonist philosophers as Epicurus or Lucretius. Furthermore, it does not solve any of the systematic difficulties regularly faced by hedonist philosophy. However, the argument that economics is detached from philosophy works as a rhetorical artifice to protect its dominant underlying philosophy: Philosophical disputes would have to be addressed within the biased mathematical apparatus of quantitative hedonism. Economists and business students must learn to identify the underlying philosophy in mainstream economics and alternative philosophical systems.
{"title":"Academic discipline of economics as hedonist philosophy","authors":"Tiago Cardao-Pito","doi":"10.46298/jpe.8668","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8668","url":null,"abstract":"Contemporary mainstream economics cannot be seen as disconnected from philosophical concerns. On the contrary, it should be understood as a defence for a specific philosophy, namely, crude quantitative hedonism where money would measure pleasure and pain. Disguised among a great mathematical apparatus involving utility functions, supply, and demand, lies a specific hedonist philosophy that every year is lectured to thousands of economic and business students around the world. This hedonist philosophy is much less sophisticated than that in ancient hedonist philosophers as Epicurus or Lucretius. Furthermore, it does not solve any of the systematic difficulties regularly faced by hedonist philosophy. However, the argument that economics is detached from philosophy works as a rhetorical artifice to protect its dominant underlying philosophy: Philosophical disputes would have to be addressed within the biased mathematical apparatus of quantitative hedonism. Economists and business students must learn to identify the underlying philosophy in mainstream economics and alternative philosophical systems.","PeriodicalId":41686,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophical Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49039825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Levrau and have produced a monumental editorial work, dedicated to the topic of equality in times of great social polarization. Equality understood as a multidimensional concept is fundamental for the vital aspects of society such as human rights, solidarity and even freedom and how these are to be conceived implemented and experienced by subjects; these are accomplishments which do not occur without an overarching idea of equality. This observation sheds some light on the long history of the human attempts to understand the theoretical, social, and practical aspects of equality. The present book explores this idea extensively, investigating the concept of equality from a multidisciplinary perspective, where a diverse range of theories about equality and welfare are combined with concrete data about equality in the real world. We emphasize the valuable distinction between equality and the welfare state, especially since, as Robert E. Goodin noticed, although the justification for the welfare state resides for the most part in the principles of social equality, ‘the welfare state is not really very egalitarian’, aiming to redistribute ‘only a certain strictly limited set of social resources; it is concerned with minimum standards, not thoroughgoing equalization; it is concerned to readjust final distributions, not basic holdings of productive assets, and so on’ (Goodin 1988, p. 51). The research into equality is structured in three parts. The first part is entitled ‘Theories & Histories’ and covers the conceptual aspects, with reference to political philosophy, history, and multicultural theory. The debates are
莱弗劳和他的同事们创作了一部巨著，致力于探讨社会两极分化时期的平等问题。平等被理解为一个多层面的概念，是人权、团结甚至自由等社会重要方面的基础，也是主体如何构思、执行和体验这些方面的基础;如果没有平等的总体理念，这些成就是不可能实现的。这一观察揭示了人类试图理解平等的理论、社会和实践方面的漫长历史。本书广泛地探讨了这一观点，从多学科的角度调查了平等的概念，其中关于平等和福利的各种理论与现实世界中关于平等的具体数据相结合。我们强调平等和福利国家之间有价值的区别，尤其是因为，正如罗伯特·e·古丁(Robert E. Goodin)注意到的那样，尽管福利国家的正当性在很大程度上存在于社会平等的原则中，但“福利国家并不是真正的平等主义”，它的目标是“仅仅重新分配某些严格有限的社会资源;它关注的是最低标准，而不是彻底的平等;它关注的是重新调整最终分配，而不是生产性资产的基本持有，等等”(Goodin 1988，第51页)。对平等的研究分为三个部分。第一部分名为“理论与历史”，涵盖了概念方面，涉及政治哲学、历史和多元文化理论。辩论是
{"title":"Review of François Levrau, Noel Clycq (eds.), Equality. Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Cham, Palgrave Macmillan/ Springer Nature, 1 st Edition, 2021, 356 pp","authors":"H. Șerban","doi":"10.46298/jpe.8672","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8672","url":null,"abstract":"Levrau and have produced a monumental editorial work, dedicated to the topic of equality in times of great social polarization. Equality understood as a multidimensional concept is fundamental for the vital aspects of society such as human rights, solidarity and even freedom and how these are to be conceived implemented and experienced by subjects; these are accomplishments which do not occur without an overarching idea of equality. This observation sheds some light on the long history of the human attempts to understand the theoretical, social, and practical aspects of equality. The present book explores this idea extensively, investigating the concept of equality from a multidisciplinary perspective, where a diverse range of theories about equality and welfare are combined with concrete data about equality in the real world. We emphasize the valuable distinction between equality and the welfare state, especially since, as Robert E. Goodin noticed, although the justification for the welfare state resides for the most part in the principles of social equality, ‘the welfare state is not really very egalitarian’, aiming to redistribute ‘only a certain strictly limited set of social resources; it is concerned with minimum standards, not thoroughgoing equalization; it is concerned to readjust final distributions, not basic holdings of productive assets, and so on’ (Goodin 1988, p. 51). The research into equality is structured in three parts. The first part is entitled ‘Theories & Histories’ and covers the conceptual aspects, with reference to political philosophy, history, and multicultural theory. The debates are","PeriodicalId":41686,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophical Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43712679","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This brief contribution describes the author’s experience with teaching a course on philosophy of economics to students pursuing a master’s in economics. The main purpose of the course is to explore the philosophical assumptions underlying economic theories. I am a Visiting Professor at Universidad de Montevideo (Uruguay), where, every two years since 2011, I deliver a course on Philosophy of Economics in the master’s in economics Program (https://um.edu.uy/unidad-de-maestrias-ypostgrados-en-economia-umpe/oferta-academica/master/maestria-en-economia). Most students come from the undergraduate program at Universidad de la República (https://udelar.edu.uy/portal/2021/02/licenciatura-en-economia/) and at Universidad de Montevideo (https://um.edu.uy/facultad-de-cienciasempresariales-y-economia/oferta-academica/grado/economia). These programs feature a standard economics approach and have not fully incorporated new economic theory developments as behavioural economics, neuroeconomics, evolutionary economics, happiness economics, the capability approach, new institutional perspectives, among others. Peter Hammond defines the rationale underlying standard economics as preference maximizing by consumers and profit maximizing by firms (1997, p. 31). He adds, ‘there seems to be little evidence of rationality in actual behaviour. This is true even for special classes of experimental subjects like economics or business students, who are supposed to understand something of what it means to be rational’ (1997, pp. 32-33). I use the term ‘standard’ economics as Hammond does. The theories of rationality that standard economics adopts are the Rational Choice Theory Crespo F. Ricardo (2021), Teaching the philosophical grounding of economics to economists: a 10 years’ experience, The Journal of Philosophical Economics: Reflections on Economic and Social Issues, XIV (1-2), 218-226 The Journal of Philosophical Economics XIV (1-2) 2021 219 and the Expected Utility Theory, and both use the concept of instrumental rationality. Thus, they have a narrow view of the scope and potentials of economics, which translate into its failure to predict and prescribe. The new approaches mentioned above – especially behavioural economics as well as natural and lab experiments – have challenged the assumptions of standard economics. However, as Kevin Hoover has recently suggestively stated, Contemporary economics is pace Robbins and Mill favourable to empirical research and to the feedback from empirical results to economic theory. However, the Robbinsian first principles themselves are not the target for any revision within mainstream economics, but are held immutable as something like a Lakatosian hard core. Recalcitrant evidence may result in a revision of the details of the structure of constraints hypothesized in a problem, but is not allowed to weaken the commitment to the framework of constrained optimization (2021, p. S3322). In the same strain, Catherine Herfeld (2021, p. S33
–Neville Keynes将“经济活动”定义为旨在生产和分配可交换手段的人类活动
{"title":"Teaching the philosophical grounding of economics to economists: a 10 years' experience","authors":"Ricardo F. Crespo","doi":"10.46298/jpe.8670","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.8670","url":null,"abstract":"This brief contribution describes the author’s experience with teaching a course on philosophy of economics to students pursuing a master’s in economics. The main purpose of the course is to explore the philosophical assumptions underlying economic theories. I am a Visiting Professor at Universidad de Montevideo (Uruguay), where, every two years since 2011, I deliver a course on Philosophy of Economics in the master’s in economics Program (https://um.edu.uy/unidad-de-maestrias-ypostgrados-en-economia-umpe/oferta-academica/master/maestria-en-economia). Most students come from the undergraduate program at Universidad de la República (https://udelar.edu.uy/portal/2021/02/licenciatura-en-economia/) and at Universidad de Montevideo (https://um.edu.uy/facultad-de-cienciasempresariales-y-economia/oferta-academica/grado/economia). These programs feature a standard economics approach and have not fully incorporated new economic theory developments as behavioural economics, neuroeconomics, evolutionary economics, happiness economics, the capability approach, new institutional perspectives, among others. Peter Hammond defines the rationale underlying standard economics as preference maximizing by consumers and profit maximizing by firms (1997, p. 31). He adds, ‘there seems to be little evidence of rationality in actual behaviour. This is true even for special classes of experimental subjects like economics or business students, who are supposed to understand something of what it means to be rational’ (1997, pp. 32-33). I use the term ‘standard’ economics as Hammond does. The theories of rationality that standard economics adopts are the Rational Choice Theory Crespo F. Ricardo (2021), Teaching the philosophical grounding of economics to economists: a 10 years’ experience, The Journal of Philosophical Economics: Reflections on Economic and Social Issues, XIV (1-2), 218-226 The Journal of Philosophical Economics XIV (1-2) 2021 219 and the Expected Utility Theory, and both use the concept of instrumental rationality. Thus, they have a narrow view of the scope and potentials of economics, which translate into its failure to predict and prescribe. The new approaches mentioned above – especially behavioural economics as well as natural and lab experiments – have challenged the assumptions of standard economics. However, as Kevin Hoover has recently suggestively stated, Contemporary economics is pace Robbins and Mill favourable to empirical research and to the feedback from empirical results to economic theory. However, the Robbinsian first principles themselves are not the target for any revision within mainstream economics, but are held immutable as something like a Lakatosian hard core. Recalcitrant evidence may result in a revision of the details of the structure of constraints hypothesized in a problem, but is not allowed to weaken the commitment to the framework of constrained optimization (2021, p. S3322). In the same strain, Catherine Herfeld (2021, p. S33","PeriodicalId":41686,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophical Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43488615","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Review of Dumas, Lloyd J., Building the Good Society. The Power and Limits of Markets, Democracy and Freedom in an Increasingly Polarized World, Emerald Publishing, 2020, xiv+228 pp., hb, ISBN 978-1-83867-632-2","authors":"G. Șerban-Oprescu","doi":"10.46298/jpe.10744","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10744","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41686,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophical Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44203803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Review of Mark Thornton, The Skyscraper Curse: And How Austrian Economists Predicted Every Major Economic Crisis of the Last Century, Auburn, Alabama, Mises Institute, 2018, 275 pp., pb, ISBN 978-1-61016-684-3","authors":"Alexandru Pătruți","doi":"10.46298/jpe.10745","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10745","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41686,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophical Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46626826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Until the 1990s, the most used research and teaching materials for economists were print journal articles and print books. Since the Internet was commercialized in the 1990s, economists have used digital technologies in research and teaching. Journal articles and books are now more easily accessed. Online subscription systems allow economists to acquire electronic study and research materials in real time. Researchers can access a wealth of teaching and research materials freely and openly. In this essay [1], I focus on Wilfred Dolfsma and Ioana Negru’s The Ethical Formation of Economists (Dolfsma and Negru 2019) and claim that digital economics research requires a global understanding of ethics consistent with the values of scholarly practices. In the absence of scientific ethics, digital tools and software can harm the members of scholarly communities internationally and become a source of scientific misconduct. Economics should be taught as part of a system of scientific ethics.
{"title":"Why is economics not part of a system of scientific ethics? A review essay on Wilfred Dolfsma and Ioana Negru’s The Ethical Formation of Economists","authors":"Altug Yalcintas","doi":"10.46298/jpe.10742","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10742","url":null,"abstract":"Until the 1990s, the most used research and teaching materials for economists were print journal articles and print books. Since the Internet was commercialized in the 1990s, economists have used digital technologies in research and teaching. Journal articles and books are now more easily accessed. Online subscription systems allow economists to acquire electronic study and research materials in real time. Researchers can access a wealth of teaching and research materials freely and openly. In this essay [1], I focus on Wilfred Dolfsma and Ioana Negru’s The Ethical Formation of Economists (Dolfsma and Negru 2019) and claim that digital economics research requires a global understanding of ethics consistent with the values of scholarly practices. In the absence of scientific ethics, digital tools and software can harm the members of scholarly communities internationally and become a source of scientific misconduct. Economics should be taught as part of a system of scientific ethics.","PeriodicalId":41686,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophical Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41468099","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pluralism in economics appears to be a double-edged sword: we need more than one theory to grasp and explain the entire economic world, yet a plurality of possible explanations undermines the aspiration of the economic discipline to provide ‘objective knowledge’ in the singular of the ‘one world one truth’ conception. Therefore, pluralism is often equated with relativism and obscurantism. In this article, I will explore both the demand for pluralism and the fear of relativism and obscurantism, scrutinising each position in order to evaluate their respective justification and devising a methodological proposal that may appease both the defender and the sceptic of economic pluralism.
{"title":"Comparing economic theories or: pluralism in economics and the need for a comparative approach to scientific research programmes","authors":"A. Heise","doi":"10.46298/jpe.10740","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10740","url":null,"abstract":"Pluralism in economics appears to be a double-edged sword: we need more than one theory to grasp and explain the entire economic world, yet a plurality of possible explanations undermines the aspiration of the economic discipline to provide ‘objective knowledge’ in the singular of the ‘one world one truth’ conception. Therefore, pluralism is often equated with relativism and obscurantism. In this article, I will explore both the demand for pluralism and the fear of relativism and obscurantism, scrutinising each position in order to evaluate their respective justification and devising a methodological proposal that may appease both the defender and the sceptic of economic pluralism.","PeriodicalId":41686,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophical Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47284699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nordhaus' contribution to climate change economics is well-known and, for many, praiseworthy. But his refusal to acknowledge his normative stances is philosophically problematic. This article explores his arguments about philosophy in the economics of climate change found in his review of the Stern's Review (2007). It concludes that Nordhaus nonetheless relies on normative, ethical assumptions, whose oversight hinders the finding of a solution to the problems he tries himself to solve.
{"title":"Nordhaus on philosophy in climate change economics","authors":"Laurent Jodoin","doi":"10.46298/jpe.10736","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10736","url":null,"abstract":"Nordhaus' contribution to climate change economics is well-known and, for many, praiseworthy. But his refusal to acknowledge his normative stances is philosophically problematic. This article explores his arguments about philosophy in the economics of climate change found in his review of the Stern's Review (2007). It concludes that Nordhaus nonetheless relies on normative, ethical assumptions, whose oversight hinders the finding of a solution to the problems he tries himself to solve.","PeriodicalId":41686,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophical Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42127701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In Marx’s thought, is ‘law of value’ a particular law of capitalism (historicism) or a general law of the economy (naturalism)? To clarify this ambiguity, this article proposes to employ the social ontology of Cornélius Castoriadis. For it, ‘labour’ is not a substance, but a recent historical creation through which, finally, the capitalist mode of production expresses a fundamental truth about all society’s way of being. From this perspective, we explore some consequences of this deconstruction for the theory of value as current neo-Marxist approaches may employ it today in their economic analyses.
{"title":"Marx’s Law of value and the ontology of labour: a Castoriadian critical point of view","authors":"R. Sobel","doi":"10.46298/jpe.10738","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.10738","url":null,"abstract":"In Marx’s thought, is ‘law of value’ a particular law of capitalism (historicism) or a general law of the economy (naturalism)? To clarify this ambiguity, this article proposes to employ the social ontology of Cornélius Castoriadis. For it, ‘labour’ is not a substance, but a recent historical creation through which, finally, the capitalist mode of production expresses a fundamental truth about all society’s way of being. From this perspective, we explore some consequences of this deconstruction for the theory of value as current neo-Marxist approaches may employ it today in their economic analyses.","PeriodicalId":41686,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophical Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44961723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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