Previous articleNext article Book ReviewsEmily Hauptmann. Foundations and American Political Science: The Transformation of the Discipline, 1945–1970. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2022. Pp. 288. $26.95 (paper).Jeffery Tyler SyckJeffery Tyler SyckUniversity of Pikeville Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmailPrint SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by American Political Thought Volume 12, Number 4Fall 2023 Published in association with the American Political Thought organized section of the American Political Science Association and the Jack Miller Center Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/726892 For permission to reuse, please contact [email protected].PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.
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It is refreshing to read a scholarly work on both the founding and the relationship between politics and religion that highlights the limits of our knowledge, which is one of the distinct virtues of Vincent PhillipMuñoz’sReligious Liberty and theAmerican Founding. Thiswell-researched, thoughtful, and carefulwork seeks to illuminate how the founders understood both religious liberty and the separation of church and state. It concludes that the founders overwhelmingly viewed religious liberty as an inalienable natural right, while they disagreed quite sharply on what this meant for church-state relations. When it comes to understanding the meaning of both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause and applying that meaning to our persistent conflicts over politics and religion, Muñoz’s book reveals that the meaning of these clauses is underdetermined (in the case of free exercise) and indeterminate (in the case of establishment). Given this, Muñoz engages in constructing the core constitutional meaning of the clauses fromwhat we do know. Yet this is, asMuñoz deftly articulates, a different project than simply interpreting the clauses. And Muñoz’s constructions of these clauses yield intriguing results that do not line up neatly with any current jurisprudential approach to either religious liberty or the separation of church and state.
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I find it deeply gratifying to have my work scrutinized so seriously by scholars whom I hold in such high regard. Two primary themes emerge in the four reviews: (1) whether a natural rights approach to American constitutionalism is possible in this century, and (2) whether I have adequately and accurately captured James Madison’s natural rights constitutionalism. Letme prefacemy response by returning to the idea that guides the book as a whole. Whether a recovery of natural rights constitutionalism is possible requires first that we understand the founders’ natural rights philosophy, including the philosophical and theological foundations on which it rests, and then that we deduce the constitutional doctrines that follow from it. My book’s primary aim is to articulate and explain the founders’ thought. Only after we comprehend their natural rights constitutionalism canwe then consider whether we ought to attempt to return to it in our law and politics. Andrew Koppelman thinks that such a recovery ought not be attempted because it is not possible. Referring to the founders and their natural rights political philosophy, hewrites that “theirworld is not ours, and they relied on premises that we cannot share and that cannot now be the basis of public law” (Koppelman 2023, in this issue, 392). I note that Koppelman draws an “ought” from an “is”—we should not rely on the founders’ political philosophy
{"title":"The Possibility and Meaning of the Natural Right of Religious Liberty: A Response","authors":"V. P. Muñoz","doi":"10.1086/725853","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/725853","url":null,"abstract":"I find it deeply gratifying to have my work scrutinized so seriously by scholars whom I hold in such high regard. Two primary themes emerge in the four reviews: (1) whether a natural rights approach to American constitutionalism is possible in this century, and (2) whether I have adequately and accurately captured James Madison’s natural rights constitutionalism. Letme prefacemy response by returning to the idea that guides the book as a whole. Whether a recovery of natural rights constitutionalism is possible requires first that we understand the founders’ natural rights philosophy, including the philosophical and theological foundations on which it rests, and then that we deduce the constitutional doctrines that follow from it. My book’s primary aim is to articulate and explain the founders’ thought. Only after we comprehend their natural rights constitutionalism canwe then consider whether we ought to attempt to return to it in our law and politics. Andrew Koppelman thinks that such a recovery ought not be attempted because it is not possible. Referring to the founders and their natural rights political philosophy, hewrites that “theirworld is not ours, and they relied on premises that we cannot share and that cannot now be the basis of public law” (Koppelman 2023, in this issue, 392). I note that Koppelman draws an “ought” from an “is”—we should not rely on the founders’ political philosophy","PeriodicalId":41928,"journal":{"name":"American Political Thought","volume":"12 1","pages":"417 - 423"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48375323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Vincent PhillipMuñoz’s bookReligious Liberty and the American Founding is a marvelous piece of historical reconstruction, bringing to vivid life the intellectual world of the framers. He gives the reader a sharply etched picture of their natural rights philosophy. But their world is not ours, and they relied on premises that we cannot share and which cannot now be the basis of public law. Today, when courts interpret the First Amendment’s religion clauses, they must articulate a rationale that will not be unintelligible or repulsive to many citizens. The interpretation also ought not to inflame the very divisions that the clause was intended to prevent. The fundamental problem is that the framers believed both that we are endowed with natural rights and that the government is incompetent and untrustworthy to adjudicate religious questions. Their natural rights philosophy, however, ultimately rested on religious foundations if it rested on anything at all. For example, Madison relied either on revealed religion or on a fallacious argument from natural law. I will explain by focusing on the fallacy, which Muñoz does not appear to notice.
{"title":"Madison’s Non Sequitur: A Comment on Vincent Phillip Muñoz’s Religious Liberty and the American Founding","authors":"A. Koppelman","doi":"10.1086/725479","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/725479","url":null,"abstract":"Vincent PhillipMuñoz’s bookReligious Liberty and the American Founding is a marvelous piece of historical reconstruction, bringing to vivid life the intellectual world of the framers. He gives the reader a sharply etched picture of their natural rights philosophy. But their world is not ours, and they relied on premises that we cannot share and which cannot now be the basis of public law. Today, when courts interpret the First Amendment’s religion clauses, they must articulate a rationale that will not be unintelligible or repulsive to many citizens. The interpretation also ought not to inflame the very divisions that the clause was intended to prevent. The fundamental problem is that the framers believed both that we are endowed with natural rights and that the government is incompetent and untrustworthy to adjudicate religious questions. Their natural rights philosophy, however, ultimately rested on religious foundations if it rested on anything at all. For example, Madison relied either on revealed religion or on a fallacious argument from natural law. I will explain by focusing on the fallacy, which Muñoz does not appear to notice.","PeriodicalId":41928,"journal":{"name":"American Political Thought","volume":"12 1","pages":"392 - 396"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45593328","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Religious Liberty and the American Founding (Muñoz 2022) is the best book I have read on its topic. It also could not be timelier, because the topic of religious liberty is central to some of the most pressing and difficult constitutional, political, and moral issues in American life today. I will briefly state why the book is excellent. Even though the book examines many vital issues in depth, I will turn quickly to twovery large issues that go beyond the book, because its greatest value may be in how it can stimulate and aid thinking on those issues.
{"title":"Religious Liberty and the American Founding and American Constitutionalism in the Twenty-First Century","authors":"Rogers M. Smith","doi":"10.1086/725481","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/725481","url":null,"abstract":"Religious Liberty and the American Founding (Muñoz 2022) is the best book I have read on its topic. It also could not be timelier, because the topic of religious liberty is central to some of the most pressing and difficult constitutional, political, and moral issues in American life today. I will briefly state why the book is excellent. Even though the book examines many vital issues in depth, I will turn quickly to twovery large issues that go beyond the book, because its greatest value may be in how it can stimulate and aid thinking on those issues.","PeriodicalId":41928,"journal":{"name":"American Political Thought","volume":"12 1","pages":"406 - 412"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44877192","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Madison’s fascinating Federalist 37 has lagged behind other Publius essays, particularly Federalist 10, in drawing scholarly attention. Only recently have historians and political theorists begun to correct this imbalance. However, even this newer interest has failed to fully grasp the significance of no. 37 or to reconsider its larger meanings. This review essay provides an extensive analysis of the key writings on Federalist 37 to document its emerging prominence. It argues that the collective impact of this scholarship points toward a latent paradigm change in how we understand Federalist 37 in relation to the better-known Federalist 10, to the ratification debate, and to Madison’s political thought. It suggests several fruitful avenues for additional scholarship. Finally, it argues that granting primacy to no. 37 helps us understand Madison as primarily a historical actor and see the role of The Federalist in the ratification debate more in a historical than a theoretical context.
{"title":"The Emergence and Fundamental Centrality of James Madison’s Federalist 37: Historians, Political Theorists, and the Recentering of Meaning in The Federalist","authors":"T. Estes","doi":"10.1086/725846","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/725846","url":null,"abstract":"Madison’s fascinating Federalist 37 has lagged behind other Publius essays, particularly Federalist 10, in drawing scholarly attention. Only recently have historians and political theorists begun to correct this imbalance. However, even this newer interest has failed to fully grasp the significance of no. 37 or to reconsider its larger meanings. This review essay provides an extensive analysis of the key writings on Federalist 37 to document its emerging prominence. It argues that the collective impact of this scholarship points toward a latent paradigm change in how we understand Federalist 37 in relation to the better-known Federalist 10, to the ratification debate, and to Madison’s political thought. It suggests several fruitful avenues for additional scholarship. Finally, it argues that granting primacy to no. 37 helps us understand Madison as primarily a historical actor and see the role of The Federalist in the ratification debate more in a historical than a theoretical context.","PeriodicalId":41928,"journal":{"name":"American Political Thought","volume":"12 1","pages":"424 - 452"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45824285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This review essay situates recent scholarship on two nineteenth-century Black American political activists, Maria Stewart and Henry McNeal Turner, in relation to contemporary Black political thought on the role of despair in the Black freedom struggle. As Jared Loggins has argued in this journal (“Who Decides What We Should Do with Our Despair?,” Winter 2022), despair’s role is a question of political judgment: it is a decision to be made rather than an answer to be discovered. I argue that, by returning to the role of despair in nineteenth-century Black American political thought, we are able to enrich our political imagination concerning possibilities for despair and its counterpart, hope, in emancipatory politics. Maria Stewart offers us a vision of apocalyptic hope for the end of an unjust world, while Henry McNeal Turner despairingly declares that the Black freedom struggle must begin again.
{"title":"The Contingency of Despair","authors":"Philip Yaure","doi":"10.1086/725848","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/725848","url":null,"abstract":"This review essay situates recent scholarship on two nineteenth-century Black American political activists, Maria Stewart and Henry McNeal Turner, in relation to contemporary Black political thought on the role of despair in the Black freedom struggle. As Jared Loggins has argued in this journal (“Who Decides What We Should Do with Our Despair?,” Winter 2022), despair’s role is a question of political judgment: it is a decision to be made rather than an answer to be discovered. I argue that, by returning to the role of despair in nineteenth-century Black American political thought, we are able to enrich our political imagination concerning possibilities for despair and its counterpart, hope, in emancipatory politics. Maria Stewart offers us a vision of apocalyptic hope for the end of an unjust world, while Henry McNeal Turner despairingly declares that the Black freedom struggle must begin again.","PeriodicalId":41928,"journal":{"name":"American Political Thought","volume":"12 1","pages":"453 - 462"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46539260","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article examines the origins and early activities of the National Conference of Democratic Mayors and the National Conference of Republican Mayors. I argue that the rise of partisan mayoral caucuses crystallized deeply rooted debates over the place of cities within the American political tradition. No longer collections of disparate locally rooted organizations, the parties reflected programmatic visions of urban governance in their national programs. Mayors turned to the national parties in response to changes in intergovernmental policies during the Ford administration. In doing so, they contributed to the development of the national party-as-organization and a more integrated party system. Democratic mayors, typically leading big cities that suffered owing to the urban crisis, acted as an urban lobby within their party and urged the party to focus on urban affairs. Republican mayors, typically representing smaller, “newer” cities, promoted a more limited intergovernmental agenda while encouraging mayoral involvement in the national party-as-organization.
{"title":"The Rise of the Democratic and Republican Mayoral Caucuses and the Nationalization of American Party Politics","authors":"Anthony Sparacino","doi":"10.1086/725850","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/725850","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the origins and early activities of the National Conference of Democratic Mayors and the National Conference of Republican Mayors. I argue that the rise of partisan mayoral caucuses crystallized deeply rooted debates over the place of cities within the American political tradition. No longer collections of disparate locally rooted organizations, the parties reflected programmatic visions of urban governance in their national programs. Mayors turned to the national parties in response to changes in intergovernmental policies during the Ford administration. In doing so, they contributed to the development of the national party-as-organization and a more integrated party system. Democratic mayors, typically leading big cities that suffered owing to the urban crisis, acted as an urban lobby within their party and urged the party to focus on urban affairs. Republican mayors, typically representing smaller, “newer” cities, promoted a more limited intergovernmental agenda while encouraging mayoral involvement in the national party-as-organization.","PeriodicalId":41928,"journal":{"name":"American Political Thought","volume":"12 1","pages":"357 - 391"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43878549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
My colleague Phillip Muñoz has written a book both very excellent and very provocative. Some of my fellow symposiasts have been provoked to dissent firmly from his normative orientation around the idea of natural rights. As someone who has written two books with “natural rights” in their titles, it can be no surprise that I am not provoked in this way. I wish to pursue further the natural rights approach developed by Muñoz. This is valid and desirable no matter what views we may have about natural rights because it is called for by our duty to the “original public meaning” of the Constitution, as Muñoz’s research reveals. The center of his book is an attempt to explain “the foundations” of the founders’ doctrines in their “philosophies and theologies of the natural right of religious liberty” (2022, 68). The chief source for the philosophic foundation is James Madison, whoseMemorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments is taken byMuñoz to provide the essential account of the founders’ shared understanding of that natural right (82). Paradoxically, however, Madison held to an “idiosyncratic”—that is, not widely shared—constitutional-legal doctrine of religious noncognizance that he inferred from that shared understanding.My goal in this note is to probe that paradox by,first, reconstructingMadison’s position in a somewhat different and more direct way thanMuñoz does and, second, asking whether Madison is correct in believing that noncognizance is the correct constitutional doctrine following from the natural right of religious liberty. The idea of a natural right to religious liberty was extremely widespread in founding-era America, but philosophic arguments explaining or defending that
我的同事菲利普·穆尼奥斯写了一本书，既非常优秀，又极具煽动性。我的一些专题讨论会同事强烈反对他围绕自然权利理念的规范取向。作为一个已经写了两本书名中带有“自然权利”的书的人，我没有被这种方式激怒也就不足为奇了。我希望进一步推行穆尼奥斯提出的自然权利办法。无论我们对自然权利有什么看法，这都是有效和可取的，因为正如穆尼奥斯的研究所揭示的那样，这是我们对宪法“原始公共意义”的义务所要求的。他的书的中心是试图解释创始人在“宗教自由的自然权利的哲学和神学”中的教义的“基础”（2022，68）。哲学基础的主要来源是詹姆斯·麦迪逊（James Madison），穆尼奥斯（Muñoz）认为他的《对宗教评估的纪念和抗议》（Memorial and Remonstance against Religious Assessment）对创始人对这一自然权利的共同理解提供了重要的解释（82）。然而，矛盾的是，麦迪逊坚持一种“特殊”的——也就是说，没有被广泛认同的——宪法法律原则，即他从这种共同的理解中推断出的宗教不承认。我在这篇文章中的目标是通过以下方式来探究这一悖论：首先，以一种与穆尼奥斯有所不同、更直接的方式重建麦迪逊的立场；其次，询问麦迪逊是否正确地认为，不承认是源自宗教自由的自然权利的正确宪法学说。宗教自由的自然权利在建国时代的美国非常普遍，但哲学论点解释或捍卫了这一点
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