Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2023.2182824
Whitney Harper
ABSTRACT Recent discussions about Eucharistic practice in the United States have received increased public attention with stories of pro-life politicians being excluded from participation. In this practice of exclusion, there is a depiction of protecting the Eucharist from impurity, with the priests citing the pro-life framework as the basis for inclusion. Using this site for reflection, this article seeks to interrogate these representations of (im)purity specifically with reference to the abortion debate and the Eucharist. Taking the concept of impurity found in the works of Judith Butler and Bruno Latour and placing it in conversation with ‘purity culture’ and the disproportional focus on bodies of women in cases of abortion, I seek to address constructed boundaries between dualisms such as pure and impure, as well as Church and the world. More specifically, I aim to reconfigure impurity away from being an ‘evil that must be avoided’ (Thomas Bauer) by the Church and instead ask how this can serve as a rich resource for scholars reflecting on religious practices today, rethinking the Body of Christ as one of inherent interdependency and porosity – not a space in need of protection from ‘impurity’, but one that further divides representations of purity and impurity altogether.
{"title":"(Im)pure bodies and the Body of Christ: Judith Butler and Bruno Latour on (im)purity and the implications for contemporary Eucharistic participation","authors":"Whitney Harper","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2023.2182824","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2023.2182824","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Recent discussions about Eucharistic practice in the United States have received increased public attention with stories of pro-life politicians being excluded from participation. In this practice of exclusion, there is a depiction of protecting the Eucharist from impurity, with the priests citing the pro-life framework as the basis for inclusion. Using this site for reflection, this article seeks to interrogate these representations of (im)purity specifically with reference to the abortion debate and the Eucharist. Taking the concept of impurity found in the works of Judith Butler and Bruno Latour and placing it in conversation with ‘purity culture’ and the disproportional focus on bodies of women in cases of abortion, I seek to address constructed boundaries between dualisms such as pure and impure, as well as Church and the world. More specifically, I aim to reconfigure impurity away from being an ‘evil that must be avoided’ (Thomas Bauer) by the Church and instead ask how this can serve as a rich resource for scholars reflecting on religious practices today, rethinking the Body of Christ as one of inherent interdependency and porosity – not a space in need of protection from ‘impurity’, but one that further divides representations of purity and impurity altogether.","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":"84 1","pages":"18 - 34"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43358826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2023.2182823
Anne Guillard
argues for the relevance of Mary Wollstonecraft’s intellectual legacy for the contemporary debate on ethics. The study is based on the whole of Wollstonecraft’s literary corpus and is characterized by its interdisciplinary openings, highlighting in particular the theological background of the English feminist’s texts. The author succeeds in capturing a reality that has often been missed in commentaries on Wollstonecraft’s protean thought: the theological underpinning of her argument for women’s rights
{"title":"Modern Virtue: Mary Wollstonecraft and a Tradition of Dissent","authors":"Anne Guillard","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2023.2182823","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2023.2182823","url":null,"abstract":"argues for the relevance of Mary Wollstonecraft’s intellectual legacy for the contemporary debate on ethics. The study is based on the whole of Wollstonecraft’s literary corpus and is characterized by its interdisciplinary openings, highlighting in particular the theological background of the English feminist’s texts. The author succeeds in capturing a reality that has often been missed in commentaries on Wollstonecraft’s protean thought: the theological underpinning of her argument for women’s rights","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":"84 1","pages":"92 - 95"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44616848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2023.2186469
M. Kosma
These two camps include a wide variety of people: Christian and virtue ethicists, moral theologians and political theorists, and feminists. On the one hand, the defenders of virtue criticize the devastating effect of modernity on the life of communities and on the idea of the common good with the emergence of individual rights claims and relativism. On the other hand, the contemptuous of virtue see any shared notion of the good life as all-encompassing and dangerous to freedom. The author does not seek to criticize either side, but to promote Wollstonecraft’s thought as an alternative way of relating to virtue ethics today: a modern virtue that articulates concern for the common good and the legitimacy of rights (chapter 4&5). The great originality of the book is to dedicate Wollstonecraft’s contributions to current theoretical debates that cross Christian ethics and theology and political theory. For Wollstonecraft, theology and religion should be seen as garments of an inherited and everrevisable wardrobe of the moral imagination (p.317). If, as Wollstonecraft invites us to do, we see religion and virtue as revisable elements within our common moral imagination, then it is up to theologians to take responsibility for making these permanent adjustments and to conceive the public contribution of theology as a provisional ethics only.
{"title":"Living I Was Your Plague: Martin Luther's World and Legacy","authors":"M. Kosma","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2023.2186469","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2023.2186469","url":null,"abstract":"These two camps include a wide variety of people: Christian and virtue ethicists, moral theologians and political theorists, and feminists. On the one hand, the defenders of virtue criticize the devastating effect of modernity on the life of communities and on the idea of the common good with the emergence of individual rights claims and relativism. On the other hand, the contemptuous of virtue see any shared notion of the good life as all-encompassing and dangerous to freedom. The author does not seek to criticize either side, but to promote Wollstonecraft’s thought as an alternative way of relating to virtue ethics today: a modern virtue that articulates concern for the common good and the legitimacy of rights (chapter 4&5). The great originality of the book is to dedicate Wollstonecraft’s contributions to current theoretical debates that cross Christian ethics and theology and political theory. For Wollstonecraft, theology and religion should be seen as garments of an inherited and everrevisable wardrobe of the moral imagination (p.317). If, as Wollstonecraft invites us to do, we see religion and virtue as revisable elements within our common moral imagination, then it is up to theologians to take responsibility for making these permanent adjustments and to conceive the public contribution of theology as a provisional ethics only.","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":"84 1","pages":"95 - 97"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45118137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2023.2188243
J. J. Rodríguez
ABSTRACT In this article, we present for the first time Schelling’s early critique of absolute idealism within his middle metaphysics (1804–1820), which has great relevance and influence on the subsequent course of German philosophy, and, more broadly considered, on later systematic thinking about the categories of unity and duality. We aim to show how Schelling defends a form of metaphysical duality, from 1804 onwards, without relapsing into a stronger Kantian dualism. In this sense, our author rejects both the dualism between nature and spirit, necessity and freedom, as well as the monist-immanent metaphysical stance later associated with Hegelian panlogism. Against Hegel, Schelling increasingly vindicates the reality of the finite and degrades the infinite to mere ideality in a movement that resembles later existentialism. Furthermore, we defend Schelling against the accusation of irrationalism that sections of Hegelianism formulated against him and present the concept of infinity without the notion of totality, which he thinks of, much like Fichte, in the light of the concept of an ‘infinite task’. Schelling’s later criticisms of Hegel are shown to be influenced by his early idealist critique of the period at hand.
{"title":"Hegel’s vanity. Schelling’s early critique of absolute idealism","authors":"J. J. Rodríguez","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2023.2188243","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2023.2188243","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this article, we present for the first time Schelling’s early critique of absolute idealism within his middle metaphysics (1804–1820), which has great relevance and influence on the subsequent course of German philosophy, and, more broadly considered, on later systematic thinking about the categories of unity and duality. We aim to show how Schelling defends a form of metaphysical duality, from 1804 onwards, without relapsing into a stronger Kantian dualism. In this sense, our author rejects both the dualism between nature and spirit, necessity and freedom, as well as the monist-immanent metaphysical stance later associated with Hegelian panlogism. Against Hegel, Schelling increasingly vindicates the reality of the finite and degrades the infinite to mere ideality in a movement that resembles later existentialism. Furthermore, we defend Schelling against the accusation of irrationalism that sections of Hegelianism formulated against him and present the concept of infinity without the notion of totality, which he thinks of, much like Fichte, in the light of the concept of an ‘infinite task’. Schelling’s later criticisms of Hegel are shown to be influenced by his early idealist critique of the period at hand.","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":"84 1","pages":"1 - 17"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45115672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2022.2163133
Colby Dickinson
{"title":"The European Reception of John D. Caputo’s Thought: Radicalizing Theology","authors":"Colby Dickinson","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2022.2163133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2022.2163133","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":"84 1","pages":"97 - 98"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60495836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2023.2186470
Christopher J. King
ABSTRACT In this paper, I offer an account of the structural differences, neglected in the literature, between Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Emmanuel Levinas, showing how Bonhoeffer’s account of persons and responsibility is differentiated through creation, fall, and redemption, whereas Levinas’s account of ethical selfhood offers itself as a kind of transcendental account of persons in which the self is structured by its encounter with the other which commands responsibility. This difference (situationally differentiated vs. transcendental) plays out in two ways – the role of the will in ethical selfhood and the identity of the primal governing agent in the encounter with others. Bonhoeffer’s account, through its differentiation into different modes of existence, allows for the possibility of different stages and modes of the encounter with the other, and thus allows for the incorporation of one model of encounter at one stage, and another model at a different stage. As a consequence, Bonhoeffer’s account includes and develops upon the kind of demand-based account Levinas offers. This can serve as an advantage over Levinas’s model insofar as it provides a ‘multi-modal’ framework to absorb other views into one’s own in a way that a transcendentally conceived framework of selfhood does not.
{"title":"Formative encounters with the other: examining the structural differences between Bonhoeffer and Levinas","authors":"Christopher J. King","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2023.2186470","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2023.2186470","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this paper, I offer an account of the structural differences, neglected in the literature, between Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Emmanuel Levinas, showing how Bonhoeffer’s account of persons and responsibility is differentiated through creation, fall, and redemption, whereas Levinas’s account of ethical selfhood offers itself as a kind of transcendental account of persons in which the self is structured by its encounter with the other which commands responsibility. This difference (situationally differentiated vs. transcendental) plays out in two ways – the role of the will in ethical selfhood and the identity of the primal governing agent in the encounter with others. Bonhoeffer’s account, through its differentiation into different modes of existence, allows for the possibility of different stages and modes of the encounter with the other, and thus allows for the incorporation of one model of encounter at one stage, and another model at a different stage. As a consequence, Bonhoeffer’s account includes and develops upon the kind of demand-based account Levinas offers. This can serve as an advantage over Levinas’s model insofar as it provides a ‘multi-modal’ framework to absorb other views into one’s own in a way that a transcendentally conceived framework of selfhood does not.","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":"84 1","pages":"35 - 54"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47538969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2023.2172064
Elias L. Khalil
ABSTRACT Can rational choice theory justify hope and patience in dealing with calamities such as financial collapse or terminal illness? The Book of Job is a good entry-point. Three friends of Job counsel him to avoid hopelessness and bitterness arising from frustration regarding calamities. They do so on non-rational grounds. They argue that Job should ignore the evidence and instead blindly uphold the belief ‘God is just.’ However, such blindness permits magic, superstitions, and cultish beliefs. The specter of such beliefs is probably what prompted the fourth friend, Elihu, to dismiss the arguments of the three friends. Elihu reasons that one should be rational, i.e., acknowledge the evidence. This need not entail the conclusion ‘God is unjust’ – as God cannot perform miracles on a daily basis. That is, given the evidence, one cannot sustain hopeful beliefs that God will interfere and reverse the course of natural catastrophes and shocks from which humans, as well as other living beings, suffer. One at best can be patient, accept suffering considering worse counterfactuals. Based on Elihu’s critique of the arguments of the three friends, and building on Maimonides’s interpretation, this paper concludes that standard rational choice theory can explain patience, but not hope.
{"title":"Can rational choice explain hope and patience? Frustration and bitterness in The Book of Job","authors":"Elias L. Khalil","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2023.2172064","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2023.2172064","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Can rational choice theory justify hope and patience in dealing with calamities such as financial collapse or terminal illness? The Book of Job is a good entry-point. Three friends of Job counsel him to avoid hopelessness and bitterness arising from frustration regarding calamities. They do so on non-rational grounds. They argue that Job should ignore the evidence and instead blindly uphold the belief ‘God is just.’ However, such blindness permits magic, superstitions, and cultish beliefs. The specter of such beliefs is probably what prompted the fourth friend, Elihu, to dismiss the arguments of the three friends. Elihu reasons that one should be rational, i.e., acknowledge the evidence. This need not entail the conclusion ‘God is unjust’ – as God cannot perform miracles on a daily basis. That is, given the evidence, one cannot sustain hopeful beliefs that God will interfere and reverse the course of natural catastrophes and shocks from which humans, as well as other living beings, suffer. One at best can be patient, accept suffering considering worse counterfactuals. Based on Elihu’s critique of the arguments of the three friends, and building on Maimonides’s interpretation, this paper concludes that standard rational choice theory can explain patience, but not hope.","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":"84 1","pages":"55 - 76"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46386614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-20DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2022.2145341
Jamie L. Howard
ABSTRACT The empirical turn has created an undercurrent of scrutiny regarding the relevance of disciplines such as philosophy and theology due to assumptions about the limitations of their epistemology. This article seeks to recognize that disciplines that are lauded as most relevant due to their reliance on empiricism as their main form of epistemology often rely upon intuition for making decisions in the research process. After delineating this process using Anthropological research as an example, I draw a parallel between descriptions of how intuition can be understood and used as a means of knowing in the work of Kant and several theologians with descriptions of how intuition is relied upon and necessarily emerges as a critical epistemology in the more traditionally empirically grounded discipline Anthropology. This parallel is offered as the launching place for connections between these disciplines through further examination of the use of intuition as an epistemology and hopes to equate the epistemo- logical integrity of disciplines such as philosophy and theology that admit to the use of intuition with those that are considered empiri- cal which rely upon intuition yet may not admit to its use overtly.
{"title":"Intuition: A potential life-raft for Philosophy and Theology?","authors":"Jamie L. Howard","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2022.2145341","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2022.2145341","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The empirical turn has created an undercurrent of scrutiny regarding the relevance of disciplines such as philosophy and theology due to assumptions about the limitations of their epistemology. This article seeks to recognize that disciplines that are lauded as most relevant due to their reliance on empiricism as their main form of epistemology often rely upon intuition for making decisions in the research process. After delineating this process using Anthropological research as an example, I draw a parallel between descriptions of how intuition can be understood and used as a means of knowing in the work of Kant and several theologians with descriptions of how intuition is relied upon and necessarily emerges as a critical epistemology in the more traditionally empirically grounded discipline Anthropology. This parallel is offered as the launching place for connections between these disciplines through further examination of the use of intuition as an epistemology and hopes to equate the epistemo- logical integrity of disciplines such as philosophy and theology that admit to the use of intuition with those that are considered empiri- cal which rely upon intuition yet may not admit to its use overtly.","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":"83 1","pages":"362 - 371"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45079910","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-20DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2022.2158907
Thiemo Breyer
ABSTRACT The concepts of resilience and vulnerability have experienced an enormous upswing over the past years in different fields of inquiry. While vulnerability has played an eminent role in sociology, feminist studies, theology, and philosophy for some time, resilience has recently become increasingly important. Several high-ranking international academic alliances have been formed, which conduct interdisciplinary research into resilience. In the following, I will explore the conceptual triad of vulnerability, crisis, and resilience to point at some historical-semantic roots of this contemporary discourse and to introduce two philosophical paths to elucidating the normative and experiential dimensions of it.
{"title":"Resilience – Its connections to vulnerability and crisis from analytic and phenomenological perspectives","authors":"Thiemo Breyer","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2022.2158907","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2022.2158907","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The concepts of resilience and vulnerability have experienced an enormous upswing over the past years in different fields of inquiry. While vulnerability has played an eminent role in sociology, feminist studies, theology, and philosophy for some time, resilience has recently become increasingly important. Several high-ranking international academic alliances have been formed, which conduct interdisciplinary research into resilience. In the following, I will explore the conceptual triad of vulnerability, crisis, and resilience to point at some historical-semantic roots of this contemporary discourse and to introduce two philosophical paths to elucidating the normative and experiential dimensions of it.","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":"83 1","pages":"381 - 392"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42542108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-20DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2022.2164418
Cornelia Richter
ABSTRACT In this short introductory article the origin of this special issue in a Cambridge conference in 2019 is briefly sketched. Moreover, the specific approach which the organizers wanted to highlight is elucidated. Also, a preview is offered of the various contributions to this special issue.
{"title":"Sisters in Arms: an Introduction","authors":"Cornelia Richter","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2022.2164418","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2022.2164418","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this short introductory article the origin of this special issue in a Cambridge conference in 2019 is briefly sketched. Moreover, the specific approach which the organizers wanted to highlight is elucidated. Also, a preview is offered of the various contributions to this special issue.","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":"83 1","pages":"315 - 317"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43013242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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