Pub Date : 2022-08-08DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2022.2140184
Ronen Pinkas
ABSTRACT In 1939 Sigmund Freud published his latest book, Moses and Monotheism, which is his most unusual and problematic work. In Moses Freud offers four groundbreaking claims in regard to the biblical story: [a] Moses was an Egyptian [b] The origin of monotheism is not Judaism [c] Moses was murdered by the Jews [d] The murder sparked a constant sense of unconscious guilt, which eventually contributed to the rational and ethical development of Jewish monotheism. As is well known, Freud’s Moses received extremely negative reviews from Jewish thinkers. The social psychoanalyst, Erich Fromm, who wrote extensively on Freud as well as on Judaism and the biblical narrative, did not explicitly express his position on Freud’s latest work. This paper offers explanations for Fromm’s roaring silence on Freud’s Moses.
{"title":"Freud’s Moses and Fromm’s Freud: Erich Fromm’s silence on Freud’s Moses – a silence of negation or a silence of consent?","authors":"Ronen Pinkas","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2022.2140184","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2022.2140184","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In 1939 Sigmund Freud published his latest book, Moses and Monotheism, which is his most unusual and problematic work. In Moses Freud offers four groundbreaking claims in regard to the biblical story: [a] Moses was an Egyptian [b] The origin of monotheism is not Judaism [c] Moses was murdered by the Jews [d] The murder sparked a constant sense of unconscious guilt, which eventually contributed to the rational and ethical development of Jewish monotheism. As is well known, Freud’s Moses received extremely negative reviews from Jewish thinkers. The social psychoanalyst, Erich Fromm, who wrote extensively on Freud as well as on Judaism and the biblical narrative, did not explicitly express his position on Freud’s latest work. This paper offers explanations for Fromm’s roaring silence on Freud’s Moses.","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45887767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-27DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2022.2093776
Nikolaas Cassidy‐Deketelaere
ABSTRACT Jean-Luc Nancy’s so-called ‘deconstruction of Christianity’ is usually understood as both a philosophy of culture (in line with various other exercises in ‘post-secular’ thought) and a critique of metaphysics (in line with Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence). This article, however, argues that its primary concern is neither the Christian religion as a cultural formation, nor the exhaustion of the metaphysical enterprise. Instead, by looking at some of the philosophical sources on which Nancy’s project is built – namely, Immanuel Kant, Karl Marx, and Martin Heidegger –, the article suggests that its true aim is to develop a new understanding of reason, or to renew the experience of reason. Though these authors have largely been neglected by the growing discussion of Nancy’s deconstruction of Christianity, the article shows how it is only by developing his occasional references to them that we can come to appreciate an important but neglected dimension of this project: namely, the fact that it is an exercise in philosophical anthropology, i.e. an inquiry into the exact nature of the reason that supposedly characterises the rational animal.
{"title":"The Depth of Reason: Kant, Marx, and Heidegger in the Deconstruction of Christianity","authors":"Nikolaas Cassidy‐Deketelaere","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2022.2093776","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2022.2093776","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Jean-Luc Nancy’s so-called ‘deconstruction of Christianity’ is usually understood as both a philosophy of culture (in line with various other exercises in ‘post-secular’ thought) and a critique of metaphysics (in line with Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence). This article, however, argues that its primary concern is neither the Christian religion as a cultural formation, nor the exhaustion of the metaphysical enterprise. Instead, by looking at some of the philosophical sources on which Nancy’s project is built – namely, Immanuel Kant, Karl Marx, and Martin Heidegger –, the article suggests that its true aim is to develop a new understanding of reason, or to renew the experience of reason. Though these authors have largely been neglected by the growing discussion of Nancy’s deconstruction of Christianity, the article shows how it is only by developing his occasional references to them that we can come to appreciate an important but neglected dimension of this project: namely, the fact that it is an exercise in philosophical anthropology, i.e. an inquiry into the exact nature of the reason that supposedly characterises the rational animal.","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44824341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-27DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2022.2127421
A. Karpiński
ABSTRACT This paper is a systematic comparison between two well–known and theologically relevant concepts – the sublime as developed in Kant’s third Critique, and Marion’s saturated phenomenon. Although it discusses the significant and apparent similarities between them, it also criticizes Marion’s identification of the sublime as a possible example of a saturated phenomenon. This is primarily because of the different origins and philosophical presuppositions guiding the elaboration of these two ideas. Kant’s aim is to confine the reception of the phenomenon to the conditions of experience, so that both in the case of judg-ments of beauty and judg-ments of the sublime, the subject achieves pleasure through self-centred appreciation of its rational capacities. Marion’s saturated phenomenon, on the other hand, aims at dispensing with the ‘metaphysical’ horizon of either the object, or the transcendental subject, in favour of passive appropriation of givenness. Although both are meant to describe what happens when the limits of understanding are breached, in the sublime this breach only serves to reinforce the capacity of the rational subject, whereas in the saturated phenomenon it points to the possibility of apprehension of the totally Other as purely given.
{"title":"The concepts of the sublime and the saturated phenomenon in Immanuel Kant and Jean-Luc Marion: a systematic comparison based on their philosophical origins","authors":"A. Karpiński","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2022.2127421","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2022.2127421","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper is a systematic comparison between two well–known and theologically relevant concepts – the sublime as developed in Kant’s third Critique, and Marion’s saturated phenomenon. Although it discusses the significant and apparent similarities between them, it also criticizes Marion’s identification of the sublime as a possible example of a saturated phenomenon. This is primarily because of the different origins and philosophical presuppositions guiding the elaboration of these two ideas. Kant’s aim is to confine the reception of the phenomenon to the conditions of experience, so that both in the case of judg-ments of beauty and judg-ments of the sublime, the subject achieves pleasure through self-centred appreciation of its rational capacities. Marion’s saturated phenomenon, on the other hand, aims at dispensing with the ‘metaphysical’ horizon of either the object, or the transcendental subject, in favour of passive appropriation of givenness. Although both are meant to describe what happens when the limits of understanding are breached, in the sublime this breach only serves to reinforce the capacity of the rational subject, whereas in the saturated phenomenon it points to the possibility of apprehension of the totally Other as purely given.","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47874955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-27DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2022.2127420
Z. Balázs
ABSTRACT The paper discusses a possible political theological interpretation of arguments developed in Robert Musil’s The Man Without Qualities. What emerges is that Musil (or his characters) pose a fundamental challenge to the possibility of any real analogy between God and the political sovereign, as suggested by Carl Schmitt. At stake is Austria as a yet-to-be-born modern sovereign. However, the novel shows why attempts to conceive it in an image of God all fail. After surveying four such attempts, the main focus will be the discussion of Anselm of Canterbury’s existential argument in this secular context. At Diotima’s inspiration it is General von Bordwehr, a largely neglected figure, who makes the most serious attempt to argue for the political sovereign as the greatest conceivable thing. The argument is that greatness entails containing every idea and its opposite, and this yields the concept of order. But order means the frozen end of everything. Hence, instead of a living God, we end up with a political sovereign marked by death.
{"title":"Does the sovereign exist? Robert Musil’s political theology","authors":"Z. Balázs","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2022.2127420","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2022.2127420","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The paper discusses a possible political theological interpretation of arguments developed in Robert Musil’s The Man Without Qualities. What emerges is that Musil (or his characters) pose a fundamental challenge to the possibility of any real analogy between God and the political sovereign, as suggested by Carl Schmitt. At stake is Austria as a yet-to-be-born modern sovereign. However, the novel shows why attempts to conceive it in an image of God all fail. After surveying four such attempts, the main focus will be the discussion of Anselm of Canterbury’s existential argument in this secular context. At Diotima’s inspiration it is General von Bordwehr, a largely neglected figure, who makes the most serious attempt to argue for the political sovereign as the greatest conceivable thing. The argument is that greatness entails containing every idea and its opposite, and this yields the concept of order. But order means the frozen end of everything. Hence, instead of a living God, we end up with a political sovereign marked by death.","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46677012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-27DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2022.2127419
Torbjörn Gustafsson Chorell
ABSTRACT Anders Nygren’s and Hannah Arendt’s critical reading of Augustine’s concept of love had its point of departure in a fundamental skepticism towards the possibility of knowing oneself. Nygren defended the need to give up the search for the ego in order to enter a fellowship with God, whereas Arendt’s turn toward the world necessitated a critical evaluation of self-love and the search for inner motivations for action in a unified self. Arendt’s solution in particular suggests that the fate of the tradition of gnothi seauton was to surrender to the new discourse on identity that effectively turned Augustine’s question of himself from a puzzle solved by inwardness into a question of performance and encounters with others.
{"title":"Giving up on knowing and loving oneself: Anders Nygren, Hannah Arendt, and Augustine","authors":"Torbjörn Gustafsson Chorell","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2022.2127419","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2022.2127419","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Anders Nygren’s and Hannah Arendt’s critical reading of Augustine’s concept of love had its point of departure in a fundamental skepticism towards the possibility of knowing oneself. Nygren defended the need to give up the search for the ego in order to enter a fellowship with God, whereas Arendt’s turn toward the world necessitated a critical evaluation of self-love and the search for inner motivations for action in a unified self. Arendt’s solution in particular suggests that the fate of the tradition of gnothi seauton was to surrender to the new discourse on identity that effectively turned Augustine’s question of himself from a puzzle solved by inwardness into a question of performance and encounters with others.","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46649417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-27DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2022.2128857
Yu Xia
ABSTRACT The majority of the contemporary literature on Schelling and Heidegger focuses on the direct connection between the two philosophers – Heidegger’s engagement with Schelling’s Freedom essay. This paper, however, explores an implicit link between them on the topic of creation by reading Schelling’s Ages of the World alongside Heidegger’s ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’. It brings God’s creation in Schelling together with artistic creation in Heidegger and argues that the two have similarities in their structures, sources, and aims: both creations are dependent on a two-fold struggle, the sources are either the absolute (in Schelling) or being (in Heidegger), and the aims are to reveal the divine principle (in Schelling) or the truth of being (in Heidegger) in the world. In making these comparisons, I argue that, in spite of Heidegger’s esoteric neologisms, his account of artistic creation is not as radically new as he himself claims. It can be read and better comprehended in the light of a Schellingian metaphysics of creation and, more broadly, in the light of the history of philosophy in general. Eventually, Heidegger’s philosophy remains committed to the tradition of philosophical theology, despite his own attempt to move beyond this tradition.
{"title":"The affinity between artistic creation in Heidegger and divine creation in Schelling","authors":"Yu Xia","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2022.2128857","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2022.2128857","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The majority of the contemporary literature on Schelling and Heidegger focuses on the direct connection between the two philosophers – Heidegger’s engagement with Schelling’s Freedom essay. This paper, however, explores an implicit link between them on the topic of creation by reading Schelling’s Ages of the World alongside Heidegger’s ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’. It brings God’s creation in Schelling together with artistic creation in Heidegger and argues that the two have similarities in their structures, sources, and aims: both creations are dependent on a two-fold struggle, the sources are either the absolute (in Schelling) or being (in Heidegger), and the aims are to reveal the divine principle (in Schelling) or the truth of being (in Heidegger) in the world. In making these comparisons, I argue that, in spite of Heidegger’s esoteric neologisms, his account of artistic creation is not as radically new as he himself claims. It can be read and better comprehended in the light of a Schellingian metaphysics of creation and, more broadly, in the light of the history of philosophy in general. Eventually, Heidegger’s philosophy remains committed to the tradition of philosophical theology, despite his own attempt to move beyond this tradition.","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41953939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-27DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2022.2093775
H. Zwart
ABSTRACT This paper presents a mutual confrontation of the oeuvres of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881–1955) and Jacques Lacan (1901–1980), highlighting their relevance for the planetary challenges we are facing today. I will present their views on technoscience, environmental pollution and religious faith, focussing on human genomics as a case study. Both authors claim that technoscience reflects a tendency towards symbolisation: incorporating the biosphere (living nature) into the “symbolic order’ (Lacan) or ‘noosphere’ (Teilhard). On various occasions, Lacan refers to Teilhard’s concept of the hominization of the planet and their dialogue culminates in a ‘final conversation’ between Teilhard and Lacan in 1954, during a reception organised by the journal Psyché. I will conclude that the Teilhard-Lacan dialogue is highly relevant for current debates concerning the Anthropocene, as a moment of global awakening and global crisis. Processes of hominization allowed humans to become literate beings, littering the planet as well: humans as literate litterers. Whereas Teilhard argues that technoscience and self-directed evolution are about to culminate in what he refers to as point Omega, Lacan rather stresses the hazards involved in this optimistic desire towards all-encompassing synthesis, unification and fulfilment.
摘要本文介绍了Pierre Teilhard de Chardin（1881–1955）和Jacques Lacan（1901–1980）的作品的相互对抗，强调了它们与我们今天面临的行星挑战的相关性。我将介绍他们对技术科学、环境污染和宗教信仰的看法，重点是人类基因组学作为一个案例研究。两位作者都声称，技术科学反映了一种象征化的趋势：将生物圈（活的自然）纳入“象征秩序”（Lacan）或“noosphere”（Teilhard）在各种场合，拉康都提到了泰尔哈德关于地球人类化的概念，他们的对话在1954年泰尔哈德和拉康在《Psyché》杂志组织的招待会上的“最后对话”中达到了高潮。我的结论是，作为全球觉醒和全球危机的时刻，Teilhard-Lacan对话与当前关于人类世的辩论高度相关。人类化的过程使人类成为有文化的人，也在地球上乱扔垃圾：人类是有文化的乱扔垃圾者。Teilhard认为，技术科学和自我导向的进化即将达到他所说的欧米茄点，而Lacan则强调了这种对全面综合、统一和实现的乐观愿望所涉及的危险。
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Pub Date : 2022-05-27DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2022.2129744
O. Beran, Kai Marchal
ABSTRACT The article discusses Iris Murdoch’s philosophical relationship to Buddhism. First, we argue that Murdoch was not, and did not identify herself as, a Buddhist. Then we suggest caution regarding Murdoch’s interpretations of Buddhism. On the one hand, she applies the limited viewpoint of her era. On the other hand, her approach is motivated by insights tracing affinities between Buddhism and Husserl’s and Sartre’s analyses of consciousness, as well as Platonic ideas of unselfing and self-purification. Murdoch’s reflections on Buddhism serve primarily a complex argument about the role of religion in our moral lives, as these reflect the rapidly changing Western cultural environment. She envisages the possibility for Christianity to learn from Buddhism and move closer towards demythologisation and a radical, loving commitment to the others here and now. While Murdoch’s observations may not be accurate as a ‘diagnosis of our times’, they serve as a valuable opening for reflecting on our lives in the suggested terms. They are also inspiring in their optimism that there is the possibility to learn from others (other cultures, other religions) for the better. The ‘muddled’ nature of our reality does not thwart this possibility of learning; it only makes its particular steps unpredictable.
{"title":"Iris Murdoch between buddhism and christianity: moral change, conceptual loss/recovery, unselfing","authors":"O. Beran, Kai Marchal","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2022.2129744","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2022.2129744","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The article discusses Iris Murdoch’s philosophical relationship to Buddhism. First, we argue that Murdoch was not, and did not identify herself as, a Buddhist. Then we suggest caution regarding Murdoch’s interpretations of Buddhism. On the one hand, she applies the limited viewpoint of her era. On the other hand, her approach is motivated by insights tracing affinities between Buddhism and Husserl’s and Sartre’s analyses of consciousness, as well as Platonic ideas of unselfing and self-purification. Murdoch’s reflections on Buddhism serve primarily a complex argument about the role of religion in our moral lives, as these reflect the rapidly changing Western cultural environment. She envisages the possibility for Christianity to learn from Buddhism and move closer towards demythologisation and a radical, loving commitment to the others here and now. While Murdoch’s observations may not be accurate as a ‘diagnosis of our times’, they serve as a valuable opening for reflecting on our lives in the suggested terms. They are also inspiring in their optimism that there is the possibility to learn from others (other cultures, other religions) for the better. The ‘muddled’ nature of our reality does not thwart this possibility of learning; it only makes its particular steps unpredictable.","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44936415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-29DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2022.2070862
Dylan S. Bailey
ABSTRACT Recent debates over the role of recognition by the community for one’s development and flourishing generally discuss community in a univocal sense: the way that recognition functions in particular communities is not fundamentally different from the way it functions in the larger community. They also tend to logically prioritize a fundamental human identity over particular religious, ethnic, or societal identities, which are understood to be secondary to, and derivative of, this basic identity. In his depiction of how communal recognition contributes to individual selfhood, Søren Kierkegaard challenges these accounts by (1) differentiating between how communal recognition occurs in society in general and in one particular community, the Christian church and (2) questioning the idea that the self created in the former is more fundamental than that created in the latter. For Kierkegaard, one’s identities as both a Christian and a fully-developed self depend essentially on recognition by the Other: initially and fundamentally on recognition by God alone, and secondarily and derivatively on recognition by the human Other.
{"title":"Communal recognition and human flourishing: a Kierkegaardian account","authors":"Dylan S. Bailey","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2022.2070862","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2022.2070862","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Recent debates over the role of recognition by the community for one’s development and flourishing generally discuss community in a univocal sense: the way that recognition functions in particular communities is not fundamentally different from the way it functions in the larger community. They also tend to logically prioritize a fundamental human identity over particular religious, ethnic, or societal identities, which are understood to be secondary to, and derivative of, this basic identity. In his depiction of how communal recognition contributes to individual selfhood, Søren Kierkegaard challenges these accounts by (1) differentiating between how communal recognition occurs in society in general and in one particular community, the Christian church and (2) questioning the idea that the self created in the former is more fundamental than that created in the latter. For Kierkegaard, one’s identities as both a Christian and a fully-developed self depend essentially on recognition by the Other: initially and fundamentally on recognition by God alone, and secondarily and derivatively on recognition by the human Other.","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48129556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-20DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2021.2002713
A. D. Attoe
ABSTRACT Thaddeus Metz’s new book ‘God, Soul and the Meaning of Life’ presents a brief analysis of supernaturalist views about the meaning of life – my specific concern being the Divine purpose theory. While the view locates meaning in the fulfilment of some divine mandate, I show that this theory is, at best, unattractive. In this essay, I challenge the view that a belief in God is not necessary for the Divine purpose theory to be viable. I show that if we were to agree that a belief in God is inconceivable, then a theory built on such a belief is, at best, wishful thinking. Arguing from a subjectivist perspective, I make clear the fact that any recourse to a godly mandate as what makes life meaningful inadvertently assumes an extrinsic and instrumental character, which makes such a pursuit an unattractive form of meaningfulness. Finally, I show that the God purpose theory is much too narrow as it fails to capture other paths to meaningfulness that do not involve a recourse to God, and also that any assigned purpose is unnecessary (and, therefore, unattractive), if God is all-knowing, all-powerful, etc.
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