Pub Date : 2020-03-14DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2020.1753093
Michael P. Wilson
ABSTRACT At the heart of this essay lies the problem of Christian universals. Sin-talk is arguably Christian theology’s primary contribution to any account of the human condition. Fashionable or unfashionable, welcome or unwelcome, it attempts to say something about who we all are. With sin being conceived as a universal, metaphysical dialectic was key to classical sin-talk’s explanatory power. In a series of books and articles, McFadyen developed an understanding of the nature of Christian truth and of what is here described as a pseudo-dialectical methodological theory to show how sin-talk (and indeed talk of any Christian universal) might yet have explanatory power in a post-modern, non-metaphysical, secular world. This article: (i) rehearses how by the end of the 20th century the loss of metaphysical dialectic had disabled Christian discourse’s capacity to gain purchase on Western society, (ii) explores McFadyen’s understanding of the character of Christian truth, (iii) analyses the problem of universals and of sin-talk in particular, (iv) explores McFadyen’s solution, and his particular indebtedness to Pannenberg, (v) suggests how McFadyen’s contribution might be evaluated.
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Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2019.1649602
Rico Sneller
ABSTRACT In this article, I argue that Kierkegaard’s interpretation of Socrates’ daimonion in The Concept of Irony should be read in light of his notion of the demonic in The Concept of Anxiety, and vice versa. Whereas the first should primarily be seen as an exemplification of philosophical transcendental consciousness, the second assumes a more strictly ‘moral’ connotation (‘anxiety about the good’). If the notion of the demonic in The Concept of Anxiety draws upon the Socratic daimonion in The Concept of Irony, this will have implications for philosophy and science in so far as they take a transcendental consciousness for granted. However, Kierkegaard’s continued reference to, if not identification with, Socrates, prevents us from immobilising Kierkegaard’s ‘own’ philosophy, as though the Socratic position can ever be definitively overcome. The ‘enclosed reserve’ of the demonic is rather philosophy’s weak spot.
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{"title":"The Fractal Consciousness and the Godness’ Problem","authors":"A. Marius","doi":"10.15640/IJPT.V8N2A2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15640/IJPT.V8N2A2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67164797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2019.1581654
Bojan Koltaj
ABSTRACT This article is an argument for furthering the understanding, role and scope of critical theology in reflection on the act, content and implications of theological thought through appropriation of Hegel’s presuppositionless approach. I examine the scope and potential of such a reflective approach in theology’s engagement with critical theory to date, proposing a venture beyond utilisation of its resources for contemporary expression of theological themes or in demonstration of theology’s socio-political potential. After demonstrating that such an approach is in keeping with theology’s critical character, I attempt to provide some outlines of such a critical theology, how it is to carry out its reflection and what insights it can yield into the method and content of theological thought.
{"title":"Critical theology: why Hegel now?","authors":"Bojan Koltaj","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2019.1581654","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2019.1581654","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article is an argument for furthering the understanding, role and scope of critical theology in reflection on the act, content and implications of theological thought through appropriation of Hegel’s presuppositionless approach. I examine the scope and potential of such a reflective approach in theology’s engagement with critical theory to date, proposing a venture beyond utilisation of its resources for contemporary expression of theological themes or in demonstration of theology’s socio-political potential. After demonstrating that such an approach is in keeping with theology’s critical character, I attempt to provide some outlines of such a critical theology, how it is to carry out its reflection and what insights it can yield into the method and content of theological thought.","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21692327.2019.1581654","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46255650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article offers an antinomic reinterpretation of Kearney’s concept of the possible God through a systematic analysis of its principles, which are so-called double identity and via tertia. Firstly, I briefly summarize the main themes of Kearney’s concept, represented by his seeking of middle ways between different one-sided antipoles (theism and atheism, metaphysics and negative theology, etc.). Secondly, I discuss the main antinomies following from via tertia: 1) God’s and man’s desire, 2) God’s strength based on his weakness, 3) a kenotic theology of the cross coming from the concept of the weak God, and 4) the call for hospitality as an ethical consequence of the previous point. Thirdly, I concentrate on the weaknesses and inconsistencies of a such approach, and finally, I try to show that antinomic thinking enables us to solve these problems and even bring Kearney’s concept closer to his original intentions. In conclusion, I briefly offer several possibilities of further developing these themes.
{"title":"Richard Kearney’s Concept of the Possible God in the Perspective of Antinomic Reinterpretation","authors":"Filip H. Härtel","doi":"10.15640/ijpt.v8n2a1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15640/ijpt.v8n2a1","url":null,"abstract":"This article offers an antinomic reinterpretation of Kearney’s concept of the possible God through a systematic analysis of its principles, which are so-called double identity and via tertia. Firstly, I briefly summarize the main themes of Kearney’s concept, represented by his seeking of middle ways between different one-sided antipoles (theism and atheism, metaphysics and negative theology, etc.). Secondly, I discuss the main antinomies following from via tertia: 1) God’s and man’s desire, 2) God’s strength based on his weakness, 3) a kenotic theology of the cross coming from the concept of the weak God, and 4) the call for hospitality as an ethical consequence of the previous point. Thirdly, I concentrate on the weaknesses and inconsistencies of a such approach, and finally, I try to show that antinomic thinking enables us to solve these problems and even bring Kearney’s concept closer to his original intentions. In conclusion, I briefly offer several possibilities of further developing these themes.","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67164752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-20DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2019.1661272
Grant Poettcker
ABSTRACT This paper examines Tomáš Halík’s Patience With God: The Story of Zacchaeus Continuing in Us in light of Kierkegaard’s insistence upon conversion. Against forms of Christianity which would understand conversion as issuing, of necessity, from a rigorous thinking-through of objective proofs or of the ends of human desire, Kierkegaard insists upon a conversion that passes through offense at the God-man’s scandalous invitation. Though Halík approvingly cites Kierkegaard’s insistence upon a faith worked out in fear and trembling, and, like Kierkegaard, sees contemporaneity with Christ as possible only because of Jesus’ own experience of God-forsakenness, deep differences remain – especially with regard to the necessity of consciousness of sin. This paper will thus consider whether Halík’s ‘patience’ dulls the passion of faith and obscures the decisiveness of the moment, and whether Halík’s portrayal of Christian responsibility as solidarity leads not to Zacchaeus or to Socrates, but to Nicodemus.
{"title":"Socrates, Nicodemus, and Zacchaeus: Kierkegaard and Halík on conversion and offense","authors":"Grant Poettcker","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2019.1661272","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2019.1661272","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper examines Tomáš Halík’s Patience With God: The Story of Zacchaeus Continuing in Us in light of Kierkegaard’s insistence upon conversion. Against forms of Christianity which would understand conversion as issuing, of necessity, from a rigorous thinking-through of objective proofs or of the ends of human desire, Kierkegaard insists upon a conversion that passes through offense at the God-man’s scandalous invitation. Though Halík approvingly cites Kierkegaard’s insistence upon a faith worked out in fear and trembling, and, like Kierkegaard, sees contemporaneity with Christ as possible only because of Jesus’ own experience of God-forsakenness, deep differences remain – especially with regard to the necessity of consciousness of sin. This paper will thus consider whether Halík’s ‘patience’ dulls the passion of faith and obscures the decisiveness of the moment, and whether Halík’s portrayal of Christian responsibility as solidarity leads not to Zacchaeus or to Socrates, but to Nicodemus.","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21692327.2019.1661272","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42636308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-20DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2018.1542611
E. Li, Katie Crabtree
ABSTRACT This paper seeks to discern the Kierkegaardian echoes present in the writings of the French philosopher Jean-François Lyotard. While these thinkers share a number of commonalities such as their resistance to categorisation and their imaginative and complex writing styles, Lyotard’s engagement with Kierkegaard has been largely dismissed as inconsequential. However, a modest yet consistent device invoked by Lyotard is Kierkegaard’s paradox of faith from Fear and Trembling. While these references to Kierkegaard read as terse blips in Lyotard’s texts, this paper argues that the Kierkegaardian echoes that can be heard in Lyotard’s writings are crucial for a deeper understanding of Lyotard’s ethical turn. Rather than being insignificant, Lyotard’s direct as well as second-hand engagement with Kierkegaard has profound effects on his philosophy of the differend. By exploring Lyotard’s enigmatic, yet brief appeals to the paradox of faith, this paper shows that Lyotard strikes a chord with Kierkegaard by using the paradox of faith as an intertextual reference to a critique of Hegelian mediation and for discussing the ethical dilemmas inherent to one of the most shocking and incomprehensible events of the twentieth century, Auschwitz.
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Pub Date : 2019-10-20DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2019.1677172
Robert C. Reed
ABSTRACT Spiritual trial is indeed ‘spiritual’ – it is possible only in someone who is not utterly spiritless as Kierkegaard means the word – but it is not true, as Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms occasionally maintain, that it makes sense only as a religious category, unless religious is redefined in radically general terms, as Kierkegaard in fact does, along with the ideas of offense, anxiety, inwardness, and desire. Every existing individual has some minimal acquaintance with spiritual trial, if only as an anxiety about a continual imminent possibility. I argue that spiritual trial, as Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms intend it – although they do not of course put it in these Levinasian terms – is inseparable from a certain phenomenology of the subject that begins with Kierkegaard and that turns spiritual trial into something essential to becoming a self, the result of one’s vulnerability to alterity, one’s anxiety to defend one’s autonomy against the experience of the other as other. Spiritual trial, in Kierkegaard’s strict sense, is therefore best understood as a special form of a very ordinary, basic experience, a kind of primordial trauma, of which Emmanuel Levinas has so far given us the most complete phenomenological description.
{"title":"Spiritual trial in Kierkegaard: religious anxiety and Levinas’s other","authors":"Robert C. Reed","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2019.1677172","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2019.1677172","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Spiritual trial is indeed ‘spiritual’ – it is possible only in someone who is not utterly spiritless as Kierkegaard means the word – but it is not true, as Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms occasionally maintain, that it makes sense only as a religious category, unless religious is redefined in radically general terms, as Kierkegaard in fact does, along with the ideas of offense, anxiety, inwardness, and desire. Every existing individual has some minimal acquaintance with spiritual trial, if only as an anxiety about a continual imminent possibility. I argue that spiritual trial, as Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms intend it – although they do not of course put it in these Levinasian terms – is inseparable from a certain phenomenology of the subject that begins with Kierkegaard and that turns spiritual trial into something essential to becoming a self, the result of one’s vulnerability to alterity, one’s anxiety to defend one’s autonomy against the experience of the other as other. Spiritual trial, in Kierkegaard’s strict sense, is therefore best understood as a special form of a very ordinary, basic experience, a kind of primordial trauma, of which Emmanuel Levinas has so far given us the most complete phenomenological description.","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21692327.2019.1677172","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42876180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-20DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2019.1654402
A. Bowen
ABSTRACT Throughout his published work, Michel Henry expresses a deep appreciation for the writings of Kierkegaard, using them as an inspirational foundation for much of his own thought. However, Henry claims to be far more Kierkegaardian than he really is. Henry’s peers have identified several philosophical and theological deficiencies in Henry’s thought. These places of weakness also happen to be his most obvious points of departure from Kierkegaard. A Kierkegaardian confrontation with Henry demands a retrieval of the Infinite Qualitative Difference (IQD) between God and man as key to exploring the structure of the self. Kierkegaard’s texts correct Henry’s assumption that the ontological difference established in the act of creation would separate the self from God. They suggest instead that the IQD provides the necessary conditions for the truly theological self to emerge.
{"title":"How to cross the rubicon without falling in: Michel Henry, Søren Kierkegaard, and new phenomenology","authors":"A. Bowen","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2019.1654402","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2019.1654402","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Throughout his published work, Michel Henry expresses a deep appreciation for the writings of Kierkegaard, using them as an inspirational foundation for much of his own thought. However, Henry claims to be far more Kierkegaardian than he really is. Henry’s peers have identified several philosophical and theological deficiencies in Henry’s thought. These places of weakness also happen to be his most obvious points of departure from Kierkegaard. A Kierkegaardian confrontation with Henry demands a retrieval of the Infinite Qualitative Difference (IQD) between God and man as key to exploring the structure of the self. Kierkegaard’s texts correct Henry’s assumption that the ontological difference established in the act of creation would separate the self from God. They suggest instead that the IQD provides the necessary conditions for the truly theological self to emerge.","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21692327.2019.1654402","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43281688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-20DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2018.1542612
Matthew D. Dinan, Michael Pallotto
ABSTRACT Although scholars increasingly recognize the debts of twentieth-century Roman Catholic theologians to Søren Kierkegaard, no one has yet traced this influence to Joseph Ratzinger (Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI). As is frequently observed, Ratzinger’s most famous book, Introduction to Christianity, opens with a meditation on a Kierkegaardian parable from Either/Or. We argue that Ratzinger’s use of Kierkegaard extends well beyond this opening image, to some central moments in his articulation of the idea of God, Christology, and theological anthropology. Upon closer inspection, we argue, Ratzinger’s use of these arguments is owing to the fact that his diagnosis of the ills of contemporary society and the orientation of contemporary Christian theology is the same as that of Kierkegaard, despite their seemingly different contexts. Identifying the Kierkegaardian influence on Introduction to Christianity helps draw our attention to the necessarily ‘introductory’ character of Christianity, which otherwise risks being lost.
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