Pub Date : 2020-09-08DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2020.1819383
T. Sweeney
ABSTRACT In this essay, I examine Anselm’s ‘Prayers and Meditations’ as rhetorical prayers. I consider the basic structure of prayer as address to the Divine. For Anselm, this address is rhetorically structured towards persuading God to reveal himself by the three Aristotelian means of persuasion: character, affect, and argument. Compassion is the phenomenological showing of God as the transcending Good as summoned by the orator. In rhetorical prayer, we take up our existential situation as moved by God to move God. Compassion is the showing-up of God in prayer as revelation of self and Other.
{"title":"Holy rhetoric: Anselm’s prayers and the phenomenology of divine compassion","authors":"T. Sweeney","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2020.1819383","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2020.1819383","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this essay, I examine Anselm’s ‘Prayers and Meditations’ as rhetorical prayers. I consider the basic structure of prayer as address to the Divine. For Anselm, this address is rhetorically structured towards persuading God to reveal himself by the three Aristotelian means of persuasion: character, affect, and argument. Compassion is the phenomenological showing of God as the transcending Good as summoned by the orator. In rhetorical prayer, we take up our existential situation as moved by God to move God. Compassion is the showing-up of God in prayer as revelation of self and Other.","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":"81 1","pages":"447 - 465"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21692327.2020.1819383","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46525480","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-04DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2020.1815559
Stephanie Rumpza
ABSTRACT The practice of icon veneration is often either dismissed either as a superstitious ‘magical’ rite or relegated to the exclusive arena of theological metaphysics. Such reductive approaches discount the importance of embodied human expression both inside religion and outside of it. This article proposes instead a way of philosophically understanding icon veneration as a meaningful human practice. After evaluating the few existing philosophical attempts to answer the question by Terrence Cuneo, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and Paul Moyaert, I first give a phenomenological analysis of substitutional practice in ordinary human experience. Then, guided by the legend of the acheiropoeiton, the first icon ‘made without hands,’ I develop a phenomenology of iconic substitution, showing how the act of prayer builds on and structurally modifies the ordinary cases of substitution I laid out above in order to form a new and meaningful practice aimed at communication which gains in significance as it is sustained over time.
{"title":"Longing in the flesh: a phenomenological account of icon veneration","authors":"Stephanie Rumpza","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2020.1815559","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2020.1815559","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The practice of icon veneration is often either dismissed either as a superstitious ‘magical’ rite or relegated to the exclusive arena of theological metaphysics. Such reductive approaches discount the importance of embodied human expression both inside religion and outside of it. This article proposes instead a way of philosophically understanding icon veneration as a meaningful human practice. After evaluating the few existing philosophical attempts to answer the question by Terrence Cuneo, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and Paul Moyaert, I first give a phenomenological analysis of substitutional practice in ordinary human experience. Then, guided by the legend of the acheiropoeiton, the first icon ‘made without hands,’ I develop a phenomenology of iconic substitution, showing how the act of prayer builds on and structurally modifies the ordinary cases of substitution I laid out above in order to form a new and meaningful practice aimed at communication which gains in significance as it is sustained over time.","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":"81 1","pages":"466 - 484"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21692327.2020.1815559","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46148368","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-23DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2020.1753096
Hortense de Villaine
In the second half of the nineteenth century, in Great Britain, a group of scientists decided to challenge the intellectual authority of theologians and clergymen. Because of the recently discovere...
19世纪下半叶，在英国，一群科学家决定挑战神学家和牧师的知识权威。由于最近的发现……
{"title":"Explaining religion by human faculties: the naturalism of Henry Maudsley","authors":"Hortense de Villaine","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2020.1753096","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2020.1753096","url":null,"abstract":"In the second half of the nineteenth century, in Great Britain, a group of scientists decided to challenge the intellectual authority of theologians and clergymen. Because of the recently discovere...","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":"81 1","pages":"369-385"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21692327.2020.1753096","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60495453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-07DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2020.1773295
J. Teehan
ABSTRACT The cognitive science of religion sets out a naturalistic account of religion, in which religious phenomena are grounded in evolved cognitive and moral intuitions. This has important implications for understanding religious systems and the practice of theology. Religions, it is argued, are moral worldviews; theology, rather than a rational justification/explication of the truth of a religion, is an elaboration and/or defense a particular moral worldview, which itself is a particular construction of evolved cognitive and moral intuitions. The philosophical, social, and moral implications of this, which are far reaching, will be explored.
{"title":"Theology in the age of cognitive science","authors":"J. Teehan","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2020.1773295","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2020.1773295","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The cognitive science of religion sets out a naturalistic account of religion, in which religious phenomena are grounded in evolved cognitive and moral intuitions. This has important implications for understanding religious systems and the practice of theology. Religions, it is argued, are moral worldviews; theology, rather than a rational justification/explication of the truth of a religion, is an elaboration and/or defense a particular moral worldview, which itself is a particular construction of evolved cognitive and moral intuitions. The philosophical, social, and moral implications of this, which are far reaching, will be explored.","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":"81 1","pages":"423 - 445"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21692327.2020.1773295","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47174181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-07DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2020.1753095
Halvor Kvandal
ABSTRACT Reformed epistemology (RE) involves a view of knowledge of God which Kelly James Clark and Justin Barrett have brought cognitive science to bear on. They argue that the cognitive science of religion (CSR) indicates that we have a ‘god-faculty’, a notion employed by Alvin Plantinga. Plantinga contends that if there is a God, then we have a specialized god-faculty. Clark and Barrett, by contrast, focus on the empirical evidence and point to a different, less specialized faculty. This difference is significant for how RE and CSR relate. The paper argues that a dilemma arises for those who bring RE and CSR together. A choice must be made between two interpretations of the god-faculty. ‘God-faculty 1ʹ is a specialized system for forming theistic beliefs. Findings in CSR indicate that there is no such system. ‘God-faculty 2ʹ is an unrefined tendency to form beliefs in superhuman agents. This thesis has empirical support in CSR. However, this faculty is unable to deliver the epistemic goods needed for the immediate, non-inferential knowledge of God RE describes. This shows that those who combine central contentions in RE with current research in CSR face a dilemma from which it is hard to escape.
{"title":"The god-faculty dilemma:challenges for reformed epistemology in the light of cognitive science","authors":"Halvor Kvandal","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2020.1753095","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2020.1753095","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Reformed epistemology (RE) involves a view of knowledge of God which Kelly James Clark and Justin Barrett have brought cognitive science to bear on. They argue that the cognitive science of religion (CSR) indicates that we have a ‘god-faculty’, a notion employed by Alvin Plantinga. Plantinga contends that if there is a God, then we have a specialized god-faculty. Clark and Barrett, by contrast, focus on the empirical evidence and point to a different, less specialized faculty. This difference is significant for how RE and CSR relate. The paper argues that a dilemma arises for those who bring RE and CSR together. A choice must be made between two interpretations of the god-faculty. ‘God-faculty 1ʹ is a specialized system for forming theistic beliefs. Findings in CSR indicate that there is no such system. ‘God-faculty 2ʹ is an unrefined tendency to form beliefs in superhuman agents. This thesis has empirical support in CSR. However, this faculty is unable to deliver the epistemic goods needed for the immediate, non-inferential knowledge of God RE describes. This shows that those who combine central contentions in RE with current research in CSR face a dilemma from which it is hard to escape.","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":"81 1","pages":"404 - 422"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21692327.2020.1753095","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47541604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-07DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2020.1757491
E. Kroeker, W. Lemmens
ABSTRACT Why is religion such a widespread human experience? In enlightenment Scotland, philosophers had already attempted to answer this question turning to natural histories of mankind, and to a careful analysis of the human mind and of those cognitive capacities responsible for religious-type beliefs and attitudes. This early approach is also echoed today, as scholars from the cognitive sciences seek to show how religious-type beliefs and practices are produced either directly or as a by-product of natural cognitive processes. Others continue to study the dependence of religious beliefs on cultural traditions, symbolic meanings and ritualistic practices. The authors of this special issue continue this discussion, focusing on specific topics and challenges posed by current studies on religion as a natural phenomenon.
{"title":"Is religion natural?","authors":"E. Kroeker, W. Lemmens","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2020.1757491","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2020.1757491","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Why is religion such a widespread human experience? In enlightenment Scotland, philosophers had already attempted to answer this question turning to natural histories of mankind, and to a careful analysis of the human mind and of those cognitive capacities responsible for religious-type beliefs and attitudes. This early approach is also echoed today, as scholars from the cognitive sciences seek to show how religious-type beliefs and practices are produced either directly or as a by-product of natural cognitive processes. Others continue to study the dependence of religious beliefs on cultural traditions, symbolic meanings and ritualistic practices. The authors of this special issue continue this discussion, focusing on specific topics and challenges posed by current studies on religion as a natural phenomenon.","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":"81 1","pages":"343 - 350"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21692327.2020.1757491","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42364989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-07DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2020.1749717
Thomas J. Spiegel
ABSTRACT In this article I argue that the kind of scientific naturalism that tends to underwrite projects of naturalizing religion operates with a tacit conception of nature which, upon closer inspection, turns out to be untenable. I first distinguish an uninteresting modest naturalism from the more ambitious and relevant scientific naturalism. Secondly I survey three different kinds of attempting to naturalize religion: naturalizing the social aspect of religion, naturalizing religious experience, and naturalizing reference to the transcendent. Thirdly I argue that these projects operate with a conception of nature which is insufficiently clear. I suggest three ways of charitably explicating that tacit conception of what is natural before arguing that neither of these three positions works. Lastly I offer an irenic proposal: we would do good in giving up the scientific naturalism that underlies projects of naturalizing religion in order to embrace Lynne Rudder Baker’s recently proposed notion of near-naturalism which allows the naturalist to retain a ‘science first’ attitude while avoiding problematic, overly restrictive notions of what is natural.
{"title":"Is religion natural? Religion, naturalism and near-naturalism","authors":"Thomas J. Spiegel","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2020.1749717","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2020.1749717","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this article I argue that the kind of scientific naturalism that tends to underwrite projects of naturalizing religion operates with a tacit conception of nature which, upon closer inspection, turns out to be untenable. I first distinguish an uninteresting modest naturalism from the more ambitious and relevant scientific naturalism. Secondly I survey three different kinds of attempting to naturalize religion: naturalizing the social aspect of religion, naturalizing religious experience, and naturalizing reference to the transcendent. Thirdly I argue that these projects operate with a conception of nature which is insufficiently clear. I suggest three ways of charitably explicating that tacit conception of what is natural before arguing that neither of these three positions works. Lastly I offer an irenic proposal: we would do good in giving up the scientific naturalism that underlies projects of naturalizing religion in order to embrace Lynne Rudder Baker’s recently proposed notion of near-naturalism which allows the naturalist to retain a ‘science first’ attitude while avoiding problematic, overly restrictive notions of what is natural.","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":"81 1","pages":"351 - 368"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21692327.2020.1749717","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48865369","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-07DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2020.1791232
Heather Morris
ABSTRACT Naturalistic explanations for religious beliefs, in the form of the cognitive science of religion (CSR), have become increasingly popular in the contemporary sphere of philosophy and theology. Some claim to provide proof that theism, or religion more generally, is falsified, whilst others suggest that their theories are compatible with holding religious beliefs. In the following, I focus on the CSR of Justin L. Barrett, in order to argue that this particular naturalistic explanation can be seen to be compatible with both theism and atheism. Although Barrett is a proponent of his CSR’s compatibility with theism, and his work appears to imply that he is an incompatibilist when it comes to atheism and CSR, it is not immediately clear whether: (i) his CSR is definitely compatible with theism; and, (ii) why it should be seen as incompatible with atheism. I investigate these questions, utilising and extending research and tools from David Leech and Aku Visala, to argue for the conclusion that Barrett’s CSR is compatible with both theism and atheism, despite what his work implies. I consider the impact this has on the broader sphere of CSR, naturalistic explanations, and different religious worldviews.
{"title":"Barrett’s cognitive science of religion vs. theism & atheism: a compatibilist approach","authors":"Heather Morris","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2020.1791232","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2020.1791232","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Naturalistic explanations for religious beliefs, in the form of the cognitive science of religion (CSR), have become increasingly popular in the contemporary sphere of philosophy and theology. Some claim to provide proof that theism, or religion more generally, is falsified, whilst others suggest that their theories are compatible with holding religious beliefs. In the following, I focus on the CSR of Justin L. Barrett, in order to argue that this particular naturalistic explanation can be seen to be compatible with both theism and atheism. Although Barrett is a proponent of his CSR’s compatibility with theism, and his work appears to imply that he is an incompatibilist when it comes to atheism and CSR, it is not immediately clear whether: (i) his CSR is definitely compatible with theism; and, (ii) why it should be seen as incompatible with atheism. I investigate these questions, utilising and extending research and tools from David Leech and Aku Visala, to argue for the conclusion that Barrett’s CSR is compatible with both theism and atheism, despite what his work implies. I consider the impact this has on the broader sphere of CSR, naturalistic explanations, and different religious worldviews.","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":"81 1","pages":"386 - 403"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21692327.2020.1791232","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47637073","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-26DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2019.1705175
M. Marren
ABSTRACT Taking Jean-Yves Lacoste’s account of liturgy as a point of departure, this essay examines Lacoste’s view of care. Lacoste thinks that care is bracketed or suspended in liturgy. To make this point, Lacoste discusses Martin Heidegger’s notions of world and care. However, Lacoste fails to make adequate distinctions between Heidegger’s notions of care (Sorge) and concern (Besorgen). The crux of this essay is my explanation of the significance that the difference between care and concern makes for our understanding of the meaning of liturgical practices and their pertinence to our worldly lives. I point out the kinds of philosophical ideas that Lacoste inherits from Heidegger and then I explain where Lacoste and Heidegger part ways and why Lacoste lacks sufficient conceptual grounds for his rejection of care as an element of liturgy.
{"title":"Boundless care: Lacoste’s liturgical being refigured through Heidegger’s Sorge","authors":"M. Marren","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2019.1705175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2019.1705175","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Taking Jean-Yves Lacoste’s account of liturgy as a point of departure, this essay examines Lacoste’s view of care. Lacoste thinks that care is bracketed or suspended in liturgy. To make this point, Lacoste discusses Martin Heidegger’s notions of world and care. However, Lacoste fails to make adequate distinctions between Heidegger’s notions of care (Sorge) and concern (Besorgen). The crux of this essay is my explanation of the significance that the difference between care and concern makes for our understanding of the meaning of liturgical practices and their pertinence to our worldly lives. I point out the kinds of philosophical ideas that Lacoste inherits from Heidegger and then I explain where Lacoste and Heidegger part ways and why Lacoste lacks sufficient conceptual grounds for his rejection of care as an element of liturgy.","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":"81 1","pages":"328 - 342"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21692327.2019.1705175","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45178841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-26DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2020.1786301
Jussi Backman
ABSTRACT The paper studies two fundamentally different forms in which the concept of care makes its comeback in twentieth-century thought. We make use of a distinction made by Peter Sloterdijk, who argues that the ancient and medieval ‘ascetic’ ideal of self-enhancement through practice has re-emerged in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, particularly in the form of a rehabilitation of the Hellenistic notion of self-care (epimeleia heautou) in Michel Foucault’s late ethics. Sloterdijk contrasts this return of self-care with Martin Heidegger’s concept of being-in-the-world as ‘total care’ (Sorge), an utterly ‘secularized’ understanding of the human being as irreducibly world-embedded that rejects the classical ascetic ideal of world-secession. We examine further the historical roots and emergence of these contrasting contemporary reappropriations of care in the Western tradition of thought and show them to be rooted in two different ontologies and ethics of the self as either world-secluded or world-immersed, autonomous or constitutively relational. The historical point of divergence of these two approaches to care, we argue, can be found in the Christian transformation of Hellenistic ethics.
{"title":"Self-care and total care: the twofold return of care in twentieth-century thought","authors":"Jussi Backman","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2020.1786301","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2020.1786301","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The paper studies two fundamentally different forms in which the concept of care makes its comeback in twentieth-century thought. We make use of a distinction made by Peter Sloterdijk, who argues that the ancient and medieval ‘ascetic’ ideal of self-enhancement through practice has re-emerged in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, particularly in the form of a rehabilitation of the Hellenistic notion of self-care (epimeleia heautou) in Michel Foucault’s late ethics. Sloterdijk contrasts this return of self-care with Martin Heidegger’s concept of being-in-the-world as ‘total care’ (Sorge), an utterly ‘secularized’ understanding of the human being as irreducibly world-embedded that rejects the classical ascetic ideal of world-secession. We examine further the historical roots and emergence of these contrasting contemporary reappropriations of care in the Western tradition of thought and show them to be rooted in two different ontologies and ethics of the self as either world-secluded or world-immersed, autonomous or constitutively relational. The historical point of divergence of these two approaches to care, we argue, can be found in the Christian transformation of Hellenistic ethics.","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":"81 1","pages":"275 - 291"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21692327.2020.1786301","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41408711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：