Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/09546545.2022.2127217
Amber Nickell
{"title":"‘Our Work with the Masses is not Worth a Kopeck … ’: A Document Collection on German and Polish Rural Soviets in Ukraine during the NEP, 1923–1929","authors":"Amber Nickell","doi":"10.1080/09546545.2022.2127217","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09546545.2022.2127217","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42121,"journal":{"name":"Revolutionary Russia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49432124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/09546545.2022.2127214
LeiAnna X. Hamel
Whites and Reds. Before and after 1917, the West provided the ideal paradigm for consumption. In the late tsarist period, this led to the establishment of a wine industry that sought to transform popular taste and put Russia on the map as an upstart wine powerhouse. It also fuelled peculiar events, such as Kovalevskii’s fight against grafting with American rootstock in order to keep Russia’s wines more European than their European counterparts (though this was and remains the only worthwhile treatment for phylloxera). Later, Soviet officials took up the charge of providing Western-style luxury to socialist consumers, promising ample meat and dairy, chocolate, sparkling wine, and exotic luxuries. Just as the tsarist and Soviet wine industries tended, in Bittner’s terms, to be ‘imitative’, so did the aspirations of related spheres from food packing to fine dining. Yet the key here is to keep in mind the ways in which Soviet officialdom, in particular, sought to put its own mark on this ideal world of consumption. While imitating the West in terms of variety, quantity, and quality, Soviet standards would rise above them morally: Soviet citizens would be able to enjoy their sausages and champagne unfettered by the degradation and inequality embedded in the capitalist system. We might hear eerie echoes of this in our current moment, as Russian officials inveigh against Western immorality while Russian business hastily patches holes in the consumer landscape created by the flight of companies such as McDonald’s. Smith and Bittner thus do more than invite readers into the past worlds of Russian and Soviet comestibles; they work to sharpen our view of the current strange and troubling moment.
{"title":"Colleen Lucey. Love for Sale: Representing Prostitution in Imperial Russia","authors":"LeiAnna X. Hamel","doi":"10.1080/09546545.2022.2127214","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09546545.2022.2127214","url":null,"abstract":"Whites and Reds. Before and after 1917, the West provided the ideal paradigm for consumption. In the late tsarist period, this led to the establishment of a wine industry that sought to transform popular taste and put Russia on the map as an upstart wine powerhouse. It also fuelled peculiar events, such as Kovalevskii’s fight against grafting with American rootstock in order to keep Russia’s wines more European than their European counterparts (though this was and remains the only worthwhile treatment for phylloxera). Later, Soviet officials took up the charge of providing Western-style luxury to socialist consumers, promising ample meat and dairy, chocolate, sparkling wine, and exotic luxuries. Just as the tsarist and Soviet wine industries tended, in Bittner’s terms, to be ‘imitative’, so did the aspirations of related spheres from food packing to fine dining. Yet the key here is to keep in mind the ways in which Soviet officialdom, in particular, sought to put its own mark on this ideal world of consumption. While imitating the West in terms of variety, quantity, and quality, Soviet standards would rise above them morally: Soviet citizens would be able to enjoy their sausages and champagne unfettered by the degradation and inequality embedded in the capitalist system. We might hear eerie echoes of this in our current moment, as Russian officials inveigh against Western immorality while Russian business hastily patches holes in the consumer landscape created by the flight of companies such as McDonald’s. Smith and Bittner thus do more than invite readers into the past worlds of Russian and Soviet comestibles; they work to sharpen our view of the current strange and troubling moment.","PeriodicalId":42121,"journal":{"name":"Revolutionary Russia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43514242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/09546545.2022.2140787
Frank Grelka, Stephan Rindlisbacher
After the Civil War, the Bolshevik government planned to mobilize the Soviet population on a voluntary basis and installed opportunities for local self-administration. Rural soviets were the most promising initiative. National minorities received particular attention. Western Soviet Ukraine with its Polish communities provides case studies for the practical impact of these ‘affirmative action’ policies. This article explores three configurations of Polish minority institutions: (a) neighbouring rural soviets close to an urban centre, (b) neighbouring rural soviets far from any urban centre and (c) isolated rural soviets far from any larger urban centre. Whereas small and poor Polish rural soviets could not function properly, bigger and financially better-equipped ones could improve their communal life by well-equipped community centres and minority schools. Yet despite the affirmative action propaganda, the state and party institutions drained the local self-administration of their financial surplus. With a few exceptions, they did not plan to invest sparse state funds into the development of a particular Soviet Polish culture. This lack of financial commitment combined with the Polish communities’ resilience against atheist initiatives from above led the communist organizations within the rural soviets such as KNW, Komsomol, and the Pioneers to complete failure. The subsequent disappointment within the party paved the way for ideas of forced collectivization.
{"title":"Modernization on Empty Coffers: Polish Minority Institutions in Early Soviet Ukraine","authors":"Frank Grelka, Stephan Rindlisbacher","doi":"10.1080/09546545.2022.2140787","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09546545.2022.2140787","url":null,"abstract":"After the Civil War, the Bolshevik government planned to mobilize the Soviet population on a voluntary basis and installed opportunities for local self-administration. Rural soviets were the most promising initiative. National minorities received particular attention. Western Soviet Ukraine with its Polish communities provides case studies for the practical impact of these ‘affirmative action’ policies. This article explores three configurations of Polish minority institutions: (a) neighbouring rural soviets close to an urban centre, (b) neighbouring rural soviets far from any urban centre and (c) isolated rural soviets far from any larger urban centre. Whereas small and poor Polish rural soviets could not function properly, bigger and financially better-equipped ones could improve their communal life by well-equipped community centres and minority schools. Yet despite the affirmative action propaganda, the state and party institutions drained the local self-administration of their financial surplus. With a few exceptions, they did not plan to invest sparse state funds into the development of a particular Soviet Polish culture. This lack of financial commitment combined with the Polish communities’ resilience against atheist initiatives from above led the communist organizations within the rural soviets such as KNW, Komsomol, and the Pioneers to complete failure. The subsequent disappointment within the party paved the way for ideas of forced collectivization.","PeriodicalId":42121,"journal":{"name":"Revolutionary Russia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41507402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/09546545.2022.2155442
Olena Palko, P. Whitewood
In 1918, newly-established Poland and Bolshevik Russia became Eastern Europe’s main rivals. The Bolsheviks regarded Poland as the biggest threat to their plans of spreading revolution to the West, whereas Poland strove to restore the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth within its pre-1772 borders, which would include large parts of Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania. Existential ideological tensions coupled with overlapping territorial claims for the borderlands made a military confrontation between Warsaw and Moscow inevitable. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that Polish-Soviet relations of the interwar period were determined by war. Following the armistice of 11 November 1918, Vladimir Lenin annulled the highly unfavourable Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and began seeking opportunities to recover former imperial territories. In the meantime, the Polish Army seized most of Lithuania, including its capital Vilnius/Wilno, and Belarus, and took control over most of western Ukraine, continuing its victorious eastward offensive all the way up to Kyiv. The Red Army’s counterattack pushed the Polish forces back to Warsaw, only to withdraw and eventually sue for peace in 1921. Although direct military conflict ended on 18 March 1921 with the signing of the Treaty of Riga between Poland, Soviet Russia, and Soviet Ukraine, it did not provide a lasting peace. The resultant border split apart the territories populated predominantly by Ukrainians and Belarusians, providing the ideological justification for the Soviet invasion of Poland in September 1939 at the beginning of the Second World War, and the subsequent incorporation of these territories into Soviet Ukraine and Belarus. War also provides a framework for studying Polish-Soviet relations. The 1919–21 war, in particular, remains a key focus for academic studies, ranging from military and diplomatic accounts to social and cultural histories of the border zones. Polish-Ukrainian relations of the period present a separate scholarly sub-field, with the key themes spanning the Polish-Ukrainian War of 1918–19, the Polish-Ukrainian rapprochement of 1920, the Polish-Ukrainian anti-Bolshevik military alliance, and the fate of the
{"title":"Revisiting the Polish Vector in Soviet History and Politics","authors":"Olena Palko, P. Whitewood","doi":"10.1080/09546545.2022.2155442","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09546545.2022.2155442","url":null,"abstract":"In 1918, newly-established Poland and Bolshevik Russia became Eastern Europe’s main rivals. The Bolsheviks regarded Poland as the biggest threat to their plans of spreading revolution to the West, whereas Poland strove to restore the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth within its pre-1772 borders, which would include large parts of Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania. Existential ideological tensions coupled with overlapping territorial claims for the borderlands made a military confrontation between Warsaw and Moscow inevitable. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that Polish-Soviet relations of the interwar period were determined by war. Following the armistice of 11 November 1918, Vladimir Lenin annulled the highly unfavourable Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and began seeking opportunities to recover former imperial territories. In the meantime, the Polish Army seized most of Lithuania, including its capital Vilnius/Wilno, and Belarus, and took control over most of western Ukraine, continuing its victorious eastward offensive all the way up to Kyiv. The Red Army’s counterattack pushed the Polish forces back to Warsaw, only to withdraw and eventually sue for peace in 1921. Although direct military conflict ended on 18 March 1921 with the signing of the Treaty of Riga between Poland, Soviet Russia, and Soviet Ukraine, it did not provide a lasting peace. The resultant border split apart the territories populated predominantly by Ukrainians and Belarusians, providing the ideological justification for the Soviet invasion of Poland in September 1939 at the beginning of the Second World War, and the subsequent incorporation of these territories into Soviet Ukraine and Belarus. War also provides a framework for studying Polish-Soviet relations. The 1919–21 war, in particular, remains a key focus for academic studies, ranging from military and diplomatic accounts to social and cultural histories of the border zones. Polish-Ukrainian relations of the period present a separate scholarly sub-field, with the key themes spanning the Polish-Ukrainian War of 1918–19, the Polish-Ukrainian rapprochement of 1920, the Polish-Ukrainian anti-Bolshevik military alliance, and the fate of the","PeriodicalId":42121,"journal":{"name":"Revolutionary Russia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43905217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/09546545.2022.2127223
Olena Palko
{"title":"The Path to the Soviet Nation: The Policy of Belarusization","authors":"Olena Palko","doi":"10.1080/09546545.2022.2127223","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09546545.2022.2127223","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42121,"journal":{"name":"Revolutionary Russia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41353675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/09546545.2022.2127215
Colleen Lucey
{"title":"Policing Prostitution: Regulating the Lower Classes in Late Imperial Russia","authors":"Colleen Lucey","doi":"10.1080/09546545.2022.2127215","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09546545.2022.2127215","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42121,"journal":{"name":"Revolutionary Russia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44106402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/09546545.2022.2136353
Olena Palko
This article offers a micro-history of Soviet anti-religious actions during the mid-1920s through a reconstruction of the investigation of Father Andrzej Fedukowicz and his forced collaboration with the Soviet secret services. In November 1924, Fedukowicz was forced to sign a letter to Pope Pius XI and a year later committed suicide to avoid the humiliation caused by his actions. This article reveals how elaborate the Soviet secret services’ techniques for dealing with uncontrolled religious allegiances had become during the seemingly religiously tolerant NEP era which replaced the overly repressive measures of the Civil War period. It aims to challenge the conventional impression of powerful and effective Soviet secret services. Detailed analysis of the process of fabrication used by the secret services shows how often the rudimentary methods of the secret police could easily threaten the success of the entire operation. In this regard, the limited results the secret services had achieved by relying on individual assets led to toughening of mass repression and a more aggressive anti-religious campaign after 1929.
{"title":"Between Moscow, Warsaw and the Holy See: The Case of Father Andrzej Fedukowicz Amidst the Early Soviet Anti-Catholic Campaign","authors":"Olena Palko","doi":"10.1080/09546545.2022.2136353","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09546545.2022.2136353","url":null,"abstract":"This article offers a micro-history of Soviet anti-religious actions during the mid-1920s through a reconstruction of the investigation of Father Andrzej Fedukowicz and his forced collaboration with the Soviet secret services. In November 1924, Fedukowicz was forced to sign a letter to Pope Pius XI and a year later committed suicide to avoid the humiliation caused by his actions. This article reveals how elaborate the Soviet secret services’ techniques for dealing with uncontrolled religious allegiances had become during the seemingly religiously tolerant NEP era which replaced the overly repressive measures of the Civil War period. It aims to challenge the conventional impression of powerful and effective Soviet secret services. Detailed analysis of the process of fabrication used by the secret services shows how often the rudimentary methods of the secret police could easily threaten the success of the entire operation. In this regard, the limited results the secret services had achieved by relying on individual assets led to toughening of mass repression and a more aggressive anti-religious campaign after 1929.","PeriodicalId":42121,"journal":{"name":"Revolutionary Russia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46649861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-27DOI: 10.1080/09546545.2022.2068796
Gabriella Safran
Published in Revolutionary Russia (Vol. 35, No. 1, 2022)
《革命的俄国》(一九二二年第35卷第1期)
{"title":"How Russia Learned to Talk: A History of Public Speaking in the Stenographic Age, 1860–1930","authors":"Gabriella Safran","doi":"10.1080/09546545.2022.2068796","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09546545.2022.2068796","url":null,"abstract":"Published in Revolutionary Russia (Vol. 35, No. 1, 2022)","PeriodicalId":42121,"journal":{"name":"Revolutionary Russia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138507140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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