Pub Date : 2023-07-12DOI: 10.1177/02601079231172366
G. Lynne, Natalia V. Czap
The purpose of this article is to expand the economic discourse beyond single interest as the dominant analytical foundation of microeconomics towards dual interest and metaeconomics. Metaeconomics is based on the reality of joint and non-separable self and other-interest arising because of non-allocable goods and non-allocable inputs. Non-allocable goods are explained by the internal tendencies in the mind to a more primal ego-based self-interest tempered by an empathy-based other (shared with the other, while internalised within the own-self-interest). Non-allocable inputs giving joint products and dual interest in the outcomes are explained by thermodynamics: production is internal to and non-separable from the natural system on the Spaceship Earth. Dual Interest Theory (DIT) assumes that self-interest is accompanied by empathy-based other-interest and that individuals tend to balance both interests in their decisions and behaviour. Several empirical tests of DIT demonstrated its advantages in explaining the observed behavioural outcomes as compared to the consideration of self-interest alone. DIT is also more powerful in explaining many other social phenomena than if one relies on the single/self-interest assumption of microeconomics alone. JEL Codes: A20, D11, D21, D62, D64, H41
{"title":"Towards Dual Interest Theory in Metaeconomics","authors":"G. Lynne, Natalia V. Czap","doi":"10.1177/02601079231172366","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/02601079231172366","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this article is to expand the economic discourse beyond single interest as the dominant analytical foundation of microeconomics towards dual interest and metaeconomics. Metaeconomics is based on the reality of joint and non-separable self and other-interest arising because of non-allocable goods and non-allocable inputs. Non-allocable goods are explained by the internal tendencies in the mind to a more primal ego-based self-interest tempered by an empathy-based other (shared with the other, while internalised within the own-self-interest). Non-allocable inputs giving joint products and dual interest in the outcomes are explained by thermodynamics: production is internal to and non-separable from the natural system on the Spaceship Earth. Dual Interest Theory (DIT) assumes that self-interest is accompanied by empathy-based other-interest and that individuals tend to balance both interests in their decisions and behaviour. Several empirical tests of DIT demonstrated its advantages in explaining the observed behavioural outcomes as compared to the consideration of self-interest alone. DIT is also more powerful in explaining many other social phenomena than if one relies on the single/self-interest assumption of microeconomics alone. JEL Codes: A20, D11, D21, D62, D64, H41","PeriodicalId":42664,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45439003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-01DOI: 10.1177/02601079221142703
S. Chahine, Adam Chahine
In this paper, we investigate the macroeconomic response to exogenous shocks, namely the COVID-19. We conjecture that the sensitivity of an economic system to an exogenous shock is endogenous on its characteristics and ability to counter a shock. We use the COVID-19 crisis as an exogenous shock, and we argue that a higher income inequality is likely to lead to a greater negative impact of an exogenous shock on economic growth. We validate our expectations using different inequality indexes. In further robustness tests, we confirm our conclusions using different proxies for economic conditions. JEL Codes: A10, I14, I15
{"title":"COVID-19 Crisis and the Association Between Inequality and Economic Growth","authors":"S. Chahine, Adam Chahine","doi":"10.1177/02601079221142703","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/02601079221142703","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we investigate the macroeconomic response to exogenous shocks, namely the COVID-19. We conjecture that the sensitivity of an economic system to an exogenous shock is endogenous on its characteristics and ability to counter a shock. We use the COVID-19 crisis as an exogenous shock, and we argue that a higher income inequality is likely to lead to a greater negative impact of an exogenous shock on economic growth. We validate our expectations using different inequality indexes. In further robustness tests, we confirm our conclusions using different proxies for economic conditions. JEL Codes: A10, I14, I15","PeriodicalId":42664,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41913623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-28DOI: 10.1177/02601079231152118
Alejandro Agafonow, Marybel Perez
On account of the leverage that the Academy of Management (AOM) has, via its positioning in the highest tiers of the A-journal lists currently used to adjudicate promotions and tenure evaluations, it is urgent to assess the premises and assumptions upon which the so-called pluralist model of scholarly impact, advocated by academics with executive responsibilities in the AOM, is built. Our findings are that the pluralist model is liable to three crucial problems: ecological bias, specific knowledge and pre-emptive costs. Consistent with extant performance evaluation scholarship, promotions and tenure evaluations must build instead on: (a) a qualitative evaluation of scholarly contributions unencumbered by ordinality assumptions; (b) the narrowing of the span of control of academics, moving supervisory authority away from the line structure and back into the hands of true peers; and (c) muting the incentives that prevent academics from focusing on riskier and long-term horizon outputs, which are pillars in agreement with known accounts of how exploratory behaviour has been successfully managed at IBM, Google, the SAS Institute and Nokia, to name but a few cases. JEL Codes: 123, O31
{"title":"When an A Is NOT an A in Academic Research, or How A-Journal List Metrics Inhibit Exploratory Behaviour in Academia","authors":"Alejandro Agafonow, Marybel Perez","doi":"10.1177/02601079231152118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/02601079231152118","url":null,"abstract":"On account of the leverage that the Academy of Management (AOM) has, via its positioning in the highest tiers of the A-journal lists currently used to adjudicate promotions and tenure evaluations, it is urgent to assess the premises and assumptions upon which the so-called pluralist model of scholarly impact, advocated by academics with executive responsibilities in the AOM, is built. Our findings are that the pluralist model is liable to three crucial problems: ecological bias, specific knowledge and pre-emptive costs. Consistent with extant performance evaluation scholarship, promotions and tenure evaluations must build instead on: (a) a qualitative evaluation of scholarly contributions unencumbered by ordinality assumptions; (b) the narrowing of the span of control of academics, moving supervisory authority away from the line structure and back into the hands of true peers; and (c) muting the incentives that prevent academics from focusing on riskier and long-term horizon outputs, which are pillars in agreement with known accounts of how exploratory behaviour has been successfully managed at IBM, Google, the SAS Institute and Nokia, to name but a few cases. JEL Codes: 123, O31","PeriodicalId":42664,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45556474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-29DOI: 10.1177/02601079221133991
Jiří Dvořák, Libor Votava, L. Komárková, Mojmír Sabolovic, Jan Závodný Pospíšil
To contribute to the discussion on the importance of the sense of fairness in the decision-making process according to the theory of rational inattention. The study is based on an experiment where economically educated respondents state and justify the price at which they are willing to provide and accept help in an emergency. Most of the respondents are willing to provide and accept help. For the assistance provided, most would demand a significantly lower price than the maximum economic return defined by the known value of the commercial service. The respondents were repeatedly willing to pass on the pricing decision to the counterparty. This behaviour in decision-making processes represents non-inclusion of a sufficient a priori knowledge as a determining factor in the selection of variants, which is a limitation in the cognitively limited modelling of economic subjects. The results are based on the original experiment as an empirical basis and it is valuable because of the lack of experimental research in this domain. Limitations include the relatively small sample of respondents and, in terms of generalising the results, that they were students at a university of economics. JEL: D01, D11, D12, D14
{"title":"Rationally Inattentive Behaviour with A Priori Knowledge","authors":"Jiří Dvořák, Libor Votava, L. Komárková, Mojmír Sabolovic, Jan Závodný Pospíšil","doi":"10.1177/02601079221133991","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/02601079221133991","url":null,"abstract":"To contribute to the discussion on the importance of the sense of fairness in the decision-making process according to the theory of rational inattention. The study is based on an experiment where economically educated respondents state and justify the price at which they are willing to provide and accept help in an emergency. Most of the respondents are willing to provide and accept help. For the assistance provided, most would demand a significantly lower price than the maximum economic return defined by the known value of the commercial service. The respondents were repeatedly willing to pass on the pricing decision to the counterparty. This behaviour in decision-making processes represents non-inclusion of a sufficient a priori knowledge as a determining factor in the selection of variants, which is a limitation in the cognitively limited modelling of economic subjects. The results are based on the original experiment as an empirical basis and it is valuable because of the lack of experimental research in this domain. Limitations include the relatively small sample of respondents and, in terms of generalising the results, that they were students at a university of economics. JEL: D01, D11, D12, D14","PeriodicalId":42664,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45706840","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-24DOI: 10.1177/02601079221132145
David Adeabah, Simplice Asongu
Over the past decade, a growing number of studies have examined the role of agricultural export in economic growth in Africa. The literature, however, provides conflicting results about the agricul...
在过去十年中，越来越多的研究审查了农业出口在非洲经济增长中的作用。然而，文献提供了关于农业…
{"title":"Agricultural Export, Growth and the Poor in Africa: A Meta Analysis","authors":"David Adeabah, Simplice Asongu","doi":"10.1177/02601079221132145","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/02601079221132145","url":null,"abstract":"Over the past decade, a growing number of studies have examined the role of agricultural export in economic growth in Africa. The literature, however, provides conflicting results about the agricul...","PeriodicalId":42664,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics","volume":"299 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138520444","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-16DOI: 10.1177/02601079221130183
Claas Digmayer
Robo-advisors (RAs) support economic decisions for customers using artificial intelligence (AI). RAs are gaining increasing significance but lack market penetration. A significant issue is the perceived low transparency of such AI systems. This study examines the public’s demands on RAs with text-mining methods from the perspective of explainable artificial intelligence (XAI). The results reveal understandability and trustworthiness issues for each of the RA use phases (configuration, matching, and maintenance). In particular, five barriers emerge in RA if information needs remain unanswered: entry barrier, assessment barrier, evaluation barrier, continuation barrier and withdrawal barrier. The barriers can be mitigated by combining explanation, design and communication measures. The results are discussed regarding theoretical implications and practical recommendations for facilitating the adoption of RAs. JEL: D8 (D81, D83, D89), G1 (G11), G2 (G20, G23), G4 (G41), I2 (I24, I25), O3 (O31, O33)
{"title":"Automated Economic Welfare for Everyone? Examining Barriers to Adopting Robo-Advisors from the Perspective of Explainable Artificial Intelligence","authors":"Claas Digmayer","doi":"10.1177/02601079221130183","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/02601079221130183","url":null,"abstract":"Robo-advisors (RAs) support economic decisions for customers using artificial intelligence (AI). RAs are gaining increasing significance but lack market penetration. A significant issue is the perceived low transparency of such AI systems. This study examines the public’s demands on RAs with text-mining methods from the perspective of explainable artificial intelligence (XAI). The results reveal understandability and trustworthiness issues for each of the RA use phases (configuration, matching, and maintenance). In particular, five barriers emerge in RA if information needs remain unanswered: entry barrier, assessment barrier, evaluation barrier, continuation barrier and withdrawal barrier. The barriers can be mitigated by combining explanation, design and communication measures. The results are discussed regarding theoretical implications and practical recommendations for facilitating the adoption of RAs. JEL: D8 (D81, D83, D89), G1 (G11), G2 (G20, G23), G4 (G41), I2 (I24, I25), O3 (O31, O33)","PeriodicalId":42664,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46688938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-22DOI: 10.1177/02601079221121903
P. Blunt, Cecilia Escobar, Vlassis Missos
Data gathered in Samoa before and after the declaration of the COVID-19 pandemic on 11 March 2020 compare and contrast the nature and extent of ‘structural violence’ perpetrated by ‘egoistic’ bilateral development assistance. Despite much higher risks and costs to aid recipients than under normal circumstances, during the pandemic, donor control in ‘increasingly detailed and encompassing ways’ and donor use of ‘technical discourse’ to conceal ‘hidden purposes of bureaucratic power or dominance’ both increased significantly. Pandemic-induced opportunistic abandonments by donor governments of neoliberal policy principles did not ameliorate such structural violence. Individual differences among donor officials affected how control was exercised and whether host-government ‘ownership’ and ‘leadership’ of development assistance was flouted peremptorily, or denied more subtly and politely (with ‘warm regards’); and they influenced the volume and complexity of ‘interpretive labour’ required of resistance. But donor domination and control were undiminished by any of this. ‘Bullshit’ jobs and the blind allegiance of their (donor) incumbents were crucial to the realisation of such ends. The findings reconfirm the embeddedness of the neoliberal order and shed light on the character of its deep-seated bureaucratic resistance to change. JEL: F35, F54, F55, O19, O20, O22, P48
{"title":"Emergency Responses Under COVID-19: Development Assistance, ‘Structural Violence’, and ‘Interpretive Labour’ in Samoa","authors":"P. Blunt, Cecilia Escobar, Vlassis Missos","doi":"10.1177/02601079221121903","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/02601079221121903","url":null,"abstract":"Data gathered in Samoa before and after the declaration of the COVID-19 pandemic on 11 March 2020 compare and contrast the nature and extent of ‘structural violence’ perpetrated by ‘egoistic’ bilateral development assistance. Despite much higher risks and costs to aid recipients than under normal circumstances, during the pandemic, donor control in ‘increasingly detailed and encompassing ways’ and donor use of ‘technical discourse’ to conceal ‘hidden purposes of bureaucratic power or dominance’ both increased significantly. Pandemic-induced opportunistic abandonments by donor governments of neoliberal policy principles did not ameliorate such structural violence. Individual differences among donor officials affected how control was exercised and whether host-government ‘ownership’ and ‘leadership’ of development assistance was flouted peremptorily, or denied more subtly and politely (with ‘warm regards’); and they influenced the volume and complexity of ‘interpretive labour’ required of resistance. But donor domination and control were undiminished by any of this. ‘Bullshit’ jobs and the blind allegiance of their (donor) incumbents were crucial to the realisation of such ends. The findings reconfirm the embeddedness of the neoliberal order and shed light on the character of its deep-seated bureaucratic resistance to change. JEL: F35, F54, F55, O19, O20, O22, P48","PeriodicalId":42664,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43052036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-08DOI: 10.1177/02601079221121894
A. Akinlo, Charles O. Okunlola
This article examines economic freedom’s impact on quality of life conditional on the political risk factors in Africa over the period 1985–2016, using the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation technique. The results show that economic freedom has a significant positive effect on the quality of life. However, political risk fundamentals, namely civil liberties, political rights and conflict, cause economic freedom to deteriorate the quality of life in African. These results support North’s (1990) argument that political institutions play a cardinal role in Africa’s economic outcomes and well-being. Therefore, governments in Africa must improve on the political factors to enhance economic freedom’s impact on quality of life. Moreover, policies that lead to an increase in aid and economic growth will improve the quality of life in Africa. JEL: C23, I31, P25
{"title":"The Effect of Economic Freedom on Quality of Life: Exploring the Role of Political Risk Factors in Africa","authors":"A. Akinlo, Charles O. Okunlola","doi":"10.1177/02601079221121894","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/02601079221121894","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines economic freedom’s impact on quality of life conditional on the political risk factors in Africa over the period 1985–2016, using the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation technique. The results show that economic freedom has a significant positive effect on the quality of life. However, political risk fundamentals, namely civil liberties, political rights and conflict, cause economic freedom to deteriorate the quality of life in African. These results support North’s (1990) argument that political institutions play a cardinal role in Africa’s economic outcomes and well-being. Therefore, governments in Africa must improve on the political factors to enhance economic freedom’s impact on quality of life. Moreover, policies that lead to an increase in aid and economic growth will improve the quality of life in Africa. JEL: C23, I31, P25","PeriodicalId":42664,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45492360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1177/02601079221121933
Eric Rahim
This article follows a suggestion made by Piero Sraffa in the late 1920s about the writing of his book that was published in 1960—a suggestion that he did not follow. The suggestion consisted in the writing of a history of political economy, starting with the ideas of the French Physiocrats, and its further development by Adam Smith and David Ricardo. This history was intended as an introduction to the 1960 book. The article concludes with a brief discussion of the ‘central propositions’ of the 1960 book, seen as a rigorous theoretical statement of the political economy of these ‘old’ economists. JEL Code: J12
{"title":"Piero Sraffa—Doing ‘History in Reverse’","authors":"Eric Rahim","doi":"10.1177/02601079221121933","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/02601079221121933","url":null,"abstract":"This article follows a suggestion made by Piero Sraffa in the late 1920s about the writing of his book that was published in 1960—a suggestion that he did not follow. The suggestion consisted in the writing of a history of political economy, starting with the ideas of the French Physiocrats, and its further development by Adam Smith and David Ricardo. This history was intended as an introduction to the 1960 book. The article concludes with a brief discussion of the ‘central propositions’ of the 1960 book, seen as a rigorous theoretical statement of the political economy of these ‘old’ economists. JEL Code: J12","PeriodicalId":42664,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics","volume":"35 1","pages":"248 - 263"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48640362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-16DOI: 10.1177/02601079221100885
Rongyu Wang
This article studies how the correlation of players’ private information affects their strategic be haviour. We introduce information correlation into a static two-player strategic substitutes entry game. The degree of information correlation is measured by the correlation coefficient of a symmetric joint normal distribution, which is used to model players’ prior distribution. It is found that a cutoff strategy cannot be used for all values of correlation coefficient to solve the game, and there exists a threshold correlation coefficient value to differentiate the unique-equilibrium and the multiple (three)-equilibria situations, given other parameters. Finally, by comparative statics analysis of symmetric equilibrium strategies, we find that increasing the payoff of entry encourages players to adopt a lower entry threshold, while increasing the information correlation or jointly increasing the variances of prior distribution increases the positive entry threshold and lowers the negative entry threshold. JEL: C72, D21, D82, L13
{"title":"Strategic Entry with Correlated Private Information","authors":"Rongyu Wang","doi":"10.1177/02601079221100885","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/02601079221100885","url":null,"abstract":"This article studies how the correlation of players’ private information affects their strategic be haviour. We introduce information correlation into a static two-player strategic substitutes entry game. The degree of information correlation is measured by the correlation coefficient of a symmetric joint normal distribution, which is used to model players’ prior distribution. It is found that a cutoff strategy cannot be used for all values of correlation coefficient to solve the game, and there exists a threshold correlation coefficient value to differentiate the unique-equilibrium and the multiple (three)-equilibria situations, given other parameters. Finally, by comparative statics analysis of symmetric equilibrium strategies, we find that increasing the payoff of entry encourages players to adopt a lower entry threshold, while increasing the information correlation or jointly increasing the variances of prior distribution increases the positive entry threshold and lowers the negative entry threshold. JEL: C72, D21, D82, L13","PeriodicalId":42664,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48544015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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