The eurocrisis led to significant reforms being conducted in the field of the European Union’s (EU’s) Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In this framework, Member States executives, and Heads of States and Governments meeting in the European Council especially, played a key role, although the European Central Bank was long the ‘only game in town’. As a result of this and other evolutions witnessed over the past decade, the gap between euro area and EU28(7) appeared to be ever-widening when the COVID-19 pandemic broke out. This article analyses the institutional balance among E(M)U institutions in the immediate response to the pandemic, how this compares to the management of the eurocrisis, and how it may be expected to play out in the implementation of the measures adopted. It finds that, this time around, a wide range of EU institutions and bodies, and the Member States, mobilized swiftly and that Member States executives played a key role again. It also shows that significant trends in favour of greater unity within the E(M)U exist. Economic and Monetary Union, European Banking Union, Executive predominance, Eurogroup, European Council, Euro Summit, Euro area, COVID crisis, eurocrisis
{"title":"Towards Increasing Unity and Continuing Executive Predominance Within the E(M)U Post-COVID?","authors":"D. Fromage","doi":"10.54648/leie2020022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/leie2020022","url":null,"abstract":"The eurocrisis led to significant reforms being conducted in the field of the European Union’s (EU’s) Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In this framework, Member States executives, and Heads of States and Governments meeting in the European Council especially, played a key role, although the European Central Bank was long the ‘only game in town’. As a result of this and other evolutions witnessed over the past decade, the gap between euro area and EU28(7) appeared to be ever-widening when the COVID-19 pandemic broke out. This article analyses the institutional balance among E(M)U institutions in the immediate response to the pandemic, how this compares to the management of the eurocrisis, and how it may be expected to play out in the implementation of the measures adopted. It finds that, this time around, a wide range of EU institutions and bodies, and the Member States, mobilized swiftly and that Member States executives played a key role again. It also shows that significant trends in favour of greater unity within the E(M)U exist.\u0000Economic and Monetary Union, European Banking Union, Executive predominance, Eurogroup, European Council, Euro Summit, Euro area, COVID crisis, eurocrisis","PeriodicalId":42718,"journal":{"name":"Legal Issues of Economic Integration","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91065771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The WTO is in a state of crisis. Yet its problems did not start with the Trump Administration. And although this has been the focus of much criticism from the United States, the Appellate Body should not be the priority in reforming the WTO. More differentiation amongst its members and its rules is needed, to reflect varying levels of development. In addition, more room for plurilaterals ought to be created. China’s atypical economic model ought to be reconciled with the WTO’s market-orientation. This can be done through an update of its Protocol of Accession to the WTO, or perhaps through a newly conceived plurilateral agreement. Such a bridging mechanism would reflect a renewed engagement of China with the WTO, and could help to recommit the United States to a rules-based system. The EU should take initiatives to make this happen. Appellate Body, China, Developing countries, Dispute settlement, EU trade policy, Made in 2025, Non-market economy, Plurilaterals, Protocol of Accession to the WTO, Special and Differential Treatment, State capitalism, State-owned enterprises, US trade policy, WTO-crisis
{"title":"Trade Conflicts: Whither the WTO?","authors":"M. Bronckers","doi":"10.54648/leie2020014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/leie2020014","url":null,"abstract":"The WTO is in a state of crisis. Yet its problems did not start with the Trump Administration. And although this has been the focus of much criticism from the United States, the Appellate Body should not be the priority in reforming the WTO. More differentiation amongst its members and its rules is needed, to reflect varying levels of development. In addition, more room for plurilaterals ought to be created. China’s atypical economic model ought to be reconciled with the WTO’s market-orientation. This can be done through an update of its Protocol of Accession to the WTO, or perhaps through a newly conceived plurilateral agreement. Such a bridging mechanism would reflect a renewed engagement of China with the WTO, and could help to recommit the United States to a rules-based system. The EU should take initiatives to make this happen.\u0000Appellate Body, China, Developing countries, Dispute settlement, EU trade policy, Made in 2025, Non-market economy, Plurilaterals, Protocol of Accession to the WTO, Special and Differential Treatment, State capitalism, State-owned enterprises, US trade policy, WTO-crisis","PeriodicalId":42718,"journal":{"name":"Legal Issues of Economic Integration","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82617353","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Book Review: The Regulation of E-cigarettes: International, European and National Challenges, Lukasz Gruszczynski ed. Edward Elgar Publishing. 2019.","authors":"Elisabet Ruiz Cairó","doi":"10.54648/leie2020017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/leie2020017","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42718,"journal":{"name":"Legal Issues of Economic Integration","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84707022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"From the Board: Short-term and Long-term Trade Responses to COVID-19","authors":"","doi":"10.54648/leie2020013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/leie2020013","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42718,"journal":{"name":"Legal Issues of Economic Integration","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89694585","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) of Germany has invented a new and impossible test of proportionality to declare as ultra vires the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Weiss. Instead of understanding proportionality as the least interventionist means of achieving a certain policy objective, it defines it as the balancing between conflicting policy objectives which in this case are monetary and economic policy. This is not the concept used by the Court of Justice. This definition of proportionality is intended as a substitute for the principle of conferral and whether the European Central Bank (ECB) encroached on economic policy. However, if monetary policy is to be effective, it must impact economic policy. Had the ECB attempted to balance monetary and economic policy effects, it would have infringed Article 127(1) TFEU that requires that the support of economic policy by the ECB is without prejudice to price stability which is the objective of monetary policy. The Federal Constitutional Court did not appreciate the significance of the fact that the ECB buys public bonds from private investors and that the interjection of private investors deprives Member States from the ability to sell unlimited amounts of bonds at prices that would enable them to run indefinite budget deficits. Monetary policy, economic policy, proportionality, ECB, public sector asset purchase programme
{"title":"An Assessment of the Judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany On the Public Sector Asset Purchase Programme of the European Central Bank","authors":"P. Nicolaides","doi":"10.54648/leie2020016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/leie2020016","url":null,"abstract":"The Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) of Germany has invented a new and impossible test of proportionality to declare as ultra vires the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Weiss. Instead of understanding proportionality as the least interventionist means of achieving a certain policy objective, it defines it as the balancing between conflicting policy objectives which in this case are monetary and economic policy. This is not the concept used by the Court of Justice. This definition of proportionality is intended as a substitute for the principle of conferral and whether the European Central Bank (ECB) encroached on economic policy. However, if monetary policy is to be effective, it must impact economic policy. Had the ECB attempted to balance monetary and economic policy effects, it would have infringed Article 127(1) TFEU that requires that the support of economic policy by the ECB is without prejudice to price stability which is the objective of monetary policy. The Federal Constitutional Court did not appreciate the significance of the fact that the ECB buys public bonds from private investors and that the interjection of private investors deprives Member States from the ability to sell unlimited amounts of bonds at prices that would enable them to run indefinite budget deficits.\u0000Monetary policy, economic policy, proportionality, ECB, public sector asset purchase programme","PeriodicalId":42718,"journal":{"name":"Legal Issues of Economic Integration","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87929880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The practical effects of the principle of primacy of EU law are well established in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). However, the highest national courts have had difficulties in coming to terms with the principle. Does the primacy of EU law also entail the ‘supremacy’ of EU law, and what is the significance of this for national sovereignty? There seems to be no coherence in the academic discussion on how to use the terms primacy and supremacy and what they actually entail. This article presents a reconceptualization of the way in which the terms primacy and supremacy could be understood in EU law. It is argued that they are two distinct concepts: primacy refers to actual conflicts between a national norm and an EU norm in situations concerning individual rights, whereas supremacy refers to the structural relation between the EU’s and the Member States’ legal orders that manifests itself as institutional conflicts of competence. This article maps out the primacy–supremacy debate, assesses the proposed conceptualization in light of recent European and national case law, and positions the argument in relation to constitutional pluralism, the leading theory of European constitutionalism. primacy, supremacy, sovereignty, constitutional pluralism, Court of Justice, national courts, comparative constitutionalism, EU law, European integration
{"title":"Reconceptualizing the Primacy–Supremacy Debate in EU Law","authors":"Tomi Tuominen","doi":"10.54648/leie2020015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/leie2020015","url":null,"abstract":"The practical effects of the principle of primacy of EU law are well established in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). However, the highest national courts have had difficulties in coming to terms with the principle. Does the primacy of EU law also entail the ‘supremacy’ of EU law, and what is the significance of this for national sovereignty? There seems to be no coherence in the academic discussion on how to use the terms primacy and supremacy and what they actually entail. This article presents a reconceptualization of the way in which the terms primacy and supremacy could be understood in EU law. It is argued that they are two distinct concepts: primacy refers to actual conflicts between a national norm and an EU norm in situations concerning individual rights, whereas supremacy refers to the structural relation between the EU’s and the Member States’ legal orders that manifests itself as institutional conflicts of competence. This article maps out the primacy–supremacy debate, assesses the proposed conceptualization in light of recent European and national case law, and positions the argument in relation to constitutional pluralism, the leading theory of European constitutionalism.\u0000primacy, supremacy, sovereignty, constitutional pluralism, Court of Justice, national courts, comparative constitutionalism, EU law, European integration","PeriodicalId":42718,"journal":{"name":"Legal Issues of Economic Integration","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76819312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
China’s rules and practices in relation to technology transfer have been of long-standing concern to its trading partners. These concerns are most strongly evident in the United States Trade Representative’s section 301 Report which foreshadowed the imposition of substantial increased tariffs on Chinese goods; a move which was quickly mirrored by China. This article subjects some of these concerns to legal scrutiny. Particular attention is given to China’s treatment of grantback clauses in technology transfer contracts which speak to the ownership of improvements made to licensed technology. China’s outgoing and recently revised rules are evaluated under two questions. The first is whether China’s rules are discriminatory contrary to the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) national treatment obligation. The second is the extent to which states are free under the TRIPS to interfere with freedom of contract in technology transfer. The article identifies a shift as between the two questions from high consensus, to low consensus norms. While the prohibition on discrimination must be strictly interpreted and applied, other TRIPS provisions which touch upon the control of anti-competitive practices in technology licensing, do not remotely reflect a stable international consensus. Interpretations of these provisions should therefore seek to accommodate different approaches, rather than presume that they reflect and prioritize one approach to the exclusion of others. technology transfer, technology licensing, grantback clauses, TRIPS, national treatment
{"title":"Technology Transfer Contracts and the TRIPS: Interpreting High and Low Consensus Norms","authors":"A. Davies","doi":"10.54648/leie2020008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/leie2020008","url":null,"abstract":"China’s rules and practices in relation to technology transfer have been of long-standing concern to its trading partners. These concerns are most strongly evident in the United States Trade Representative’s section 301 Report which foreshadowed the imposition of substantial increased tariffs on Chinese goods; a move which was quickly mirrored by China. This article subjects some of these concerns to legal scrutiny. Particular attention is given to China’s treatment of grantback clauses in technology transfer contracts which speak to the ownership of improvements made to licensed technology. China’s outgoing and recently revised rules are evaluated under two questions. The first is whether China’s rules are discriminatory contrary to the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) national treatment obligation. The second is the extent to which states are free under the TRIPS to interfere with freedom of contract in technology transfer. The article identifies a shift as between the two questions from high consensus, to low consensus norms. While the prohibition on discrimination must be strictly interpreted and applied, other TRIPS provisions which touch upon the control of anti-competitive practices in technology licensing, do not remotely reflect a stable international consensus. Interpretations of these provisions should therefore seek to accommodate different approaches, rather than presume that they reflect and prioritize one approach to the exclusion of others.\u0000technology transfer, technology licensing, grantback clauses, TRIPS, national treatment","PeriodicalId":42718,"journal":{"name":"Legal Issues of Economic Integration","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83513380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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{"title":"From the Board: The EU–UK Future Relationship: A Trade or Governance Agreement?","authors":"Vidigal","doi":"10.54648/leie2020005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/leie2020005","url":null,"abstract":"Disclaimer/Complaints regulations If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible.","PeriodicalId":42718,"journal":{"name":"Legal Issues of Economic Integration","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76763737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article aims at assessing the potential and limitations of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) in safeguarding countries’ efforts to promote renewable energy (RE). In particular, it explores whether and to what extent PTAs recently concluded by the European Union (EU) have addressed the main shortcomings found under the World Trade Organization (WTO) law. Namely, the fact that WTO rules are currently too stringent on the use of RE subsidies while too lenient on the use of trade remedy measures against RE technologies. It argues that EU PTAs could and should have gone further with regards to both subsidy and trade remedy disciplines that enable RE promotion, substantively as well procedurally, while still remaining WTO-compatible. The article further finds that much of the potential of EU PTAs has remained untapped due to inconsistency in policy practice, which reflects the lack of a coherent, ambitious and forward-looking negotiating strategy on the part of the EU. The article concludes by identifying which approach to RE promotion in PTAs is preferable and should be consistently pursued by the EU in future negotiations. Climate change mitigation, renewable energy promotion, WTO law, green policy space, preferential trade agreements, EU
{"title":"Promoting Green Energy Through EU Preferential Trade Agreements: Potential and Limitations","authors":"G. M. Durán, Ilaria Espa","doi":"10.54648/leie2020006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/leie2020006","url":null,"abstract":"This article aims at assessing the potential and limitations of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) in safeguarding countries’ efforts to promote renewable energy (RE). In particular, it explores whether and to what extent PTAs recently concluded by the European Union (EU) have addressed the main shortcomings found under the World Trade Organization (WTO) law. Namely, the fact that WTO rules are currently too stringent on the use of RE subsidies while too lenient on the use of trade remedy measures against RE technologies. It argues that EU PTAs could and should have gone further with regards to both subsidy and trade remedy disciplines that enable RE promotion, substantively as well procedurally, while still remaining WTO-compatible. The article further finds that much of the potential of EU PTAs has remained untapped due to inconsistency in policy practice, which reflects the lack of a coherent, ambitious and forward-looking negotiating strategy on the part of the EU. The article concludes by identifying which approach to RE promotion in PTAs is preferable and should be consistently pursued by the EU in future negotiations.\u0000Climate change mitigation, renewable energy promotion, WTO law, green policy space, preferential trade agreements, EU","PeriodicalId":42718,"journal":{"name":"Legal Issues of Economic Integration","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81074824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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