We investigate whether late redistribution programs that can be targeted toward low income families, but that may distort savings decisions, can “dominate” early redistribution programs that cannot be targeted as a result of information constraints. We use simple two-period overlapping generations models with heterogeneous agents under six policy regimes: a model calibrated to the U.S. economy (benchmark), two early redistribution (lump sum) regimes, two (targeted) late redistribution regimes, and finally a model without taxes and redistribution. Redistribution programs are financed by a labor tax on the young generation and a capital tax on the old generation. We argue that if the programs are small in size, late redistribution can dominate early redistribution in terms of welfare but not in terms of real output. Better targeting of low income households cannot completely offset savings distortions. In addition, we find that the optimal transfer and tax policy implies a capital tax of 100% and transfers exclusively to the young generation.
{"title":"The Timing of Redistribution","authors":"G. Glomm, Juergen Jung","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1144803","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1144803","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate whether late redistribution programs that can be targeted toward low income families, but that may distort savings decisions, can “dominate” early redistribution programs that cannot be targeted as a result of information constraints. We use simple two-period overlapping generations models with heterogeneous agents under six policy regimes: a model calibrated to the U.S. economy (benchmark), two early redistribution (lump sum) regimes, two (targeted) late redistribution regimes, and finally a model without taxes and redistribution. Redistribution programs are financed by a labor tax on the young generation and a capital tax on the old generation. We argue that if the programs are small in size, late redistribution can dominate early redistribution in terms of welfare but not in terms of real output. Better targeting of low income households cannot completely offset savings distortions. In addition, we find that the optimal transfer and tax policy implies a capital tax of 100% and transfers exclusively to the young generation.","PeriodicalId":428258,"journal":{"name":"CAEPR: Center for Applied Economics & Policy Research Working Paper Series","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132076494","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I analyze the crowding-out effects of public transfers on labor supply of the elderly in the context of developing countries. I argue that the interactions between private transfers received and labor supplied by the elderly affect the opportunity cost of retirement and, therefore, magnify the crowding-out effects of public transfers on the labor supply of the elderly. Using household survey data from Vietnam, I find the evidence supporting this hypothesis. That is, the crowding-out effect is about two times larger when accounting for the endogeneity of private transfers, which is caused by the interactions of private transfers and the labor supply.
{"title":"Transfers and Labor Market Behavior of the Elderly in Developing Countries: Theory and Evidence from Vietnam","authors":"C. Tran, Juergen Jung","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1147649","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1147649","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I analyze the crowding-out effects of public transfers on labor supply of the elderly in the context of developing countries. I argue that the interactions between private transfers received and labor supplied by the elderly affect the opportunity cost of retirement and, therefore, magnify the crowding-out effects of public transfers on the labor supply of the elderly. Using household survey data from Vietnam, I find the evidence supporting this hypothesis. That is, the crowding-out effect is about two times larger when accounting for the endogeneity of private transfers, which is caused by the interactions of private transfers and the labor supply.","PeriodicalId":428258,"journal":{"name":"CAEPR: Center for Applied Economics & Policy Research Working Paper Series","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133370517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine quantitatively why uniform vouchers have repeatedly suffered electoral defeats against the current system where public and private schools coexist. We argue that the topping-up option available under uniform vouchers is not suficiently valuable for the poorer households to prefer the uniform vouchers to the current mix of public and private education. We then develop a model of publicly funded means-tested education vouchers where the voucher received by each household is a linearly decreasing function of income. Public policy, which is determined by majority voting, consists of two dimensions: the overall funding level (or the tax rate) and the slope of the means testing function. We solve the model when the political decisions are sequential-households vote first on the tax rate and then on the extent of means testing. We establish that a majority voting equilibrium exists. We show that the means-tested voucher regime is majority preferred to the status-quo. These results are robust to alternative preference parameters, income distribution parameters and voter turnout.
{"title":"Why Do Education Vouchers Fail?","authors":"G. Glomm, P. Bearse, Buly A. Cardak, B. Ravikumar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1456391","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1456391","url":null,"abstract":"We examine quantitatively why uniform vouchers have repeatedly suffered electoral defeats against the current system where public and private schools coexist. We argue that the topping-up option available under uniform vouchers is not suficiently valuable for the poorer households to prefer the uniform vouchers to the current mix of public and private education. We then develop a model of publicly funded means-tested education vouchers where the voucher received by each household is a linearly decreasing function of income. Public policy, which is determined by majority voting, consists of two dimensions: the overall funding level (or the tax rate) and the slope of the means testing function. We solve the model when the political decisions are sequential-households vote first on the tax rate and then on the extent of means testing. We establish that a majority voting equilibrium exists. We show that the means-tested voucher regime is majority preferred to the status-quo. These results are robust to alternative preference parameters, income distribution parameters and voter turnout.","PeriodicalId":428258,"journal":{"name":"CAEPR: Center for Applied Economics & Policy Research Working Paper Series","volume":"371 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134129294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines monetary policy responses to oil price shocks in a small open economy that produces traded and non-traded goods. When only labor and oil are used in production and prices are sticky in the non-traded sector the behavior of inflation, the nominal exchange rate, and the relative price of the non-traded good depends crucially upon whether the ratio of the cost share of oil to the cost share of labor is higher for the traded or non-traded sector. If the ratio is smaller (higher) for the traded sector then a policy that fully stabilizes non-traded inflation causes the nominal exchange rate to appreciate (depreciate) and the relative price of the non-traded good to rise (fall) when there is a surprise rise in the price of oil. Similar results can hold for a policy that stabilizes CPI inflation. Under a policy that flexes the nominal exchange rate, non-traded inflation rises (falls) if the ratio is smaller (larger) for the traded sector. Analytical results show that a policy of fixing the exchange rate always produces a unique solution and that a policy of stabilizing non-traded inflation produces a unique solution so long as the nominal interest rate is raised more than one-for-one with rises in non-traded inflation. A policy that stabilizes CPI inflation, however, produces multiple equilibria for a wide range of calibrations of the policy rule.
{"title":"Exchange Rates, Oil Price Shocks, and Monetary Policy In an Economy with Traded and Non-Traded Goods","authors":"Michael D. Plante","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1456396","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1456396","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines monetary policy responses to oil price shocks in a small open economy that produces traded and non-traded goods. When only labor and oil are used in production and prices are sticky in the non-traded sector the behavior of inflation, the nominal exchange rate, and the relative price of the non-traded good depends crucially upon whether the ratio of the cost share of oil to the cost share of labor is higher for the traded or non-traded sector. If the ratio is smaller (higher) for the traded sector then a policy that fully stabilizes non-traded inflation causes the nominal exchange rate to appreciate (depreciate) and the relative price of the non-traded good to rise (fall) when there is a surprise rise in the price of oil. Similar results can hold for a policy that stabilizes CPI inflation. Under a policy that flexes the nominal exchange rate, non-traded inflation rises (falls) if the ratio is smaller (larger) for the traded sector. Analytical results show that a policy of fixing the exchange rate always produces a unique solution and that a policy of stabilizing non-traded inflation produces a unique solution so long as the nominal interest rate is raised more than one-for-one with rises in non-traded inflation. A policy that stabilizes CPI inflation, however, produces multiple equilibria for a wide range of calibrations of the policy rule.","PeriodicalId":428258,"journal":{"name":"CAEPR: Center for Applied Economics & Policy Research Working Paper Series","volume":"41 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120858736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian model where supply and demand shocks affect the price of oil. Optimal policy fully stabilizes core inflation when wages are flexible. The nominal rate rises (falls) in response to the demand (supply) shock. With sticky wages core inflation falls (rises) in response to the demand (supply) shock. Impulse response functions from a VAR estimated with post-1986 U.S. data show minimal movement in core inflation in response to both shocks. The federal funds rate rises (falls) in response to the demand (supply) shock, consistent with the predictions from the theoretical model for policy that stabilizes core inflation.
{"title":"How Should Monetary Policy Respond to Changes in the Relative Price of Oil? Considering Supply and Demand Shocks","authors":"Michael D. Plante","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1456384","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1456384","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian model where supply and demand shocks affect the price of oil. Optimal policy fully stabilizes core inflation when wages are flexible. The nominal rate rises (falls) in response to the demand (supply) shock. With sticky wages core inflation falls (rises) in response to the demand (supply) shock. Impulse response functions from a VAR estimated with post-1986 U.S. data show minimal movement in core inflation in response to both shocks. The federal funds rate rises (falls) in response to the demand (supply) shock, consistent with the predictions from the theoretical model for policy that stabilizes core inflation.","PeriodicalId":428258,"journal":{"name":"CAEPR: Center for Applied Economics & Policy Research Working Paper Series","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133237305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this lecture, I argue that there are remarkable parallels between how monetary and fiscal policies operate on the macro economy and that these parallels are sufficient to lead us to think about transforming fiscal policy and fiscal institutions as many countries have transformed monetary policy and monetary institutions. Making fiscal transparency comparable to monetary transparency requires fiscal authorities to discuss future possible fiscal policies explicitly. Enhanced fiscal transparency can help anchor expectations of fiscal policy and make fiscal actions more predictable and effective. As advanced economies move into a prolonged period of heightened fiscal activity, anchoring fiscal expectations will become an increasingly important aspect of macroeconomic policy.
{"title":"Anchoring Fiscal Expectations","authors":"E. Leeper","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1456393","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1456393","url":null,"abstract":"In this lecture, I argue that there are remarkable parallels between how monetary and fiscal policies operate on the macro economy and that these parallels are sufficient to lead us to think about transforming fiscal policy and fiscal institutions as many countries have transformed monetary policy and monetary institutions. Making fiscal transparency comparable to monetary transparency requires fiscal authorities to discuss future possible fiscal policies explicitly. Enhanced fiscal transparency can help anchor expectations of fiscal policy and make fiscal actions more predictable and effective. As advanced economies move into a prolonged period of heightened fiscal activity, anchoring fiscal expectations will become an increasingly important aspect of macroeconomic policy.","PeriodicalId":428258,"journal":{"name":"CAEPR: Center for Applied Economics & Policy Research Working Paper Series","volume":"98 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128274234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper considers monetary and fiscal policy responses to oil price shocks in low income oil importing countries. I examine the dynamic properties and the welfare implications of a set of inflation targeting policies and a group of policies where the government provides a subsidy on household purchases of oil products and finances this subsidy through some combination of printing money and raising non-distortionary lump sum taxes. Even in the case where lump sum taxes finance the subsidy, it distorts household behavior in important ways leading to over consumption of oil products, increased trade deficits, and distortions to the labor supply. Resorting to the inflation tax to finance the subsidy leads to significant macroeconomic issues when exchange rates are flexible. The welfare gains from a policy that finances the subsidy through lump sum taxation are small compared to the policy with full pass through. For most calibrations the losses from financing the policy through the inflation tax are substantial. The welfare generated by the inflation targeting policies is close to the baseline policy with full pass through so long as the response to inflation is strong enough.
{"title":"Fiscal and Monetary Policy Responses to Oil Price Shocks in Oil Importing Low Income Countries","authors":"Michael D. Plante","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1456398","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1456398","url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers monetary and fiscal policy responses to oil price shocks in low income oil importing countries. I examine the dynamic properties and the welfare implications of a set of inflation targeting policies and a group of policies where the government provides a subsidy on household purchases of oil products and finances this subsidy through some combination of printing money and raising non-distortionary lump sum taxes. Even in the case where lump sum taxes finance the subsidy, it distorts household behavior in important ways leading to over consumption of oil products, increased trade deficits, and distortions to the labor supply. Resorting to the inflation tax to finance the subsidy leads to significant macroeconomic issues when exchange rates are flexible. The welfare gains from a policy that finances the subsidy through lump sum taxation are small compared to the policy with full pass through. For most calibrations the losses from financing the policy through the inflation tax are substantial. The welfare generated by the inflation targeting policies is close to the baseline policy with full pass through so long as the response to inflation is strong enough.","PeriodicalId":428258,"journal":{"name":"CAEPR: Center for Applied Economics & Policy Research Working Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128862118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models that include policy rules for government spending, lump-sum transfers, and distortionary taxation on labor and capital income and on consumption expenditures are fit to U.S. data under a variety of specifications of fiscal policy rules. We obtain several results. First, the best fitting model allows a rich set of fiscal instruments to respond to stabilize debt. Second, responses of aggregate variables to fiscal policy shocks under rich fiscal rules can vary considerably from responses that allow only non-distortionary fiscal instruments to finance debt. Third, based on estimated policy rules, transfers, capital tax rates, and government spending have historically responded strongly to government debt, while labor taxes have responded more weakly. Fourth, all components of the intertemporal condition linking debt to expected discounted surpluses---transfers, spending, tax revenues, and discount factors---display instances where their expected movements are important in establishing equilibrium. Fifth, debt-financed fiscal shocks trigger long lasting dynamics so that short-run multipliers can differ markedly from long-run multipliers, even in their signs.
{"title":"Dynamics of Fiscal Financing in the United States","authors":"E. Leeper, Michael D. Plante, Nora Traum","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1456361","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1456361","url":null,"abstract":"Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models that include policy rules for government spending, lump-sum transfers, and distortionary taxation on labor and capital income and on consumption expenditures are fit to U.S. data under a variety of specifications of fiscal policy rules. We obtain several results. First, the best fitting model allows a rich set of fiscal instruments to respond to stabilize debt. Second, responses of aggregate variables to fiscal policy shocks under rich fiscal rules can vary considerably from responses that allow only non-distortionary fiscal instruments to finance debt. Third, based on estimated policy rules, transfers, capital tax rates, and government spending have historically responded strongly to government debt, while labor taxes have responded more weakly. Fourth, all components of the intertemporal condition linking debt to expected discounted surpluses---transfers, spending, tax revenues, and discount factors---display instances where their expected movements are important in establishing equilibrium. Fifth, debt-financed fiscal shocks trigger long lasting dynamics so that short-run multipliers can differ markedly from long-run multipliers, even in their signs.","PeriodicalId":428258,"journal":{"name":"CAEPR: Center for Applied Economics & Policy Research Working Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131043507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There is a long-run `Beveridge Curve' in the Housing market given by the negative relationship between the vacancy rate of housing and the rate of household formation. This is true in the owner-occupied market, the rental market, and the total market for housing irrespective of ownership status. The Beveridge Curve represents a long-run supply condition that can be explained by assuming that (1) the cost to produce a new house is decreasing in the growth rate of the housing stock and (2) the probability to sell a new house is decreasing in the vacancy rate. Short-run deviations from the Beveridge curve represent a measurement of oversupply. Using a years of supply metric, for the total housing market irrespective of ownership, in 2007-2008 there were 0.995 years of supply, more than three times the previous peak of 0.285 years of supply in 1973-1974. Comparing the rental market to the owner-occupied market, oversupply generally shows up in the rental market, not the owner-occupied market and the oversupply in the rental market is twice as volatile as oversupply in the owner-occupied market, implying that a large part of the market adjustment to housing supply occurs in the rental market. Interestingly two-thirds of the oversupply in 2007-2008 resided in the rental market as opposed to the owner-occupied market. Using FHFA data for house prices, 46% of the movements in oversupply in the owner-occupied market since 1975 can be explained by house price movements. The last result suggests that at short horizons (4-6 years) house prices are not determined by supply. Rather, house prices drive supply at short time horizons, permitting bubbles and oversupplies of housing to form.
{"title":"The Beveridge Curve in the Housing Market: Supply and Disequilibrium","authors":"B. Peterson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1456351","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1456351","url":null,"abstract":"There is a long-run `Beveridge Curve' in the Housing market given by the negative relationship between the vacancy rate of housing and the rate of household formation. This is true in the owner-occupied market, the rental market, and the total market for housing irrespective of ownership status. The Beveridge Curve represents a long-run supply condition that can be explained by assuming that (1) the cost to produce a new house is decreasing in the growth rate of the housing stock and (2) the probability to sell a new house is decreasing in the vacancy rate. Short-run deviations from the Beveridge curve represent a measurement of oversupply. Using a years of supply metric, for the total housing market irrespective of ownership, in 2007-2008 there were 0.995 years of supply, more than three times the previous peak of 0.285 years of supply in 1973-1974. Comparing the rental market to the owner-occupied market, oversupply generally shows up in the rental market, not the owner-occupied market and the oversupply in the rental market is twice as volatile as oversupply in the owner-occupied market, implying that a large part of the market adjustment to housing supply occurs in the rental market. Interestingly two-thirds of the oversupply in 2007-2008 resided in the rental market as opposed to the owner-occupied market. Using FHFA data for house prices, 46% of the movements in oversupply in the owner-occupied market since 1975 can be explained by house price movements. The last result suggests that at short horizons (4-6 years) house prices are not determined by supply. Rather, house prices drive supply at short time horizons, permitting bubbles and oversupplies of housing to form.","PeriodicalId":428258,"journal":{"name":"CAEPR: Center for Applied Economics & Policy Research Working Paper Series","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129886504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper contributes to the debate about fiscal multipliers by studying the impacts of government investment in conventional neoclassical growth models. The analysis focuses on two dimensions of fiscal policy that are critical for understanding the effects of government investment: implementation delays associated with building public capital projects and expected future fiscal adjustments to debt-financed spending. Implementation delays can produce small or even negative labor and output responses in the short run; anticipated fiscal financing adjustments matter both quantitatively and qualitatively for long-run growth effects. Taken together, these two dimensions have important implications for the short-run and long-run impacts of fiscal stimulus in the form of higher government infrastructure investment. The analysis is conducted in several models with features relevant for studying government spending, including utility-yielding government consumption, time-to-build for private investment, and government production.
{"title":"Government Investment and Fiscal Stimulus in The Short and Long Runs","authors":"E. Leeper, Shu-Chun S. Yang, Todd B. Walker","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1456359","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1456359","url":null,"abstract":"This paper contributes to the debate about fiscal multipliers by studying the impacts of government investment in conventional neoclassical growth models. The analysis focuses on two dimensions of fiscal policy that are critical for understanding the effects of government investment: implementation delays associated with building public capital projects and expected future fiscal adjustments to debt-financed spending. Implementation delays can produce small or even negative labor and output responses in the short run; anticipated fiscal financing adjustments matter both quantitatively and qualitatively for long-run growth effects. Taken together, these two dimensions have important implications for the short-run and long-run impacts of fiscal stimulus in the form of higher government infrastructure investment. The analysis is conducted in several models with features relevant for studying government spending, including utility-yielding government consumption, time-to-build for private investment, and government production.","PeriodicalId":428258,"journal":{"name":"CAEPR: Center for Applied Economics & Policy Research Working Paper Series","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127888195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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