In Brazil generous public sector pensions have induced civil servants to retire on average at age 55. In this paper we use an OLG model to assess the effects of such policy induced early retirement on capital accumulation and long-run income levels. We calibrate the model to data from Brazil and then conduct policy experiments changing the generosity of (early) public sector pensions. We find that the current generosity of public sector pensions which induces civil servants to retire 10 years prematurely (at age 55 rather than at age 65) is often associated with decreases in steady state output (GDP) of over 2 percent and welfare losses in the private sector of more than 1 percent of consumption.
{"title":"Macroeconomic Implications of Early Retirement in the Public Sector: The Case of Brazil","authors":"G. Glomm, Juergen Jung, C. Tran","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.903389","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.903389","url":null,"abstract":"In Brazil generous public sector pensions have induced civil servants to retire on average at age 55. In this paper we use an OLG model to assess the effects of such policy induced early retirement on capital accumulation and long-run income levels. We calibrate the model to data from Brazil and then conduct policy experiments changing the generosity of (early) public sector pensions. We find that the current generosity of public sector pensions which induces civil servants to retire 10 years prematurely (at age 55 rather than at age 65) is often associated with decreases in steady state output (GDP) of over 2 percent and welfare losses in the private sector of more than 1 percent of consumption.","PeriodicalId":428258,"journal":{"name":"CAEPR: Center for Applied Economics & Policy Research Working Paper Series","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131998304","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Laboratory experiments are used to study the voluntary provision of a pure public good in the presence of an anonymous external donor. The external funds are used in two different settings, lump-sum matching and one-to-one matching, to examine how allocations to the public good are affected. The experimental results reveal that allocations to the public good under lumpsum matching are significantly higher, and have significantly lower within-group dispersion, relative to one-to-one matching and a baseline setting without external matching funds.
{"title":"Matching Contributions and the Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public Good: Experimental Evidence","authors":"R. J. Baker, James M. Walker, Arlington Williams","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.932687","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.932687","url":null,"abstract":"Laboratory experiments are used to study the voluntary provision of a pure public good in the presence of an anonymous external donor. The external funds are used in two different settings, lump-sum matching and one-to-one matching, to examine how allocations to the public good are affected. The experimental results reveal that allocations to the public good under lumpsum matching are significantly higher, and have significantly lower within-group dispersion, relative to one-to-one matching and a baseline setting without external matching funds.","PeriodicalId":428258,"journal":{"name":"CAEPR: Center for Applied Economics & Policy Research Working Paper Series","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126230924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many resource allocation contests have the property that individuals undertake costly actions to appropriate a potentially divisible resource. We design an experiment to compare individuals’ decisions across three resource allocation contests which are isomorphic under risk-neutrality. The results indicate that in aggregate the single-prize contest generates lower expenditures than either the proportional-prize or the multi-prize contest. Interestingly, while the aggregate results indicate similar behavior in the proportional-prize and multi-prize contests, individual level analysis indicates that the behavior in the single-prize contest is more similar to the behavior in the multi-prize contest than in the proportional-prize contest. We also elicit preferences toward risk, ambiguity and losses, and find that while such preferences cannot explain individual behavior in the proportional-prize contest, preferences with regard to losses are predictive of behavior in both the single-prize and multiple-prize contests. Therefore, it appears that loss aversion is correlated with behavior in the single-prize and multi-prize contests where losses are likely to occur, but not in the proportional-prize contest where losses are unlikely.
{"title":"Resource Allocation Contests: Experimental Evidence","authors":"David Schmidt, Robert Shupp, James M. Walker","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.428022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.428022","url":null,"abstract":"Many resource allocation contests have the property that individuals undertake costly actions to appropriate a potentially divisible resource. We design an experiment to compare individuals’ decisions across three resource allocation contests which are isomorphic under risk-neutrality. The results indicate that in aggregate the single-prize contest generates lower expenditures than either the proportional-prize or the multi-prize contest. Interestingly, while the aggregate results indicate similar behavior in the proportional-prize and multi-prize contests, individual level analysis indicates that the behavior in the single-prize contest is more similar to the behavior in the multi-prize contest than in the proportional-prize contest. We also elicit preferences toward risk, ambiguity and losses, and find that while such preferences cannot explain individual behavior in the proportional-prize contest, preferences with regard to losses are predictive of behavior in both the single-prize and multiple-prize contests. Therefore, it appears that loss aversion is correlated with behavior in the single-prize and multi-prize contests where losses are likely to occur, but not in the proportional-prize contest where losses are unlikely.","PeriodicalId":428258,"journal":{"name":"CAEPR: Center for Applied Economics & Policy Research Working Paper Series","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131086778","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper makes changes in monetary policy rules (or regimes) endogenous. Changes are triggered when certain endogenous variables cross specified thresholds. Rational expectations equilibria are examined in three models of threshold switching to illustrate that (i) expectations formation effects generated by the possibility of regime change can be quantitatively important; (ii) symmetric shocks can have asymmetric effects; (iii) endogenous switching is a natural way to formally model preemptive policy actions. In a conventional calibrated model, preemptive policy shifts agents' expectations, enhancing the ability of policy to offset demand shocks; this yields a quantitatively significant "preemption dividend."
{"title":"Endogenous Monetary Policy Regime Change","authors":"Troy A. Davig, E. Leeper","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.932673","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.932673","url":null,"abstract":"This paper makes changes in monetary policy rules (or regimes) endogenous. Changes are triggered when certain endogenous variables cross specified thresholds. Rational expectations equilibria are examined in three models of threshold switching to illustrate that (i) expectations formation effects generated by the possibility of regime change can be quantitatively important; (ii) symmetric shocks can have asymmetric effects; (iii) endogenous switching is a natural way to formally model preemptive policy actions. In a conventional calibrated model, preemptive policy shifts agents' expectations, enhancing the ability of policy to offset demand shocks; this yields a quantitatively significant \"preemption dividend.\"","PeriodicalId":428258,"journal":{"name":"CAEPR: Center for Applied Economics & Policy Research Working Paper Series","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133199798","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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