We model strategic competition in a market with asymmetric information as a noncooperative game in which each firm competes for the business of a buyer of unknown type by offering the buyer a catalog of products and prices. The timing in our model is Stackelberg: in the first stage, given the distribution of buyer types known to all firms and the deducible, type-dependent best responses of the agent, firms simultaneously and noncooperatively choose their catalog offers. In the second stage the buyer, knowing his type, chooses a single firm and product-price pair from that firm's catalog. By backward induction, this Stackelberg game with asymmetric information reduces to a game over catalogs with payoff indeterminacies. In particular, due to ties within catalogs and/or across catalogs, corresponding to any catalog profile offered by firms there may be multiple possible expected firm payoffs, all consistent with the rational optimizing behavior of the agent for each of his types. The resolution of these indeterminacies depends on the tie-breaking mechanism which emerges in the market. Because each tie-breaking mechanism induces a particular game over catalogs, a reasonable candidate would be a tie-breaking mechanism which supports a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding catalog game. We call such a mechanism an endogenous Nash mechanism. The fundamental question we address in this paper is, does there exist an endogenous Nash mechanism - and therefore, does there exist a Nash equilibrium for the catalog game? We show under fairly mild conditions on primitives that catalog games naturally possess tie-breaking mechanisms which support Nash equilibria.
{"title":"Endogenous Mechanisms and Nash Equilibrium in Competitive Contracting","authors":"F. Page, P. Monteiro","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1028297","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1028297","url":null,"abstract":"We model strategic competition in a market with asymmetric information as a noncooperative game in which each firm competes for the business of a buyer of unknown type by offering the buyer a catalog of products and prices. The timing in our model is Stackelberg: in the first stage, given the distribution of buyer types known to all firms and the deducible, type-dependent best responses of the agent, firms simultaneously and noncooperatively choose their catalog offers. In the second stage the buyer, knowing his type, chooses a single firm and product-price pair from that firm's catalog. By backward induction, this Stackelberg game with asymmetric information reduces to a game over catalogs with payoff indeterminacies. In particular, due to ties within catalogs and/or across catalogs, corresponding to any catalog profile offered by firms there may be multiple possible expected firm payoffs, all consistent with the rational optimizing behavior of the agent for each of his types. The resolution of these indeterminacies depends on the tie-breaking mechanism which emerges in the market. Because each tie-breaking mechanism induces a particular game over catalogs, a reasonable candidate would be a tie-breaking mechanism which supports a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding catalog game. We call such a mechanism an endogenous Nash mechanism. The fundamental question we address in this paper is, does there exist an endogenous Nash mechanism - and therefore, does there exist a Nash equilibrium for the catalog game? We show under fairly mild conditions on primitives that catalog games naturally possess tie-breaking mechanisms which support Nash equilibria.","PeriodicalId":428258,"journal":{"name":"CAEPR: Center for Applied Economics & Policy Research Working Paper Series","volume":"513 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127022453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We use comparable micro level panel data for 14 countries and a set of identically specified empirical models to investigate the relationship between exports and productivity. Our overall results are in line with the big picture that is by now familiar from the literature: Exporters are more productive than non-exporters when observed and unobserved heterogeneity are controlled for, and these exporter productivity premia tend to increase with the share of exports in total sales; there is strong evidence in favor of self-selection of more productive firms into export markets, but nearly no evidence in favor of the learning-by-exporting hypothesis. We document that the exporter premia differ considerably across countries in identically specified empirical models. In a meta-analysis of our results we find that countries that are more open and have more effective government report higher productivity premia. However, the level of development per se does not appear to be an explanation for the observed cross-country differences.
{"title":"Exports and Productivity - Comparable Evidence for 14 Countries by The International Study Group on Exports and Productivity","authors":"J Wagner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1059201","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1059201","url":null,"abstract":"We use comparable micro level panel data for 14 countries and a set of identically specified empirical models to investigate the relationship between exports and productivity. Our overall results are in line with the big picture that is by now familiar from the literature: Exporters are more productive than non-exporters when observed and unobserved heterogeneity are controlled for, and these exporter productivity premia tend to increase with the share of exports in total sales; there is strong evidence in favor of self-selection of more productive firms into export markets, but nearly no evidence in favor of the learning-by-exporting hypothesis. We document that the exporter premia differ considerably across countries in identically specified empirical models. In a meta-analysis of our results we find that countries that are more open and have more effective government report higher productivity premia. However, the level of development per se does not appear to be an explanation for the observed cross-country differences.","PeriodicalId":428258,"journal":{"name":"CAEPR: Center for Applied Economics & Policy Research Working Paper Series","volume":" 20","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113951366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Given the preferences of players and the rules governing network formation, what networks are likely to emerge and persist? And how do individuals and coalitions evaluate possible consequences of their actions in forming networks? To address these questions we introduce a model of network formation whose primitives consist of a feasible set of networks, player preferences, the rules of network formation, and a dominance relation on feasible networks. The rules of network formation may range from non-cooperative, where players may only act unilaterally, to cooperative, where coalitions of players may act in concert. The dominance relation over feasible networks incorporates not only player preferences and the rules of network formation but also assumptions concerning the degree of farsightedness of players. A specification of the primitives induces an abstract game consisting of (i) a feasible set of networks, and (ii) a path dominance relation defined on the feasible set of networks. Using this induced game we characterize sets of network outcomes that are likely to emerge and persist. Finally, we apply our approach and results to characterize the equilibrium of well known models and their rules of network formation, such as those of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005).
考虑到参与者的偏好和控制网络形成的规则，什么样的网络可能会出现并持续存在?个人和联盟如何评估他们形成网络的行为可能产生的后果?为了解决这些问题，我们引入了一个网络形成模型，该模型的基本要素包括一组可行网络、玩家偏好、网络形成规则和可行网络上的优势关系。网络形成的规则可以从非合作性(玩家只能单方面行动)到合作性(玩家联盟可以一致行动)不等。可行网络的优势关系不仅包含了玩家偏好和网络形成规则，还包含了关于玩家远见程度的假设。通过对原语的说明，可以归纳出一个抽象的博弈，该博弈由(i)可行网络集和(ii)可行网络集上定义的路径优势关系组成。利用这种诱导博弈，我们描述了可能出现并持续存在的网络结果集。最后，我们应用我们的方法和结果来描述众所周知的模型及其网络形成规则的均衡，例如Jackson和Wolinsky(1996)以及Jackson和van den Nouweland(2005)的模型。
{"title":"Strategic Basins of Attraction, the Path Dominance Core, and Network Formation Games","authors":"Frank H. Page, M. Wooders","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1019244","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1019244","url":null,"abstract":"Given the preferences of players and the rules governing network formation, what networks are likely to emerge and persist? And how do individuals and coalitions evaluate possible consequences of their actions in forming networks? To address these questions we introduce a model of network formation whose primitives consist of a feasible set of networks, player preferences, the rules of network formation, and a dominance relation on feasible networks. The rules of network formation may range from non-cooperative, where players may only act unilaterally, to cooperative, where coalitions of players may act in concert. The dominance relation over feasible networks incorporates not only player preferences and the rules of network formation but also assumptions concerning the degree of farsightedness of players. A specification of the primitives induces an abstract game consisting of (i) a feasible set of networks, and (ii) a path dominance relation defined on the feasible set of networks. Using this induced game we characterize sets of network outcomes that are likely to emerge and persist. Finally, we apply our approach and results to characterize the equilibrium of well known models and their rules of network formation, such as those of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005).","PeriodicalId":428258,"journal":{"name":"CAEPR: Center for Applied Economics & Policy Research Working Paper Series","volume":"97 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116914459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Dynamic rational expectations models imply that the real value of debt in the hands of the public must be equal to the expected present-value of surpluses. We impose this equilibrium condition on an identified VAR and characterize the way in which the present-value support of debt varies across various types of fiscal policy shocks and between fiscal and non-fiscal shocks. The role of expected primary surpluses in supporting innovations to debt depends on the nature of the shock. For some fiscal policy shocks, debt is supported almost entirely by changes in the present-value of surpluses, however, in the case of other fiscal policy shocks, surpluses fail to adjust and instead leave a large role for expected changes in discount rates. Horizons over which debt innovations are financed are long - on the order of fifty years - while present-values calculated up to any finite horizon up to then fluctuate wildly, particularly following government spending and transfer shocks.
{"title":"What Has Financed Government Debt?","authors":"Hess T. Chung, E. Leeper","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1013405","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1013405","url":null,"abstract":"Dynamic rational expectations models imply that the real value of debt in the hands of the public must be equal to the expected present-value of surpluses. We impose this equilibrium condition on an identified VAR and characterize the way in which the present-value support of debt varies across various types of fiscal policy shocks and between fiscal and non-fiscal shocks. The role of expected primary surpluses in supporting innovations to debt depends on the nature of the shock. For some fiscal policy shocks, debt is supported almost entirely by changes in the present-value of surpluses, however, in the case of other fiscal policy shocks, surpluses fail to adjust and instead leave a large role for expected changes in discount rates. Horizons over which debt innovations are financed are long - on the order of fifty years - while present-values calculated up to any finite horizon up to then fluctuate wildly, particularly following government spending and transfer shocks.","PeriodicalId":428258,"journal":{"name":"CAEPR: Center for Applied Economics & Policy Research Working Paper Series","volume":"270 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130633552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In a model, two players, heterogeneous in their information quality, compete with each other with perfect information about the other player's information quality. If they can decide their timings of actions endogenously, the less-informed player has an incentive to delay her action for learning. On the other hand, the more-informed player wants to delay her action to prevent her information from being revealed, not to enable her to learn. The conflict of these two types of second mover advantages yields a war of attrition. Although both players can benefit from acting as the follower, the gain from a delay for learning is greater than that for preventing the other's learning. Therefore, a cost for the delay in action plays an important role in characterizing the equilibrium. In contrast to the literature, in which only informational externalities are considered, this article shows that the introduction of payoff externalities contributes to different procedures and reasoning processes through which the heterogeneous players' timings of actions are decided endogenously.
{"title":"Endogenous Timing of Actions Under Conflict between Two Types of Second Mover Advantage","authors":"Y. Yoon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1003843","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1003843","url":null,"abstract":"In a model, two players, heterogeneous in their information quality, compete with each other with perfect information about the other player's information quality. If they can decide their timings of actions endogenously, the less-informed player has an incentive to delay her action for learning. On the other hand, the more-informed player wants to delay her action to prevent her information from being revealed, not to enable her to learn. The conflict of these two types of second mover advantages yields a war of attrition. Although both players can benefit from acting as the follower, the gain from a delay for learning is greater than that for preventing the other's learning. Therefore, a cost for the delay in action plays an important role in characterizing the equilibrium. In contrast to the literature, in which only informational externalities are considered, this article shows that the introduction of payoff externalities contributes to different procedures and reasoning processes through which the heterogeneous players' timings of actions are decided endogenously.","PeriodicalId":428258,"journal":{"name":"CAEPR: Center for Applied Economics & Policy Research Working Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133600321","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I construct an intertemporal searching model ("take it or leave it offer") in a frictional directorship market to explain the unbalanced matching between the director and the firm. In this model, potential candidates for outside directors and firms have heterogeneous (also, well ordered) quality levels. Also, both parties have strictly ordered preferences over the quality of counterpart from high levels to low levels. A candidate considers his quality ranking to compare the value of accepting a favorite offer at present to the value of waiting for successful matching with a better offer in the future. My model suggests that that highly qualified candidates would be likely to be matched with bad (not too bad) firms. The best candidate could go to the 150th ranked firm over 250 firms under the uniform distribution for the quality of the firm, and the 140th ranked firm under the extreme value distribution.
{"title":"The Unbalanced Matching in a Director Market","authors":"Changmin Lee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.998027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.998027","url":null,"abstract":"I construct an intertemporal searching model (\"take it or leave it offer\") in a frictional directorship market to explain the unbalanced matching between the director and the firm. In this model, potential candidates for outside directors and firms have heterogeneous (also, well ordered) quality levels. Also, both parties have strictly ordered preferences over the quality of counterpart from high levels to low levels. A candidate considers his quality ranking to compare the value of accepting a favorite offer at present to the value of waiting for successful matching with a better offer in the future. My model suggests that that highly qualified candidates would be likely to be matched with bad (not too bad) firms. The best candidate could go to the 150th ranked firm over 250 firms under the uniform distribution for the quality of the firm, and the 140th ranked firm under the extreme value distribution.","PeriodicalId":428258,"journal":{"name":"CAEPR: Center for Applied Economics & Policy Research Working Paper Series","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121569007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article proposes a general class of joint and marginal diagnostic tests for parametric conditional mean and variance models of possibly nonlinear non-Markovian time series sequences. The use of joint and marginal tests is motivated from the fact that marginal tests for the conditional variance may lead misleading conclusions when the conditional mean is misspecified. The new tests are based on a generalized spectral approach and, contrary to existing procedures, they do not need to choose a lag order depending on the sample size or to smooth the data. Moreover, the proposed tests are robust to higher order dependence of unknown form, in particular to conditional skewness and kurtosis. It turns out that the asymptotic null distributions of the new tests depend on the data generating process, so a new bootstrap procedure is proposed and theoretically justified. A simulation study compares the finite sample performance of the proposed and competing tests and shows that our tests can play a valuable role in time series modeling. Finally, an application to the S&P 500 highlights the merits of our approach.
{"title":"Joint and Marginal Diagnostic Tests for Conditional Mean and Variance Specifications","authors":"J. Escanciano","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.993205","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.993205","url":null,"abstract":"This article proposes a general class of joint and marginal diagnostic tests for parametric conditional mean and variance models of possibly nonlinear non-Markovian time series sequences. The use of joint and marginal tests is motivated from the fact that marginal tests for the conditional variance may lead misleading conclusions when the conditional mean is misspecified. The new tests are based on a generalized spectral approach and, contrary to existing procedures, they do not need to choose a lag order depending on the sample size or to smooth the data. Moreover, the proposed tests are robust to higher order dependence of unknown form, in particular to conditional skewness and kurtosis. It turns out that the asymptotic null distributions of the new tests depend on the data generating process, so a new bootstrap procedure is proposed and theoretically justified. A simulation study compares the finite sample performance of the proposed and competing tests and shows that our tests can play a valuable role in time series modeling. Finally, an application to the S&P 500 highlights the merits of our approach.","PeriodicalId":428258,"journal":{"name":"CAEPR: Center for Applied Economics & Policy Research Working Paper Series","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131785008","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I analyze directorships held by CEOs who retired during 1989-1993 and during 1998-2002. My results suggest that retired CEOs became more popular on boards. Also, although pre-retirement accounting performance helps explain the number of outside directorships a retired CEO held in the 1989-1993 sample as Brickley, Linck, and Coles (1999) found, it does not in the 1998-2002 sample. Third, a company's stock performance during a CEO's tenure affects whether he became an inside director of that company after retirement. A 25% change in stock price performance increased the probability by 11% in the 1989-1993 sample, and 51% in the 1998-2002 sample. Finally, if a retired CEO worked in a regulated industry, his probability of serving at least one outside directorship fell by 34% in the 1989-1993 sample, and 24% in the 1998-2002 sample.
{"title":"What's Happened over the Past 10 Years to the Selection of Retired CEOs as Board Members?","authors":"Changmin Lee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.988162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.988162","url":null,"abstract":"I analyze directorships held by CEOs who retired during 1989-1993 and during 1998-2002. My results suggest that retired CEOs became more popular on boards. Also, although pre-retirement accounting performance helps explain the number of outside directorships a retired CEO held in the 1989-1993 sample as Brickley, Linck, and Coles (1999) found, it does not in the 1998-2002 sample. Third, a company's stock performance during a CEO's tenure affects whether he became an inside director of that company after retirement. A 25% change in stock price performance increased the probability by 11% in the 1989-1993 sample, and 51% in the 1998-2002 sample. Finally, if a retired CEO worked in a regulated industry, his probability of serving at least one outside directorship fell by 34% in the 1989-1993 sample, and 24% in the 1998-2002 sample.","PeriodicalId":428258,"journal":{"name":"CAEPR: Center for Applied Economics & Policy Research Working Paper Series","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126559083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper analyzes how the budget allocated to state prosecutors varies from one district to another and the reasons for such variation by using theoretical and empirical methods. The main results of this paper are as follows: Other factors being equal, more politically conservative prosecutorial districts get less budget, this decrease in budget with political conservatism is steeper in more affluent and also in more populous districts, and that there are fixed costs in operating a prosecutor’s office. Other less surprising results are that other factors remaining same, prosecutorial budget increases with the population, the crime rate, and with the affluence of the district.
{"title":"Why Do Budgets Received by State Prosecutors Vary Across Districts in the United States?","authors":"Manu Raghav","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.946233","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.946233","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes how the budget allocated to state prosecutors varies from one district to another and the reasons for such variation by using theoretical and empirical methods. The main results of this paper are as follows: Other factors being equal, more politically conservative prosecutorial districts get less budget, this decrease in budget with political conservatism is steeper in more affluent and also in more populous districts, and that there are fixed costs in operating a prosecutor’s office. Other less surprising results are that other factors remaining same, prosecutorial budget increases with the population, the crime rate, and with the affluence of the district.","PeriodicalId":428258,"journal":{"name":"CAEPR: Center for Applied Economics & Policy Research Working Paper Series","volume":"121 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115771364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The use of propensity score methods for program evaluation with nonexperimental data typically requires that the propensity score be estimated, often with a model whose specification is unknown. Although theoretical results suggest that estimators using more flexible propensity score specifications perform better, this has not filtered into applied research. Here we provide Monte Carlo evidence indicating benefits of overspecifying the propensity score that are robust across a number of different covariate structures and estimators. We illustrate these results with two applications, one assessing the environmental effects of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization membership and the other assessing the impact of adopting the euro on bilateral trade.
{"title":"On the Specification of Propensity Scores: With Applications to the Analysis of Trade Policies","authors":"Daniel L. Millimet, R. Tchernis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.918454","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.918454","url":null,"abstract":"The use of propensity score methods for program evaluation with nonexperimental data typically requires that the propensity score be estimated, often with a model whose specification is unknown. Although theoretical results suggest that estimators using more flexible propensity score specifications perform better, this has not filtered into applied research. Here we provide Monte Carlo evidence indicating benefits of overspecifying the propensity score that are robust across a number of different covariate structures and estimators. We illustrate these results with two applications, one assessing the environmental effects of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization membership and the other assessing the impact of adopting the euro on bilateral trade.","PeriodicalId":428258,"journal":{"name":"CAEPR: Center for Applied Economics & Policy Research Working Paper Series","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134376222","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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