Journal of the Philosophy of History最新文献

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The One Big Idea: Koselleck’s Structures of Repetition and Their Historiographical Consequences 一个大概念：科塞勒克的重复结构及其历史学后果

IF 0.5 3区历史学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

Journal of the Philosophy of History

Pub Date : 2023-12-27 DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341510

Peter Vogt

What is the one big idea of Koselleck’s Historik understood as a methodological framework for the attempt to combine a theory of historical times with a theory of historical time? In part (1) of this paper, I criticize the two most basic attempts to understand Koselleck’s one big idea as mistaken because they are exclusively interested either in history (in the singular) or in histories (in the plural) and thus miss the central relevance of structures of repetition (“Wiederholungsstrukturen”) for Koselleck’s Historik. In part (2), I will clarify the rather hidden pre-history, the main ambition, the theoretical context and the substantial content of Koselleck’s concept of structures of repetition in history and language. In part (3), I will discuss four historiographical consequences of Koselleck’s structures of repetition. I will end the paper by observing a remarkable theoretical affinity between Barrington Moore’s search for recurring patterns in the field of sociology and Koselleck’s structures of repetition in history and language. Moore’s work illustrates the historiographical potential of the one big idea of Koselleck’s Historik better than any other work I am aware of.

什么是科塞勒克《历史学》的一个大思想，将其理解为试图将历史时代理论与历史时间理论相结合的方法论框架？在本文的第(1)部分，我将批评理解科塞勒克 "一个大思想 "的两种最基本的尝试是错误的，因为它们要么只对历史（单数）感兴趣，要么只对历史（复数）感兴趣，从而忽略了重复结构（"Wiederholungsstrukturen"）对于科塞勒克历史学的核心意义。在第(2)部分，我将阐明科塞勒克关于历史和语言中重复结构概念的相当隐蔽的前史、主要目标、理论背景和实质内容。在第（3）部分，我将讨论科塞勒克的重复结构的四种历史学后果。在本文的最后，我将指出巴林顿-摩尔（Barrington Moore）在社会学领域对重复模式的探索与科塞勒克的历史和语言中的重复结构之间存在着显著的理论亲和力。摩尔的著作比我所知的任何其他著作都更好地阐释了科塞勒克《历史学》中一个大思想的历史学潜力。

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引用次数: 0

Koselleck and the Problem of Historical Judgment 科塞勒克与历史判断问题

IF 0.5 3区历史学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

Journal of the Philosophy of History

Pub Date : 2023-12-27 DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341507

Zachary Riebeling

This article undertakes an exploration of Reinhart Koselleck’s ideas concerning historical knowledge and moral judgment. Koselleck’s position is exemplified by the maxim “knowing is better than knowing better,” declaimed throughout his career. I argue that Koselleck’s separation of knowledge and judgment was unstable, with the prescription to know repeatedly folded into the proscription against knowing better.

This article begins with an analysis of Koselleck’s maxim and the underlying theoretical position that sustained it. I show how the separation resulted from Koselleck’s attempts to delegitimate utopian philosophies of history and to maintain a plurality of possible histories. I also demonstrate how Koselleck’s maxim reveals the centrality of philosophical-historical schemata in current debates about the meaning and utility of the past, and how recognizing the tension between knowledge and judgment can reshape concerns about history and moral judgment. Throughout, I illuminate how Koselleck’s knowledge/judgment problematic is germane to the philosophy of history by reading him alongside R.G. Collingwood and Joan Scott.

本文探讨了莱因哈特-科塞勒克关于历史知识和道德判断的观点。科塞勒克的立场体现在他在整个职业生涯中都在宣扬的格言 "知之者不如好知者"。本文首先分析了科塞勒克的格言以及支撑这一格言的基本理论立场。文章首先分析了科塞勒克的格言以及支撑这一格言的基本理论立场。我说明了科塞勒克是如何将乌托邦式的历史哲学合法化并保持可能历史的多元性的。我还展示了科塞勒克的格言如何揭示了哲学-历史图式在当前关于过去的意义和效用的争论中的核心地位，以及认识到知识与判断之间的张力如何能够重塑对历史和道德判断的关注。我将科塞克的知识/判断问题与科林伍德（R.G. Collingwood）和琼-斯科特（Joan Scott）放在一起解读，以此阐明科塞克的知识/判断问题如何与历史哲学密切相关。

引用次数: 0

Experience versus Recollection: Reinhart Koselleck and Aleida Assmann on Collective Memory 经验与回忆：莱因哈特-科塞勒克和阿莱达-阿斯曼论集体记忆

IF 0.5 3区历史学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

Journal of the Philosophy of History

Pub Date : 2023-12-27 DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341511

Jan Ferdinand

Since the 1990s, Reinhart Koselleck has been one of the critics of the concept of collective memory. This includes contributions to practical debates on the one hand and reflections on a more theoretical level on the other. In contrast, with her concept of cultural memory, Aleida Assmann has taken a more positive view of the concept of collective memory. She defends this concept against Koselleck’s critical remarks, referring to him as an implicit addressee of her reflections. This essay takes this disagreement as an opportunity to look more closely at the ‘dialogue’ between them by addressing three overlapping aspects, primarily on a theoretical level: the distinction between experience and recollection, the collective conditions of recollection, and the opposition between history of memory and memory of history.

自 20 世纪 90 年代以来，莱因哈特-科塞勒克一直是集体记忆概念的批评者之一。这一方面包括对实践辩论的贡献，另一方面也包括在理论层面的反思。与此相反，阿莱达-阿斯曼（Aleida Assmann）通过她的文化记忆概念，对集体记忆概念采取了更为积极的看法。她针对科塞勒克的批评意见为这一概念进行了辩护，将科塞勒克视为其反思的隐含对象。本文以这一分歧为契机，主要从理论层面探讨三个相互重叠的方面：经验与回忆之间的区别、回忆的集体条件以及记忆的历史与历史的记忆之间的对立，从而更仔细地审视他们之间的 "对话"。

引用次数: 0

Frege and the Logic of the Historical Proposition 弗雷格与历史命题的逻辑

IF 0.5 3区历史学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

Journal of the Philosophy of History

Pub Date : 2023-11-22 DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341505

Luke O’Sullivan

This article argues that history played a larger role in the thought of Gottlob Frege than has usually been acknowledged. Frege’s logical writings frequently employed statements about the past as examples that included references to historical persons. Frege also described history as a science and argued that historical propositions could support valid inferences and reliably identify historical persons and events. But Frege’s eternalist theory of reference, designed primarily for formal concepts and objects, struggled to accommodate such propositions. Identifying an objective referent for the subjectivity of historical actors was particularly problematic. The article suggests that Frege’s writings are interesting for the philosopher of history for at least two reasons: first, his work is clarificatory when considering the key features that historical propositions must have to count as objective knowledge, and second, it foreshadowed the issues with historicity that analytical philosophy experienced in the twentieth century. It concludes that the problems Frege raised exposed the need for a new concept of inter-subjectivity to replace his own Platonic foundation for objectivity.

本文认为，历史在戈特洛布·弗雷格的思想中所起的作用比人们通常认为的要大。弗雷格的逻辑著作经常使用关于过去的陈述作为例子，其中包括对历史人物的参考。弗雷格还将历史描述为一门科学，并认为历史命题可以支持有效的推论，并可靠地识别历史人物和事件。但是弗雷格的永恒论的指称理论，主要是为形式概念和对象设计的，很难适应这样的命题。为历史行动者的主体性确定一个客观的参照对象尤其成问题。这篇文章表明，弗雷格的著作对历史哲学家来说是有趣的，至少有两个原因:首先，当考虑到历史命题必须被视为客观知识的关键特征时，他的作品是澄清的，其次，它预示了分析哲学在20世纪经历的历史性问题。本文的结论是，弗雷格提出的问题表明，需要一种新的主体间性概念来取代他自己的柏拉图式的客观性基础。

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引用次数: 0

Narratives, Events & Monotremes: The Philosophy of History in Practice 叙事、事件与单线:实践中的历史哲学

IF 0.5 3区历史学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

Journal of the Philosophy of History

Pub Date : 2023-10-05 DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341500

Adrian Currie

Significant work in the philosophy of history has focused on the writing of historiographical narratives, isolated from the rest of what historians do. Taking my cue from the philosophy of science in practice, I suggest that understanding historical narratives as embedded within historical practice more generally is fruitful. I illustrate this by bringing a particular instance of historical practice, Natalie Lawrence’s explanation of the sad fate of Winston the platypus, into dialogue with some of Louis Mink’s arguments in favour of anti-realism about historical events. Attending to how historians seek out and utilize archival resources puts serious pressure on these arguments, motivates realist positions, and re-focuses the philosophy of history towards making sense of historiography as a part of the diversity of historians’ interests.

历史哲学的重要工作集中在历史编纂叙事的写作上，与历史学家的其他工作相分离。从实践中的科学哲学中得到启示，我建议更广泛地理解嵌入历史实践中的历史叙事是富有成效的。为了说明这一点，我引用了一个历史实践的特殊例子，即娜塔莉·劳伦斯对鸭嘴兽温斯顿悲惨命运的解释，与路易斯·明克关于历史事件的一些反对现实主义的论点进行了对话。关注历史学家如何寻找和利用档案资源给这些论点带来了严重的压力，激发了现实主义的立场，并将历史哲学重新聚焦于将史学理解为历史学家兴趣多样性的一部分。

引用次数: 0

Thinking about Past Minds: Cognitive Science as Philosophy of Historiography 思考过去的心灵:作为史学哲学的认知科学

IF 0.5 3区历史学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

Journal of the Philosophy of History

Pub Date : 2023-10-05 DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341498

Adam Michael Bricker

This paper outlines the case for a future research program that uses the tools of experimental cognitive science to investigate questions that traditionally fall under the remit of the philosophy of historiography. The central idea is this – the epistemic profile of historians’ representations of the past is largely an empirical matter, determined in no small part by the cognitive processes that produce these representations. However, as the philosophy of historiography is not presently equipped to investigate such cognitive questions, legitimate concerns about evidential quality go largely overlooked. The case of mental state representation provides an excellent illustration of this. Representations of past mental states – the thoughts and fears and knowledge and desires of past agents – play much the same evidential role in historiography as in everyday life, serving in the causal explanation of agents’ behaviors and supporting normative evaluation of those behaviors. However, we have good reason to suspect that the theory of mind processes that support these representations may be more susceptible to error when deployed in the context of historiography than under everyday conditions. This raises worries about the quality of evidence that theory of mind can provide historiography, worries which require experimental cognitive science to properly address.

本文概述了未来研究计划的案例，该计划使用实验认知科学的工具来调查传统上属于史学哲学职权范围的问题。中心思想是这样的——历史学家对过去的描述在很大程度上是一个经验问题，在很大程度上是由产生这些描述的认知过程决定的。然而，由于史学哲学目前还不具备调查这些认知问题的能力，对证据质量的合理关注在很大程度上被忽视了。心理状态表征的例子很好地说明了这一点。过去精神状态的表征——过去行为主体的思想、恐惧、知识和欲望——在历史编纂中扮演着与日常生活中一样的证据角色，为行为主体的行为提供因果解释，并支持对这些行为的规范性评估。然而，我们有充分的理由怀疑，支持这些表征的心理过程理论在史学背景下比在日常条件下更容易出错。这引起了人们对心智理论提供的史学证据质量的担忧，这些担忧需要实验认知科学来妥善解决。

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引用次数: 0

Pre-Narrativist Philosophy of History 前叙事主义历史哲学

IF 0.5 3区历史学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

Journal of the Philosophy of History

Pub Date : 2023-10-05 DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341497

Jonas Ahlskog

Prior to the narrativist turn in the 1970s, philosophy of history focused on action and agency. Seminal pre-narrativist philosophers of history – from Collingwood and Oakeshott to Dilthey and Gadamer – argued that agent-centred action explanation constitutes an irreducible element of historical research. This paper re-examines the agent-centred perspective as one of the key insights of pre-narrativist philosophy of history. This insight has not only been neglected in philosophy of history after the narrativist turn but also fundamentally misunderstood. The paper advances two connected arguments: (i) that the agent-centred perspective is internal to the very idea of historical knowledge, and (ii) that the agent-centred perspective is epistemically prior to retrospective (re)description, which has been the focus of narrativist philosophy of history. In conclusion, the paper contends that the agent-centred and the retrospective perspective constitute two integral and irreducible modes of thought that belong to history.

在20世纪70年代叙事主义转向之前，历史哲学关注的是行动和代理。从科林伍德和奥克肖特到狄尔泰和伽达默尔，前叙事主义历史哲学家都认为，以主体为中心的行为解释构成了历史研究中不可减少的元素。本文重新审视了作为前叙事主义历史哲学重要见解之一的主体中心视角。这种洞见不仅在叙事主义转向后的历史哲学中被忽视，而且从根本上被误解了。本文提出了两个相互关联的论点:(i)以主体为中心的视角是历史知识概念的内部，(ii)以主体为中心的视角在认识论上先于回顾(重新)描述，这一直是叙事主义历史哲学的焦点。最后，本文认为主体中心观和回溯观构成了两种不可分割的历史思维方式。

引用次数: 0

On Compatibility between Presentism and Anti-Presentism in History of Science 论科学史上的现在论与反现在论的相容性

IF 0.5 3区历史学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

Journal of the Philosophy of History

Pub Date : 2023-10-05 DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341502

Karoliina Pulkkinen

Presentism – the influence of the present on historians’ work – has been met with resistance among historians of science; many hold that excessive reference to the present can compromise the aim of understanding past practices in their own terms. In response to this concern, a number of authors have argued that not only is such influence inevitable, it can also be legitimate and helpful. In probing into the presentist and anti-presentist positions in histories of science, I argue here that there is a much larger degree of compatibility between the two positions than has been previously acknowledged. Building on recent work on legitimate forms of presentism, I argue that at least three types of presentism – empirical presentism, motivational presentism, critical presentism – display compatibility with anti-presentism, insofar as certain pitfalls of presentism are kept in mind.

现在主义——现在对历史学家工作的影响——在科学史家中遭到了抵制;许多人认为，过度提及现在可能会损害以自己的方式理解过去实践的目的。针对这种担忧，一些作者认为，这种影响不仅是不可避免的，而且也是合理和有益的。在探究科学史上的现在论和反现在论立场时，我在这里认为，这两种立场之间的兼容性比以前所承认的要大得多。基于最近对存在主义合法形式的研究，我认为至少有三种类型的存在主义——经验的存在主义，动机的存在主义，批判的存在主义——与反存在主义表现出兼容性，只要我们牢记存在主义的某些陷阱。

引用次数: 0

Memory, Folk Narratives, and Social Critique: Notes on Jane Addams and the “Devil Baby” Legend 记忆、民间叙事与社会批判:简·亚当斯与“魔鬼宝宝”传奇笔记

IF 0.5 3区历史学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

Journal of the Philosophy of History

Pub Date : 2023-10-05 DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341503

Tullio Viola

The article focuses on the link between memory, folk narratives, and critical thinking. I suggest in particular that there are instances in which the transmission of a folkloric story, such as a legend or a tale, can intersect with a person’s life experiences and facilitate the articulation of critical perspectives on society that might otherwise go unexpressed. The opportunity for discussing this idea is offered by the work of early twentieth-century Chicago sociologist Jane Addams. In her book The Long Road of Woman’s Memory (1916) Addams dealt with the modern revival of an ancient legend and investigated its interplay with the recollections, grievances, and aspirations of working-class women.

本文主要探讨记忆、民间叙事和批判性思维之间的联系。我特别建议，在某些情况下，民间故事的传播，如传说或故事，可以与一个人的生活经历相交，并促进对社会的批判性观点的表达，否则这些观点可能无法表达。20世纪早期芝加哥社会学家简·亚当斯(Jane adams)的研究为讨论这一观点提供了机会。在她的书《女性记忆的漫长之路》(1916)中，亚当斯探讨了一个古老传说的现代复兴，并研究了它与工人阶级妇女的回忆、不满和愿望的相互作用。

引用次数: 0

On Plurality and Relativism in History 论历史的多元性与相对主义

IF 0.5 3区历史学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

Journal of the Philosophy of History

Pub Date : 2023-10-05 DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341499

Eugen Zeleňák

The existence of differing historical interpretations of the same happenings and the consequences of this phenomenon have attracted scholarly attention and deserve to be studied in the future by philosophers of history. Plurality repeatedly surfaces in historical discussions and relativism seems to be one of the obvious conclusions drawn from the existence of competing historical accounts. In my paper, I begin with plurality in history to examine further the issue of relativism. I focus on the dualism of scheme and content as being at the root of relativity and subsequently argue that abandoning this type of dualism is one way how to avoid relativism even within a broadly constructivist view of history. The discussion is, moreover, linked to the issue of how historians present their accounts: Do they offer representations of the past or should we think about their outcomes in a different way?

对同一事件的不同历史解释的存在以及这种现象的后果已经引起了学术界的关注，值得历史哲学家在未来进行研究。在历史讨论中，多元性反复出现，相对主义似乎是从相互竞争的历史叙述的存在中得出的明显结论之一。在我的论文中，我从历史上的多元性开始，进一步探讨相对主义的问题。我将重点放在方案和内容的二元论上，将其作为相对论的根源，并随后提出，放弃这种二元论是避免相对主义的一种方法，即使在广义的建构主义历史观中也是如此。此外，讨论还与历史学家如何陈述他们的叙述有关:他们是否提供了对过去的陈述，还是我们应该以不同的方式思考他们的结果?

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全部化学•材料生命科学医学物理工程技术环境•农林材料科学地球科学法学管理学化学环境科学与生态学计算机科学教育学经济学农林科学人文科学生物学数学物理与天体物理心理学综合性期刊其他工业工程理学历史学农学文学信息工程

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Journal of the Philosophy of History

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