Pub Date : 2023-10-05DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341502
Karoliina Pulkkinen
Presentism – the influence of the present on historians’ work – has been met with resistance among historians of science; many hold that excessive reference to the present can compromise the aim of understanding past practices in their own terms. In response to this concern, a number of authors have argued that not only is such influence inevitable, it can also be legitimate and helpful. In probing into the presentist and anti-presentist positions in histories of science, I argue here that there is a much larger degree of compatibility between the two positions than has been previously acknowledged. Building on recent work on legitimate forms of presentism, I argue that at least three types of presentism – empirical presentism, motivational presentism, critical presentism – display compatibility with anti-presentism, insofar as certain pitfalls of presentism are kept in mind.
{"title":"On Compatibility between Presentism and Anti-Presentism in History of Science","authors":"Karoliina Pulkkinen","doi":"10.1163/18722636-12341502","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341502","url":null,"abstract":"Presentism – the influence of the present on historians’ work – has been met with resistance among historians of science; many hold that excessive reference to the present can compromise the aim of understanding past practices in their own terms. In response to this concern, a number of authors have argued that not only is such influence inevitable, it can also be legitimate and helpful. In probing into the presentist and anti-presentist positions in histories of science, I argue here that there is a much larger degree of compatibility between the two positions than has been previously acknowledged. Building on recent work on legitimate forms of presentism, I argue that at least three types of presentism – empirical presentism, motivational presentism, critical presentism – display compatibility with anti-presentism, insofar as certain pitfalls of presentism are kept in mind.","PeriodicalId":43541,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of History","volume":"39 17","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138506057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-05DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341503
Tullio Viola
The article focuses on the link between memory, folk narratives, and critical thinking. I suggest in particular that there are instances in which the transmission of a folkloric story, such as a legend or a tale, can intersect with a person’s life experiences and facilitate the articulation of critical perspectives on society that might otherwise go unexpressed. The opportunity for discussing this idea is offered by the work of early twentieth-century Chicago sociologist Jane Addams. In her book The Long Road of Woman’s Memory (1916) Addams dealt with the modern revival of an ancient legend and investigated its interplay with the recollections, grievances, and aspirations of working-class women.
{"title":"Memory, Folk Narratives, and Social Critique: Notes on Jane Addams and the “Devil Baby” Legend","authors":"Tullio Viola","doi":"10.1163/18722636-12341503","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341503","url":null,"abstract":"The article focuses on the link between memory, folk narratives, and critical thinking. I suggest in particular that there are instances in which the transmission of a folkloric story, such as a legend or a tale, can intersect with a person’s life experiences and facilitate the articulation of critical perspectives on society that might otherwise go unexpressed. The opportunity for discussing this idea is offered by the work of early twentieth-century Chicago sociologist Jane Addams. In her book <jats:italic>The Long Road of Woman’s Memory</jats:italic> (1916) Addams dealt with the modern revival of an ancient legend and investigated its interplay with the recollections, grievances, and aspirations of working-class women.","PeriodicalId":43541,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of History","volume":"39 29","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138506073","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-05DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341499
Eugen Zeleňák
The existence of differing historical interpretations of the same happenings and the consequences of this phenomenon have attracted scholarly attention and deserve to be studied in the future by philosophers of history. Plurality repeatedly surfaces in historical discussions and relativism seems to be one of the obvious conclusions drawn from the existence of competing historical accounts. In my paper, I begin with plurality in history to examine further the issue of relativism. I focus on the dualism of scheme and content as being at the root of relativity and subsequently argue that abandoning this type of dualism is one way how to avoid relativism even within a broadly constructivist view of history. The discussion is, moreover, linked to the issue of how historians present their accounts: Do they offer representations of the past or should we think about their outcomes in a different way?
{"title":"On Plurality and Relativism in History","authors":"Eugen Zeleňák","doi":"10.1163/18722636-12341499","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341499","url":null,"abstract":"The existence of differing historical interpretations of the same happenings and the consequences of this phenomenon have attracted scholarly attention and deserve to be studied in the future by philosophers of history. Plurality repeatedly surfaces in historical discussions and relativism seems to be one of the obvious conclusions drawn from the existence of competing historical accounts. In my paper, I begin with plurality in history to examine further the issue of relativism. I focus on the dualism of scheme and content as being at the root of relativity and subsequently argue that abandoning this type of dualism is one way how to avoid relativism even within a broadly constructivist view of history. The discussion is, moreover, linked to the issue of how historians present their accounts: Do they offer representations of the past or should we think about their outcomes in a different way?","PeriodicalId":43541,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of History","volume":"39 18","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138506056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-05DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341501
Veli Virmajoki
In this paper, I analyze how frameworks shape historiographical explanations. I argue that, in order to identify a sequence of events as relevant to a historical outcome, assumptions about the workings of the relevant domain have to be made. By extending Lakatosian considerations, I argue that these assumptions are provided by a framework that contains a set of factors and intertwined principles that (supposedly) govern how a historical phenomenon works. I connect frameworks with a counterfactual account of historical explanation. Frameworks enable us to explain the past by providing a backbone of explanatory patterns of counterfactual dependency. I conclude by noting that both counterfactual scenarios and scenarios of the future require frameworks and, therefore, historiographical explanation generates a set of possible futures. Analyzing these possible futures enables us to reveal the theoretical commitments of historiography.
{"title":"Frameworks in Historiography: Explanation, Scenarios, and Futures","authors":"Veli Virmajoki","doi":"10.1163/18722636-12341501","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341501","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I analyze how frameworks shape historiographical explanations. I argue that, in order to identify a sequence of events as relevant to a historical outcome, assumptions about the workings of the relevant domain have to be made. By extending Lakatosian considerations, I argue that these assumptions are provided by a framework that contains a set of factors and intertwined principles that (supposedly) govern how a historical phenomenon works. I connect frameworks with a counterfactual account of historical explanation. Frameworks enable us to explain the past by providing a backbone of explanatory patterns of counterfactual dependency. I conclude by noting that both counterfactual scenarios and scenarios of the future require frameworks and, therefore, historiographical explanation generates a set of possible futures. Analyzing these possible futures enables us to reveal the theoretical commitments of historiography.","PeriodicalId":43541,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of History","volume":"37 23","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138506064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-03DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341496
Georg Gangl, Ilkka Lähteenmäki
{"title":"The Futures of the Philosophy of History: An Introduction","authors":"Georg Gangl, Ilkka Lähteenmäki","doi":"10.1163/18722636-12341496","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341496","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43541,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of History","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139363568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-21DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341504
Adam Timmins
{"title":"Analysing Historical Narratives: On Academic, Popular and Educational Framings of the Past, edited by Stefan Berger, Nicola Brauch and Chris Lorenz","authors":"Adam Timmins","doi":"10.1163/18722636-12341504","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341504","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43541,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of History","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42339288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-13DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341490
Rachelle Powell, Irina Mikhalevich
Stephen Jay Gould argued that the shape of animal life as we know it is a radically contingent accident of history determined more by fortune than comparative functional merit. Acknowledging the formative role of contingency in macroevolution is crucial, Gould believed, to vanquishing the lingering vestiges of progressivism that continue to buttress anthropocentric views of life. Gould’s contingency thesis has come under fire in recent years by proponents of convergent evolution who argue that not only is replication ubiquitous in evolution, but also that it indicates an evolutionary process charging inexorably toward ever more complex and human-like outcomes. We argue here that although convergentist approaches are widely seen as inimical to the Gouldian view of life, in fact the two are indispensable allies in the anti-progressivist crusade, particularly in relation to the evolution of mind. We illustrate this by examining the progressivist foundations of comparative cognition science and the ongoing resistance to attributions of convergent minds.
斯蒂芬·杰伊·古尔德（Stephen Jay Gould）认为，我们所知道的动物生命的形态是一个根本偶然的历史事故，更多地是由命运而非相对功能价值决定的。古尔德认为，承认偶然性在宏观进化中的形成作用，对于战胜继续支持以人类为中心的生命观的进步主义残余至关重要。近年来，古尔德的偶然性理论受到了趋同进化论支持者的抨击，他们认为复制不仅在进化中无处不在，而且表明进化过程正在无情地向更复杂、更像人类的结果发展。我们在这里认为，尽管趋同主义的方法被广泛视为不利于古尔德的生命观，但事实上，这两者是反进步主义运动中不可或缺的盟友，尤其是在思想进化方面。我们通过考察比较认知科学的进步主义基础和对趋同思维归因的持续抵制来说明这一点。
{"title":"Wonderful Mind: Convergentism and the Crusade Against Evolutionary Progress","authors":"Rachelle Powell, Irina Mikhalevich","doi":"10.1163/18722636-12341490","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341490","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Stephen Jay Gould argued that the shape of animal life as we know it is a radically contingent accident of history determined more by fortune than comparative functional merit. Acknowledging the formative role of contingency in macroevolution is crucial, Gould believed, to vanquishing the lingering vestiges of progressivism that continue to buttress anthropocentric views of life. Gould’s contingency thesis has come under fire in recent years by proponents of convergent evolution who argue that not only is replication ubiquitous in evolution, but also that it indicates an evolutionary process charging inexorably toward ever more complex and human-like outcomes. We argue here that although convergentist approaches are widely seen as inimical to the Gouldian view of life, in fact the two are indispensable allies in the anti-progressivist crusade, particularly in relation to the evolution of mind. We illustrate this by examining the progressivist foundations of comparative cognition science and the ongoing resistance to attributions of convergent minds.","PeriodicalId":43541,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of History","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46939236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-13DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341492
Eric Desjardins, Derek Oswick, Craig W. Fox
Historical contingency is commonly associated with unpredictability and outcome variability. As such, it can be seen as an undesirable aspect of experimental investigations. Many might agree that experimental methodologies that include enough control help to by-pass this problem and thereby make for more secure knowledge. Against this received view, we argue that, for at least some historically contingent processes, an over-emphasis on control might mislead by obscuring the very object of investigation or by preventing fruitful discoveries. In discussing cases from evolutionary biology, developmental biology, and geochemistry/astrophysics, we show how investigating through approaches that don’t prioritize environmental control, while allowing for greater variability of outcomes, better respects the object/environment entanglement of these systems. Finally, we defend the idea that, despite the lower level of control, these types of experiments do not have a lower epistemic value than more highly controlled experiments.
{"title":"On the Ambivalence of Control in Experimental Investigation of Historically Contingent Processes","authors":"Eric Desjardins, Derek Oswick, Craig W. Fox","doi":"10.1163/18722636-12341492","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341492","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Historical contingency is commonly associated with unpredictability and outcome variability. As such, it can be seen as an undesirable aspect of experimental investigations. Many might agree that experimental methodologies that include enough control help to by-pass this problem and thereby make for more secure knowledge. Against this received view, we argue that, for at least some historically contingent processes, an over-emphasis on control might mislead by obscuring the very object of investigation or by preventing fruitful discoveries. In discussing cases from evolutionary biology, developmental biology, and geochemistry/astrophysics, we show how investigating through approaches that don’t prioritize environmental control, while allowing for greater variability of outcomes, better respects the object/environment entanglement of these systems. Finally, we defend the idea that, despite the lower level of control, these types of experiments do not have a lower epistemic value than more highly controlled experiments.","PeriodicalId":43541,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of History","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48297453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-13DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341487
Helen Zhao
This article aims to shed light on what lies at the heart of skepticism towards counterfactual, alternative, or what-if history. On its face, counterfactual history gives historians and philosophers good reason to worry. First, because counterfactual pasts leave no traces, historians lack an important source of empirical warrant. Second, because rewriting historical events might unpredictably change the past, inferences about what might have happened seem only weakly supported by generalizations about what actually did happen. Third, counterfactual narratives appear especially vulnerable to wishful thinking. Ultimately, through consideration of the epistemic values that regulate the construction of counterfactual narratives, I marshal arguments against these objections and defend the legitimacy of the project. Still, I hope to show that far from being a mere ‘parlor game’, counterfactual history raises deep and provocative questions about historians’ ability to know our past, only some of which I address here.
{"title":"Counterfactual History: Three Worries and Replies","authors":"Helen Zhao","doi":"10.1163/18722636-12341487","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341487","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This article aims to shed light on what lies at the heart of skepticism towards counterfactual, alternative, or what-if history. On its face, counterfactual history gives historians and philosophers good reason to worry. First, because counterfactual pasts leave no traces, historians lack an important source of empirical warrant. Second, because rewriting historical events might unpredictably change the past, inferences about what might have happened seem only weakly supported by generalizations about what actually did happen. Third, counterfactual narratives appear especially vulnerable to wishful thinking. Ultimately, through consideration of the epistemic values that regulate the construction of counterfactual narratives, I marshal arguments against these objections and defend the legitimacy of the project. Still, I hope to show that far from being a mere ‘parlor game’, counterfactual history raises deep and provocative questions about historians’ ability to know our past, only some of which I address here.","PeriodicalId":43541,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of History","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43285704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-13DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341486
Alison K. McConwell, D. Turner
Historical contingency has been a central theme of much recent work in the philosophy of historical science. This includes a rich and interdisciplinary literature on the role and nature of contingency in sciences like evolutionary biology, paleontology, geology, ecology, astrobiology, and more. Philosophers have approached the shared historical character of these sciences through mostly metaphysical and epistemic questions about the nature of life’s past, trends and determinism, the presence (or absence) of directionality, the fragility and causal dependence of events, and the success and nature of narrative explanations in these contexts. Much of this work has centered around a particular controversy about the nature of life’s history. Contingency as a feature of historical analysis in much of this work derives from Stephen Jay Gould’s characterization of evolutionary history.1 In that treatise, Gould analyzed work concerning the fossils of the Burgess Shale, a quarry that houses some of the earliest fossils from the Cambrian period over 500 million years ago. He asked: if we were to replay the tape of life, would outcomes be largely the same or vastly different? The Burgess shale fossils included a striking variety of animal body plans, and Gould wondered how differently the world today might look if most of the animals today had descended from one
{"title":"Historical Contingency: A Special Issue on Epistemic & Non-Epistemic Values in Historical Sciences","authors":"Alison K. McConwell, D. Turner","doi":"10.1163/18722636-12341486","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341486","url":null,"abstract":"Historical contingency has been a central theme of much recent work in the philosophy of historical science. This includes a rich and interdisciplinary literature on the role and nature of contingency in sciences like evolutionary biology, paleontology, geology, ecology, astrobiology, and more. Philosophers have approached the shared historical character of these sciences through mostly metaphysical and epistemic questions about the nature of life’s past, trends and determinism, the presence (or absence) of directionality, the fragility and causal dependence of events, and the success and nature of narrative explanations in these contexts. Much of this work has centered around a particular controversy about the nature of life’s history. Contingency as a feature of historical analysis in much of this work derives from Stephen Jay Gould’s characterization of evolutionary history.1 In that treatise, Gould analyzed work concerning the fossils of the Burgess Shale, a quarry that houses some of the earliest fossils from the Cambrian period over 500 million years ago. He asked: if we were to replay the tape of life, would outcomes be largely the same or vastly different? The Burgess shale fossils included a striking variety of animal body plans, and Gould wondered how differently the world today might look if most of the animals today had descended from one","PeriodicalId":43541,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of History","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46105674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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