Pub Date : 2021-11-12DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341467
F. Ankersmit
Few philosophers of history ever recognized the profundity of Peter Munz’s The Shapes of Time that came out in 1977. In this book Munz upheld the view that no part or aspect of the past itself provides us with the solid fundament of all historical knowledge. For him, the historian’s most fundamental logical entity is what he calls the Sinngebild. The Sinngebild consists of two events defined and held together by a covering law. These CL’s can be anything from simple truisms, the regularities we know from daily life to truly scientific laws. But ‘underneath’ these Sinngebilde there is nothing. Hence, Munz’s bold assertation: ‘the truth of the matter is that there is no ascertainable face behind the various masks every story-teller is creating’ and his claim that his philosophy of history is ‘an idealism writ small’. Next, Munz distinguishes between ‘explanation’ and ‘interpretation’. We ‘explain’ the past by taking seriously the historical agent’s self-description and ‘interpret’ it by stating what it looks like from our present perspective. ‘Explanation’ and ‘interpretation’ may ‘typologically’ be more or less similar. Relying on a number of very well-chosen examples from his own field (Munz was a medievalist), this enables Munz to argue why one historical interpretation may be superior to another. In his later life Munz developed a speculative philosophy of history inspired by Popper’s fallibilism.
{"title":"Peter Munz and Historical Thought","authors":"F. Ankersmit","doi":"10.1163/18722636-12341467","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341467","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Few philosophers of history ever recognized the profundity of Peter Munz’s The Shapes of Time that came out in 1977. In this book Munz upheld the view that no part or aspect of the past itself provides us with the solid fundament of all historical knowledge. For him, the historian’s most fundamental logical entity is what he calls the Sinngebild. The Sinngebild consists of two events defined and held together by a covering law. These CL’s can be anything from simple truisms, the regularities we know from daily life to truly scientific laws. But ‘underneath’ these Sinngebilde there is nothing. Hence, Munz’s bold assertation: ‘the truth of the matter is that there is no ascertainable face behind the various masks every story-teller is creating’ and his claim that his philosophy of history is ‘an idealism writ small’. Next, Munz distinguishes between ‘explanation’ and ‘interpretation’. We ‘explain’ the past by taking seriously the historical agent’s self-description and ‘interpret’ it by stating what it looks like from our present perspective. ‘Explanation’ and ‘interpretation’ may ‘typologically’ be more or less similar. Relying on a number of very well-chosen examples from his own field (Munz was a medievalist), this enables Munz to argue why one historical interpretation may be superior to another. In his later life Munz developed a speculative philosophy of history inspired by Popper’s fallibilism.","PeriodicalId":43541,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of History","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49324920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-12DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341462
P. Carrard
Forgotten during several years and rediscovered by historians of the Annales in the 1930s, Paul Lacombe’s De l’histoire considérée comme science (1894) is now quoted in such books as Antoine Prost’s Douze leçons sur l’histoire and the Sage Handbook of Historical Theory. Lacombe’s work is important from an historical standpoint. Against the focus on single events that prevailed in the late nineteenth century, Lacombe defined scientific history as the identifications of regularities for the purpose of articulating laws. Against the empirical approach practiced during that same period, he also stressed the importance of the hypothesis – of the assumptions that made the selection of the facts possible. Finally, connected to several militant women of the time, Lacombe, sought to do what we would now call “gender history,” that is, to study the distribution of gender roles during specific periods. While anticipating several developments in the theory of history, Lacombe was yet a man of his time. He thus did not foresee that his (and his contemporaries’) contrast between observation-based and document-based science would later be challenged, some philosophers now arguing that chemists and physicists are not more able than historians to “observe” the phenomena that they describe.
保罗·拉孔布(Paul Lacombe) 1894年出版的《从历史角度看，与历史的关系》(De l’histoire as sur l’histoire)和《圣人历史理论手册》(Sage Handbook of Historical Theory)等书中都引用了拉孔布(Paul Lacombe) 1894年出版的《从历史角度看》(De l’histoire)。从历史的角度来看，拉孔布的工作很重要。与19世纪晚期流行的关注单一事件的观点不同，拉孔布将科学史定义为为了阐明规律而对规律的识别。与同一时期实行的经验主义方法相反，他还强调假设的重要性，即使事实选择成为可能的假设。最后，拉孔布与当时几位激进的女性有联系，试图做我们现在所说的“性别史”，也就是说，研究特定时期性别角色的分布。虽然拉孔布预见了历史理论的若干发展，但他仍然是那个时代的人物。因此，他没有预见到他(和他同时代的人)对基于观察和基于文献的科学的对比后来会受到挑战，一些哲学家现在认为化学家和物理学家并不比历史学家更有能力“观察”他们所描述的现象。
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Pub Date : 2021-11-12DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341469
M. Wimmer
In this article, I portray both the “thinking historian” Heinz-Dieter Kittsteiner and his philosophical analysis of the unavailability of the historical process. In his book Out of Control (2004), Kittsteiner builds on Immanuel Kant’s concept of the historical sign to demonstrate how history is out of joint due to the contingent character of the historical process. This understanding demands a new theory of historical time and of historiographical practice, which I reconstruct through a close reading of a chapter of Kittsteiner’s book.
{"title":"Kittsteiner’s History Out of Joint","authors":"M. Wimmer","doi":"10.1163/18722636-12341469","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341469","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In this article, I portray both the “thinking historian” Heinz-Dieter Kittsteiner and his philosophical analysis of the unavailability of the historical process. In his book Out of Control (2004), Kittsteiner builds on Immanuel Kant’s concept of the historical sign to demonstrate how history is out of joint due to the contingent character of the historical process. This understanding demands a new theory of historical time and of historiographical practice, which I reconstruct through a close reading of a chapter of Kittsteiner’s book.","PeriodicalId":43541,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of History","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43674249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-12DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341460
H. Paul, Larissa Schulte Nordholt
Why do philosophy of history books so easily end up on the scrap heap of history?1 Why does nobody anymore read Raymond Martin’s The Past Within Us (1989), despite this little book offering a stimulating correction to the tendency, not uncommon in the field, of privileging conceptual reflection over empirical analysis? Why is Henri-Irénée Marrou’s “treatise on the virtues of the historian,” published in 1954 as De la connaissance historique, almost entirely forgotten, notwithstanding the “virtue turn” that is manifesting itself throughout the humanities and social sciences? Or why is Hanno Kesting’s Geschichtsphilosophie und Weltbürgerkrieg (1959) collecting dust on library shelves, despite the fact that its analysis of historical narratives underpinning the Cold War, the project of European integration, and Third World development policies aligns well with a currently thriving type of intellectual history? It is hard to generalize about a field as heterogenous as the philosophy of history. One thing, however, is certain: like many other humanities scholars, philosophers of history often feel more inclined to dissociate themselves from
为什么历史书中的哲学很容易被扔进历史的垃圾堆？1为什么没有人再读雷蒙德·马丁的《我们的过去》（1989），尽管这本小书对概念反思优先于实证分析的趋势进行了刺激性的纠正，这在该领域并不罕见？为什么亨利·伊雷内·马鲁（Henri Irénée Marrou）1954年出版的《历史的美德论》（De la connaisance historique）几乎被完全遗忘了，尽管“美德转向”在整个人文科学和社会科学中都有体现？或者，为什么Hanno Kesting的《Geschichtphilosophie und Weltbürgerkrieg》（1959）在图书馆书架上积满了灰尘，尽管它对支撑冷战、欧洲一体化项目和第三世界发展政策的历史叙事的分析与目前蓬勃发展的知识史类型非常吻合？很难对历史哲学这样一个异质性的领域进行概括。然而，有一点是肯定的：像许多其他人文学者一样，历史哲学家往往更倾向于与
{"title":"Introduction: The Posterizing Impulse in Philosophy of History","authors":"H. Paul, Larissa Schulte Nordholt","doi":"10.1163/18722636-12341460","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341460","url":null,"abstract":"Why do philosophy of history books so easily end up on the scrap heap of history?1 Why does nobody anymore read Raymond Martin’s The Past Within Us (1989), despite this little book offering a stimulating correction to the tendency, not uncommon in the field, of privileging conceptual reflection over empirical analysis? Why is Henri-Irénée Marrou’s “treatise on the virtues of the historian,” published in 1954 as De la connaissance historique, almost entirely forgotten, notwithstanding the “virtue turn” that is manifesting itself throughout the humanities and social sciences? Or why is Hanno Kesting’s Geschichtsphilosophie und Weltbürgerkrieg (1959) collecting dust on library shelves, despite the fact that its analysis of historical narratives underpinning the Cold War, the project of European integration, and Third World development policies aligns well with a currently thriving type of intellectual history? It is hard to generalize about a field as heterogenous as the philosophy of history. One thing, however, is certain: like many other humanities scholars, philosophers of history often feel more inclined to dissociate themselves from","PeriodicalId":43541,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of History","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44933553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-20DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341457
A. Currie, Daniel G. Swaim
We defend a realist account of history: past facts are discoveries not creations. We show how ‘moderate’ realists, who admit the critical role of perspective, while insisting on history’s metaphysical independence from historians, can accommodate Paul Roth’s arguments in favor of irrealism. Moreover, our position is consistent with a dynamic past: as history unfurls past events gain new properties. Realism is necessary, we argue, to capture substantive disputes within history. It also grounds history’s reflexivity: the point of the continual re-examination of history (and history’s history!) turns in part on there being mind-independent past facts to be had.
{"title":"Past Facts and the Nature of History","authors":"A. Currie, Daniel G. Swaim","doi":"10.1163/18722636-12341457","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341457","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000We defend a realist account of history: past facts are discoveries not creations. We show how ‘moderate’ realists, who admit the critical role of perspective, while insisting on history’s metaphysical independence from historians, can accommodate Paul Roth’s arguments in favor of irrealism. Moreover, our position is consistent with a dynamic past: as history unfurls past events gain new properties. Realism is necessary, we argue, to capture substantive disputes within history. It also grounds history’s reflexivity: the point of the continual re-examination of history (and history’s history!) turns in part on there being mind-independent past facts to be had.","PeriodicalId":43541,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of History","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41358202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-20DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341458
Aviezer Tucker
This article examines historicism as the expansion of historiography beyond its bounds, analogous to Physicalism, Naturalism, Psychologism, and Scientism. Five senses of historicism are distinguished: Ontological Historicism claims ultimate reality is, and only is, historical. Idiographic historicism considers historiography an empirical science that results in observational descriptions of unique singular events. Introspective historicism considers the epistemology of historiography to be founded on self-knowledge. Scientistic historicism considers historiography an applied psychology or social science that can expand to overtake the social sciences. Methodological historicism extends the use of historiographic methodologies to unreliable or dependent evidence. The first four historicisms are inconsistent with historiography within bounds and implode. Methodological historicism describes proper historiographic methodologies that are applied out of their proper bounds, but are used in historiography based on the epistemology of testimony and the tracing of the transmission of information from historical event to historiographic evidence.
{"title":"Historicism Now: Historiographic Ontology, Epistemology and Methodology Out of Bounds","authors":"Aviezer Tucker","doi":"10.1163/18722636-12341458","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341458","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines historicism as the expansion of historiography beyond its bounds, analogous to Physicalism, Naturalism, Psychologism, and Scientism. Five senses of historicism are distinguished: Ontological Historicism claims ultimate reality is, and only is, historical. Idiographic historicism considers historiography an empirical science that results in observational descriptions of unique singular events. Introspective historicism considers the epistemology of historiography to be founded on self-knowledge. Scientistic historicism considers historiography an applied psychology or social science that can expand to overtake the social sciences. Methodological historicism extends the use of historiographic methodologies to unreliable or dependent evidence. The first four historicisms are inconsistent with historiography within bounds and implode. Methodological historicism describes proper historiographic methodologies that are applied out of their proper bounds, but are used in historiography based on the epistemology of testimony and the tracing of the transmission of information from historical event to historiographic evidence.","PeriodicalId":43541,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of History","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43741740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-09DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341459
Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen
The focus on the narrative aspects of the writing of history since the 1970s has reinforced constructivist and pluralist assumptions about historiography. Narrativization and narrative features in texts have typically been understood as being dependent on the subject-side, and thus, on the narrator and her culture. Assuming then that narrativity is an essential feature of historical presentation, the conclusion that seems to follow is that there cannot be only one objectively correct narrativization of the past. Instead, there are many possible (literary) worlds of history. But are there other reasons to favor pluralism with respect to the worlds of history? By contrast, it is often thought that the sciences gradually reveal the secrets of nature and debunk our errors and myths. This form of progress has of course been questioned by Kuhn and other historical philosophers in particular but still captures the imagination of many. Could the past be approached in a similar way? That is, could we think that painstaking study reveals the shape of the real past, which could perhaps also function as a guide to the future? Further, if we think that historical explanations are causal, citing causes and effects of phenomena, does this add force to realism in historiography? Is it conceivable that there is something like one correct and describable causal structure in the past? And can we get to the one true account of the past? The papers of this issue are united by their concern with the form and philosophical bearing of historical knowledge. Specifically, they discuss narrativity, causality and plurality of historical (re)presentations. Bruce S. Bennett and Moletlanyi Tshipa argue most explicitly for the plurality of historical worlds. Their application of the Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI), borrowed from physics, strikingly states that all possible histories exist. It may be the case that we, in fact, inhabit a less probable world. The authors also suggest that MWI can help us to think about causation in history. Georg Gangl likewise studies the nature of causality in his research paper. Gangl argues that historiography shares the same form of explanation, causal narrative explanation, as other historical sciences, such as evolutionary biology and paleontology. According to Gangl, “historians track with their narratives ... ‘causal networks’ that spread through time,” which seems to take us beyond the historian-narrator’s world to the real mechanisms of the past. Yet,
自20世纪70年代以来，对历史写作叙事方面的关注加强了关于史学的建构主义和多元主义假设。文本中的叙事和叙事特征通常被理解为依赖于主体方面，因此依赖于叙述者及其文化。假设叙事性是历史呈现的基本特征，那么似乎可以得出的结论是，对过去的客观正确的叙述不可能只有一种。相反，历史有许多可能的(文学)世界。但是，关于历史世界，还有其他理由支持多元主义吗?相比之下，人们通常认为科学逐渐揭示了自然的秘密，揭穿了我们的错误和神话。这种形式的进步当然受到了库恩和其他历史哲学家的质疑，但仍然吸引了许多人的想象力。是否可以用类似的方式来看待过去?也就是说，我们是否可以认为艰苦的研究揭示了真实的过去的形状，这也许也可以作为未来的指南?此外，如果我们认为历史解释是因果关系，引用现象的因果关系，这是否增加了史学中的现实主义的力量?在过去是否存在一种正确且可描述的因果结构?我们能找到关于过去的唯一真实的叙述吗?这个问题的论文是由他们对历史知识的形式和哲学意义的关注而统一起来的。具体来说，他们讨论了叙事性、因果关系和历史(再)呈现的多元性。Bruce S. Bennett和Moletlanyi Tshipa最明确地主张历史世界的多元性。他们从物理学中借鉴的多世界解释(MWI)的应用惊人地表明，所有可能的历史都存在。事实上，我们可能生活在一个不太可能发生的世界。作者还认为，MWI可以帮助我们思考历史上的因果关系。Georg Gangl同样在他的研究论文中研究了因果关系的本质。Gangl认为，史学与其他历史科学(如进化生物学和古生物学)有着相同的解释形式，即因果叙事解释。根据Gangl的说法，“历史学家追踪他们的叙述……通过时间传播的‘因果网络’，”这似乎把我们带出了历史叙述者的世界，到了过去的真实机制。然而,
{"title":"Editorial: How Many Worlds of History Are There?","authors":"Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen","doi":"10.1163/18722636-12341459","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341459","url":null,"abstract":"The focus on the narrative aspects of the writing of history since the 1970s has reinforced constructivist and pluralist assumptions about historiography. Narrativization and narrative features in texts have typically been understood as being dependent on the subject-side, and thus, on the narrator and her culture. Assuming then that narrativity is an essential feature of historical presentation, the conclusion that seems to follow is that there cannot be only one objectively correct narrativization of the past. Instead, there are many possible (literary) worlds of history. But are there other reasons to favor pluralism with respect to the worlds of history? By contrast, it is often thought that the sciences gradually reveal the secrets of nature and debunk our errors and myths. This form of progress has of course been questioned by Kuhn and other historical philosophers in particular but still captures the imagination of many. Could the past be approached in a similar way? That is, could we think that painstaking study reveals the shape of the real past, which could perhaps also function as a guide to the future? Further, if we think that historical explanations are causal, citing causes and effects of phenomena, does this add force to realism in historiography? Is it conceivable that there is something like one correct and describable causal structure in the past? And can we get to the one true account of the past? The papers of this issue are united by their concern with the form and philosophical bearing of historical knowledge. Specifically, they discuss narrativity, causality and plurality of historical (re)presentations. Bruce S. Bennett and Moletlanyi Tshipa argue most explicitly for the plurality of historical worlds. Their application of the Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI), borrowed from physics, strikingly states that all possible histories exist. It may be the case that we, in fact, inhabit a less probable world. The authors also suggest that MWI can help us to think about causation in history. Georg Gangl likewise studies the nature of causality in his research paper. Gangl argues that historiography shares the same form of explanation, causal narrative explanation, as other historical sciences, such as evolutionary biology and paleontology. According to Gangl, “historians track with their narratives ... ‘causal networks’ that spread through time,” which seems to take us beyond the historian-narrator’s world to the real mechanisms of the past. Yet,","PeriodicalId":43541,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of History","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44437960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-29DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341456
F. Ankersmit
Up till the 1980s narrativist philosophers of history were mainly interested in the cognitivist dimension of historical narrative. With Hayden White this interest was exchanged for an exclusive preoccupation with the literary aspects of the historian’s narrative representation of the past. However, it may seem that a revival of pre-Whitean narrativist philosophy of history is at hand. Two recent books suggest as much: one by Chiel van den Akker published in 2018 and one more by Paul Roth that came out in 2020. Obviously, a narrativist revival can take two different forms. It may aim at providing pre-Whitean narrativism with a more up-to-date philosophical basis or at guiding it into new directions. It will be argued in this review-essay that the book by Roth mainly does the former, whereas the book by Van den Akker does both.
{"title":"A Narrativist Revival?","authors":"F. Ankersmit","doi":"10.1163/18722636-12341456","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341456","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Up till the 1980s narrativist philosophers of history were mainly interested in the cognitivist dimension of historical narrative. With Hayden White this interest was exchanged for an exclusive preoccupation with the literary aspects of the historian’s narrative representation of the past. However, it may seem that a revival of pre-Whitean narrativist philosophy of history is at hand. Two recent books suggest as much: one by Chiel van den Akker published in 2018 and one more by Paul Roth that came out in 2020. Obviously, a narrativist revival can take two different forms. It may aim at providing pre-Whitean narrativism with a more up-to-date philosophical basis or at guiding it into new directions. It will be argued in this review-essay that the book by Roth mainly does the former, whereas the book by Van den Akker does both.","PeriodicalId":43541,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of History","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45884677","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-09DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341454
J. Aurell
What is the classic in history? What is a classic in historical writing? Very few historians and critics have addressed these questions, and when they have done so, it has been only in a cursory manner. These are queries that require some explanation regarding historical texts because of their peculiar ambivalence between science and art, content and form, sources and imagination, scientific and narrative language. Based on some examples of the Western historiographical tradition, I discuss in this article to what extent historians should engage the concept of the classic – as has been done for literary texts. If one assumes that the historical text is not only a referential account but also a narrative analogous to literary texts, then the concept of the classic becomes one of the keys for understanding the historical text – and may improve our understanding not only of historiography, but of history itself. I will argue in this article that it is possible to identify a category of the classic text in some historical writings, precisely because of the literarity they possess without losing their specific historical condition. Because of their narrative condition, historical texts share some of the features assigned to literary texts – that is, endurance, timelessness, universal meaningfulness, resistance to historical criticism, susceptibility to multiple interpretations, and ability to function as models. Yet, since historical texts do not construct imaginary worlds but reflect external realities, they also have to achieve some specific features according to this referential content – that is, surplus of meaning, historical use of metaphors, effect of contemporaneity without damaging the pastness of the past, and a certain appropriation of literariness. Without seeking to be normative or systematic, this article focuses on some specific features of the historical classic, offering a series of reflections to open rather than try to close a debate on this complex topic.
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Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-29678-2_114
A. Megill
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