Pub Date : 2004-06-28DOI: 10.1109/DSN.2004.1311876
Fred A. Bower, Paul G. Shealy, S. Ozev, Daniel J. Sorin
In this paper, we present a hardware technique, called self-repairing array structures (SRAS), for masking hard faults in microprocessor array structures, such as the reorder buffer and branch history table. SRAS masks errors that could otherwise lead to slow system recoveries. To detect row errors, every write to a row is mirrored to a dedicated "check row". We then read out both the written row and check row and compare their results. To correct errors, SRAS maps out faulty array rows with a level of indirection.
{"title":"Tolerating hard faults in microprocessor array structures","authors":"Fred A. Bower, Paul G. Shealy, S. Ozev, Daniel J. Sorin","doi":"10.1109/DSN.2004.1311876","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2004.1311876","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we present a hardware technique, called self-repairing array structures (SRAS), for masking hard faults in microprocessor array structures, such as the reorder buffer and branch history table. SRAS masks errors that could otherwise lead to slow system recoveries. To detect row errors, every write to a row is mirrored to a dedicated \"check row\". We then read out both the written row and check row and compare their results. To correct errors, SRAS maps out faulty array rows with a level of indirection.","PeriodicalId":436323,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks, 2004","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125059763","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-06-28DOI: 10.1109/DSN.2004.1311958
K. Keeton, A. Merchant
Designing storage systems to provide business continuity in the face of failures requires the use of various data protection techniques, such as backup, remote mirroring, point-in-time copies and vaulting, often in concert. Predicting the dependability provided by such compositions of techniques is difficult, yet necessary for dependable system design. We present a framework for evaluating the dependability of data storage systems, including both individual data protection techniques and their compositions. Our models estimate storage system recovery time, data loss, normal mode system utilization and operational costs under a variety of failure scenarios. We demonstrate the effectiveness of these modeling techniques through a case study using real-world storage system designs and workloads.
{"title":"A framework for evaluating storage system dependability","authors":"K. Keeton, A. Merchant","doi":"10.1109/DSN.2004.1311958","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2004.1311958","url":null,"abstract":"Designing storage systems to provide business continuity in the face of failures requires the use of various data protection techniques, such as backup, remote mirroring, point-in-time copies and vaulting, often in concert. Predicting the dependability provided by such compositions of techniques is difficult, yet necessary for dependable system design. We present a framework for evaluating the dependability of data storage systems, including both individual data protection techniques and their compositions. Our models estimate storage system recovery time, data loss, normal mode system utilization and operational costs under a variety of failure scenarios. We demonstrate the effectiveness of these modeling techniques through a case study using real-world storage system designs and workloads.","PeriodicalId":436323,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks, 2004","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129926142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-06-28DOI: 10.1109/DSN.2004.1311914
A. Smirnov, T. Chiueh
An intrusion-resilient database management system is the one that is capable of restoring its consistency after being compromised by a malicious attack or a human error. More specifically, an intrusion-resilient mechanism helps to quickly repair a database by nullifying the damage caused by malicious or erroneous transactions, while preserving the effects of unaffected legitimate transactions that take place between intrusions/errors and their detection. The goal of this project is to develop a portable implementation framework that can augment a commercial database management system with intrusion resilience without requiring any modifications to its internals. The intrusion resilience mechanism described in this paper significantly improves the availability of modern DBMSs by facilitating and sometimes even automating the post-intrusion damage repair process. In addition, it can be embodied in a reusable implementation framework, whose portability is demonstrated by its successful application to three different DBMSs: PostgreSQL, Oracle, and Sybase. Performance measurements on the fully operational prototypes under the TPC-C benchmark show that the run-time overhead of the intrusion-resilience mechanism is between 6% and 13%.
{"title":"A portable implementation framework for intrusion-resilient database management systems","authors":"A. Smirnov, T. Chiueh","doi":"10.1109/DSN.2004.1311914","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2004.1311914","url":null,"abstract":"An intrusion-resilient database management system is the one that is capable of restoring its consistency after being compromised by a malicious attack or a human error. More specifically, an intrusion-resilient mechanism helps to quickly repair a database by nullifying the damage caused by malicious or erroneous transactions, while preserving the effects of unaffected legitimate transactions that take place between intrusions/errors and their detection. The goal of this project is to develop a portable implementation framework that can augment a commercial database management system with intrusion resilience without requiring any modifications to its internals. The intrusion resilience mechanism described in this paper significantly improves the availability of modern DBMSs by facilitating and sometimes even automating the post-intrusion damage repair process. In addition, it can be embodied in a reusable implementation framework, whose portability is demonstrated by its successful application to three different DBMSs: PostgreSQL, Oracle, and Sybase. Performance measurements on the fully operational prototypes under the TPC-C benchmark show that the run-time overhead of the intrusion-resilience mechanism is between 6% and 13%.","PeriodicalId":436323,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks, 2004","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126427886","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-06-28DOI: 10.1109/DSN.2004.1311877
Nicholas J. Wang, Justin Quek, Todd M. Rafacz, Sanjay J. Patel
The progression of implementation technologies into the sub-100 nanometer lithographies renew the importance of understanding and protecting against single-event upsets in digital systems. In this work, the effects of transient faults on high performance microprocessors is explored. To perform a thorough exploration, a highly detailed register transfer level model of a deeply pipelined, out-of-order microprocessor was created. Using fault injection, we determined that fewer than 15% of single bit corruptions in processor state result in software visible errors. These failures were analyzed to identify the most vulnerable portions of the processor, which were then protected using simple low-overhead techniques. This resulted in a 75% reduction in failures. Building upon the failure modes seen in the microarchitecture, fault injections into software were performed to investigate the level of masking that the software layer provides. Together, the baseline microarchitectural substrate and software mask more than 9 out of 10 transient faults from affecting correct program execution.
{"title":"Characterizing the effects of transient faults on a high-performance processor pipeline","authors":"Nicholas J. Wang, Justin Quek, Todd M. Rafacz, Sanjay J. Patel","doi":"10.1109/DSN.2004.1311877","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2004.1311877","url":null,"abstract":"The progression of implementation technologies into the sub-100 nanometer lithographies renew the importance of understanding and protecting against single-event upsets in digital systems. In this work, the effects of transient faults on high performance microprocessors is explored. To perform a thorough exploration, a highly detailed register transfer level model of a deeply pipelined, out-of-order microprocessor was created. Using fault injection, we determined that fewer than 15% of single bit corruptions in processor state result in software visible errors. These failures were analyzed to identify the most vulnerable portions of the processor, which were then protected using simple low-overhead techniques. This resulted in a 75% reduction in failures. Building upon the failure modes seen in the microarchitecture, fault injections into software were performed to investigate the level of masking that the software layer provides. Together, the baseline microarchitectural substrate and software mask more than 9 out of 10 transient faults from affecting correct program execution.","PeriodicalId":436323,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks, 2004","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128013803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-06-28DOI: 10.1109/DSN.2004.1311881
Kevin S. Killourhy, R. Maxion, K. Tan
Many classifications of attacks have been tendered, often in taxonomic form, A common basis of these taxonomies is that they have been framed from the perspective of an attacker - they organize attacks with respect to the attacker's goals, such as privilege elevation from user to root (from the well known Lincoln taxonomy). Taxonomies based on attacker goals are attack-centric; those based on defender goals are defense-centric. Defenders need a way of determining whether or not their detectors will detect a given attack. It is suggested that a defense-centric taxonomy would suit this role more effectively than an attack-centric taxonomy. This paper presents a new, defense-centric attack taxonomy, based on the way that attacks manifest as anomalies in monitored sensor data. Unique manifestations, drawn from 25 attacks, were used to organize the taxonomy, which was validated through exposure to an intrusion-detection system, confirming attack detect ability. The taxonomy's predictive utility was compared against that of a well-known extant attack-centric taxonomy. The defense-centric taxonomy is shown to be a more effective predictor of a detector's ability to detect specific attacks, hence informing a defender that a given detector is competent against an entire class of attacks.
{"title":"A defense-centric taxonomy based on attack manifestations","authors":"Kevin S. Killourhy, R. Maxion, K. Tan","doi":"10.1109/DSN.2004.1311881","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2004.1311881","url":null,"abstract":"Many classifications of attacks have been tendered, often in taxonomic form, A common basis of these taxonomies is that they have been framed from the perspective of an attacker - they organize attacks with respect to the attacker's goals, such as privilege elevation from user to root (from the well known Lincoln taxonomy). Taxonomies based on attacker goals are attack-centric; those based on defender goals are defense-centric. Defenders need a way of determining whether or not their detectors will detect a given attack. It is suggested that a defense-centric taxonomy would suit this role more effectively than an attack-centric taxonomy. This paper presents a new, defense-centric attack taxonomy, based on the way that attacks manifest as anomalies in monitored sensor data. Unique manifestations, drawn from 25 attacks, were used to organize the taxonomy, which was validated through exposure to an intrusion-detection system, confirming attack detect ability. The taxonomy's predictive utility was compared against that of a well-known extant attack-centric taxonomy. The defense-centric taxonomy is shown to be a more effective predictor of a detector's ability to detect specific attacks, hence informing a defender that a given detector is competent against an entire class of attacks.","PeriodicalId":436323,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks, 2004","volume":"174 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115846627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-06-28DOI: 10.1109/DSN.2004.1311884
G. Goodson, J. Wylie, G. Ganger, M. Reiter
This paper describes a decentralized consistency protocol for survivable storage that exploits local data versioning within each storage-node. Such versioning enables the protocol to efficiently provide linearizability and wait-freedom of read and write operations to erasure-coded data in asynchronous environments with Byzantine failures of clients and servers. By exploiting versioning storage-nodes, the protocol shifts most work to clients and allows highly optimistic operation: reads occur in a single round-trip unless clients observe concurrency or write failures. Measurements of a storage system prototype using this protocol show that it scales well with the number of failures tolerated, and its performance compares favorably with an efficient implementation of Byzantine-tolerant state machine replication.
{"title":"Efficient Byzantine-tolerant erasure-coded storage","authors":"G. Goodson, J. Wylie, G. Ganger, M. Reiter","doi":"10.1109/DSN.2004.1311884","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2004.1311884","url":null,"abstract":"This paper describes a decentralized consistency protocol for survivable storage that exploits local data versioning within each storage-node. Such versioning enables the protocol to efficiently provide linearizability and wait-freedom of read and write operations to erasure-coded data in asynchronous environments with Byzantine failures of clients and servers. By exploiting versioning storage-nodes, the protocol shifts most work to clients and allows highly optimistic operation: reads occur in a single round-trip unless clients observe concurrency or write failures. Measurements of a storage system prototype using this protocol show that it scales well with the number of failures tolerated, and its performance compares favorably with an efficient implementation of Byzantine-tolerant state machine replication.","PeriodicalId":436323,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks, 2004","volume":"295 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134542130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-06-28DOI: 10.1109/DSN.2004.1311878
Cynthia Wong, Chenxi Wang, D. Song, Stan Bielski, G. Ganger
If we limit the contact rate of worm traffic, can we alleviate and ultimately contain Internet worms? This paper sets out to answer this question. Specifically, we are interested in analyzing different deployment strategies of rate control mechanisms and the effect thereof on suppressing the spread of worm code. We use both analytical models and simulation experiments. We find that rate control at individual hosts or edge routers yields a slowdown that is linear in the number of hosts (or routers) with the rate limiting filters. Limiting contact rate at the backbone routers, however, is substantially more effective-it renders a slowdown comparable to deploying rate limiting filters at every individual host that is covered. This result holds true even when susceptible and infected hosts are patched and immunized dynamically. To provide context for our analysis, we examine real traffic traces obtained from a campus computing network. We observe that rate throttling could be enforced with minimal impact on legitimate communications. Two worms observed in the traces, however, would be significantly slowed down.
{"title":"Dynamic quarantine of Internet worms","authors":"Cynthia Wong, Chenxi Wang, D. Song, Stan Bielski, G. Ganger","doi":"10.1109/DSN.2004.1311878","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2004.1311878","url":null,"abstract":"If we limit the contact rate of worm traffic, can we alleviate and ultimately contain Internet worms? This paper sets out to answer this question. Specifically, we are interested in analyzing different deployment strategies of rate control mechanisms and the effect thereof on suppressing the spread of worm code. We use both analytical models and simulation experiments. We find that rate control at individual hosts or edge routers yields a slowdown that is linear in the number of hosts (or routers) with the rate limiting filters. Limiting contact rate at the backbone routers, however, is substantially more effective-it renders a slowdown comparable to deploying rate limiting filters at every individual host that is covered. This result holds true even when susceptible and infected hosts are patched and immunized dynamically. To provide context for our analysis, we examine real traffic traces obtained from a campus computing network. We observe that rate throttling could be enforced with minimal impact on legitimate communications. Two worms observed in the traces, however, would be significantly slowed down.","PeriodicalId":436323,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks, 2004","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134383162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-06-28DOI: 10.1109/DSN.2004.1311912
C. Cachin, A. Samar
A correctly working domain name system (DNS) is essential for the Internet. Due to its significance and because of deficiencies in its current design, the DNS is vulnerable to a wide range of attacks. This paper presents the design and implementation of a secure distributed name service on the level of a DNS zone. Our service is able to provide fault tolerance and security even in the presence of a fraction of corrupted name servers, avoiding any single point of failure. It further solves the problem of storing zone secrets online without leaking them to a corrupted server, while still supporting secure dynamic updates. Our service uses state-machine replication and threshold cryptography. We present results from experiments performed using a prototype implementation on the Internet in realistic setups. The results show that our design achieves the required assurances while servicing the most frequent requests in reasonable time.
{"title":"Secure distributed DNS","authors":"C. Cachin, A. Samar","doi":"10.1109/DSN.2004.1311912","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2004.1311912","url":null,"abstract":"A correctly working domain name system (DNS) is essential for the Internet. Due to its significance and because of deficiencies in its current design, the DNS is vulnerable to a wide range of attacks. This paper presents the design and implementation of a secure distributed name service on the level of a DNS zone. Our service is able to provide fault tolerance and security even in the presence of a fraction of corrupted name servers, avoiding any single point of failure. It further solves the problem of storing zone secrets online without leaking them to a corrupted server, while still supporting secure dynamic updates. Our service uses state-machine replication and threshold cryptography. We present results from experiments performed using a prototype implementation on the Internet in realistic setups. The results show that our design achieves the required assurances while servicing the most frequent requests in reasonable time.","PeriodicalId":436323,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks, 2004","volume":"111 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133144026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-06-28DOI: 10.1109/DSN.2004.1311913
Yu-Sung Wu, S. Bagchi, S. Garg, Navjot Singh, T. Tsai
Voice-over-IP (VoIP) systems are gaining in popularity as the technology for transmitting voice traffic over IP networks. As the popularity of VoIP systems increases, they are being subjected to different kinds of intrusions some of which are specific to such systems and some of which follow a general pattern. VoIP systems pose several new challenges to intrusion detection system (IDS) designers. First, these systems employ multiple protocols for call management (e.g., SIP) and data delivery (e.g., RTP). Second, the systems are distributed in nature and employ distributed clients, servers and proxies. Third, the attacks to such systems span a large class, from denial of service to billing fraud attacks. Finally, the systems are heterogeneous and typically under several different administrative domains. In this paper, we propose the design of an intrusion detection system targeted to VoIP systems, called SCIDIVE (pronounced "Skydive"). SCIDIVE is structured to detect different classes of intrusions, including, masquerading, denial of service, and media stream-based attacks. It can operate with both classes of protocols that compose VoIP systems - call management protocols (CMP), e.g., SIP, and media delivery protocols (MDP), e.g., RTP. SCIDIVE proposes two abstractions for VoIP IDS - stateful detection and cross-protocol detection. Stateful detection denotes assembling state from multiple packets and using the aggregated state in the rule-matching engine. Cross protocol detection denotes matching rules that span multiple protocols. SCIDIVE is demonstrated on a sample VoIP system that comprises SIP clients and SIP proxy servers with RTP as the data delivery protocol. Four attack scenarios are created and the accuracy and the efficiency of the system evaluated with rules meant to catch these attacks.
{"title":"SCIDIVE: a stateful and cross protocol intrusion detection architecture for voice-over-IP environments","authors":"Yu-Sung Wu, S. Bagchi, S. Garg, Navjot Singh, T. Tsai","doi":"10.1109/DSN.2004.1311913","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2004.1311913","url":null,"abstract":"Voice-over-IP (VoIP) systems are gaining in popularity as the technology for transmitting voice traffic over IP networks. As the popularity of VoIP systems increases, they are being subjected to different kinds of intrusions some of which are specific to such systems and some of which follow a general pattern. VoIP systems pose several new challenges to intrusion detection system (IDS) designers. First, these systems employ multiple protocols for call management (e.g., SIP) and data delivery (e.g., RTP). Second, the systems are distributed in nature and employ distributed clients, servers and proxies. Third, the attacks to such systems span a large class, from denial of service to billing fraud attacks. Finally, the systems are heterogeneous and typically under several different administrative domains. In this paper, we propose the design of an intrusion detection system targeted to VoIP systems, called SCIDIVE (pronounced \"Skydive\"). SCIDIVE is structured to detect different classes of intrusions, including, masquerading, denial of service, and media stream-based attacks. It can operate with both classes of protocols that compose VoIP systems - call management protocols (CMP), e.g., SIP, and media delivery protocols (MDP), e.g., RTP. SCIDIVE proposes two abstractions for VoIP IDS - stateful detection and cross-protocol detection. Stateful detection denotes assembling state from multiple packets and using the aggregated state in the rule-matching engine. Cross protocol detection denotes matching rules that span multiple protocols. SCIDIVE is demonstrated on a sample VoIP system that comprises SIP clients and SIP proxy servers with RTP as the data delivery protocol. Four attack scenarios are created and the accuracy and the efficiency of the system evaluated with rules meant to catch these attacks.","PeriodicalId":436323,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks, 2004","volume":"83 2-3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123445537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-06-28DOI: 10.1109/DSN.2004.1311921
Jonathan C. Rowanhill, Philip E. Varner, J. Knight
The management of modern distributed systems is complicated by scale and dynamics. Scalable, decoupled communication establishes flexible, loosely coupled component relationships, and these relationships help meet the present demands on management. However, traditional decoupled addressing mechanisms tend to focus the addressing on only one of the parties involved in communication while, in general, a communication relationship involves a sender, communicated content, and receivers. The state of all three are simultaneously relevant to correctness of a management relationship and its communications. We introduce selective notification, a scalable, decoupled event dissemination architecture supporting simultaneous and combined addressing of senders, receivers, and events. We demonstrate its application to programming dynamic, scalable management relationships. We then discuss its implementation, and present measurements of its effective capabilities.
{"title":"Efficient hierarchic management for reconfiguration of networked information systems","authors":"Jonathan C. Rowanhill, Philip E. Varner, J. Knight","doi":"10.1109/DSN.2004.1311921","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2004.1311921","url":null,"abstract":"The management of modern distributed systems is complicated by scale and dynamics. Scalable, decoupled communication establishes flexible, loosely coupled component relationships, and these relationships help meet the present demands on management. However, traditional decoupled addressing mechanisms tend to focus the addressing on only one of the parties involved in communication while, in general, a communication relationship involves a sender, communicated content, and receivers. The state of all three are simultaneously relevant to correctness of a management relationship and its communications. We introduce selective notification, a scalable, decoupled event dissemination architecture supporting simultaneous and combined addressing of senders, receivers, and events. We demonstrate its application to programming dynamic, scalable management relationships. We then discuss its implementation, and present measurements of its effective capabilities.","PeriodicalId":436323,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks, 2004","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125929967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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