Pub Date : 2022-05-18DOI: 10.1080/20502877.2022.2073857
M. Pruski, Dominic Whitehouse, S. Bow
Abortion pill reversal (APR) treatment aims to halt an initiated medical abortion, wherein a pregnant woman takes progesterone after having taken the first of the two consecutive abortion pills, typically because she has changed her mind and no longer wants to abort the pregnancy. It is a controversial intervention, generally supported by those identifying as pro-life and opposed by those identifying as pro-choice. This paper examines whether, in principle, those identifying with the pro-choice view should support APR. We firstly examine the commitments of the pro-choice stance. We then briefly outline the evidence supporting the APR. Following this, we discuss potential consequences of APR on women’s mental health and its safety. We conclude that those espousing the pro-choice standpoint should be, in principle, committed to supporting the availability of APR, while recognising that data on its efficacy may be difficult to obtain.
{"title":"The right to choose to abort an abortion: should pro-choice advocates support abortion pill reversal?","authors":"M. Pruski, Dominic Whitehouse, S. Bow","doi":"10.1080/20502877.2022.2073857","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20502877.2022.2073857","url":null,"abstract":"Abortion pill reversal (APR) treatment aims to halt an initiated medical abortion, wherein a pregnant woman takes progesterone after having taken the first of the two consecutive abortion pills, typically because she has changed her mind and no longer wants to abort the pregnancy. It is a controversial intervention, generally supported by those identifying as pro-life and opposed by those identifying as pro-choice. This paper examines whether, in principle, those identifying with the pro-choice view should support APR. We firstly examine the commitments of the pro-choice stance. We then briefly outline the evidence supporting the APR. Following this, we discuss potential consequences of APR on women’s mental health and its safety. We conclude that those espousing the pro-choice standpoint should be, in principle, committed to supporting the availability of APR, while recognising that data on its efficacy may be difficult to obtain.","PeriodicalId":43760,"journal":{"name":"New Bioethics-A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body","volume":"28 1","pages":"252 - 267"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42769204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-03DOI: 10.1080/20502877.2022.2067625
Thana C. de Campos-Rudinsky
This paper examines the problem of dying alone in the context of no-visitors hospital policy during the COVID-19 pandemic. It critically analyses a rights-based solution, offering a democratized visitors policy alternative, premised on the value of legal justice. While an inclusive, participatory, and thoroughly justified visitors' policy, which takes into account the good of all stakeholders in the process, is indeed the right alternative to the paternalistic, top-down no-visitors policy, I argue that the democratized visitors' policy alternative ought to be grounded on reasons of both justice and love. Legal justice and claimable individual rights, though important, are limited and cannot fully capture the vicissitudes of mutual vulnerabilities and the moral stringency of duties of mutual care. In the context of suffering and death, instances of extreme vulnerability and interdependence, individual rights of autonomy and self-determination prove insufficient to meet our most basic needs for love, human presence, and accompaniment.
{"title":"On Love, Dying Alone, and Community","authors":"Thana C. de Campos-Rudinsky","doi":"10.1080/20502877.2022.2067625","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20502877.2022.2067625","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the problem of dying alone in the context of no-visitors hospital policy during the COVID-19 pandemic. It critically analyses a rights-based solution, offering a democratized visitors policy alternative, premised on the value of legal justice. While an inclusive, participatory, and thoroughly justified visitors' policy, which takes into account the good of all stakeholders in the process, is indeed the right alternative to the paternalistic, top-down no-visitors policy, I argue that the democratized visitors' policy alternative ought to be grounded on reasons of both justice and love. Legal justice and claimable individual rights, though important, are limited and cannot fully capture the vicissitudes of mutual vulnerabilities and the moral stringency of duties of mutual care. In the context of suffering and death, instances of extreme vulnerability and interdependence, individual rights of autonomy and self-determination prove insufficient to meet our most basic needs for love, human presence, and accompaniment.","PeriodicalId":43760,"journal":{"name":"New Bioethics-A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body","volume":"28 1","pages":"238 - 251"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47839523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-01DOI: 10.1080/20502877.2022.2067627
C. Milo
The right to informed consent (IC), as established in the Supreme Court judgment in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, I claim involves a ‘journey of love’ between clinicians and patients. The latter entails a process of dialogue and support between the parties, concerning disclosure of risks, benefits and alternatives to medical treatment(s). In this paper, I first claim that IC, in the light of the spirit of Montgomery, is predicated upon two pillars, namely patients’ autonomy and medical partnership. I will then explore a case study: the case of legal abortion in England and Wales. Regarding this case, the progressive reduction of medical involvement has meant that little opportunity has been provided for this ‘journey’ to be unpacked in a medical context. I will ultimately claim that more needs to be done to safeguard IC as a ‘journey of love’ through valuing both patients’ autonomy and medical partnership.
我声称，最高法院在Montgomery诉Lanarkshire Health Board[2015]UKSC 11案的判决中确立的知情同意权（IC）涉及临床医生和患者之间的“爱的旅程”。后者涉及各方之间的对话和支持过程，涉及披露风险、益处和医疗替代方案。在本文中，我首先声称，根据蒙哥马利的精神，IC建立在两个支柱之上，即患者的自主性和医疗伙伴关系。然后，我将探讨一个案例研究：英格兰和威尔士的合法堕胎案例。关于这个案例，医疗参与的逐渐减少意味着几乎没有机会在医学背景下展开这段“旅程”。我最终会声称，需要做更多的工作，通过重视患者的自主性和医疗伙伴关系，来保护IC作为一次“爱的旅程”。
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Pub Date : 2022-04-25DOI: 10.1080/20502877.2022.2069318
B. Blackshaw
{"title":"Losing our Dignity: How Secularized Medicine is Undermining Fundamental Human Equality","authors":"B. Blackshaw","doi":"10.1080/20502877.2022.2069318","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20502877.2022.2069318","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43760,"journal":{"name":"New Bioethics-A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body","volume":"28 1","pages":"380 - 382"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48799345","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/20502877.2022.2070960
B. Blackshaw, Nick Colgrove, D. Rodger
Opponents of abortion are commonly said to be inconsistent in their beliefs or actions, and to fail in their obligations to prevent the deaths of embryos and fetuses from causes other than induced abortion. We have argued that these ‘inconsistency arguments’ conform to a pattern which is susceptible to a number of objections, and that consequently they fail en masse. In response, Joshua Shaw argues that we misrepresent inconsistency arguments, and that we underestimate the extent to which our opponents have anticipated and addressed counterarguments. In this essay we draw on aspects of Shaw’s alternative formulation of inconsistency arguments to present an improved inconsistency argument structure. While we agree with Shaw that inconsistency arguments must each be examined on their merits, we reject Shaw’s assertion that our objections are dependent on misrepresentations. Our initial objections remain largely successful, therefore, in dealing with the inconsistency arguments of which we are aware.
{"title":"Why inconsistency arguments fail: a response to Shaw","authors":"B. Blackshaw, Nick Colgrove, D. Rodger","doi":"10.1080/20502877.2022.2070960","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20502877.2022.2070960","url":null,"abstract":"Opponents of abortion are commonly said to be inconsistent in their beliefs or actions, and to fail in their obligations to prevent the deaths of embryos and fetuses from causes other than induced abortion. We have argued that these ‘inconsistency arguments’ conform to a pattern which is susceptible to a number of objections, and that consequently they fail en masse. In response, Joshua Shaw argues that we misrepresent inconsistency arguments, and that we underestimate the extent to which our opponents have anticipated and addressed counterarguments. In this essay we draw on aspects of Shaw’s alternative formulation of inconsistency arguments to present an improved inconsistency argument structure. While we agree with Shaw that inconsistency arguments must each be examined on their merits, we reject Shaw’s assertion that our objections are dependent on misrepresentations. Our initial objections remain largely successful, therefore, in dealing with the inconsistency arguments of which we are aware.","PeriodicalId":43760,"journal":{"name":"New Bioethics-A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body","volume":"28 1","pages":"139 - 151"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43475581","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/20502877.2022.2066828
T. Stammers
omy illustrates how decision-making might proceed based on a specific understanding of the patient’s interests, and would likely not conform with all different accounts of harm. In sum, this is a helpful, engaging, accessible book. It does not provide a complete guide for action, but for those who wish to think more about the meaning of harm, there are many other places to look. Amajor strength of the book is its discussion of a broad range of relevant considerations and arguments, with nuanced and clear analysis. Those who are interested in the subject but lacking background knowledge will benefit from reading this book, although I would recommend that they also read Nudge. For those who are already well-acquainted with nudge theory, and who wish to consider its application to medical ethics, this book is an excellent resource.
{"title":"Modifying Our Genes: Theology, Science and ‘Playing God’","authors":"T. Stammers","doi":"10.1080/20502877.2022.2066828","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20502877.2022.2066828","url":null,"abstract":"omy illustrates how decision-making might proceed based on a specific understanding of the patient’s interests, and would likely not conform with all different accounts of harm. In sum, this is a helpful, engaging, accessible book. It does not provide a complete guide for action, but for those who wish to think more about the meaning of harm, there are many other places to look. Amajor strength of the book is its discussion of a broad range of relevant considerations and arguments, with nuanced and clear analysis. Those who are interested in the subject but lacking background knowledge will benefit from reading this book, although I would recommend that they also read Nudge. For those who are already well-acquainted with nudge theory, and who wish to consider its application to medical ethics, this book is an excellent resource.","PeriodicalId":43760,"journal":{"name":"New Bioethics-A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body","volume":"28 1","pages":"191 - 193"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46587764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/20502877.2022.2063576
Alexis Heng Boon Chin, S. M. Saifuddeen
Elective egg freezing (oocyte cryopreservation) for fertility preservation - commonly referred to as social egg freezing or non-medical egg freezing, will be permitted in Singapore from 2023. There is a need for clear religious directives on social egg freezing for the minority Muslim population in Singapore, due to conflicting Fatwas on this medical procedure that were issued in different Islamic countries, in particular Egypt and Malaysia. Although social egg freezing would be beneficial for the fertility preservation of many single Muslim women who are unable to start a family due to various personal circumstances, there are also various potential risks and harms of this medical procedure at the individual and societal level. Hence, based on Maqasid Al-Shariah, by which preventing harm takes precedence over securing benefit in medical treatment (Tadawi), it is posited that social egg freezing should be classified as Makruh, which is permissible but discouraged in Islam.
从2023年起，新加坡将允许选择性卵子冷冻（卵母细胞冷冻保存）以保存生育能力，通常被称为社会卵子冷冻或非医学卵子冷冻。由于不同伊斯兰国家，特别是埃及和马来西亚发布的Fatwas关于社会卵子冷冻的医疗程序存在冲突，因此有必要为新加坡的少数穆斯林人口制定明确的宗教指令。尽管社会卵子冷冻有利于许多因各种个人情况而无法组建家庭的单身穆斯林妇女的生育能力，但这种医疗程序在个人和社会层面也存在各种潜在风险和危害。因此，根据Maqasid Al Shariah，预防伤害优先于确保医疗福利（Tadawi），人们认为社会卵子冷冻应归类为Makruh，这在伊斯兰教中是允许的，但不鼓励。
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Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/20502877.2022.2062945
Zishang Yue
This essay discusses sentient robot (SR) research through the lens of suffering. First three kinds of suffering are considered: physical, psychological, and existential. Physical pain is shown to be primarily subjective, and distinctive psychological and existential sufferings probably do exist, which are neither reducible to neurobiological events, nor replicable through algorithms. The current stage of SR research is then reviewed. Many creative proposals are presented, together with some philosophical and technical challenges posed by other scholars. I then offer my critique of SR research, claiming that it is based on a superficial understanding of suffering and unjustified philosophical presuppositions, namely, reductive physicalism. Without the capability to suffer, robots probably cannot love in any real sense, and no meaningful relationship may be developed between such a robot and a human. Therefore, we are probably unable to produce sentient robots that can become our companions (friends, lovers, etc.).
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Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/20502877.2022.2076789
T. Stammers
Those who edit academic journals rarely seek fortune in financial terms or if they do, are unlikely to find it. However, Shakespeare’s Brutus was quite right that with ‘fortune’ in terms of gaining influence or success, timing is so often crucial. I often regret that editing a journal which is only published quarterly often means that by the time articles appear, the topics they consider have often peaked in the news and sometimes passed altogether. This issue however is book-ended with two articles which explore things as yet not possible so who knows in years to come what future readers may make of their ideas and speculations. Gibson, at a time when the hardships faced by geographically displaced refugees are all too apparent, explores in his intriguing paper, whether refugee status would be appropriate in centuries to come, for those who may become displaced in time though being cryogenically preserved. Yue, in his review article, explores through the lens of suffering, whether robot companions could ever be programmed to be sentient in a way that could lead to meaningful loving relationships with our own species. Elective egg freezing (oocyte cryopreservation) for fertility preservation – commonly referred to as social egg freezing, will be permitted in Singapore from 2023. Heng Boon Chin and Saiffuddeen, in their paper, consider the ethics of this change in the law from both secular and Islamic perspectives, before it comes into effect. Although abortion has long been a subject of ethical debate, the leak of a Supreme Court draft opinion to possibly strike down Roe v Wade in the US has propelled it back into the news again, giving added relevance to the next two papers in this issue. First, Singh by demonstrating ‘a dis-analogy between giving a fetus Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) and abortion’ argues that Hendricks’ (2019a, 2019b) impairment argument for the impermissibility of abortion fails. Blackshaw et al in the second paper on abortion, respond to Shaw’s recent paper arguing that inconsistency arguments against abortion fail en masse (2021). Richards in his paper, contends that whatever challenges, present or future, religious preclusion or marginalisation in bioethics is not only harmful but inadmissable. Even the book reviews in this issue have a futuristic component, courtesy of Bryan Hall’s An Ethical Guidebook to the Zombie Apocalypse: How to keep your brain without losing your heart. Cons’ cracking review of this volume the new bioethics, Vol. 28 No. 2, 2022, 95–96
{"title":"Present policies and possible futures","authors":"T. Stammers","doi":"10.1080/20502877.2022.2076789","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20502877.2022.2076789","url":null,"abstract":"Those who edit academic journals rarely seek fortune in financial terms or if they do, are unlikely to find it. However, Shakespeare’s Brutus was quite right that with ‘fortune’ in terms of gaining influence or success, timing is so often crucial. I often regret that editing a journal which is only published quarterly often means that by the time articles appear, the topics they consider have often peaked in the news and sometimes passed altogether. This issue however is book-ended with two articles which explore things as yet not possible so who knows in years to come what future readers may make of their ideas and speculations. Gibson, at a time when the hardships faced by geographically displaced refugees are all too apparent, explores in his intriguing paper, whether refugee status would be appropriate in centuries to come, for those who may become displaced in time though being cryogenically preserved. Yue, in his review article, explores through the lens of suffering, whether robot companions could ever be programmed to be sentient in a way that could lead to meaningful loving relationships with our own species. Elective egg freezing (oocyte cryopreservation) for fertility preservation – commonly referred to as social egg freezing, will be permitted in Singapore from 2023. Heng Boon Chin and Saiffuddeen, in their paper, consider the ethics of this change in the law from both secular and Islamic perspectives, before it comes into effect. Although abortion has long been a subject of ethical debate, the leak of a Supreme Court draft opinion to possibly strike down Roe v Wade in the US has propelled it back into the news again, giving added relevance to the next two papers in this issue. First, Singh by demonstrating ‘a dis-analogy between giving a fetus Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) and abortion’ argues that Hendricks’ (2019a, 2019b) impairment argument for the impermissibility of abortion fails. Blackshaw et al in the second paper on abortion, respond to Shaw’s recent paper arguing that inconsistency arguments against abortion fail en masse (2021). Richards in his paper, contends that whatever challenges, present or future, religious preclusion or marginalisation in bioethics is not only harmful but inadmissable. Even the book reviews in this issue have a futuristic component, courtesy of Bryan Hall’s An Ethical Guidebook to the Zombie Apocalypse: How to keep your brain without losing your heart. Cons’ cracking review of this volume the new bioethics, Vol. 28 No. 2, 2022, 95–96","PeriodicalId":43760,"journal":{"name":"New Bioethics-A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body","volume":"28 1","pages":"95 - 96"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44799642","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/20502877.2022.2071193
Stephen Richards
ABSTRACT Central to this essay is the understanding that varied communities may have an inherent and unrecognised culture of their own and this culture may be detrimental to their core. Bioethics constitutes one such community and is embedded in norms and values comprising its own culture. I use exclusion of religion or simply ‘irreligion’ as an example of a cultural element that may be established and so shape the culture of bioethics. Irreligious bioethics includes both overt religious preclusion and the more pervasive form of religious marginalisation. This norm is narrated into the culture of bioethics with justifications sustaining it. Irreligious bioethics is inadmissible as it claims illegitimate neutrality, is a misuse of expertise and results in a variety of harms. As bioethics is influential in society, those engaged should be critically reflective and aware of harmful cultural elements whilst also possessing the honesty, courage and capacity to change them.
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