U. Braendle, M. Stiglbauer, Khaldoun I. Ababneh, Evangelos Dedousis
In 2006 German Chancellor Angela Merkel became the patron of Germany’s Diversity Charter (“Charta der Vielfalt”), a company initiative promoting diversity in firms. Yet numerous firms have voluntarily signed the charter, affirming their compliance to diversity reinforcement and encouragement. The German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC), a soft-law regulation aiming to foster good corporate governance, especially for listed companies, also included the subject of diversity since 2009 (GCGC, 2009). In fact, during the last few years the concept of diversity has increasingly gained in popularity (Díaz-Fernández, GonzálezRodríguez, & Simonetti, 2020), and has simultaneously remained a topic of public discourse ever since (Naciti, 2019). Consider the following four examples that reflect the increasing importance of diversity: first, Germany pursued a controversial debate about the introduction of fixed quotas for women on corporations’ supervisory boards (Bschorr & Lorenz, 2013, pp. 34–35), an attempt to increase diversity among the gender. Second, caused by demographic change and affected by a raised retirement age — retirement age is to be increased gradually from 65 to 67 years by 2023 — a growing number of older age group German employees will Abstract
2006年，德国总理安格拉•默克尔成为德国多元化宪章(“Charta der Vielfalt”)的赞助人，这是一项促进公司多元化的公司倡议。然而，许多公司自愿签署了宪章，确认他们遵守加强和鼓励多元化的规定。德国公司治理守则(GCGC)是一项旨在促进良好公司治理，特别是上市公司治理的软法律法规，自2009年以来也将多样性纳入其中(GCGC, 2009)。事实上，在过去的几年里，多样性的概念越来越受欢迎(Díaz-Fernández, GonzálezRodríguez， & Simonetti, 2020)，并且自那时起一直是公共话语的主题(Naciti, 2019)。考虑以下四个反映多样性日益重要的例子:首先，德国就在公司监事会中引入女性固定配额进行了有争议的辩论(Bschorr & Lorenz, 2013, pp. 34-35)，试图增加性别之间的多样性。其次，受人口结构变化和退休年龄提高的影响——到2023年，退休年龄将从65岁逐步提高到67岁——越来越多的高龄德国雇员将被抽调
{"title":"The impact of board diversity on firm performance – The case of Germany","authors":"U. Braendle, M. Stiglbauer, Khaldoun I. Ababneh, Evangelos Dedousis","doi":"10.22495/cocv17i2art15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv17i2art15","url":null,"abstract":"In 2006 German Chancellor Angela Merkel became the patron of Germany’s Diversity Charter (“Charta der Vielfalt”), a company initiative promoting diversity in firms. Yet numerous firms have voluntarily signed the charter, affirming their compliance to diversity reinforcement and encouragement. The German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC), a soft-law regulation aiming to foster good corporate governance, especially for listed companies, also included the subject of diversity since 2009 (GCGC, 2009). In fact, during the last few years the concept of diversity has increasingly gained in popularity (Díaz-Fernández, GonzálezRodríguez, & Simonetti, 2020), and has simultaneously remained a topic of public discourse ever since (Naciti, 2019). Consider the following four examples that reflect the increasing importance of diversity: first, Germany pursued a controversial debate about the introduction of fixed quotas for women on corporations’ supervisory boards (Bschorr & Lorenz, 2013, pp. 34–35), an attempt to increase diversity among the gender. Second, caused by demographic change and affected by a raised retirement age — retirement age is to be increased gradually from 65 to 67 years by 2023 — a growing number of older age group German employees will Abstract","PeriodicalId":438501,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Ownership and Control","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129698424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
By the turn of this century, the accounting and auditing profession took a totally new direction at both, legal and practical levels along with an increased awareness about transparency, accountability and responsibility reached by all stakeholders of business firms. The failure of big corporations such as Enron and WorldCom in addition to other business scandals which in turn took down big audit firms (i.e., Arthur Andersen), made a shift in auditing practices and its regulations. As a result, a substantial increase in the research field was noticed with regards to auditors’ roles in fraud detection and prevention, internal Abstract
{"title":"Determinants of audit fees in developing countries: Evidence from Egypt","authors":"Walid ElGammal, Marwa Gharzeddine","doi":"10.22495/cocv17i2art12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv17i2art12","url":null,"abstract":"By the turn of this century, the accounting and auditing profession took a totally new direction at both, legal and practical levels along with an increased awareness about transparency, accountability and responsibility reached by all stakeholders of business firms. The failure of big corporations such as Enron and WorldCom in addition to other business scandals which in turn took down big audit firms (i.e., Arthur Andersen), made a shift in auditing practices and its regulations. As a result, a substantial increase in the research field was noticed with regards to auditors’ roles in fraud detection and prevention, internal Abstract","PeriodicalId":438501,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Ownership and Control","volume":"247 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116391833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Auditor independence is gaining a lot of attention from researchers, regulators and public observers. This has been described to have a major significant impact on audit quality. Several reasons have been given for the crucial importance of auditor independence to audit quality and this has formed a longstanding debate among academics, regulators and market observers on how best to protect auditors and mitigate concerns from users of the financial report (Tepalagul & Lin, 2015). The accounting scandals of publicly listed entities ignited the scrutiny and criticism by market regulators and independent observers on the credibility of audit reports, and also industry experts‟ reactions to Enron scandal prompted the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 (Dattin, 2017; Tepalagul & Lin, 2015; Velte & Loy, 2018). Most important, the earliest research to investigate the impact of auditor independence on audit quality was greatly attributed to DeAngelo (1981). According to DeAngelo (1981), audit quality greatly depends on auditor independence and has been defined as the probability that the auditor will uncover and report any breach in the accounting system. The concern to auditor independence is highly imperative, because of its magnitude to financial credibility and this has been the reason why market regulators are more concern about the independence of auditor to provide high audit quality that meets the international standard and that can be relied upon by the users of financial statements (Dattin, 2017; Tepalagul & Lin, 2015; Velte & Loy, 2018). The accounting fraud and the collapse of major companies such as Enron, WorldCom, Satyam, Cadbury in Nigeria; Olympus in Japan dent serious blow to audit profession and the aftermath of global financial crisis provide another avenue for market regulators and practitioners in questioning the independence of auditor (Wood & Small, 2019; Velte Abstract
{"title":"A theoretical approach to auditor independence and audit quality","authors":"Rahman Yakubu, Tracey Williams","doi":"10.22495/cocv17i2art11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv17i2art11","url":null,"abstract":"Auditor independence is gaining a lot of attention from researchers, regulators and public observers. This has been described to have a major significant impact on audit quality. Several reasons have been given for the crucial importance of auditor independence to audit quality and this has formed a longstanding debate among academics, regulators and market observers on how best to protect auditors and mitigate concerns from users of the financial report (Tepalagul & Lin, 2015). The accounting scandals of publicly listed entities ignited the scrutiny and criticism by market regulators and independent observers on the credibility of audit reports, and also industry experts‟ reactions to Enron scandal prompted the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 (Dattin, 2017; Tepalagul & Lin, 2015; Velte & Loy, 2018). Most important, the earliest research to investigate the impact of auditor independence on audit quality was greatly attributed to DeAngelo (1981). According to DeAngelo (1981), audit quality greatly depends on auditor independence and has been defined as the probability that the auditor will uncover and report any breach in the accounting system. The concern to auditor independence is highly imperative, because of its magnitude to financial credibility and this has been the reason why market regulators are more concern about the independence of auditor to provide high audit quality that meets the international standard and that can be relied upon by the users of financial statements (Dattin, 2017; Tepalagul & Lin, 2015; Velte & Loy, 2018). The accounting fraud and the collapse of major companies such as Enron, WorldCom, Satyam, Cadbury in Nigeria; Olympus in Japan dent serious blow to audit profession and the aftermath of global financial crisis provide another avenue for market regulators and practitioners in questioning the independence of auditor (Wood & Small, 2019; Velte Abstract","PeriodicalId":438501,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Ownership and Control","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114460977","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
M. A. Shabeeb Ali, Hazem Ramadan Ismael, A. H. Ahmed
JEL Classification: G340, M210, M410, M420, M480 DOI: 10.22495/cocv17i2art10 Using a UK panel data set drawn from 1675 Chief Executive Officer (CEO) year observations and 1540 Chief Financial Officer (CFO) year observations, we examine the relationship between CEO and CFO equity incentives and earnings management. In addition, we examine the moderation effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between executives’ equity incentives and earnings management. We use multivariate regression models to test our hypotheses. We find that CEO equity incentives are related to higher absolute and income increasing earnings management. These results support the managerial power theory argument that CEOs exploit equitylinked compensation to obtain more personal benefits without causing public anger. Contrary to CEO equity incentives, we could not find any significant relationship between CFO equity incentives and any of the earnings management proxies. In addition, we find that corporate governance quality (measured by individual mechanisms and overall index) has no effect on the relationship between executives’ equity incentives and earnings management. This result indicates that whereas some corporate governance mechanisms can reduce earnings management in general, they do not affect wealth driven incentives to manipulate accruals. In total, results question the effectiveness of the corporate governance system in mitigating opportunistic behavior motivated by executives’ compensation structures.
{"title":"Equity incentives, earnings management and corporate governance: Empirical evidence using UK panel data","authors":"M. A. Shabeeb Ali, Hazem Ramadan Ismael, A. H. Ahmed","doi":"10.22495/cocv17i2art10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv17i2art10","url":null,"abstract":"JEL Classification: G340, M210, M410, M420, M480 DOI: 10.22495/cocv17i2art10 Using a UK panel data set drawn from 1675 Chief Executive Officer (CEO) year observations and 1540 Chief Financial Officer (CFO) year observations, we examine the relationship between CEO and CFO equity incentives and earnings management. In addition, we examine the moderation effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between executives’ equity incentives and earnings management. We use multivariate regression models to test our hypotheses. We find that CEO equity incentives are related to higher absolute and income increasing earnings management. These results support the managerial power theory argument that CEOs exploit equitylinked compensation to obtain more personal benefits without causing public anger. Contrary to CEO equity incentives, we could not find any significant relationship between CFO equity incentives and any of the earnings management proxies. In addition, we find that corporate governance quality (measured by individual mechanisms and overall index) has no effect on the relationship between executives’ equity incentives and earnings management. This result indicates that whereas some corporate governance mechanisms can reduce earnings management in general, they do not affect wealth driven incentives to manipulate accruals. In total, results question the effectiveness of the corporate governance system in mitigating opportunistic behavior motivated by executives’ compensation structures.","PeriodicalId":438501,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Ownership and Control","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124891900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ahmed Imran Hunjra, Uzma Perveen, Leon Li, Muhammad Irfan Chani, R. Mehmood
* Corresponding author, University Institute of Management Sciences, PMAS-Arid Agriculture University Rawalpindi, Pakistan Contact details: PMAS-Arid Agriculture University Rawalpindi, Shamsabad, Muree Road Rawalpindi, Pakistan ** University Institute of Management Sciences, PMAS-Arid Agriculture University Rawalpindi, Pakistan *** School of Accounting, Finance and Economics, The University of Waikato, New Zealand **** Department of Management Sciences, COMSATS University Islamabad, Vehari Campus, Pakistan
{"title":"Impact of ownership concentration, institutional ownership and earnings management on stock market liquidity","authors":"Ahmed Imran Hunjra, Uzma Perveen, Leon Li, Muhammad Irfan Chani, R. Mehmood","doi":"10.22495/cocv17i2art7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv17i2art7","url":null,"abstract":"* Corresponding author, University Institute of Management Sciences, PMAS-Arid Agriculture University Rawalpindi, Pakistan Contact details: PMAS-Arid Agriculture University Rawalpindi, Shamsabad, Muree Road Rawalpindi, Pakistan ** University Institute of Management Sciences, PMAS-Arid Agriculture University Rawalpindi, Pakistan *** School of Accounting, Finance and Economics, The University of Waikato, New Zealand **** Department of Management Sciences, COMSATS University Islamabad, Vehari Campus, Pakistan","PeriodicalId":438501,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Ownership and Control","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125570217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
JEL Classification: M14, G34, M40 DOI: 10.22495/cocv17i2art6 Today, to integrate sustainable development goals into business, an overall integrated sustainable performance management system — to implement and measure these global goals — is needed. In a short timeframe, the benefit impact assessment (BIA) — elaborated by B Lab, utilized by benefit corporations (a new and emerging hybrid type of prosocial business) and adopted by the United Nations — became the most comprehensive indicator to evaluate company practices against SDGs. Italy was the first sovereign country to insert the benefit corporation legislation after the US and analyze the effectiveness of the BIA. This prompted us to address our attention to the integration of benefit-driven indicators, adopted by Italian B Corps into their performance management systems, and to analyze if these indicators are used by managers to support internal decision-making. To achieve this goal, cross-sector semistructured interviews were conducted in seven Italian certified benefit corporations. Relevant to both researchers and practitioners, our review provides a useful snapshot of how the BIA is developing as an assessment and how value-based organizations are moving toward an integrated sustainable performance management system.
{"title":"Integrated sustainable performance management systems: A case study on Italian benefit corporations","authors":"G. Nigri, Mara Del Baldo, Armando Agulini","doi":"10.22495/cocv17i2art6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv17i2art6","url":null,"abstract":"JEL Classification: M14, G34, M40 DOI: 10.22495/cocv17i2art6 Today, to integrate sustainable development goals into business, an overall integrated sustainable performance management system — to implement and measure these global goals — is needed. In a short timeframe, the benefit impact assessment (BIA) — elaborated by B Lab, utilized by benefit corporations (a new and emerging hybrid type of prosocial business) and adopted by the United Nations — became the most comprehensive indicator to evaluate company practices against SDGs. Italy was the first sovereign country to insert the benefit corporation legislation after the US and analyze the effectiveness of the BIA. This prompted us to address our attention to the integration of benefit-driven indicators, adopted by Italian B Corps into their performance management systems, and to analyze if these indicators are used by managers to support internal decision-making. To achieve this goal, cross-sector semistructured interviews were conducted in seven Italian certified benefit corporations. Relevant to both researchers and practitioners, our review provides a useful snapshot of how the BIA is developing as an assessment and how value-based organizations are moving toward an integrated sustainable performance management system.","PeriodicalId":438501,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Ownership and Control","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115826449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Corporate governance encourages more investments and improves board members’ monitoring function (Shahid & Abbas, 2019). With corporate governance, firms can improve their financial performance and motivate directors to achieve the best returns on investments. The importance of financial and nonfinancial performance measures has come out as opposed to traditional financial standards which have failed to explore future performance and effective evaluation. This has led to the Abstract
{"title":"The relationship between corporate governance and stock prices in the GCC financial markets","authors":"M. A. Al Mubarak","doi":"10.22495/cocv17i2art5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv17i2art5","url":null,"abstract":"Corporate governance encourages more investments and improves board members’ monitoring function (Shahid & Abbas, 2019). With corporate governance, firms can improve their financial performance and motivate directors to achieve the best returns on investments. The importance of financial and nonfinancial performance measures has come out as opposed to traditional financial standards which have failed to explore future performance and effective evaluation. This has led to the Abstract","PeriodicalId":438501,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Ownership and Control","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130376512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Traditional cost behavior assumes that variable costs vary symmetrically according to changes in the level of activity. This means that variable costs change proportionately with changes in the cost driver. The key notion in symmetric cost behavior is that variable costs change identically by the same percentage in the two directions (i.e., upward and downward in cost driver) regardless whether the response rate of variable costs is less, equal or more than the rate of change in cost driver (Balakrishnan & Gruca, 2008; Malik, 2012). However, fixed costs remain constant in total despite changes in the cost driver within the relevant range. On the other hand, some costs are neither precisely variable nor fixed; this type of cost known as mixed cost. According to traditional analysis of cost behavior, managerial decisions (i.e., pricing, cost planning, cost control, budgeting, cost variances, cost standardization, cost reduction and cost allocation) are, precisely, based on prior analysis of cost behavior (Novák et al., 2018). The recent stream of research in cost accounting has criticized prior thinking in terms of traditional cost behavior. More specifically, many researchers have provided empirical evidence that emphasize the asymmetric cost behavior throughout Abstract
传统的成本行为假设可变成本根据活动水平的变化对称地变化。这意味着可变成本随着成本动因的变化成比例地变化。对称成本行为的关键概念是，无论可变成本的响应率是小于、等于还是大于成本驱动因素的变化率，可变成本在两个方向上(即成本驱动因素向上和向下)的变化百分比都是相同的(Balakrishnan & Gruca, 2008;马利克,2012)。然而，尽管成本驱动因素在相关范围内发生了变化，但固定成本在总量上保持不变。另一方面，有些成本既不是精确可变的，也不是固定的;这种成本称为混合成本。根据传统的成本行为分析，管理决策(即定价、成本计划、成本控制、预算、成本差异、成本标准化、成本降低和成本分配)精确地基于对成本行为的事先分析(Novák et al.， 2018)。最近的成本会计研究对传统成本行为的先验思维提出了批评。更具体地说，许多研究者提供的经验证据表明，整个摘要都强调了成本行为的不对称
{"title":"Cost stickiness behavior and financial crisis: Evidence from the UK chemical industry","authors":"Ahmed Hassanein, Mohsen Younis","doi":"10.22495/cocv17i2art4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv17i2art4","url":null,"abstract":"Traditional cost behavior assumes that variable costs vary symmetrically according to changes in the level of activity. This means that variable costs change proportionately with changes in the cost driver. The key notion in symmetric cost behavior is that variable costs change identically by the same percentage in the two directions (i.e., upward and downward in cost driver) regardless whether the response rate of variable costs is less, equal or more than the rate of change in cost driver (Balakrishnan & Gruca, 2008; Malik, 2012). However, fixed costs remain constant in total despite changes in the cost driver within the relevant range. On the other hand, some costs are neither precisely variable nor fixed; this type of cost known as mixed cost. According to traditional analysis of cost behavior, managerial decisions (i.e., pricing, cost planning, cost control, budgeting, cost variances, cost standardization, cost reduction and cost allocation) are, precisely, based on prior analysis of cost behavior (Novák et al., 2018). The recent stream of research in cost accounting has criticized prior thinking in terms of traditional cost behavior. More specifically, many researchers have provided empirical evidence that emphasize the asymmetric cost behavior throughout Abstract","PeriodicalId":438501,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Ownership and Control","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129730299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Accounting ratios come from financial information included in financial statements that companies are obliged to produce for external stakeholders and to be compliant with the law and fiscal rules. They can have a prediction role for companies’ bankruptcy (Barnes, 1987). Bankruptcy can be defined as the lack of resources to repay the obligations of a company as they come due (Boardman, Bartley, & Ratliff, 1981). Many studies have been devoted to the use of accounting data in order to predict corporates bankruptcy, starting from Beaver’s (1966), and Altman’s (1968) research. Beaver used univariate statistics in the US market while Altman found out that this kind of analysis is not good enough for evaluating companies’ potential failure. For this reason, he introduced the Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) in order to predict the possibility of a company to fail. Anyway, this analysis does not consider the evolution of financial ratios over time. Ohlson (1980), to solve this issue, used information about the company’s performance at a different time before failure. In the US context, Altman’s model was used by many researchers to predict big companies’ failure (Blum, 1974; Ohlson, 1980). The survival of a firm is linked to economic and financial equilibrium in the medium-long term, where economic balance refers to the capability to generate revenues higher than costs and to produce a profit for shareholders’ Abstract
{"title":"Corporate failure: Bankruptcy prediction for Italian SMEs based on a longitudinal case study from 2000 to 2011","authors":"F. di Donato, L. Nieddu","doi":"10.22495/cocv17i3art2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv17i3art2","url":null,"abstract":"Accounting ratios come from financial information included in financial statements that companies are obliged to produce for external stakeholders and to be compliant with the law and fiscal rules. They can have a prediction role for companies’ bankruptcy (Barnes, 1987). Bankruptcy can be defined as the lack of resources to repay the obligations of a company as they come due (Boardman, Bartley, & Ratliff, 1981). Many studies have been devoted to the use of accounting data in order to predict corporates bankruptcy, starting from Beaver’s (1966), and Altman’s (1968) research. Beaver used univariate statistics in the US market while Altman found out that this kind of analysis is not good enough for evaluating companies’ potential failure. For this reason, he introduced the Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) in order to predict the possibility of a company to fail. Anyway, this analysis does not consider the evolution of financial ratios over time. Ohlson (1980), to solve this issue, used information about the company’s performance at a different time before failure. In the US context, Altman’s model was used by many researchers to predict big companies’ failure (Blum, 1974; Ohlson, 1980). The survival of a firm is linked to economic and financial equilibrium in the medium-long term, where economic balance refers to the capability to generate revenues higher than costs and to produce a profit for shareholders’ Abstract","PeriodicalId":438501,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Ownership and Control","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124986303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Cristian Carini, Laura Rocca, Monica Veneziani, Claudio Teodori
Directive 2014/95, in force since 2017, is the first European step that requires companies to provide mandatory non-financial information (NFI). The regulation concerns sustainability information with the policy goal of increased accountability and comparability among European “public interest entities” on that matters. According to the framework of Regulatory Integrated Assessment (RIA), the study compares the disclosure before and after the Directive application considering the content (what) and the location of the information in companies’ reports (where). Content analysis is applied to both financial and non-financial reports to create a disclosure scoring index and an overlapping one. Thus to compare the ex-ante analysis to the ex-post by a quantitative scoring system. The research contributes to the debate on the regulatory policy evaluation examining whether the ex-post assessment reveals a change in companies’ reporting behaviour about non-financial information, i.e. if the regulation achieves its policy objectives of improving sustainability disclosure. Findings show differences between the ex-ante and the ex-post phase: after the enforcement of the Directive there is an increase in the degree of disclosure (what) and a reduction in the level of overlap (where), with more companies choosing “embedded” reports. These results are a preliminary step in the regulatory policy evaluation and they answer to the request of more studies on the ex-post implementation review of regulation.
{"title":"The first impact of EU regulation on non-financial disclosure: An exploratory analysis in the oil & gas sector","authors":"Cristian Carini, Laura Rocca, Monica Veneziani, Claudio Teodori","doi":"10.22495/cocv17i1art3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv17i1art3","url":null,"abstract":"Directive 2014/95, in force since 2017, is the first European step that requires companies to provide mandatory non-financial information (NFI). The regulation concerns sustainability information with the policy goal of increased accountability and comparability among European “public interest entities” on that matters. According to the framework of Regulatory Integrated Assessment (RIA), the study compares the disclosure before and after the Directive application considering the content (what) and the location of the information in companies’ reports (where). Content analysis is applied to both financial and non-financial reports to create a disclosure scoring index and an overlapping one. Thus to compare the ex-ante analysis to the ex-post by a quantitative scoring system. The research contributes to the debate on the regulatory policy evaluation examining whether the ex-post assessment reveals a change in companies’ reporting behaviour about non-financial information, i.e. if the regulation achieves its policy objectives of improving sustainability disclosure. Findings show differences between the ex-ante and the ex-post phase: after the enforcement of the Directive there is an increase in the degree of disclosure (what) and a reduction in the level of overlap (where), with more companies choosing “embedded” reports. These results are a preliminary step in the regulatory policy evaluation and they answer to the request of more studies on the ex-post implementation review of regulation.","PeriodicalId":438501,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Ownership and Control","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126640116","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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