{"title":"Casting inference to the best explanation's lot with active inference","authors":"M. D. Beni","doi":"10.1111/theo.12455","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12455","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44390591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Philosophical originality","authors":"S. Hansson","doi":"10.1111/theo.12451","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12451","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42774251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Truth‐value relations and logical relations","authors":"L. Humberstone","doi":"10.1111/theo.12450","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12450","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49508782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The possibility of curing aging is currently generating hopes and concerns among entrepreneurs, experts, and the general public. This article aims to clarify some of the key assumptions of the Strategies for Engineered Negligible Senescence agenda, one of the most prominent paradigms for rejuvenation. To do this, we present the three fundamental claims of this research program: (1) aging can be repaired; (2) rejuvenation is possible through the reversal of all molecular damage; (3) and the human organism is a sophisticated machine. Secondly, we argue that this agenda fits with a machine conception of the organism (described by Daniel Nicholson); we show that, if aging is understood from this philosophical approach, there is an internal confusion in the research program between what is repair and what is rejuvenation. Finally, we state that this theoretical viewpoint connects with scientific criticism and reinforces the idea that there are limits to the aspirations to live indefinitely young.
{"title":"The machine-like repair of aging. Disentangling the key assumptions of the SENS agenda","authors":"Pablo García-Barranquero, M. Bertolaso","doi":"10.1387/theoria.23544","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.23544","url":null,"abstract":"The possibility of curing aging is currently generating hopes and concerns among entrepreneurs, experts, and the general public. This article aims to clarify some of the key assumptions of the Strategies for Engineered Negligible Senescence agenda, one of the most prominent paradigms for rejuvenation. To do this, we present the three fundamental claims of this research program: (1) aging can be repaired; (2) rejuvenation is possible through the reversal of all molecular damage; (3) and the human organism is a sophisticated machine. Secondly, we argue that this agenda fits with a machine conception of the organism (described by Daniel Nicholson); we show that, if aging is understood from this philosophical approach, there is an internal confusion in the research program between what is repair and what is rejuvenation. Finally, we state that this theoretical viewpoint connects with scientific criticism and reinforces the idea that there are limits to the aspirations to live indefinitely young.","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47309940","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Kripke has taken the Gödel case as a counterexample for reference descriptivism. Machery et al. question the validity of Kripke’s case and had conducted empirical studies to show its inadequacy. Experimental data suggest intuitions on this matter vary both across and within cultures. However, there is a descriptive ambiguity, we argue, in Kripke’s Gödel case, for people associate different types of descriptions with proper names, such as the description of brute facts and the description of social facts. We argue in this paper with experimental data that the descriptive ambiguity exists and affects the actual ratio of Kripkeans in reference. This result flaws Machery et al.’s interpretation on empirical research, but does not challenge their claim on cross-cultural divergence. In fact, there are more East Asian descriptivists than Machery et al. expected.
{"title":"Kripke’s Gödel case: Descriptive ambiguity and its experimental interpretation","authors":"Chao Ding, Chuang Liu","doi":"10.1387/theoria.23375","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.23375","url":null,"abstract":"Kripke has taken the Gödel case as a counterexample for reference descriptivism. Machery et al. question the validity of Kripke’s case and had conducted empirical studies to show its inadequacy. Experimental data suggest intuitions on this matter vary both across and within cultures. However, there is a descriptive ambiguity, we argue, in Kripke’s Gödel case, for people associate different types of descriptions with proper names, such as the description of brute facts and the description of social facts. We argue in this paper with experimental data that the descriptive ambiguity exists and affects the actual ratio of Kripkeans in reference. This result flaws Machery et al.’s interpretation on empirical research, but does not challenge their claim on cross-cultural divergence. In fact, there are more East Asian descriptivists than Machery et al. expected. ","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41678815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Algunas aseveraciones que no son acerca del significado de las palabras usadas pueden transmitir información acerca de ese significado. En (Mena, 2022) ofrecí una teoría para explicar este fenómeno de manera puramente semántica. Lo novedoso de la teoría consiste en incluir las interpretaciones del lenguaje en las circunstancias de evaluación: los parámetros respecto a los cuales evaluamos los contenidos de las expresiones ling¨üísticas. En este ensayo argumento que las aseveraciones de oraciones que contienen indéxicos pueden transmitir información acerca del contexto de uso, aunque esas oraciones no sean acerca de contextos. Dado esto, ofrezco una extensión de mi teoría de los efectos metalingüísticos para modelar a los indéxicos de manera similar. También discuto las muchas maneras en que la teoría aquí presentada se distingue de otras semánticas bidimensionales.
{"title":"Efectos metalingüisticos y metacontextuales","authors":"Ricardo Mena","doi":"10.1387/theoria.23458","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.23458","url":null,"abstract":"Algunas aseveraciones que no son acerca del significado de las palabras usadas pueden transmitir información acerca de ese significado. En (Mena, 2022) ofrecí una teoría para explicar este fenómeno de manera puramente semántica. Lo novedoso de la teoría consiste en incluir las interpretaciones del lenguaje en las circunstancias de evaluación: los parámetros respecto a los cuales evaluamos los contenidos de las expresiones ling¨üísticas. En este ensayo argumento que las aseveraciones de oraciones que contienen indéxicos pueden transmitir información acerca del contexto de uso, aunque esas oraciones no sean acerca de contextos. Dado esto, ofrezco una extensión de mi teoría de los efectos metalingüísticos para modelar a los indéxicos de manera similar. También discuto las muchas maneras en que la teoría aquí presentada se distingue de otras semánticas bidimensionales.","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47395952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Camp (2009) distinguishes two varieties of conceptual recombination. One of them is full-blown or (as I prefer to call it) spontaneous recombination. The other is causal-counterfactual recombination. She suggests that while human animals recombine their concepts in a full-blown way, many non-human animals are capable of conceptual recombinability but only of the causal-counterfactual kind. In this paper, I argue that there is conceptual space to draw further sub-distinctions on how different animals may recombine their concepts. More specifically, I propose to differentiate between a) narrow causal counterfactual recombination; b) broad causal-counterfactual recombination; c) lean spontaneous recombination; d) robust spontaneous recombination. Afterwards, I focus on how these distinctions relate to several previous philosophical ideas on the representational capacities of non-human animals. I also provide several empirical examples suggesting that some animals display one or another of these four ways of recombining concepts, at least in some contexts.
{"title":"Conceptual recombination and stimulus-independence in non-human animals","authors":"Laura Danón","doi":"10.1387/theoria.23638","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.23638","url":null,"abstract":"Camp (2009) distinguishes two varieties of conceptual recombination. One of them is full-blown or (as I prefer to call it) spontaneous recombination. The other is causal-counterfactual recombination. She suggests that while human animals recombine their concepts in a full-blown way, many non-human animals are capable of conceptual recombinability but only of the causal-counterfactual kind. In this paper, I argue that there is conceptual space to draw further sub-distinctions on how different animals may recombine their concepts. More specifically, I propose to differentiate between a) narrow causal counterfactual recombination; b) broad causal-counterfactual recombination; c) lean spontaneous recombination; d) robust spontaneous recombination. Afterwards, I focus on how these distinctions relate to several previous philosophical ideas on the representational capacities of non-human animals. I also provide several empirical examples suggesting that some animals display one or another of these four ways of recombining concepts, at least in some contexts.","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47711419","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Not every truth could have a Truthmaker","authors":"J. Stigall","doi":"10.1111/theo.12446","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12446","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43065294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Merely verbal disputes and common ground","authors":"J. T. Miller","doi":"10.1111/theo.12449","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12449","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47364596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Personal autonomy: From practice to theory","authors":"J. A. Marceta, N. Juth","doi":"10.1111/theo.12448","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12448","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45151493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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