The argument from inductive risk is considered to be one of the strongest challenges for value-free science. A great part of its appeal lies in the idea that even an ideal epistemic agent—the “perfect scientist” or “scientist qua scientist”—cannot escape inductive risk. In this paper, I scrutinize this ambition by stipulating an idealized Bayesian decision setting. I argue that inductive risk does not show that the “perfect scientist” must, descriptively speaking, make non-epistemic value-judgements, at least not in a way that undermines the value-free ideal. However, the argument is more successful in showing that there are cases where the “perfect scientist” should, normatively speaking, use non-epistemic values. I also show that this is possible without creating problems of illegitimate prescription and wishful thinking. Thus, while inductive risk does not refute value-freedom completely, it still represents a powerful critique of value-free science.
{"title":"Inductive risk: does it really refute value-freedom?","authors":"M. Dressel","doi":"10.1387/theoria.22795","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.22795","url":null,"abstract":"The argument from inductive risk is considered to be one of the strongest challenges for value-free science. A great part of its appeal lies in the idea that even an ideal epistemic agent—the “perfect scientist” or “scientist qua scientist”—cannot escape inductive risk. In this paper, I scrutinize this ambition by stipulating an idealized Bayesian decision setting. I argue that inductive risk does not show that the “perfect scientist” must, descriptively speaking, make non-epistemic value-judgements, at least not in a way that undermines the value-free ideal. However, the argument is more successful in showing that there are cases where the “perfect scientist” should, normatively speaking, use non-epistemic values. I also show that this is possible without creating problems of illegitimate prescription and wishful thinking. Thus, while inductive risk does not refute value-freedom completely, it still represents a powerful critique of value-free science.","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46534342","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Can philosophical theories of perception defer to perceptual science when fixing their ontological commitments regarding the objects of perception? Or in other words, can perceptual science inform us about the nature of perception? Many contemporary mainstream philosophers of perception answer affirmatively. However, in this essay I provide two arguments against this idea. On the one hand, I will argue that perceptual science is not committed to certain assumptions, relevant for determining perceptual ontology, which however are generally relied upon by philosophers when interpreting such science. On the other hand, I will show how perceptual science often relies on another assumption, which I call the ‘Measuring instrument conception’ of sensory systems, which philosophers of perception should clearly reject. Given these two symmetric lines of argument, I will finally suggest that we ought to think differently about the relationship between perceptual science and the philosophy of perception.
{"title":"Perceptual science and the nature of perception","authors":"Alessandra Buccella","doi":"10.1387/theoria.22650","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.22650","url":null,"abstract":"Can philosophical theories of perception defer to perceptual science when fixing their ontological commitments regarding the objects of perception? Or in other words, can perceptual science inform us about the nature of perception? Many contemporary mainstream philosophers of perception answer affirmatively. However, in this essay I provide two arguments against this idea. On the one hand, I will argue that perceptual science is not committed to certain assumptions, relevant for determining perceptual ontology, which however are generally relied upon by philosophers when interpreting such science. On the other hand, I will show how perceptual science often relies on another assumption, which I call the ‘Measuring instrument conception’ of sensory systems, which philosophers of perception should clearly reject. Given these two symmetric lines of argument, I will finally suggest that we ought to think differently about the relationship between perceptual science and the philosophy of perception.","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44802780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rectification note to “Scientific models and metalinguistic negotiation” (Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 34(2), 277-295).
“科学模型和元语言协商”的更正说明（Theoria.An International Journal for Theory，History and Foundations of Science，34（2），277-295）。
{"title":"Rectification note to “Scientific models and metalinguistic negotiation” (Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 34(2), 277-295)","authors":"Mirco Sambrotta","doi":"10.1387/theoria.23644","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.23644","url":null,"abstract":"Rectification note to “Scientific models and metalinguistic negotiation” (Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 34(2), 277-295).","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49115251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mario Gómez-Torrente. 2020. Roads to Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press","authors":"S. Soames","doi":"10.1387/theoria.23642","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.23642","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44308448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An analysis of absurdity\u0000 1","authors":"Tony Tsz Fung Lau","doi":"10.1111/theo.12422","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12422","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41249374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Eli Hirsch argues that certain ontological disputes involve a conflict between “ equivalent ” languages, and that the principle of charity compels each disputant to interpret the other as speaking truly in their own language. For Hirsch, a language ’ s semantics maps sentences (in context) onto sets of possible worlds but assigns no role to reference. I argue that this method leads to an overly uncharitable portrayal of the disputes at issue – whereby ontologists who speak “ equivalent ” languages can only argue about syntax. Lack of charity stems from the fact that this portrayal likely fails to uphold the self-conception of the disputants – and particularly what I will call “ the weak self-conception ” . As a result, Hirsch ’ s deflationism falls victim of the same principle of charity that informs it.
{"title":"Ontological disagreements, reference, and charity: A challenge for Hirsch's deflationism","authors":"Delia Belleri","doi":"10.1111/theo.12421","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12421","url":null,"abstract":"Eli Hirsch argues that certain ontological disputes involve a conflict between “ equivalent ” languages, and that the principle of charity compels each disputant to interpret the other as speaking truly in their own language. For Hirsch, a language ’ s semantics maps sentences (in context) onto sets of possible worlds but assigns no role to reference. I argue that this method leads to an overly uncharitable portrayal of the disputes at issue – whereby ontologists who speak “ equivalent ” languages can only argue about syntax. Lack of charity stems from the fact that this portrayal likely fails to uphold the self-conception of the disputants – and particularly what I will call “ the weak self-conception ” . As a result, Hirsch ’ s deflationism falls victim of the same principle of charity that informs it.","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46168295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A new case of the Myth of the Given?","authors":"Daniel E. Kalpokas","doi":"10.1111/theo.12423","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12423","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43747605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Never trust an unsound theory","authors":"Christian Bennet, Rasmus Blanck","doi":"10.1111/theo.12408","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12408","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49087189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sten Lindström in memoriam","authors":"Wlodek Rabinowicz","doi":"10.1111/theo.12404","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12404","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46897854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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