Can philosophical theories of perception defer to perceptual science when fixing their ontological commitments regarding the objects of perception? Or in other words, can perceptual science inform us about the nature of perception? Many contemporary mainstream philosophers of perception answer affirmatively. However, in this essay I provide two arguments against this idea. On the one hand, I will argue that perceptual science is not committed to certain assumptions, relevant for determining perceptual ontology, which however are generally relied upon by philosophers when interpreting such science. On the other hand, I will show how perceptual science often relies on another assumption, which I call the ‘Measuring instrument conception’ of sensory systems, which philosophers of perception should clearly reject. Given these two symmetric lines of argument, I will finally suggest that we ought to think differently about the relationship between perceptual science and the philosophy of perception.
{"title":"Perceptual science and the nature of perception","authors":"Alessandra Buccella","doi":"10.1387/theoria.22650","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.22650","url":null,"abstract":"Can philosophical theories of perception defer to perceptual science when fixing their ontological commitments regarding the objects of perception? Or in other words, can perceptual science inform us about the nature of perception? Many contemporary mainstream philosophers of perception answer affirmatively. However, in this essay I provide two arguments against this idea. On the one hand, I will argue that perceptual science is not committed to certain assumptions, relevant for determining perceptual ontology, which however are generally relied upon by philosophers when interpreting such science. On the other hand, I will show how perceptual science often relies on another assumption, which I call the ‘Measuring instrument conception’ of sensory systems, which philosophers of perception should clearly reject. Given these two symmetric lines of argument, I will finally suggest that we ought to think differently about the relationship between perceptual science and the philosophy of perception.","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44802780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rectification note to “Scientific models and metalinguistic negotiation” (Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 34(2), 277-295).
“科学模型和元语言协商”的更正说明（Theoria.An International Journal for Theory，History and Foundations of Science，34（2），277-295）。
{"title":"Rectification note to “Scientific models and metalinguistic negotiation” (Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 34(2), 277-295)","authors":"Mirco Sambrotta","doi":"10.1387/theoria.23644","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.23644","url":null,"abstract":"Rectification note to “Scientific models and metalinguistic negotiation” (Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 34(2), 277-295).","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49115251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An analysis of absurdity\u0000 1","authors":"Tony Tsz Fung Lau","doi":"10.1111/theo.12422","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12422","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":"13 17","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41249374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Eli Hirsch argues that certain ontological disputes involve a conflict between “ equivalent ” languages, and that the principle of charity compels each disputant to interpret the other as speaking truly in their own language. For Hirsch, a language ’ s semantics maps sentences (in context) onto sets of possible worlds but assigns no role to reference. I argue that this method leads to an overly uncharitable portrayal of the disputes at issue – whereby ontologists who speak “ equivalent ” languages can only argue about syntax. Lack of charity stems from the fact that this portrayal likely fails to uphold the self-conception of the disputants – and particularly what I will call “ the weak self-conception ” . As a result, Hirsch ’ s deflationism falls victim of the same principle of charity that informs it.
{"title":"Ontological disagreements, reference, and charity: A challenge for Hirsch's deflationism","authors":"Delia Belleri","doi":"10.1111/theo.12421","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12421","url":null,"abstract":"Eli Hirsch argues that certain ontological disputes involve a conflict between “ equivalent ” languages, and that the principle of charity compels each disputant to interpret the other as speaking truly in their own language. For Hirsch, a language ’ s semantics maps sentences (in context) onto sets of possible worlds but assigns no role to reference. I argue that this method leads to an overly uncharitable portrayal of the disputes at issue – whereby ontologists who speak “ equivalent ” languages can only argue about syntax. Lack of charity stems from the fact that this portrayal likely fails to uphold the self-conception of the disputants – and particularly what I will call “ the weak self-conception ” . As a result, Hirsch ’ s deflationism falls victim of the same principle of charity that informs it.","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46168295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A new case of the Myth of the Given?","authors":"Daniel E. Kalpokas","doi":"10.1111/theo.12423","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12423","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43747605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Never trust an unsound theory","authors":"Christian Bennet, Rasmus Blanck","doi":"10.1111/theo.12408","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12408","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49087189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sten Lindström in memoriam","authors":"Wlodek Rabinowicz","doi":"10.1111/theo.12404","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12404","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46897854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper presents a uniform semantic treatment of nonmonotonic inference operations that allow for inferences from infinite sets of premisses. The semantics is formulated in terms of selection functions and is a generalisation of the preferential semantics of Shoham, Kraus et al., and Makinson. A selection function picks out from a given set of possible states (worlds, situations, models) a subset consisting of those states that are, in some sense, the most preferred ones. A proposition α is a nonmonotonic consequence of a set of propositions Γ iff α holds in all the most preferred Γ -states. In the literature on revealed preference theory, there are a number of well-known theorems concerning the represen-tability of selection functions, satisfying certain properties, in terms of underlying preference relations. Such theorems are utilised here to give corresponding representation theorems for nonmonotonic inference operations. At the end of the paper, the connection between nonmonotonic inference and belief revision, in the sense of Alchourr (cid:1) on, Gärdenfors, and Makinson, is explored. In this connection, infinitary belief revision operations, that allow for the revision of a theory with a possibly infinite set of propositions, are introduced and characterised axiomatically. Several semantic representation theorems are proved for operations of this kind.
{"title":"A semantic approach to nonmonotonic reasoning: Inference operations and choice","authors":"Sten Lindström","doi":"10.1111/theo.12405","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12405","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a uniform semantic treatment of nonmonotonic inference operations that allow for inferences from infinite sets of premisses. The semantics is formulated in terms of selection functions and is a generalisation of the preferential semantics of Shoham, Kraus et al., and Makinson. A selection function picks out from a given set of possible states (worlds, situations, models) a subset consisting of those states that are, in some sense, the most preferred ones. A proposition α is a nonmonotonic consequence of a set of propositions Γ iff α holds in all the most preferred Γ -states. In the literature on revealed preference theory, there are a number of well-known theorems concerning the represen-tability of selection functions, satisfying certain properties, in terms of underlying preference relations. Such theorems are utilised here to give corresponding representation theorems for nonmonotonic inference operations. At the end of the paper, the connection between nonmonotonic inference and belief revision, in the sense of Alchourr (cid:1) on, Gärdenfors, and Makinson, is explored. In this connection, infinitary belief revision operations, that allow for the revision of a theory with a possibly infinite set of propositions, are introduced and characterised axiomatically. Several semantic representation theorems are proved for operations of this kind.","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46601701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The conception of property is usually moulded upon diverting historical and political-philosophical frameworks. The current interest on the commons illustrates these divergences when they come up between a ‘pure’ public and a ‘pure’ private form of ownership. This conceptual triad misleads by conflating private property with an absolute property right while equating public property with a centralised political regime. This article traces the republican conception of property in order to show how it draws a legal and philosophical continuum around different forms of ownership, based on a fiduciary principle underlying the relationship between the sovereign or principal (trustor) and its agent (trustee). Despite modern socialism apparently left aside the question of the commons, the republican-fiduciary rationale was reformulated according to the modern industrial capitalist society.
{"title":"Private, Public and Common","authors":"B. Laín, Edgar Manjarín","doi":"10.3167/th.2022.6917104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3167/th.2022.6917104","url":null,"abstract":"The conception of property is usually moulded upon diverting historical and political-philosophical frameworks. The current interest on the commons illustrates these divergences when they come up between a ‘pure’ public and a ‘pure’ private form of ownership. This conceptual triad misleads by conflating private property with an absolute property right while equating public property with a centralised political regime. This article traces the republican conception of property in order to show how it draws a legal and philosophical continuum around different forms of ownership, based on a fiduciary principle underlying the relationship between the sovereign or principal (trustor) and its agent (trustee). Despite modern socialism apparently left aside the question of the commons, the republican-fiduciary rationale was reformulated according to the modern industrial capitalist society.","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42353738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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