{"title":"Response‐dependence and normativity","authors":"Yifan Sun","doi":"10.1111/theo.12429","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12429","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41864681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Moore′s paradox generalized","authors":"Claudio de Almeida","doi":"10.1111/theo.12427","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12427","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42749982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction","authors":"Joshua Norton","doi":"10.1111/theo.12387","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12387","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45763247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Protect science against frivolous litigation!","authors":"S. Hansson","doi":"10.1111/theo.12426","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12426","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44805413","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
El objetivo de este artículo es ofrecer una explicación de la legitimidad de ciertos argumentos ad hominem acudiendo a la epistemología de las virtudes. La tesis central es que hay argumentos ad hominem que son aceptables, si se conciben como argumentos inductivos cuya fuerza está determinada por una apelación justa a los vicios epistémicos del interlocutor. Se argumenta que algunos argumentos ad hominem abusivos son aceptables si descansan en un señalamiento justo de la carencia de virtudes epistémicas confiabilistas por parte del interlocutor. Así mismo, algunos argumentos ad hominem circunstanciales serían aceptables si descansan en un señalamiento justo de la carencia de virtudes responabilistas por parte del interlocutor. El artículo también expone cómo otros intentos de reivindicación de los argumentos ad hominem adolecen de algunos problemas.
{"title":"Argumentos ad hominem y epistemología de las virtudes: Cómo atacar a la persona sin cometer una falla lógica o moral en el intento","authors":"Ángel RIVERA-NOVOA","doi":"10.1387/theoria.23046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.23046","url":null,"abstract":"El objetivo de este artículo es ofrecer una explicación de la legitimidad de ciertos argumentos ad hominem acudiendo a la epistemología de las virtudes. La tesis central es que hay argumentos ad hominem que son aceptables, si se conciben como argumentos inductivos cuya fuerza está determinada por una apelación justa a los vicios epistémicos del interlocutor. Se argumenta que algunos argumentos ad hominem abusivos son aceptables si descansan en un señalamiento justo de la carencia de virtudes epistémicas confiabilistas por parte del interlocutor. Así mismo, algunos argumentos ad hominem circunstanciales serían aceptables si descansan en un señalamiento justo de la carencia de virtudes responabilistas por parte del interlocutor. El artículo también expone cómo otros intentos de reivindicación de los argumentos ad hominem adolecen de algunos problemas.","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49653951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Necessitation and the Changing Past","authors":"A. Schipper","doi":"10.1111/theo.12424","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12424","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43053882","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
One of the most important things that the Darwinian revolution affects is the previous teleological thinking. In particular, the attribution of functions to various entities of the natural world with explanatory pretensions. In this change, his theory of natural selection played an important role. We all agree on that, but the diversity and heterogeneity of the answers that try to explain what Darwin did exactly with functional biology are overwhelming.In this paper I will try to show how Darwin modified previous functional biology. For pre-Darwinian naturalists did not hesitate to attribute functions in which, for example, the traits of one species were in the service of other species.I will try to show that this has consequences on the discussion regarding the nature of functional language. I will try to show that the main approaches, the systemic and the etiological, do not adequately account for these changes and therefore do not account for the way functional biology regulates the kind of legitimate functions.I will outline a possible new solution to this problem: appropriate functional attributions in Darwinian functional biology could be regulated by a theory or a set of laws that provide the criteria for determining its fundamental concepts.
{"title":"Darwinian functional biology","authors":"Santiago Ginnobili","doi":"10.1387/theoria.22645","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.22645","url":null,"abstract":"One of the most important things that the Darwinian revolution affects is the previous teleological thinking. In particular, the attribution of functions to various entities of the natural world with explanatory pretensions. In this change, his theory of natural selection played an important role. We all agree on that, but the diversity and heterogeneity of the answers that try to explain what Darwin did exactly with functional biology are overwhelming.In this paper I will try to show how Darwin modified previous functional biology. For pre-Darwinian naturalists did not hesitate to attribute functions in which, for example, the traits of one species were in the service of other species.I will try to show that this has consequences on the discussion regarding the nature of functional language. I will try to show that the main approaches, the systemic and the etiological, do not adequately account for these changes and therefore do not account for the way functional biology regulates the kind of legitimate functions.I will outline a possible new solution to this problem: appropriate functional attributions in Darwinian functional biology could be regulated by a theory or a set of laws that provide the criteria for determining its fundamental concepts.","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46468655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to the “received view” the disagreement between endurantism and perdurantism is ontological and concerns the existence of temporal parts of continuants. In a recent paper, (Wasserman 2016) argues that the ontological conception of these theories does not address the crucial point: explaining the way things persist. According to Wasserman, perdurantism is not just the view that things have temporal parts; it is the view that things persist by (or in virtue of) having temporal parts. Moreover, in the last decade an alternative understanding of the dispute between endurantism and perdurantism, the so called “locative turn”, has lead to an understanding of these two theories as concerning crucially locational rather than mereological notions. Our main aim in this paper is to bring together those two revisionary approaches to the received view, and show how they can enrich each other and open up further dimension of the debate. Finally in the last section we focus on some of the non-standard accounts of persistence and location that arise from this approach, such as “autonomism of persistence and location” and “reverse locational endurantism/perdurantism”.
{"title":"Explanation, persistence, and location","authors":"G. Torrengo, V. Buonomo","doi":"10.1387/theoria.21957","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.21957","url":null,"abstract":"According to the “received view” the disagreement between endurantism and perdurantism is ontological and concerns the existence of temporal parts of continuants. In a recent paper, (Wasserman 2016) argues that the ontological conception of these theories does not address the crucial point: explaining the way things persist. According to Wasserman, perdurantism is not just the view that things have temporal parts; it is the view that things persist by (or in virtue of) having temporal parts. Moreover, in the last decade an alternative understanding of the dispute between endurantism and perdurantism, the so called “locative turn”, has lead to an understanding of these two theories as concerning crucially locational rather than mereological notions. Our main aim in this paper is to bring together those two revisionary approaches to the received view, and show how they can enrich each other and open up further dimension of the debate. Finally in the last section we focus on some of the non-standard accounts of persistence and location that arise from this approach, such as “autonomism of persistence and location” and “reverse locational endurantism/perdurantism”. ","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45020378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I will argue that, contrary to what is generally assumed in the debate on expressive action, we do not have good reasons to exclude facial and bodily expressions of emotion such as smiling or frowning from the category of actions. For this purpose, I will compare facial and bodily expressions of emotion with simple expressive actions, such as jumping for joy or covering one’s face in shame. I will try to show that simple expressive actions cannot be presented as actions while excluding facial and bodily expressions of emotion from this condition. My contention will then be that either both sorts of behaviour are to be identified as actions or neither is. The latter sounds rather implausible, though, as we would have to assimilate jumping for joy or covering one’s face in shame to spasms, which conflicts with the way we relate to such behaviours. My conclusion will then be that both simple expressive actions and facial and bodily expressions of emotion should be included within the category of actions, at least on the basis of the main assumptions in the current debate on expressive action.
{"title":"Duchenne smiles are actions not mere happenings: lessons from the debate on expressive action","authors":"Marta Cabrera","doi":"10.1387/theoria.22572","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.22572","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I will argue that, contrary to what is generally assumed in the debate on expressive action, we do not have good reasons to exclude facial and bodily expressions of emotion such as smiling or frowning from the category of actions. For this purpose, I will compare facial and bodily expressions of emotion with simple expressive actions, such as jumping for joy or covering one’s face in shame. I will try to show that simple expressive actions cannot be presented as actions while excluding facial and bodily expressions of emotion from this condition. My contention will then be that either both sorts of behaviour are to be identified as actions or neither is. The latter sounds rather implausible, though, as we would have to assimilate jumping for joy or covering one’s face in shame to spasms, which conflicts with the way we relate to such behaviours. My conclusion will then be that both simple expressive actions and facial and bodily expressions of emotion should be included within the category of actions, at least on the basis of the main assumptions in the current debate on expressive action.","PeriodicalId":43859,"journal":{"name":"Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47591242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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