{"title":"Optimal Risk Financing in Large Corporations through Insurance Captives","authors":"P. Picard, J. Pinquet","doi":"10.1057/grir.2012.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1057/grir.2012.4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43920,"journal":{"name":"Geneva Risk and Insurance Review","volume":"38 1","pages":"48 - 86"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2013-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1057/grir.2012.4","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"58580351","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Risk and the Endogenous Economist: Some Comparisons of the Treatment of Risk in Physics and Economics","authors":"N. Doherty","doi":"10.1057/grir.2012.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1057/grir.2012.6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43920,"journal":{"name":"Geneva Risk and Insurance Review","volume":"38 1","pages":"1 - 22"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2013-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1057/grir.2012.6","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"58580545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Expiration Dates in Automobile Insurance Contracts: The Curious Case of Last Policy Month Claims in Taiwan","authors":"Chu‐Shiu Li, Chwen-chi Liu, Sheng-Chang Peng","doi":"10.1057/grir.2012.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1057/grir.2012.3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43920,"journal":{"name":"Geneva Risk and Insurance Review","volume":"38 1","pages":"23 - 47"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2013-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1057/grir.2012.3","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"58580291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Competitive Insurance Markets and Adverse Selection in the Lab","authors":"D. Riahi, L. Lévy-Garboua, C. Montmarquette","doi":"10.1057/grir.2012.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1057/grir.2012.5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43920,"journal":{"name":"Geneva Risk and Insurance Review","volume":"38 1","pages":"87 - 113"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2013-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1057/grir.2012.5","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"58580464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Disappointment and the Optimal Insurance Contract","authors":"Rachel J. Huang, Pai-Ta Shih, Larry Y. Tzeng","doi":"10.1057/grir.2012.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1057/grir.2012.2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43920,"journal":{"name":"Geneva Risk and Insurance Review","volume":"37 1","pages":"258 - 284"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2012-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1057/grir.2012.2","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"58580603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Iterative Adjustment of Survival Functions by Composed Probability Distortions","authors":"Alexis Bienvenüe, D. Rullière","doi":"10.1057/grir.2011.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1057/grir.2011.7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43920,"journal":{"name":"Geneva Risk and Insurance Review","volume":"37 1","pages":"156 - 179"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2011-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1057/grir.2011.7","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"58579788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Non-Linearity Between Life Insurance and Economic Development: A Revisited Approach","authors":"Chi-Hung Chang, Chien‐Chiang Lee","doi":"10.1057/grir.2011.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1057/grir.2011.10","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43920,"journal":{"name":"Geneva Risk and Insurance Review","volume":"37 1","pages":"223 - 257"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2011-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1057/grir.2011.10","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"58579327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Properties of a Risk Measure Derived from Ruin Theory","authors":"J. Trufin, Hansjoerg Albrecher, M. Denuit","doi":"10.1057/GRIR.2010.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1057/GRIR.2010.10","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43920,"journal":{"name":"Geneva Risk and Insurance Review","volume":"36 1","pages":"174-188"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2011-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1057/GRIR.2010.10","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"58579513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When an agent invests in new industrial activities, he has a limited initial knowledge of his project's returns. Acquiring information allows him both to reduce the uncertainty on the dangerousness of this project and to limit potential damages that it might cause on people's health and on the environment. In this paper, we study whether there exist situations in which the agent does not acquire information. We find that an agent with time-consistent preferences, as well as an agent with hyperbolic ones, will acquire information unless its cost exceeds the direct benefit they could get with this information. Nevertheless, a hyperbolic agent may remain strategically ignorant and, when he does acquire information, he will acquire less information than a time-consistent type. Moreover, a hyperbolic-discounting type who behaves as a time-consistent agent in the future is more inclined to stay ignorant. We then emphasize that this strategic ignorance depends on the degree of precision of the information. Finally, we analyse the role that existing liability rules could play as an incentive to acquire information under uncertainty and with regard to the form of the agent's preferences.
{"title":"Innovation and Information Acquisition under Time Inconsistency and Uncertainty","authors":"Sophie Chemarin, Caroline Orset","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1161251","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1161251","url":null,"abstract":"When an agent invests in new industrial activities, he has a limited initial knowledge of his project's returns. Acquiring information allows him both to reduce the uncertainty on the dangerousness of this project and to limit potential damages that it might cause on people's health and on the environment. In this paper, we study whether there exist situations in which the agent does not acquire information. We find that an agent with time-consistent preferences, as well as an agent with hyperbolic ones, will acquire information unless its cost exceeds the direct benefit they could get with this information. Nevertheless, a hyperbolic agent may remain strategically ignorant and, when he does acquire information, he will acquire less information than a time-consistent type. Moreover, a hyperbolic-discounting type who behaves as a time-consistent agent in the future is more inclined to stay ignorant. We then emphasize that this strategic ignorance depends on the degree of precision of the information. Finally, we analyse the role that existing liability rules could play as an incentive to acquire information under uncertainty and with regard to the form of the agent's preferences.","PeriodicalId":43920,"journal":{"name":"Geneva Risk and Insurance Review","volume":"36 1","pages":"132-173"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2011-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68149205","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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