EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW最新文献

In 2021, the European Commission published its Assessment of the EU Member States' rules on health data in the light of General Data Protection Regulation. The Commission concluded that the GDPR has been interpreted in many ways in the EU as regards health research, and national implementation legislation has resulted in a fragmented legal landscape. Several lawful bases are used as a legitimation for the secondary use of health data. I address the Dutch legislation on the re-use, or secondary use of health data for scientific research where explicit consent is the general rule. However, both the GDPR, the Dutch GDPR Implementation Act and sectoral health legislation leave room for alternatives. I conclude that a further review of these alternatives is required to enhance scientific health research with the secondary use of health data, and I sketch a few avenues for further exploration.

Contemporary biomedical research heavily relies on secondary use of personal health data that were obtained in a different clinical or research setting. Under the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), data controllers processing personal data must comply with the principle of purpose limitation, which restricts further processing of personal data beyond the purpose for which the data were initially collected. However, “further processing” is not explicitly defined, resulting in considerable interpretive ambiguities as to whether “secondary use” of data by researchers constitutes “further processing” under the GDPR. This ambiguity is problematic as it exposes researchers to potential non-compliance risks. In this article, we analyse the term “further processing” within the meaning of the GDPR, elucidate important aspects in which it differs from “secondary use”, and discuss the implications for data controllers’ GDPR compliance obligations. Subsequently, we contextualise this analysis within a broader discussion of regulating scientific research under the GDPR.

This paper deals with a series of legal cases in Italy, Germany, and Austria, between September 2019 and December 2020, which ruled that laws prohibiting or restricting assistance in suicide were unconstitutional. There are similarities between these three cases, all of which are influenced by the practice of assisted suicide in Switzerland, but also differences, not least because of the antecedent legal contexts. Each case is based on flawed reasoning. They have in common an exaggerated account of autonomy or self-determination, insufficiently qualified by the duty to protect human life or by other ethical constraints. The Italian and Austrian Courts also appeal to the principle of equality and to a supposed analogy with refusal of life-sustaining treatments, both of which raise concerns in relation to further expansion of the provisions. In responding to these flawed judgements, legislators should favour proposals that prevent the normalisation of assisted and non-assisted suicide.

Informed consent has been inconsistently conceptualised as a right, an immunity or even a power in the hands of the patient, which leaves its legal definition as partially indefinite. From the norms of the CHRB, a legal theory stance and the proposals of celebrated authors - namely, W.N. Hohfeld, H. Kelsen and R. Alexy, I will provide a steady conceptual structure for the subjective legal positions of the parties involved in the healthcare relationship regarding informed consent.