EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW最新文献

This paper deals with a series of legal cases in Italy, Germany, and Austria, between September 2019 and December 2020, which ruled that laws prohibiting or restricting assistance in suicide were unconstitutional. There are similarities between these three cases, all of which are influenced by the practice of assisted suicide in Switzerland, but also differences, not least because of the antecedent legal contexts. Each case is based on flawed reasoning. They have in common an exaggerated account of autonomy or self-determination, insufficiently qualified by the duty to protect human life or by other ethical constraints. The Italian and Austrian Courts also appeal to the principle of equality and to a supposed analogy with refusal of life-sustaining treatments, both of which raise concerns in relation to further expansion of the provisions. In responding to these flawed judgements, legislators should favour proposals that prevent the normalisation of assisted and non-assisted suicide.

Informed consent has been inconsistently conceptualised as a right, an immunity or even a power in the hands of the patient, which leaves its legal definition as partially indefinite. From the norms of the CHRB, a legal theory stance and the proposals of celebrated authors - namely, W.N. Hohfeld, H. Kelsen and R. Alexy, I will provide a steady conceptual structure for the subjective legal positions of the parties involved in the healthcare relationship regarding informed consent.

The field of human germline genome editing (HGGE) offers a promising reproductive potential to prevent inheritance of genetic diseases, yet also opens the door to undesirable eugenics. This stirred the debate about the acceptability of HGGE in light of human rights, particularly human dignity. The European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) use human dignity as a guiding principle. Therefore, this article examined the clinical implementation of HGGE in light of relevant case-law regarding Article 2 and Article 8 ECHR. The analysis illustrates that the ECtHR broadens the scope of artificial reproductive rights under Article 8, however, Contracting States of the Council of Europe can limit these rights and the accessibility to reproductive techniques, such as HGGE. The ECtHR remains elusive about the legal status of unborn life, but protection under Article 2 with the introduction of HGGE should not be ruled out.

The key aim of this paper is to highlight the oft-under-represented narrative of how persons with disabilities (specifically, those with intellectual disabilities) may access the benefits that genome editing may offer. Firstly, this paper reflects on the critical need for a paradigm shift in how we view intellectual disabilities, and centering the rights of persons with disabilities to allow them to access the broad scope of their right to health under various international law instruments (including the complementary right to habilitation under Article 26 of the CRPD). Secondly, the paper evaluates the legal provisions in the CRPD and other international instruments relating to the rights of persons with intellectual disabilities, and their access to genome editing technologies. This analysis intends to demonstrate that human rights in disability discourse be complemented with emancipatory, participatory, and transformative research. Finally, the paper argues for a reinvigorated line of thinking that expands on the social model of disability: to align with inclusive, contemporary disability discourse that embodies greater responsibility and innovation in perpetuating better access to genome editing technologies for persons with intellectual disabilities.