On 31 December 2020 at 11.00pm after forty-eight years the United Kingdom and European Union concluded the UK departure from the EU when the Transition Period (TP) following the Withdrawal Agreement (WA) came to an end and the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) between the UK and the EU was signed. From 11pm 31 December 2020, Britain was no longer bound by EU law and the jurisdiction of the EU Court of Justice (CJEU). It had left the single market and the customs union. The UK was set loose to find its way in the world. It is quite clear that while the treaty opens a new phase in relations between ourselves and Europe there is deep uncertainty as to what the future holds in our relations with the Union. Although the relationship had frequently been turbulent it was almost unthinkable until shortly over five years ago that the UK would depart from the Union. The purpose of this article is not to revisit past reflections on the indelible influence of EU law on UK law and its legacy (See P. Birkinshaw, European Public Law: The Achievement and the Brexit Challenge (3rd ed. 2020)). It will offer an account of the TCA and its provisions, future difficulties that the TCA is likely to present as it unfolds; what returning sovereignty, and sovereignty, mean; and to offer some thoughts on the future relationship and influence of EU law on our domestic law. Path to the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), the TCA, Contents, Consequences, Sovereignty, Future influence of EU law in UK
{"title":"Brexit and the Trade and Cooperation Agreement: Endgame or Prolegomenon?","authors":"P. Birkinshaw","doi":"10.54648/euro2021011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/euro2021011","url":null,"abstract":"On 31 December 2020 at 11.00pm after forty-eight years the United Kingdom and European Union concluded the UK departure from the EU when the Transition Period (TP) following the Withdrawal Agreement (WA) came to an end and the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) between the UK and the EU was signed. From 11pm 31 December 2020, Britain was no longer bound by EU law and the jurisdiction of the EU Court of Justice (CJEU). It had left the single market and the customs union. The UK was set loose to find its way in the world. It is quite clear that while the treaty opens a new phase in relations between ourselves and Europe there is deep uncertainty as to what the future holds in our relations with the Union. Although the relationship had frequently been turbulent it was almost unthinkable until shortly over five years ago that the UK would depart from the Union. The purpose of this article is not to revisit past reflections on the indelible influence of EU law on UK law and its legacy (See P. Birkinshaw, European Public Law: The Achievement and the Brexit Challenge (3rd ed. 2020)). It will offer an account of the TCA and its provisions, future difficulties that the TCA is likely to present as it unfolds; what returning sovereignty, and sovereignty, mean; and to offer some thoughts on the future relationship and influence of EU law on our domestic law.\u0000Path to the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), the TCA, Contents, Consequences, Sovereignty, Future influence of EU law in UK","PeriodicalId":43955,"journal":{"name":"European Public Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43744471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Aiming to foster reflection on the role of the EU regarding the enforcement of the rule of law, this essay revisits, in a normative fashion, the Union’s legal system with references to recent and established case law and literature. It understands the judicial enforcement of the rule of law as a synonym of effective judicial protection and analyses the pluralistic system of the Union as being overarched by loyalty. It then introduces three specific components of the rule of law related to its judicial enforcement. The first concerns its material aspect: the standards of protection of rights and principles. The contribution opines that the systemic analysis of the Union excludes conflicts of standards. The second component refers to judicial control. It is argued that the related structural obligations of the Member States are enforceable by individual claims grounded on a self-standing right. The last component is organic and relates to the judge. The contribution posits that the national judge is empowered by her European mandate to enforcing the rule of law. While the technique of exceptional circumstances as part of the mechanism of the European arrest warrant confirms this position, cases of constitutional conflicts suggest the procedural deficiency. EU legal system, rule of law, effective judicial protection, judicial enforcement of the rule of law, multidimensional legal system, substantive loyalty, standards of protection, procedural loyalty, duties of the Member States, individual claims, European mandate of the national judge, judicial cooperation, preliminary ruling, exceptional circumstances, constitutional conflicts
{"title":"Revisiting the EU Legal System: Substantive & Procedural Loyalty for the Judicial Enforcement of the Rule of Law","authors":"Panagiotis Zinonos","doi":"10.54648/euro2021017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/euro2021017","url":null,"abstract":"Aiming to foster reflection on the role of the EU regarding the enforcement of the rule of law, this essay revisits, in a normative fashion, the Union’s legal system with references to recent and established case law and literature. It understands the judicial enforcement of the rule of law as a synonym of effective judicial protection and analyses the pluralistic system of the Union as being overarched by loyalty. It then introduces three specific components of the rule of law related to its judicial enforcement. The first concerns its material aspect: the standards of protection of rights and principles. The contribution opines that the systemic analysis of the Union excludes conflicts of standards. The second component refers to judicial control. It is argued that the related structural obligations of the Member States are enforceable by individual claims grounded on a self-standing right. The last component is organic and relates to the judge. The contribution posits that the national judge is empowered by her European mandate to enforcing the rule of law. While the technique of exceptional circumstances as part of the mechanism of the European arrest warrant confirms this position, cases of constitutional conflicts suggest the procedural deficiency.\u0000EU legal system, rule of law, effective judicial protection, judicial enforcement of the rule of law, multidimensional legal system, substantive loyalty, standards of protection, procedural loyalty, duties of the Member States, individual claims, European mandate of the national judge, judicial cooperation, preliminary ruling, exceptional circumstances, constitutional conflicts","PeriodicalId":43955,"journal":{"name":"European Public Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42143515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Despite the importance formally attached to the principle, the Italian legal system is witnessing a progressive ‘weakening’ of the duty to give reasons. This weakening process seems problematic from the perspective of the respect of the rule of law and effective judicial protection of individuals vis-à-vis the administrative action. This phenomenon though is not specific of the only Italian legal system. The analysis of European Law and of the provisions in selected Member States have shown the weakening of the duty to give reasons can be considered a widespread issue. duty to give reasons, administrative measure, participation, administrative procedure
{"title":"The ‘Weakening’ of the Duty to Give Reasons in Italy: An Isolated Case or a European Trend?","authors":"M. Delsignore, M. Ramajoli","doi":"10.54648/euro2021002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/euro2021002","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the importance formally attached to the principle, the Italian legal system is witnessing a progressive ‘weakening’ of the duty to give reasons. This weakening process seems problematic from the perspective of the respect of the rule of law and effective judicial protection of individuals vis-à-vis the administrative action. This phenomenon though is not specific of the only Italian legal system. The analysis of European Law and of the provisions in selected Member States have shown the weakening of the duty to give reasons can be considered a widespread issue.\u0000duty to give reasons, administrative measure, participation, administrative procedure","PeriodicalId":43955,"journal":{"name":"European Public Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44746300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Book Review: Le Futur Du Droit Administratif: The Future of Administrative Law, Jean-Bernard Auby, Émile Chevalier & Emmanuel Slautsky eds. Paris: SciencesPo & LexisNexis. 2019","authors":"J. Handrlica","doi":"10.54648/euro2021010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/euro2021010","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43955,"journal":{"name":"European Public Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42447680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The authors believe that the judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court contains serious breaches of EU law and is manifestly erroneous. The German judges refuse to apply the CJEU’s judgment and arrogate the power to assess the legality of European Central Bank (ECB) decisions and to review the reasoning of the CJEU, which they qualify as being ‘unintelligible and arbitrary’ for the sole purpose of declaring it ‘ultra vires’. They use the principle of proportionality in a legally incorrect way, ignoring the difference in scope between the latter and the principle of conferral. They make highly questionable use of the principle of democracy and of economic analysis to assess the merits of ECB decisions. A careful analysis of the judgment leads us to wish for the initiation of an infringement procedure. Breach of EU law by the judiciary conferral, democratic principle, dialogue between courts, EU competences, infringement procedure, manifest error, primacy, proportionality, ultravires
{"title":"The Bundesverfassungsgericht’s Glaring and Deliberate Breaches of EU Law Based on ‘Unintelligible’ and ‘Arbitrary’ Grounds","authors":"J. Ziller, D. Galetta","doi":"10.54648/euro2021004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/euro2021004","url":null,"abstract":"The authors believe that the judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court contains serious breaches of EU law and is manifestly erroneous. The German judges refuse to apply the CJEU’s judgment and arrogate the power to assess the legality of European Central Bank (ECB) decisions and to review the reasoning of the CJEU, which they qualify as being ‘unintelligible and arbitrary’ for the sole purpose of declaring it ‘ultra vires’. They use the principle of proportionality in a legally incorrect way, ignoring the difference in scope between the latter and the principle of conferral. They make highly questionable use of the principle of democracy and of economic analysis to assess the merits of ECB decisions. A careful analysis of the judgment leads us to wish for the initiation of an infringement procedure.\u0000Breach of EU law by the judiciary conferral, democratic principle, dialogue between courts, EU competences, infringement procedure, manifest error, primacy, proportionality, ultravires","PeriodicalId":43955,"journal":{"name":"European Public Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48581736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The EU standards on independence of national regulatory authorities (NRAs) expanded significantly over the past two decades, including the most recent legislative developments relating to competition authorities and regulators in the sectors of audiovisual media and electronic communications. They appear to gradually challenge the principle of administrative sovereignty enabling the Member States to shape their administrative structures autonomously. The major aim of this article is to investigate the concept of independence, established in various acts of the EU law with regard to NRAs. In particular, the main attributes of ‘EU-made national independent authorities’ are explored, as well as the limitations of their autonomy deemed legitimate under the EU legislation. After reconstruction of the phenomenon of independent regulatory authorities, the paper reviews the EU standards on their independence. It then discusses similarities, differences and inconsistencies in interpreting the overarching principle of independence across various areas of the EU legislation, considering also additional guidelines stemming from the CJEU’s case law. Finally, the paper provides a summary of the main attributes of administrative independence guaranteed by the EU law to national regulators and analyses to what extent they pose a challenge to the principle of administrative sovereignty of the Member States. national regulatory authorities, administrative independence, administrative sovereignty
{"title":"Challenging Administrative Sovereignty: Dimensions of Independence of National Regulatory Authorities Under the EU Law","authors":"Dawid Sześciło","doi":"10.54648/euro2021008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/euro2021008","url":null,"abstract":"The EU standards on independence of national regulatory authorities (NRAs) expanded significantly over the past two decades, including the most recent legislative developments relating to competition authorities and regulators in the sectors of audiovisual media and electronic communications. They appear to gradually challenge the principle of administrative sovereignty enabling the Member States to shape their administrative structures autonomously. The major aim of this article is to investigate the concept of independence, established in various acts of the EU law with regard to NRAs. In particular, the main attributes of ‘EU-made national independent authorities’ are explored, as well as the limitations of their autonomy deemed legitimate under the EU legislation. After reconstruction of the phenomenon of independent regulatory authorities, the paper reviews the EU standards on their independence. It then discusses similarities, differences and inconsistencies in interpreting the overarching principle of independence across various areas of the EU legislation, considering also additional guidelines stemming from the CJEU’s case law. Finally, the paper provides a summary of the main attributes of administrative independence guaranteed by the EU law to national regulators and analyses to what extent they pose a challenge to the principle of administrative sovereignty of the Member States.\u0000national regulatory authorities, administrative independence, administrative sovereignty","PeriodicalId":43955,"journal":{"name":"European Public Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42805815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Book Review: Member State Interests And European Union Law: Revisiting The Foundations Of Member State Obligations, By Márton Varju Ed. London And New York: Routledge. 2019","authors":"Viktor Szép","doi":"10.54648/euro2021009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/euro2021009","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43955,"journal":{"name":"European Public Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49543683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
P. Huber, Christoph Grabenwarter, R. Knez, Ineta Ziemele
The constitutional courts play a paramount role within the European judicial area and form a specific branch of the judicial network, including the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights. Within the European Union (EU) with its specific compound structure, in which national legal orders and Union law reciprocally influence, complement, determine and affect each other, national constitutional courts and the CJEU are not only assigned with the common task to enforce EU law, but also to preserve its limits, first and foremost the principle of conferral and the constitutional identities of the Member States. The respect for these limits is an essential prerequisite for the Member State’s participation in the EU and repeatedly enshrined in the Treaties. In order to be able to fulfil this common tasks all sides need to engage in sincere cooperation and a dialectic process, the potential of which must not be curtailed by hierarchical perceptions.Whereas the national (constitutional) courts are obliged to respect the CJEU’s authority to ultimately decide on the interpretation of EU law in principle, it is the CJEU’s obligation to take their referrals seriously and thoroughly adress concerns brought forward. The constitutional courts of the Member States are assigned with the constitutional responsibility to accompany the process of European integration in order to ensure that sovereign rights are only transferred in line with the respective provisions as well as that the excercise of competences respects the limits laid down in the Treaties and does not interfere with the constitutional identities of theMember States. It is of course again for the CJEU to review whether EU institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies act within their mandate in the first place including a quite large tolerance for different interpretations. To the extend the CJEU, however, fails to assume this responsibility, it is for the constitutional courts of the Member States to step in. The desirable success of the European integration largely depends on an orderly, sustainable and generally accepted process in the long run to which the network of constitutional courts can make a decisive contribution, provided it is designed and lived as a true cooperation among equals. In this regard it is not only necessary to intensify the joint efforts, but also to evaluate possibilities to enhance the involvement of the national courts, in particular the establishment of a reverse preliminary ruling procedure. duty to give reasons, administrative measure, participation, administrative procedure
{"title":"The Role of the Constitutional Courts in the European Judicial Network","authors":"P. Huber, Christoph Grabenwarter, R. Knez, Ineta Ziemele","doi":"10.54648/euro2021003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/euro2021003","url":null,"abstract":"The constitutional courts play a paramount role within the European judicial area and form a specific branch of the judicial network, including the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights. Within the European Union (EU) with its specific compound structure, in which national legal orders and Union law reciprocally influence, complement, determine and affect each other, national constitutional courts and the CJEU are not only assigned with the common task to enforce EU law, but also to preserve its limits, first and foremost the principle of conferral and the constitutional identities of the Member States. The respect for these limits is an essential prerequisite for the Member State’s participation in the EU and repeatedly enshrined in the Treaties. In order to be able to fulfil this common tasks all sides need to engage in sincere cooperation and a dialectic process, the potential of which must not be curtailed by hierarchical perceptions.Whereas the national (constitutional) courts are obliged to respect the CJEU’s authority to ultimately decide on the interpretation of EU law in principle, it is the CJEU’s obligation to take their referrals seriously and thoroughly adress concerns brought forward. The constitutional courts of the Member States are assigned with the constitutional responsibility to accompany the process of European integration in order to ensure that sovereign rights are only transferred in line with the respective provisions as well as that the excercise of competences respects the limits laid down in the Treaties and does not interfere with the constitutional identities of theMember States. It is of course again for the CJEU to review whether EU institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies act within their mandate in the first place including a quite large tolerance for different interpretations. To the extend the CJEU, however, fails to assume this responsibility, it is for the constitutional courts of the Member States to step in. The desirable success of the European integration largely depends on an orderly, sustainable and generally accepted process in the long run to which the network of constitutional courts can make a decisive contribution, provided it is designed and lived as a true cooperation among equals. In this regard it is not only necessary to intensify the joint efforts, but also to evaluate possibilities to enhance the involvement of the national courts, in particular the establishment of a reverse preliminary ruling procedure.\u0000duty to give reasons, administrative measure, participation, administrative procedure","PeriodicalId":43955,"journal":{"name":"European Public Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48386224","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"European Court of Human Rights: May 2019-April 2020","authors":"A. Mowbray","doi":"10.54648/euro2021001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/euro2021001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43955,"journal":{"name":"European Public Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43289346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Case law regularly includes personal data on identifiable persons, often of a rather sensitive nature. This makes the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) relevant. However, the processing of personal data in case law has until recently not been questioned from the point of view of data protection of the individuals concerned. The Court of Justice of the European Union has taken steps ensure such protection for individuals appearing before the courts. Sweden has chosen another path. As transparency is a highly treasured in Sweden, including transparency in the judiciary, restricting access to the full verdict is sensitive. Instead, the processing of personal data has been restricted in a certain areas, such as research. In order to fulfill the requirements for an ‘appropriate safeguard’ under Article 89 GDPR, an ethical approval is needed for all research on specific categories of sensitive personal data, with no exception for publicly-available official documents like case law. The question posed is how the interest in protection of personal data retrieved from case law can be reconciled with the interest in transparency of the judicial process. It is concluded that even though requirements for an ethical approval of legal research hardly can be seen as a relevant ‘appropriate safeguard’, it cannot be denied that there is a legitimate interest of identifiable persons in case law to have their rights in personal data at least considered. Courts should therefore be stronger in elucidating when and why transparency is of overriding importance, and when and why data protection and the interest of secrecy should prevail. Data protection, transparency, case law, official documents, secrecy, sensitive data, research exception, appropriate safeguard, ethical approval
{"title":"The GDPR and Processing of Personal Data for Research Purposes: What About Case Law?","authors":"J. Reichel","doi":"10.54648/euro2021007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/euro2021007","url":null,"abstract":"Case law regularly includes personal data on identifiable persons, often of a rather sensitive nature. This makes the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) relevant. However, the processing of personal data in case law has until recently not been questioned from the point of view of data protection of the individuals concerned. The Court of Justice of the European Union has taken steps ensure such protection for individuals appearing before the courts. Sweden has chosen another path. As transparency is a highly treasured in Sweden, including transparency in the judiciary, restricting access to the full verdict is sensitive. Instead, the processing of personal data has been restricted in a certain areas, such as research. In order to fulfill the requirements for an ‘appropriate safeguard’ under Article 89 GDPR, an ethical approval is needed for all research on specific categories of sensitive personal data, with no exception for publicly-available official documents like case law. The question posed is how the interest in protection of personal data retrieved from case law can be reconciled with the interest in transparency of the judicial process. It is concluded that even though requirements for an ethical approval of legal research hardly can be seen as a relevant ‘appropriate safeguard’, it cannot be denied that there is a legitimate interest of identifiable persons in case law to have their rights in personal data at least considered. Courts should therefore be stronger in elucidating when and why transparency is of overriding importance, and when and why data protection and the interest of secrecy should prevail.\u0000Data protection, transparency, case law, official documents, secrecy, sensitive data, research exception, appropriate safeguard, ethical approval","PeriodicalId":43955,"journal":{"name":"European Public Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44573225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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