This article revolves around the search for statutory recognition of the use of algorithmics (including rule-based systems) to make decisions. Thus, the focus is on whether a powerconferring rule is necessary before an administrative authority may issue a valid automated decision. By claiming that such a power-conferring rule is not only desirable but also a legal requirement, one contends that the shifting to automated decision making in the public sector is simply a by-product of reengineering bureaucratic practice through Information and Communication Technology. The issue is essential because there are several cases throughout Europe and beyond in which the latter is precisely the case. Moreover, values such as efficiency and flexibility to adapt to fast technological change could be considered sound justificatory arguments to purport that automated decision-making in the public sector should not be governed through the traditional arsenal of the rule of law. The primary purpose of the article is to offer a first conceptual skeleton to sow the seeds for further research on a normative claim that automated public administration decision-making should, nonetheless, be implemented in light of the rule of law. Secondly, it offers some recommendations for a legal framework to govern such a practice. The background idea is that focusing on the legal power to make an automated decision constitutes a necessary step to guarantee that the ethical and political principles that should undergird the adoption, development and implementation of any form of algorithmic decisionmaking in the public sector are appropriately and adequately taken into account. public sector, automated decisions, rule of law, algorithms
{"title":"Public Administration Algorithm Decision- Making and the Rule of Law","authors":"S. Matteucci","doi":"10.54648/euro2021005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/euro2021005","url":null,"abstract":"This article revolves around the search for statutory recognition of the use of algorithmics (including rule-based systems) to make decisions. Thus, the focus is on whether a powerconferring rule is necessary before an administrative authority may issue a valid automated decision. By claiming that such a power-conferring rule is not only desirable but also a legal requirement, one contends that the shifting to automated decision making in the public sector is simply a by-product of reengineering bureaucratic practice through Information and Communication Technology. The issue is essential because there are several cases throughout Europe and beyond in which the latter is precisely the case. Moreover, values such as efficiency and flexibility to adapt to fast technological change could be considered sound justificatory arguments to purport that automated decision-making in the public sector should not be governed through the traditional arsenal of the rule of law. The primary purpose of the article is to offer a first conceptual skeleton to sow the seeds for further research on a normative claim that automated public administration decision-making should, nonetheless, be implemented in light of the rule of law. Secondly, it offers some recommendations for a legal framework to govern such a practice. The background idea is that focusing on the legal power to make an automated decision constitutes a necessary step to guarantee that the ethical and political principles that should undergird the adoption, development and implementation of any form of algorithmic decisionmaking in the public sector are appropriately and adequately taken into account.\u0000public sector, automated decisions, rule of law, algorithms","PeriodicalId":43955,"journal":{"name":"European Public Law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47346276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Unlike other EU Member States, existing studies on public procurement challenges in UK local government lack empirical analysis. The Law Commission has identified this as an area for review. Little is known about the frequency and distribution of such challenges within the UK. Consequently, observations made on the number of procurement disputes actually leading to judicial review applications are speculative. This article, for the first time, generates new empirical data on the subject and makes reform recommendations. Using data elicited from nearly 400 local government bodies, the national and regional frequency and distribution of such challenges is illuminated for the first time. Glaring inability by Local Government bodies to retain and retrieve data pertaining to Local Government procurement was revealed by the study; the frequency and distribution of challenges was seen to vary widely across different UK regions; the number of challenges has risen significantly following 2009 law and policy reforms (rather than reduce); and the insights generated in the article will support the Law Commission’s call for further study of internal administrative review systems within public bodies so the connection between administrative justice and those seeking natural justice in procurement disputes is better understood. judicial review, local government, public procurement, freedom of information, policy reform.
{"title":"An Empirical Study of the Frequency and Distribution of Judicial Review in Resolving Public Procurement Disputes Within the UK: Proposals for Legal and Policy Reform","authors":"D. Cahill, Stephen Clear","doi":"10.54648/euro2021006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/euro2021006","url":null,"abstract":"Unlike other EU Member States, existing studies on public procurement challenges in UK local government lack empirical analysis. The Law Commission has identified this as an area for review. Little is known about the frequency and distribution of such challenges within the UK. Consequently, observations made on the number of procurement disputes actually leading to judicial review applications are speculative. This article, for the first time, generates new empirical data on the subject and makes reform recommendations. Using data elicited from nearly 400 local government bodies, the national and regional frequency and distribution of such challenges is illuminated for the first time. Glaring inability by Local Government bodies to retain and retrieve data pertaining to Local Government procurement was revealed by the study; the frequency and distribution of challenges was seen to vary widely across different UK regions; the number of challenges has risen significantly following 2009 law and policy reforms (rather than reduce); and the insights generated in the article will support the Law Commission’s call for further study of internal administrative review systems within public bodies so the connection between administrative justice and those seeking natural justice in procurement disputes is better understood.\u0000judicial review, local government, public procurement, freedom of information, policy reform.","PeriodicalId":43955,"journal":{"name":"European Public Law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47022305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article is a contribution to the vital discussions about the rule of law in the EU, focusing on a specific and crucial element of the rule of law: judicial independence. Recently, the CJEU started to use Article 19 (1) of Treaty on European Union and Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as a basis for enforcing judicial independence in the Member States in cases which do not contain any explicit cross-border elements. This is how some provisions of the heavily criticized reform of the Polish judiciary have already been declared as contrary to EU law by the CJEU. However, it is not only Poland where judges face difficulties. The main subject of this article is a Hungarian case: a preliminary reference issued by a Hungarian judge questioning his own independence. Judicial independence is not primarily threatened by explicit legal provisions but by the fact that the former head of the judiciary administration regularly misused her competence to invalidate judicial applications over several years. This article analyses the Hungarian preliminary reference and its chances in light of the CJEU’s recent, respective case law, especially the preliminary ruling concerning the Polish National Council of the Judiciary, the KRS (Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa) and the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court (joined cases C 585/18, C 624/18 and C 625/18). Hungary, Poland, European Court of Justice, Article 19 (1) TEU, Article 47 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, judicial independence, judicial councils, disciplinary chamber, right to an effective remedy, preliminary reference, infringement procedure, rule of law, C-564/19, joined cases C 585/18, C 624/18 and C 625/18
本文对有关欧盟法治的重要讨论做出了贡献，重点关注法治的一个具体而关键的因素:司法独立。最近，欧洲法院开始使用《欧洲联盟条约》第19(1)条和《欧盟基本权利宪章》第47条作为基础，在不包含任何明确跨境因素的案件中，在成员国执行司法独立。这就是为什么受到严厉批评的波兰司法改革的一些条款已经被欧洲法院宣布为违反欧盟法律。然而，法官面临困难的不仅仅是波兰。本文的主题是匈牙利的一个案件:一名匈牙利法官对其独立性提出质疑。司法独立主要不是受到明确的法律规定的威胁，而是受到司法行政部门前负责人几年来经常滥用职权使司法申请无效的事实的威胁。本文根据欧洲法院最近各自的判例法，特别是关于波兰国家司法委员会、波兰最高法院(Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa)和最高法院纪律分庭(合并案例C 585/18、C 624/18和C 625/18)的初步裁决，分析了匈牙利的初步参考及其机会。匈牙利、波兰、欧洲法院、第19(1)条TEU、欧盟基本权利宪章第47条、司法独立、司法委员会、纪律分庭、获得有效补救的权利、初步参考、侵权程序、法治、C-564/19、合并案例C 585/18、C 624/18和C 625/18
{"title":"Judges Sitting on the Warsaw-Budapest Express Train: The Independence of Polish and Hungarian Judges Before the CJEU","authors":"B. Bakó","doi":"10.54648/euro2020057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/euro2020057","url":null,"abstract":"This article is a contribution to the vital discussions about the rule of law in the EU, focusing on a specific and crucial element of the rule of law: judicial independence. Recently, the CJEU started to use Article 19 (1) of Treaty on European Union and Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as a basis for enforcing judicial independence in the Member States in cases which do not contain any explicit cross-border elements. This is how some provisions of the heavily criticized reform of the Polish judiciary have already been declared as contrary to EU law by the CJEU. However, it is not only Poland where judges face difficulties. The main subject of this article is a Hungarian case: a preliminary reference issued by a Hungarian judge questioning his own independence. Judicial independence is not primarily threatened by explicit legal provisions but by the fact that the former head of the judiciary administration regularly misused her competence to invalidate judicial applications over several years. This article analyses the Hungarian preliminary reference and its chances in light of the CJEU’s recent, respective case law, especially the preliminary ruling concerning the Polish National Council of the Judiciary, the KRS (Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa) and the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court (joined cases C 585/18, C 624/18 and C 625/18).\u0000Hungary, Poland, European Court of Justice, Article 19 (1) TEU, Article 47 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, judicial independence, judicial councils, disciplinary chamber, right to an effective remedy, preliminary reference, infringement procedure, rule of law, C-564/19, joined cases C 585/18, C 624/18 and C 625/18","PeriodicalId":43955,"journal":{"name":"European Public Law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44667258","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Belgian Constitutional law, Minority Cabinet, Relation Parliament/Government, (Constructive) Motion of (no) confidence, Formalism
比利时宪法，少数党内阁，议会/政府关系，(建设性)不信任动议，形式主义
{"title":"Minority Government: A Challenge for Belgian Constitutional Law","authors":"K. Lemmens","doi":"10.54648/euro2020067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/euro2020067","url":null,"abstract":"Belgian Constitutional law, Minority Cabinet, Relation Parliament/Government, (Constructive) Motion of (no) confidence, Formalism","PeriodicalId":43955,"journal":{"name":"European Public Law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46281924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since the European Court of Human Rights (Court/ECtHR) began to define an autonomous concept of penalty, its case law has been developing on the basis of the Engel criteria. This study aims to reveal the implementation of these criteria by the ECtHR and its consequences under the case law. Although the definition of penalty depends on the application of these criteria, the existence of a problem of consistency among them draws attention. As a matter of fact, one of the criteria, the nature of the sanction has undertaken a function to expand the Court’s ratione materiae through an objective assessment. However, the other Engel criteria, nature of the offence and degree of severity of the sanction are open to criticism in terms of objectivity, as well as narrowing the limits of the concept of penalty and consequently restricting the Court’s ratione materiae. concept of penalty, criminal offence, European Court of Human Rights, Engel criteria, nature of sanction, nature of offence
{"title":"Redefining the Concept of Penalty in the Case-law of the European Court of Human Rights","authors":"Barış Bahçeci","doi":"10.54648/euro2020069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/euro2020069","url":null,"abstract":"Since the European Court of Human Rights (Court/ECtHR) began to define an autonomous concept of penalty, its case law has been developing on the basis of the Engel criteria. This study aims to reveal the implementation of these criteria by the ECtHR and its consequences under the case law. Although the definition of penalty depends on the application of these criteria, the existence of a problem of consistency among them draws attention. As a matter of fact, one of the criteria, the nature of the sanction has undertaken a function to expand the Court’s ratione materiae through an objective assessment. However, the other Engel criteria, nature of the offence and degree of severity of the sanction are open to criticism in terms of objectivity, as well as narrowing the limits of the concept of penalty and consequently restricting the Court’s ratione materiae.\u0000concept of penalty, criminal offence, European Court of Human Rights, Engel criteria, nature of sanction, nature of offence","PeriodicalId":43955,"journal":{"name":"European Public Law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42460686","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Prisoner Complaints Mechanisms: Assessing Human Rights Requirements and the Role of a General Ombudsman","authors":"Sophie van der Valk, M. Rogan","doi":"10.54648/euro2020066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/euro2020066","url":null,"abstract":"prison complaints mechanisms, grievance procedures, Mandela Rules, European Prison Rules, Ombuds institutions, prisons, human rights, administrative justice, Ireland, effective remedise","PeriodicalId":43955,"journal":{"name":"European Public Law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45558891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article explores the relationship between constitutionalism and populism with particular attention paid to the Italian case. This piece is divided into two parts. In Part I it will be argued that the relationship between populism and constitutionalism should not be seen in terms of mutual exclusion and perfect opposition. Indeed, it is possible to say that populism frequently relies on concepts and categories belonging to the language of constitutionalism (majority, democracy, people), trying to reshape them and offering in this way a sort of constitutional counter-narrative. In this sense, the populist approach to constitutional categories can be described in light of two concepts: mimetism and parasitism. In Part II, I shall focus on the referendum, which is an instrument frequently used by populists and currently object of a problematic constitutional reform proposal advanced by the MoVimento 5 Stelle. As we will see this reform risks affecting the constitutional balance between powers in Italy. Populism, mimetism, parasitism, post – WWII constitutionalism, referendum
{"title":"Between Mimetism and Parasitism: Italian Populism in a Comparative Perspective","authors":"Giuseppe Martinico","doi":"10.54648/euro2020071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/euro2020071","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores the relationship between constitutionalism and populism with particular attention paid to the Italian case. This piece is divided into two parts. In Part I it will be argued that the relationship between populism and constitutionalism should not be seen in terms of mutual exclusion and perfect opposition. Indeed, it is possible to say that populism frequently relies on concepts and categories belonging to the language of constitutionalism (majority, democracy, people), trying to reshape them and offering in this way a sort of constitutional counter-narrative. In this sense, the populist approach to constitutional categories can be described in light of two concepts: mimetism and parasitism. In Part II, I shall focus on the referendum, which is an instrument frequently used by populists and currently object of a problematic constitutional reform proposal advanced by the MoVimento 5 Stelle. As we will see this reform risks affecting the constitutional balance between powers in Italy.\u0000Populism, mimetism, parasitism, post – WWII constitutionalism, referendum","PeriodicalId":43955,"journal":{"name":"European Public Law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48006155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
public administration, databases, digitalization, data storage, outsourcing, internalization, digital sovereignty
公共行政、数据库、数字化、数据存储、外包、内部化、数字主权
{"title":"Data Storage by Public Administrations","authors":"G. Carullo, C. Ernst","doi":"10.54648/euro2020055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/euro2020055","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000public administration, databases, digitalization, data storage, outsourcing, internalization, digital sovereignty","PeriodicalId":43955,"journal":{"name":"European Public Law","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41685827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The principle of proportionality is a general principle of EU law which applies to the European Central Bank (ECB) in the fields both of monetary policy and banking supervision. In recent years, the issue of the proportionality of the ECB’s action has been at the centre of extensive debate in European legal doctrine and jurisprudence. This article aims to contribute to this debate by providing a comprehensive analysis of the meaning and implications of the principle of proportionality in the field of banking supervision and monetary policy. The article is divided into four parts. Parts I gives a general overview of the origin of the principle and its subsequent developments in light of the case-law of the European Court of Justice. It also reflects on the different meanings of proportionality as a flexible and multi-faceted principle. Part II investigates the principle of proportionality according to an ex ante perspective, i.e. as a principle capable of governing and orienting legislative and administrative action. Under this perspective, the article analyses the way proportionality impacts banking regulation, banking supervision and monetary policy. Part III deals with the ex post perspective, i.e. the way proportionality is assessed and scrutinized by EU courts. Part IV concludes. Part III and IV will be published in the next issue. National courts, Court of Justice of the European Union, Preliminary reference procedure, national procedural autonomy, Appeals, Appellate courts
{"title":"The Principle of Proportionality and the European Central Bank","authors":"M. P. Chiti, M. Macchia, Andrea Magliari","doi":"10.54648/euro2020059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/euro2020059","url":null,"abstract":"The principle of proportionality is a general principle of EU law which applies to the European Central Bank (ECB) in the fields both of monetary policy and banking supervision. In recent years, the issue of the proportionality of the ECB’s action has been at the centre of extensive debate in European legal doctrine and jurisprudence. This article aims to contribute to this debate by providing a comprehensive analysis of the meaning and implications of the principle of proportionality in the field of banking supervision and monetary policy.\u0000The article is divided into four parts. Parts I gives a general overview of the origin of the principle and its subsequent developments in light of the case-law of the European Court of Justice. It also reflects on the different meanings of proportionality as a flexible and multi-faceted principle. Part II investigates the principle of proportionality according to an ex ante perspective, i.e. as a principle capable of governing and orienting legislative and administrative action. Under this perspective, the article analyses the way proportionality impacts banking regulation, banking supervision and monetary policy.\u0000Part III deals with the ex post perspective, i.e. the way proportionality is assessed and scrutinized by EU courts. Part IV concludes. Part III and IV will be published in the next issue.\u0000National courts, Court of Justice of the European Union, Preliminary reference procedure, national procedural autonomy, Appeals, Appellate courts","PeriodicalId":43955,"journal":{"name":"European Public Law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45046302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the Italian legal system, the transposition of Directive 2014/104/EU into Legislative Decree No. 3 of 2017, with a view to improving the efficacy of both ‘follow-on’ and ‘stand-alone’ legal actions in private and public antitrust enforcement, has highlighted the problem of the judicial review of National Competition Authority (NCA) decisions. The Directive established its own ‘binding effect’ designed by the European Union order to increase the effectiveness and procedural efficiency of actions for damages in the Member States. According to the logic of the European Union, the binding effect seeks to ensure that an infringement of competition law, established by a final decision of the NCA or a court of judicial review, is deemed to be irrefutably acknowledged for the purpose of bringing an action for damages before the national courts under Article 101 or 102 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) or under national competition law. However, in terms of accomplishing this objective, the prevision introduced into Italian law by Article 9(1) of the Directive becomes problematic when set against the current system of judicial review of NCA decisions in Italy, potentially undermining the effectiveness of the legal protection of the individual. The focus of the article is that the Italian system does not – in its current form – allow adequate judicial review of NCA decisions. Taking the interpretation of Articles 6(1) European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and 24 of the Italian Constitution as fundamental norms establishing the ‘right to a fair trial’ and the ‘right to a defence’ as its starting point, the article seeks to offer a solution to the problem arising in relation to full judicial review of NCA decisions within the Italian legal context based on the thesis that if there is no full revision of the facts and no full revision of the discretionary powers there can be no full judicial review. EU Damages Directive, Private and public antitrust enforcement systems, The binding effect of the NCA’s decisions, Administrative and technical discretion, Judicial review of the NCA’s fact findings and technical assessments; European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law, Articles 6(1) ECHR and 24 of the Italian Constitution, Intensity of review in Italy, Full jurisdiction of the Italian administrative courts
{"title":"Judicial Review of the NCA’s Decisions: Some Problematic Aspects of the EU Damages Directive in the Context of Italian Law","authors":"Donato Vese","doi":"10.54648/euro2020073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/euro2020073","url":null,"abstract":"In the Italian legal system, the transposition of Directive 2014/104/EU into Legislative Decree No. 3 of 2017, with a view to improving the efficacy of both ‘follow-on’ and ‘stand-alone’ legal actions in private and public antitrust enforcement, has highlighted the problem of the judicial review of National Competition Authority (NCA) decisions. The Directive established its own ‘binding effect’ designed by the European Union order to increase the effectiveness and procedural efficiency of actions for damages in the Member States. According to the logic of the European Union, the binding effect seeks to ensure that an infringement of competition law, established by a final decision of the NCA or a court of judicial review, is deemed to be irrefutably acknowledged for the purpose of bringing an action for damages before the national courts under Article 101 or 102 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) or under national competition law. However, in terms of accomplishing this objective, the prevision introduced into Italian law by Article 9(1) of the Directive becomes problematic when set against the current system of judicial review of NCA decisions in Italy, potentially undermining the effectiveness of the legal protection of the individual. The focus of the article is that the Italian system does not – in its current form – allow adequate judicial review of NCA decisions. Taking the interpretation of Articles 6(1) European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and 24 of the Italian Constitution as fundamental norms establishing the ‘right to a fair trial’ and the ‘right to a defence’ as its starting point, the article seeks to offer a solution to the problem arising in relation to full judicial review of NCA decisions within the Italian legal context based on the thesis that if there is no full revision of the facts and no full revision of the discretionary powers there can be no full judicial review.\u0000EU Damages Directive, Private and public antitrust enforcement systems, The binding effect of the NCA’s decisions, Administrative and technical discretion, Judicial review of the NCA’s fact findings and technical assessments; European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law, Articles 6(1) ECHR and 24 of the Italian Constitution, Intensity of review in Italy, Full jurisdiction of the Italian administrative courts","PeriodicalId":43955,"journal":{"name":"European Public Law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47386695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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