Pub Date : 2023-01-30eCollection Date: 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1017/awf.2023.6
Julie Fn Potier, Vanessa Louzier
Hippotherapy has been used for decades and its benefits to human patients have largely been proven, whether being applied to those with physical or mental disabilities. There have been a plethora of animal welfare studies recently, pertaining especially to ridden horses. This study aimed to investigate stress markers in horses during hippotherapy sessions to address the ethical considerations raised by using horses for therapy. A ridden stress ethogram was established and validated specifically for this study via subjective observation and video recording of a ridden session involving intermediate-level riders. The experiment entailed eight healthy horses undergoing two ridden sessions on separate days, one with disabled riders and one with beginners. Several parameters associated with physiological responses to stress were evaluated at rest, such as heart rate, plasma adrenocorticotropic hormone [ACTH], serum and salivary cortisol. These parameters as well as the behavioural stress score from the ethogram scale were measured during both sessions. No significant differences were found between heart rate, plasma ACTH, and stress scores. Serum and salivary cortisol were significantly lower during the hippotherapy session than during the session with beginners. The current study found no evidence of compromised welfare when horses were used as a therapeutic aid during hippotherapy sessions compared to their usual ridden activity. Although these results indicate that hippotherapy may be ethically justified as it benefits humans without causing harm to the horses, the present study was small, and the results should be interpreted with caution.
{"title":"Evaluation of stress markers in horses during hippotherapy sessions in comparison to being ridden by beginners.","authors":"Julie Fn Potier, Vanessa Louzier","doi":"10.1017/awf.2023.6","DOIUrl":"10.1017/awf.2023.6","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Hippotherapy has been used for decades and its benefits to human patients have largely been proven, whether being applied to those with physical or mental disabilities. There have been a plethora of animal welfare studies recently, pertaining especially to ridden horses. This study aimed to investigate stress markers in horses during hippotherapy sessions to address the ethical considerations raised by using horses for therapy. A ridden stress ethogram was established and validated specifically for this study via subjective observation and video recording of a ridden session involving intermediate-level riders. The experiment entailed eight healthy horses undergoing two ridden sessions on separate days, one with disabled riders and one with beginners. Several parameters associated with physiological responses to stress were evaluated at rest, such as heart rate, plasma adrenocorticotropic hormone [ACTH], serum and salivary cortisol. These parameters as well as the behavioural stress score from the ethogram scale were measured during both sessions. No significant differences were found between heart rate, plasma ACTH, and stress scores. Serum and salivary cortisol were significantly lower during the hippotherapy session than during the session with beginners. The current study found no evidence of compromised welfare when horses were used as a therapeutic aid during hippotherapy sessions compared to their usual ridden activity. Although these results indicate that hippotherapy may be ethically justified as it benefits humans without causing harm to the horses, the present study was small, and the results should be interpreted with caution.</p>","PeriodicalId":44287,"journal":{"name":"Legal Theory","volume":"10 1","pages":"e10"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10936384/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78866824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-01DOI: 10.1017/S1352325222000180
L. Eggert
ABSTRACT This paper examines what prevents us from legally enforcing the moral imperative of protecting human rights during military operations carried out for distinctly humanitarian purposes. The answer, I argue, lies not in familiar objections to bringing the law into greater congruence with morality, but in international law's indeterminacy regarding the use of force. Preserving stability within the nascent international legal system comes at the cost of a law that eschews the protection of individual rights even in cases in which the protection of human rights is what justifies military action. The tension between state sovereignty and the protection of human rights thus not only generates well-known controversies about the lawfulness of military intervention. It also prevents us from devising laws to protect human rights during wars whose very purpose it is to stop human rights violations. Protecting human rights during humanitarian interventions may thus remain an undertaking as quixotic as it is morally urgent.
{"title":"LAW AND MORALITY IN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION","authors":"L. Eggert","doi":"10.1017/S1352325222000180","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325222000180","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper examines what prevents us from legally enforcing the moral imperative of protecting human rights during military operations carried out for distinctly humanitarian purposes. The answer, I argue, lies not in familiar objections to bringing the law into greater congruence with morality, but in international law's indeterminacy regarding the use of force. Preserving stability within the nascent international legal system comes at the cost of a law that eschews the protection of individual rights even in cases in which the protection of human rights is what justifies military action. The tension between state sovereignty and the protection of human rights thus not only generates well-known controversies about the lawfulness of military intervention. It also prevents us from devising laws to protect human rights during wars whose very purpose it is to stop human rights violations. Protecting human rights during humanitarian interventions may thus remain an undertaking as quixotic as it is morally urgent.","PeriodicalId":44287,"journal":{"name":"Legal Theory","volume":"28 1","pages":"298 - 324"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45814257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-01DOI: 10.1017/S1352325222000192
Tarunabh Khaitan, S. Steel
ABSTRACT This paper provides a taxonomy of the different kinds of theory that may be offered of an area of law. We distinguish two basic types of philosophical accounts in special jurisprudence: nonnormative accounts and normative accounts. Section II explains the two central subspecies of nonnormative accounts of areas of law: (i) conceptual and ontological theories and (ii) reason-tracking causal theories. Section III explores normative theories of areas of law. Normative accounts subdivide into detached and committed normative accounts. Detached or committed normative accounts can be subdivided further into the following cross-cutting categories: (i) pro tanto or all-things-considered, (ii) hyper-reformist or practice-dependent, (iii) taxonomical or substantive. Section IV shows that our taxonomy does not presume a prior commitment to any particular school in general jurisprudence. This paper clarifies methodological confusion that exists in theorizing about areas of law, and contributes to the subfield of thinking generally about special jurisprudence.
{"title":"THEORIZING AREAS OF LAW: A TAXONOMY OF SPECIAL JURISPRUDENCE","authors":"Tarunabh Khaitan, S. Steel","doi":"10.1017/S1352325222000192","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325222000192","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper provides a taxonomy of the different kinds of theory that may be offered of an area of law. We distinguish two basic types of philosophical accounts in special jurisprudence: nonnormative accounts and normative accounts. Section II explains the two central subspecies of nonnormative accounts of areas of law: (i) conceptual and ontological theories and (ii) reason-tracking causal theories. Section III explores normative theories of areas of law. Normative accounts subdivide into detached and committed normative accounts. Detached or committed normative accounts can be subdivided further into the following cross-cutting categories: (i) pro tanto or all-things-considered, (ii) hyper-reformist or practice-dependent, (iii) taxonomical or substantive. Section IV shows that our taxonomy does not presume a prior commitment to any particular school in general jurisprudence. This paper clarifies methodological confusion that exists in theorizing about areas of law, and contributes to the subfield of thinking generally about special jurisprudence.","PeriodicalId":44287,"journal":{"name":"Legal Theory","volume":"28 1","pages":"325 - 351"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47672684","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-05DOI: 10.1017/S1352325222000155
Conor Crummey
ABSTRACT According to contemporary nonpositivist theories, legal obligations are a subset of our genuine moral obligations. Debates within nonpositivism then turn on how we delimit the legal “domain” of morality. Recently, nonpositivist theories have come under criticism on two grounds. First, that they are underinclusive, because they cannot explain why paradigmatically “legal” obligations are such. Second, that they are overinclusive, because they count as “legal” certain moral obligations that are plainly nonlegal. This paper undertakes both a ground-clearing exercise for and a defense of nonpositivism. It argues, in particular, that Dworkin's claims about the legal domain of morality in his later work are often mischaracterized by critics, because these critics fail to read these claims in light of his earlier theory of “Law as Integrity.” A nonpositivist theory that unifies Dworkin's earlier and later work, I argue, deals with the criticisms leveled at nonpositivist theories better than other nonpositivist competitors.
{"title":"ONE-SYSTEM INTEGRITY AND THE LEGAL DOMAIN OF MORALITY","authors":"Conor Crummey","doi":"10.1017/S1352325222000155","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325222000155","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT According to contemporary nonpositivist theories, legal obligations are a subset of our genuine moral obligations. Debates within nonpositivism then turn on how we delimit the legal “domain” of morality. Recently, nonpositivist theories have come under criticism on two grounds. First, that they are underinclusive, because they cannot explain why paradigmatically “legal” obligations are such. Second, that they are overinclusive, because they count as “legal” certain moral obligations that are plainly nonlegal. This paper undertakes both a ground-clearing exercise for and a defense of nonpositivism. It argues, in particular, that Dworkin's claims about the legal domain of morality in his later work are often mischaracterized by critics, because these critics fail to read these claims in light of his earlier theory of “Law as Integrity.” A nonpositivist theory that unifies Dworkin's earlier and later work, I argue, deals with the criticisms leveled at nonpositivist theories better than other nonpositivist competitors.","PeriodicalId":44287,"journal":{"name":"Legal Theory","volume":"28 1","pages":"269 - 297"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49526314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-01DOI: 10.1017/S1352325222000131
D. Plunkett, Daniel Wodak
ABSTRACT Take “legal reality” to be the part of reality that actual legal thought and talk is distinctively about, such as legal institutions, legal obligations, and legal norms. Our goal is to explore whether legal reality is disunified. To illustrate the issue, consider the possibility that an important metaphysical thesis such as positivism is true of one part of legal reality (legal institutions), but not another (legal norms). We offer two arguments that suggest that legal reality is disunified: one concerns the heterogeneity of different entities that are part of legal reality; the other concerns variation within legal thought and talk. We then show that taking the possibility of the disunity of legal reality seriously has important upshots for how we think about the positivist and antipositivist traditions, the debate between them, and their relation to other parts of legal theory, such as critical legal theory and legal realism.
{"title":"THE DISUNITY OF LEGAL REALITY","authors":"D. Plunkett, Daniel Wodak","doi":"10.1017/S1352325222000131","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325222000131","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Take “legal reality” to be the part of reality that actual legal thought and talk is distinctively about, such as legal institutions, legal obligations, and legal norms. Our goal is to explore whether legal reality is disunified. To illustrate the issue, consider the possibility that an important metaphysical thesis such as positivism is true of one part of legal reality (legal institutions), but not another (legal norms). We offer two arguments that suggest that legal reality is disunified: one concerns the heterogeneity of different entities that are part of legal reality; the other concerns variation within legal thought and talk. We then show that taking the possibility of the disunity of legal reality seriously has important upshots for how we think about the positivist and antipositivist traditions, the debate between them, and their relation to other parts of legal theory, such as critical legal theory and legal realism.","PeriodicalId":44287,"journal":{"name":"Legal Theory","volume":"28 1","pages":"235 - 267"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48994221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-23DOI: 10.1017/S1352325222000143
Hrafn Asgeirsson
ABSTRACT The following two theses seem both plausible and consistent: in cases where it is indeterminate whether the relevant legal language applies to the relevant set of facts, officials are not bound to decide the case one way rather than the other, but may reason either way; all reasons for action are—in some relevant sense—knowable. In this paper, I point out what I take to be a robust but unacknowledged tension between these two claims. The tension requires some careful teasing out, but the basic idea is that given certain further plausible assumptions concerning law, language, and normativity, the two claims turn out to be inconsistent. In addition to examining the sources of the tension in some detail, I also address several possible objections to my argument and discuss which of the many theses should be rejected.
{"title":"A PUZZLE ABOUT VAGUENESS, REASONS, AND JUDICIAL DISCRETION","authors":"Hrafn Asgeirsson","doi":"10.1017/S1352325222000143","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325222000143","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The following two theses seem both plausible and consistent: in cases where it is indeterminate whether the relevant legal language applies to the relevant set of facts, officials are not bound to decide the case one way rather than the other, but may reason either way; all reasons for action are—in some relevant sense—knowable. In this paper, I point out what I take to be a robust but unacknowledged tension between these two claims. The tension requires some careful teasing out, but the basic idea is that given certain further plausible assumptions concerning law, language, and normativity, the two claims turn out to be inconsistent. In addition to examining the sources of the tension in some detail, I also address several possible objections to my argument and discuss which of the many theses should be rejected.","PeriodicalId":44287,"journal":{"name":"Legal Theory","volume":"28 1","pages":"210 - 234"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48642615","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-26DOI: 10.1017/S135232522200012X
R. Allen, Christopher Smiciklas
ABSTRACT A vast literature has developed probing the law's aversion to statistical/probability evidence in general and its rejection of naked statistical evidence in particular. This literature rests on false premises. At least so far as US law is concerned, there is no general aversion to statistical forms of proof and even naked statistics are admissible and sufficient for a verdict when the evidentiary proffer meets the normal standards of admissibility, the most important of which is reliability. The belief to the contrary rests upon a series of mistakes: most importantly, mismodeling of the structure of legal systems and the nature of common law decision making. Contributing to these mistakes is the common methodology in this literature of relying on weird hypotheticals that mismodel the underlying legal relations and contain impossible epistemological demands. Collectively, these phenomena have distracted attention from issues that actually affect real legal systems.
{"title":"THE LAW'S AVERSION TO NAKED STATISTICS AND OTHER MISTAKES","authors":"R. Allen, Christopher Smiciklas","doi":"10.1017/S135232522200012X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S135232522200012X","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT A vast literature has developed probing the law's aversion to statistical/probability evidence in general and its rejection of naked statistical evidence in particular. This literature rests on false premises. At least so far as US law is concerned, there is no general aversion to statistical forms of proof and even naked statistics are admissible and sufficient for a verdict when the evidentiary proffer meets the normal standards of admissibility, the most important of which is reliability. The belief to the contrary rests upon a series of mistakes: most importantly, mismodeling of the structure of legal systems and the nature of common law decision making. Contributing to these mistakes is the common methodology in this literature of relying on weird hypotheticals that mismodel the underlying legal relations and contain impossible epistemological demands. Collectively, these phenomena have distracted attention from issues that actually affect real legal systems.","PeriodicalId":44287,"journal":{"name":"Legal Theory","volume":"28 1","pages":"179 - 209"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47878659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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